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For nearly 35 years I have been closely involved in information secu-
rity and the development and implementation of supporting policies, 
standards, and procedures. This has often been an overlooked and 
undersupported portion of implementing an effective information 
security program. What was missing in the early years was an author-
itative examination of the processes needed to manage the implemen-
tation of such a program from executive row to entry-level personnel.
Todd Fitzgerald’s new book, Information Security Governance 
Simplified: From the Boardroom to the Keyboard, presents 15 chapters of 
advice and real-world experience on how to handle the roll out of an 
effective program.
Corporate governance addresses the foundation upon which an 
organization will build its information security program. The founda-
tion of a successful information security program begins with strong 
upper-level management support. This support establishes a focus on 
security within the highest levels of the organization. Without a solid 
foundation (i.e., proactive support of those persons in positions that 
control information technology [IT] resources), the effectiveness of 
the security program can fail when pressured by politics and budget 
limitations. Chapter 2, “Developing Information Security Strategy,” 
provides insight into what is needed to establish the foundation upon 
which a security program can be built.
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Any information security program must get its direction from 
executive management. The requirements of today’s laws and regu-
lations have identified either the organization’s board of directors 
or an executive management steering committee as responsible for 
instituting an effective program. To be effective, the typical security 
professional will need to learn how to interact with the “C-suite” of 
executives. Chapter 4 addresses this key issue and provides valuable 
tips on how to sell the program to management.
The responsibilities for each group of management and employees 
must be established. Typically the roles and responsibilities are estab-
lished in mission statement, and Chapter 3, “Defining the Security 
Management Organization,” will give the reader the tools needed to 
establish a workable information security charter. Once this is estab-
lished, the need to establish the formal job descriptions will help com-
plete the security organization’s infrastructure.
An effective security program needs practical security policies and 
procedures backed by the authority necessary to enforce compliance. 
Practical security policies and procedures are defined as those that 
are attainable and provide meaningful security through appropriate 
controls. The ability to determine the effectiveness of the security 
program is not easily obtainable if there are no procedures in place. 
Chapter 6, “Creating Effective Information Security Policies,” will 
provide the keys to success in this endeavor.
Developing and establishing an effective security program requires 
the ability to capture and provide meaningful information on pro-
gram effectiveness. To provide meaningful data, quantifiable security 
metrics must be based on IT security performance goals and objec-
tives, and be easily obtainable and feasible to measure. They must also 
be repeatable, provide relevant performance trends over time, and be 
useful for tracking performance and directing resources. Chapter 7, 
“Security Compliance Using Control Frameworks,” addresses some 
of these elements.
The security program itself must emphasize consistent periodic 
analysis of the program. The results of this analysis are used to apply 
lessons learned, improve the effectiveness of existing security controls, 
and plan future controls to meet new security requirements as they 
occur. Accurate data collection must be a priority with stakeholders 
and users if the collected data is to be meaningful to the management 
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and improvement of the overall security program. The chapter to 
really look forward to is Chapter 11, “The Auditors Have Arrived, 
Now What?”
Todd has taken the time to include for the reader some practi-
cal security considerations for managerial, technical, and operational 
controls. This is followed up with a discussion on how legal issues are 
impacting the information security program.
I have known Todd for a number of years, and I asked his peers 
and colleagues to give their impressions of him and as a consen-
sus we came up with the following: Todd is outgoing, ambitious, 
social, appears to love what he does, and is very passionate about 
helping those he works with. He seems to especially enjoy doing 
training activities for information security topics, in particular how 
they relate to Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA). One more adjective for Todd would be enthusiastic; he 
uses more exclamation points in his writing than any other person 
I know!
Finally, Todd provides some thought-provoking insights in the final 
chapter, “17 Ways to Dismantle Information Security Governance 
Efforts.” I know I’ve been guilty of at least a couple of them. The only 
thing more enjoyable than reading Todd’s book on information secu-
rity governance simplified would be to be part of one of his sessions 





One of the secrets of speakers at security conferences is that we 
learn much from the process of preparing the material and from the 
individuals who chose to attend the session. This book represents 
the culmination of the interaction of many conference attendees from 
San Francisco to Vienna, sharing their knowledge, as well as from my 
own experience in leading or advising information security program 
development for several companies. I am forever grateful to all those 
who speak up during the sessions with their ideas, whether in agree-
ment or not with what I may be selling. I want to thank Madeline Parisi, 
Robert Richardson, Jean Hey, David Lynas, and Marci McCarthy 
from Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), 
Computer Security Institute (CSI), Management Information Systems 
Training Institute (MISTI), Computer Security Audit and Control 
(COSAC) Symposium, and Information Security Executive (ISE)/
Tech Exec Networks (T.E.N.), respectively, for providing me with the 
opportunity to share ideas through speaking engagements at interna-
tional and national conferences over the past decade. It has provided 
me with the opportunity to meet so many wonderful people with dif-
ferent perspectives from different places.
Thanks to Tom Peltier for his relentless contribution for advanc-
ing the information security field to the profession it is today and for 
graciously writing the foreword to this book.
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end afternoon writing (I do have a day job!). Thanks for the positive 
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He that would govern others, first should be the master of himself.
Phillip Massinger, 1583–1640
Information security as a technical practice has been around long 
enough that some individuals have retired from an entire career 
focused on information security. As a career path with multiple dis-
ciplines as part of a profession, information security has only gained 
real traction over the past 10 to 15 years. In fact, many of the laws, 
regulations, standards, and control frameworks driving how informa-
tion security controls are implemented have been promulgated in the 
new millennium.
Security incidents have prompted companies to implement con-
trols in a reactive nature, without the benefit of a planned governance 
framework to guide the security investments. New laws have man-
dated compliance dates where organizations work steadfastly toward 
the dates by placing a check in the completed box to demonstrate 
compliance. Security activities are occurring as threats exploit vul-
nerabilities within organizations and require attention to information 
security governance (doing the right thing) and information secu-
rity management (doing things right). The following are key actions 
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that need to be addressed to provide effective information security 
governance to protect the information assets:
• Align the security program with business needs
• Develop an information security strategy
• Create the information security management structure
• Communicate effectively with the CEOs (chief executive 
officers), CIOs (chief information officers), and CFOs (chief 
financial officers)
• Determine and manage acceptable risk
• Create security policies with organizational participation
• Select a governing control or standards framework
• Select the appropriate, risk-based controls that align to the 
laws and frameworks
• Prepare for and leverage internal and external audits to 
enhance processes
• Create a security-aware culture
• Understand the existing and emerging laws and regulations 
impacting the organization
• Learn from the security incidents of others
• Recognize pitfalls to information security governance
The body of knowledge for information security is extensive, includ-
ing the managerial, operational, and technical issues represented 
by the various control requirements. So how does an organization 
effectively manage the information security practices to ensure com-
pliance with the laws, increase the predictability of business processes, 
establish a structure to optimize the use of security resources, provide 
a process for effective risk management, and ensure that the appro-
priate organizational stakeholders are sufficiently involved? There is 
no silver bullet, however, the information security governance guid-
ance provided in this book provides insights as to what actions will 
increase the certainty that the information security program will be 
effective and reduce the likelihood that internal and external threats 
will damage the information security program.
The information security officer role has been emerging and was 
initially viewed primarily as a technical role. However, today the 
function must combine leadership, managerial, and technical abili-
ties, with the emphasis on the leadership and managerial abilities to 
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provide the critical policy and business guidance to support the enter-
prise. This book provides guidance to build an information security 
program that incorporates the policies, standards, communications, 
relationships, organizational structures, and controls necessary to be 
effective not just for this week or this month, but as part of a long-
term information security strategy addressing the appropriate laws 
and business operations.
This book is written for
• Information security officers (including chief information secu-
rity officers, directors, and managers of information security)
• Technical information security professionals
• Internal and external auditors
• Risk managers
• Board of directors
• Information technology (IT) leadership/steering committees
• CEOs, CFOs, CIOs
• Technical specialists
• Compliance officers, privacy officers
• Legal staff, general counsel
• Executive/senior/middle/first-line management
• End users
Chapters 1 to 4 lay the information security governance foundation 
by focusing on getting the right strategy, security management orga-
nization, and relationships with the executives and middle manage-
ment in place. Chapters 5 and 6 begin with insights on risk management 
and ensuring the appropriate security policies, standards, guide-
lines, and procedures are developed to enable the organization to 
formalize management’s intent for the specific controls addressed in 
Chapters 7 through 10. Chapter 7 provides discussion of the vari-
ous control frameworks and standards, with Chapters 8 through 10 
providing practical security considerations for implementation of the 
controls. Chapter 11 discusses how to prepare for and leverage exter-
nal audits, followed by Chapter 12 that provides insight to the “soft 
skills” and security awareness communication skills needed to deliver 
the security message effectively. Chapters 13 and 14 provide a survey 
of some of the current laws impacting information security as well as 
recent incidents of others, which can provide lessons learned for our 
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organizations. And finally, Chapter 15 provides 17 ways to dismantle 
the efforts that have been set forth in the previous 14 chapters, as well 
as some final thoughts.
The chapters are structured in a way that this book may also be 
used as a textbook for a semester course. Each of the 15 chapters 
can be used as the basis for discussion of the different key topics 
that make up the foundation of a great information security gover-
nance program.
This book shares insights about what works and what does not 
work when building the information security program to protect a 
company’s information assets. The chapters that follow are based upon 
practical experience versus a theoretical concept pulled from a docu-
mented framework. As you read these chapters, ask yourself, “How 
would this work in my organization?” or “What do we have in place to 
mitigate that issue?” Your experience and resulting solutions may be 
very similar or vastly different depending upon the company culture 
and constraints. The important point is that the questions raised in 
these chapters are asked and action plans to address how the organi-
zation should manage information security are consciously decided.
I hope that you will enjoy reading this book as much as I enjoyed 
writing it. If, as you are reading through this book, you have some 
“aha, that’s a great idea” moments, or “yes, we are doing that too,” or 
it spurs some new thought altogether that helps you, then I am glad 
to have helped make a difference.
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Our chief want in life is somebody who shall make us do what we can.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1803–1882
The Rocky Mountains are an amazing display of nature that stretch 
across the western states. The mountains have been viewed many times 
in travels to the West Coast, but the real beauty of the mountain tops 
and the depths of the canyons can be appreciated best by taking a long 
train ride from Chicago to San Francisco. It becomes clear that the 
majestic tops of the mountain cannot exist without the canyons down 
below; rocks of all sizes grace the mountain, with little rocks some-
times holding up the big rocks, and sometimes vice versa; vegetation 
is sometimes very sparse, yet it seems to have a role there; and finally, 
as strong as the mountains are, man has sometimes blasted their way 
through, with tunnels like the Moffat Tunnel, which is 6.2 miles long 
and cut the distance between Denver and the Pacific Coast by 176 miles 
in 1928.
We like to think of our organizations as solid fortresses built on 
solid rock foundations that cannot be blasted through. We like to 
believe that all of the little rocks at the bottom in our organizations 
are being led to a greater vision by the top, massive rocks that often sit 
at the top of the mountain. We like to believe that our organizations 
are strong enough to endure any headwinds or storms that will come 
our way. We want to believe that what may have taken many years to 
build will endure and fend off competitors. Yes, we want to believe we 
have built a solid foundation just like those shown in Figure 1.1. As 
we all know, large rocks once at the top of the organization sometimes 
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crumble, or are subject to attacks by avalanches, acting as external 
forces that serve to threaten the stability of the organization.
What does this have to do with information security? Plenty and the 
answer is twofold. First, without building within the organization an 
adequate security foundation that can withstand external and internal 
threats from the environment, our organizations will become reaction-
ary to protect the information assets. Second, the security organization 
must be adopted within the context of a larger whole—involving the 
board of directors, senior management, middle management, front-
line supervisors, and the end user in order to have sustained success 
over time. Engaging individuals in a constructive security commit-
ment to the organization does not happen by accident but rather must 
be intentional. Individuals must know what their responsibilities are at 
all levels to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
assets. We call this knowledge information security governance.
Information Security Governance
Governance comes from the Latin origins to define “steering” or to 
“have power over.” Information security governance defines the roles 
Figure 1.1 Building a security rock foundation.
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and expectations of the management levels and nonmanagement 
levels alike so that each party understands what it is responsible for. 
Without taking the time to define these expectations, organizations 
will still operate with a set of practices, but they may not achieve the 
desired result. Failure to define a set of security policies leads indi-
viduals to make up their own rules and methods of operating, which 
may not be in the best interest to the organization. Information secu-
rity governance grants the power to the appropriate individuals to 
carry out the security mission.
Performance expectations in the form of qualitative and quantita-
tive metrics should be set to ensure that the security program is being 
fulfilled. For example, if it is expected that everyone in the organiza-
tion receive security awareness training, including the executives, then 
this information should be tracked and evaluated against a standard, 
just as market share, increases in revenue, and hitting cost targets are 
measured within the organization.
Undesirable outcomes are avoided with a strong information secu-
rity governance program. Since expectations of each management 
level are articulated and communicated according to their role, the 
likelihood is reduced that activities are not performed correctly. For 
example, if the organization sets a policy of shredding sensitive docu-
ments at the end of the day, and the vice president of the claims area 
decides to dedicate an employee to shred the many claims that need 
to be disposed of quickly, he or she may choose to hire an external 
contractor to come onsite to shred the documents. If the vice presi-
dent chooses this action, he or she then needs to make sure that this 
is permissible under the information security policy, even though 
intentions are consistent with the policy. There may be retention 
requirements or background policies for the contractor that could be 
violated. The decision-making process followed by the executive must 
follow the thought process for the information security program. In 
other words, can the executive make this decision on his or her own? 
Or does the executive need to obtain approval from the information 
security officer? If an external vendor is chosen, how does the execu-
tive ensure that the information will be properly protected in tran-
sit and destruction? Are there existing contracts in place? How will 
the documents be stored securely onsite until they can be shredded? 
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This example illustrates why it must be clear within the organization 
who has what authority and role with respect to information security. 
The individuals within the organization need to be able to perform 
their roles within the policies and procedures that have been agreed 
upon, as well as have the ability to recognize when an exception to a 
policy needs to be considered and then subsequently seek appropriate 
approval prior to implementation.
A security governance framework controls and coordinates the 
security activities within the company. For example, knowing that 
an end user department must have all access requests for its local 
applications processed by security administration increases the likeli-
hood that the appropriate segregation of duties principles are being 
enforced. It also indicates the organization’s desire to control all access 
through centralized management and not permit individual depart-
ments to set up their own administration activities, where the orga-
nization may have decided that there was a likelihood that the access 
approvals would be granted by someone who was also a user of the 
system having the access capability but not the proper management 
authority. The proper logging mechanisms of the request, approval, and 
granting of the access request may also not be in place in the end-user 
department. Just as the organization controls who enters individu-
als into payroll (human resources) and who approves salary increases 
(managers and the manager’s supervisor), it needs to establish clear 
control over the information security activities.
Information security governance also defines processes to control 
the activities. Standard operating procedures should include docu-
mented processes to carry out the security mission as well as indicat-
ing who has the authority to approve the processes.
The policies, processes, and decision rights for a specific area of 
responsibility must be maintained to provide consistent management 
of the enterprise. The IT Governance Institute’s (ITGI) definition 
of information security governance reads, “Information Security 
Governance is a subset of enterprise governance that provides strategic 
direction, ensures objectives are achieved, manages risk appropriately, 
uses organizational resources responsibly, and monitors the success or 
failure of the information security programme” (ITGI, n.d.).
5gettIng InFormAtIon seCurIty rIght
Tone at the Top
Why is it at a third-grade concert, you hear the squeaky flute or the 
strings on the violin that went astray? The entire saxophone section 
could be sounding in perfect harmony, but if one, and just one was 
playing with a bad reed, the efforts of the rest of the saxophone section 
will not even be heard or recognized for its good work. If we like to 
think of our organizations as orchestras, then the conductors leading 
the instruments of all types need to also ensure that they are contribut-
ing to excellence by walking the walk. People in companies are very 
smart and look for cues that the senior management is advocating and 
following the rules that it is expected to follow. If it is not, then associ-
ates at the lower organizational level in the company fail to see the cred-
ibility in the rule and feel that they can also bypass the security policy.
Tone at the Bottom
Some legislation, such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) final security rule mandated that all 
people within the organization receive security awareness train-
ing (DHHS, 2003). The senior executives were not exempt from 
attending the training. Subsequent audits could reveal that the senior 
management was not participating. In practice, when the senior man-
agement would attend security awareness training along with their 
staffs, it had the side effect of showing the staff, “Hey, this must be 
important.” The words and actions from senior management should 
not be under estimated in their impact. Alternatively, if a manager 
is discounting the need for a policy and decides not to follow it, he 
cannot expect others on his team to take the policy seriously. If, for 
example, he comes to work one day and forgets his physical ID access 
badge and asks a staff member to “ just let me in,” the manager should 
not be surprised when a staff member holds the door open for another 
person at another time.
Organizations have traditionally been managed with a hierarchical 
command and control structure, whereby the individuals at the top 
of the organization define the policies that must be adhered to by the 
rest of the organization. As long as management is demonstrating 
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consistent application of the rules and these rules make sense to them, 
these rules are likely to be followed. If the manager encourages the 
associate to cut corners to meet deadlines on a regular basis, this may 
carry over into the end users attitude toward sidestepping information 
security policies to meet their deadlines.
Nonmanagement associates tend to discuss what is going on in 
their departments and their leadership, and even if an individual’s own 
leader is a stickler for following the rules, failure to follow the rules by 
other department leaders can have a negative impact on the perfor-
mance of the individual, questioning why the other department does 
not have to follow the same security rules.
Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC)
A variety of laws and regulations have surfaced over the past decade in 
an attempt to strengthen the security of information stored within the 
companies to which the information assets are entrusted. As a result of 
the laws that have been enacted, various security control “standards” 
and “frameworks” have evolved and become popular means to meet the 
requirements of the laws. Since laws and regulations are intentionally 
developed at a higher “what needs to happen” level versus the “how to 
secure the information” level, the standards and control frameworks 
become valuable tools to ensure that security is planned, organized, 
implemented, tested, and monitored.
Governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) is a term that has been 
embraced primarily by the vendor community in recent years in rec-
ognition of the fact that companies are struggling with the plethora 
of controls which must be implemented to meet the extensive require-
ments of the laws and regulations. Governance is simply the struc-
ture, policies, and practices that are put in place by the organization to 
ensure that the controls are adequately communicated, carried out, and 
enforced by engaging direction and support at the appropriate organi-
zational level. Risk is the act of making informed decisions about the 
losses that the company is willing to accept given a breach of security 
and building the appropriate mitigating risk strategies to reduce the 
risk to acceptable levels defined by the business. Compliance is ensur-
ing that the controls are being adhered to on an ongoing basis, thereby 
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increasing the likelihood of a reduction of risk and increased adherence 
to the governance intended by the organization (Fitzgerald, 2008).
The three components of governance, risk, and compliance are nec-
essary for adequate security controls; however, implementing them does 
not ensure that a security program is adequate. Compliance is a neces-
sary control that has been recognized by governments for centuries. 
Criminal acts, by their very nature, are forms of noncompliance with 
the laws that are in place. Take driving a car for example. As a teenager 
obtains his or her driver’s license, the diligent parent warns about the 
downside of not following the laws, reckless driving, speeding, and 
paying attention to parking and vehicle regulations. The teenager says, 
“Sure Dad, no problem” and forgets 5 minutes later as they morph into 
their busy teenage social network of friends and peer pressure, away 
from the constant reminders of Mom and Dad. Teenagers do not real-
ize at the time the consequences of their actions. Or, maybe they do 
subconsciously, but it is not the most important thought in their daily 
“work life.” Time goes on, piling up speeding tickets, tickets for exces-
sive window tinting, unpaid parking tickets, and so on until one day 
they have the opportunity to pay their own car insurance! The parent at 
that point transfers the risk to the child, and then the learning of true 
cost of noncompliance begins. The risk is ultimately acknowledged and 
accepted, and new mitigating strategies are put in place, such as better 
driving. Organizations are made up of many busy “teenagers,” each of 
which are influenced by their peer work groups and need to be edu-
cated as to the future costs of noncompliance to the security controls. 
Adopting a control framework is a good start. However, compliance 
must be addressed as an ongoing, deliberate strategy.
The Compliance Dilemma
Answers.com provides a definition for compliance as “the act of com-
plying with a wish, request, or demand; acquiescence.” It further 
provides a definition that may resonate with how many companies 
feel about the plethora of government regulations: “a disposition or 
tendency to yield to the will of others.” Compliance with security 
regulations is no trivial task; in fact, in a survey conducted by the 
Security Compliance Council, as much as 34% of information tech-
nology resources were being consumed to demonstrate compliance 
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(Hurley, 2006). These are valuable, technical resources that could be 
deployed to other high-value, new development efforts or to improv-
ing the efficiency of operations, but rather are being utilized to ensure 
that the regulations are being followed. This is a significant burden for 
large businesses. However, in smaller businesses the resources dedi-
cated may be smaller in numbers, except that the hidden costs must be 
considered, such as burnout of the one or two information technology 
(IT) people who are working many hours of overtime to comply.
Compliance ensures that due diligence has been exercised within 
the organization to meet the government regulations for security 
practices. Compliance can be achieved in many ways, as many of 
these regulations provide a higher-level definition of the requirement 
of what must be done; however, the lower-level, platform-specific 
details of how the solution is implemented are typically not stated 
in the regulation itself. The regulation’s primary task is to ensure 
that the appropriate processes are in place, people are aware of their 
responsibilities, and technical issues are appropriately managed. The 
regulations are drafted at a policy level and, as such, it would be dif-
ficult to mandate the selection of a specific platform from a particular 
vendor, as this would provide an undue advantage for that vendor. 
Furthermore, because technology changes at a pace faster than the 
 policy- making process, by the time new legislation was enacted, 
the legislation would most likely be out of date. This approach would 
also stifle innovation by mandating the use of specific, currently pres-
ent technology to address security challenges.
The landscape of government regulations and security control 
frameworks covered in the subsequent sections is shown in Figure 1.2. 
These laws, regulations, and security control standards and frame-
works are covered in more detail in subsequent chapters. These provide 
the structure for what must be complied with to protect the particular 
vertical industry security protection and assurance needs, as well as 
some potential frameworks for selecting and managing the controls 
within those frameworks. There is value in reviewing the security laws 
and standards outside of the mandates within a particular industry (for 
example, reviewing the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council [FFIEC] handbook while being subject to HIPAA security 
requirements), as this may provide security control thought leadership 
to strengthen the security program.
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GoverninG Security LawS, reGuLationS and StandardS
Laws and Regulations Control Frameworks/Standards
Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
 Final Privacy Rule (Modified 2002)
 Final Security Rule (2003)
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 
(GLBA)
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)
UK Data Protection Act 1998
Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI) (2006)
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Cyber Security Standards (2006)
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
of 1986
Computer Security Act of 1987
Privacy Act of 1974
Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH) part of American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009
Control Objectives for Information 
and related Technology (CobiT)
ISO/IEC 27001/2:2005
NIST Recommended Controls 
(800-53 Rev3)
Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO)
IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL)
Federal Financial Institutions 
Institutional Examination Council 
(FFIEC) Handbook
Federal Information Systems 
Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM)






                          
Control frameworks and standards demonstrate compliance of regulations 
Supported by technical implementations
Technical Implementations
Vendor specific platform controls
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation 
Guides (STIGs)
Sans Institute Top 20 Vulnerabilities
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publications
NIST National Vulnerability Database
Figure 1.2 Landscape of governing security laws, regulations, and standards.
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It is important to recognize at this point that the information secu-
rity governance program leverages the laws, regulations, frameworks, 
and standards from multiple places and may have to simultaneously be 
compliant with multiple laws and regulations. The chapters that fol-
low provide the necessary “security rocks” for laying the information 
security governance foundation.
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Mirrors should reflect a little before throwing back images.
Jean Cocteau, 1889–1963
Most organizations today have a vision statement to direct the com-
pany employees to conduct business in a way that meets the overall 
goals of the organization. Vision statements are generally very short 
so that employees can easily grasp the essence of the strategy and 
behave in a manner that is consistent with the strategy. This is helpful 
to determine the right course of action in absence of a documented 
policy. Just as the overall business needs to have a vision, mission 
statement, goals, and action plans, so does the information security 
program if it is to sustain long-term viability and be effective in meet-
ing the needs of the business.
What happens more often than not is that a need for information 
security appears one day as the result of an incident, public disclosure 
of information, a new law or regulation that must be complied with, 
or an inquiry from a member of senior management that was reading 
about a security incident that was experienced by a competitor in the 
news. This scenario is depicted in Figure 2.1. What follows is that 
someone is assigned to resolve the incident or come up with what 
needs to be done for information security. The individual assigned is 
usually within the information technology (IT) department, as secu-
rity is usually seen as an information technology problem to be solved. 
The person then takes this assignment on, in addition with his or her 
other responsibilities, and starts fixing the problem at hand. After a 
series of small successes and a further understanding of the scope of 
information security, the person charged with addressing information 
security requests more resources and is initially met with resistance. 
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A few more projects are taken on, and problems tackled, increasing 
the visibility of the security function. In this scenario, the strategy 
is the result of looking in the rear-view mirror and articulating the 
accomplishments of what has been completed in an attempt to gain 
more funds to further more initiatives. Thus, the strategy emerges, so 
to speak, and is generated from a bottom-up approach.
An alternative approach is to perform an assessment of the infor-
mation security practices that are in place by hiring an external firm 
to conduct an objective review, and then creating short and long-term 
multiyear plans for addressing the problem areas, concentrating on 
the areas of highest risk first as depicted in Figure 2.2. This top-down 
approach is beneficial in that it provides broad coverage for all of the 
domains and can be established without focusing on an immedi-
ate trigger, as in the bottom-up approach. The top-down approach 
also takes into consideration the risks of the security areas evaluated, 
whereas the immediate, bottom-up approach starts by focusing on the 
issue that is getting the most visibility at the time.
One could argue that using an immediate security incident to 
spur the organization into action is not developing a strategy at all 
and is more akin to running by the seat of your pants. The reality 
is that organizations do not always have the foresight or the knowl-
edge within the organization to recognize the role that information 
security should play within the business. They may not have an advo-
cate for information security that can articulate how implementing 













Figure 2.1 incident-driven security strategy approach.
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increasing market share, creating a competitive advantage, and so 
on. Imagine also that a security incident is occurring and the person 
assigned says, “We should create a strategy to develop and implement 
an information security program to deal with this.” Using the nomen-
clature put so well within the book Good to Great (Collins, 2001), 
there may not be a seat on the next bus for that individual! When 
there are urgent business problems to solve, the first order of action is 
to put out the fire, and then work on the fire suppression equipment 
and safety procedures, buy fire extinguishers, and so forth. The same 
principle applies to security incidents; although they may spur us into 
action and get the ball rolling, we must address the immediate issue 
at hand first.
A third type of strategy development is by not consciously creating 
a strategy at all, as shown by Figure 2.3. Organizations that could 
be classified as security unaware fall into this category. They are the 
organizations that have individuals performing security functions, 
however, not in a premediated manner. Security “happens” within 
Company Vision
Mission Statement
Information Security Mission Statement











Figure 2.2 top-down vision-driven security strategy.
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these organizations as different individuals are assigned the various 
functions of information security, whether or not it is called that. For 
example, the systems administrator may receive requests for access via 
e-mail and she provides the access requested. An individual is respon-
sible for moving source code to production status within the version 
control software. The help desk administers password resets upon 
request. Security functions are distributed across different individuals 
within the organization without a master plan of what should be per-
formed. Risk assessments and reviews of the latest threats are usually 
nonexistent in this type of organization. Plans for upcoming initia-
tives are sparse and new initiatives are generated by the next large 
incident that impacts availability or an unintended public disclosure.
So whatever method has been used to initiate the development 
of an information security strategy, whether leveraging the security 
incident in the bottom-up strategy or via the preplanned, system-
atic top-down strategy assessment, or by not consciously creating a 
strategy, it should be recognized that all organizations have one. The 
more planned the strategy is, the more likely that the strategy will be 
















Figure 2.3 organically driven whack-a-mole security strategy.
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the business strategy. The unconscious strategy has a relatively slim 
chance of meeting the needs of the business, as security events tend 
to drive what the security response will be versus a thought-out plan 
for the future. Few companies can afford to take risks without know-
ing the risk that they are assuming by doing nothing (more about 
information security risk assessment is covered in Chapter 5 about 
risk management). The chance that an unconscious effort will address 
each of the information security domains prior to when they are 
needed in a proactive manner is like spinning the roulette wheel to 
determine what the next business strategy would be.
The rest of this chapter will focus on the top-down or bottom-up 
strategy development approach as viable alternatives for developing 
an information security strategy. Although each organization will 
vary in the areas that are of most importance, the subsequent sections 
provide some areas that need to be considered when developing the 
strategy. Failure to do so can cause the information security program 
to be out of touch with the needs of the business and not in alignment.
Evolution of Information Security
No security book would be complete without recognizing how the 
computing environment has changed from the early days of the main-
frame to distributing computing to personal computers to laptops to 
smart phones. Rather than exploring the laborious details of the chal-
lenges that each of these environments provided, suffice it to say that 
the number of platforms have increased and the data has moved fur-
ther away from the data center “glass house.” We are having to protect 
information that is more accessible in more ways by more people than 
ever before. The quantities of information desired are also staggering.
Even with the proliferation of information and the complexity of 
the environments that house this information, information security 
as a whole is still regarded as an IT issue that involves the creation of 
user IDs or accounts, and issuance of passwords. That’s it. Although it 
is important to get the security administration, identity management, 
or access management correct, that is only one piece of the informa-
tion security program. The various functions that must make up an 
information security program are explained in detail in the security 
management chapter (Chapter 3). When developing any information 
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security strategy, it is important to understand that the common view 
of individuals within the organization may be that the security staff’s 
role is limited to the issuance of user IDs and granting access. There 
may be an education process necessary prior to engaging individuals 
in the development of an information security strategy or the focus 
may center on the traditional security administration functions.
Organization Historical Perspective
Before developing the security strategy, the person responsible for 
developing the strategy needs to understand the organization’s past 
experiences with information security. Organizations tend to have 
long memories with projects that failed and relatively short-term 
memories with projects that were successes and had little visibility. If 
the previous security officer implemented a strategy that failed, possi-
bly evidenced by their short tenure or abrupt departure, then it would 
behoove the new security officer to informally obtain what some of the 
issues were and the approaches attempted to solve them. This does not 
mean that the same approach would not work by a new person with 
additional management support or attempted under a different set of 
new circumstances, but the reasons should be uncovered as quickly as 
possible. Failure may have been due to not enough resources applied, 
lack of available technical expertise, failure to communicate project 
vision, lack of management support, and so forth. Alternatively, it 
may have had more to do with clashes of personality of the individual 
responsible for the implementation utilizing an autocratic approach 
versus a collaborative approach.
Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt, Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt
One reason that the predecessor’s information security strategy may 
not have been well received by the organization was that the security 
officer utilized the fear–uncertainty–doubt cycle. It works like this:
Step 1—A security incident occurs that gets (unwanted) man-
agement attention.
Step 2—The security officer indicates what a large problem this 
is and requests a large amount of funding to implement new 
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controls, hire more resources, and so forth to fix the problem. 
This is usually the response to a senior executive’s question of, 
“How can we prevent this and ensure it does not happen again?”
Step 3—The security officer implements the solution and all is 
well … until the next time the same event happens.
Step 4—Repeat steps 1 through 3. The security officer indicates that 
there is new technology that will reduce the risk even further.
Step 5—A new incident occurs, and the same process is fol-
lowed again.
What is wrong with this model? Many security officers will echo 
the sentiment, “There is nothing like a good incident.” Although it 
is true that the first incident raises the level of awareness and impor-
tance that adequate controls be in place and many times does pro-
vide the necessary funding, the problem is the second, third, and 
fourth time the “sky is falling” message is given, Chicken Little tends 
to get little additional funding. The response from senior management 
is more likely to be to find a way to prevent the issue from reoccurring 
with the resources that have already been provided. The reality is that 
the fear, uncertainty, and doubt message tends to dissipate over time 
and is not effective. It is much more effective to have a security strat-
egy roadmap that provides concrete enhancements to the business to 
deal with the threats facing the organization.
Understand the External Environment
Companies work within the context of a much larger environment and 
are subject to external circumstances beyond what is created by them. 
These include the regulatory environment, strategies of the competi-
tors, being aware of the emerging threats, knowing the cost structures, 
and leveraging the external independent research that is available.
Regulatory
Each organization should understand the regulatory environment 
within which it participates. Is it a publicly traded company sub-
ject to the Sarbanes–Oxley rules? Does it maintain protected health 
information (PHI) and subject to the Health Insurance Portability 
18 InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
and Accountability Act (HIPAA)? Does it serve customers in one 
of the 40-plus states that have enacted security incident notification 
laws? Are they processing credit cards and subject to the Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS)? The regulatory 
environment will drive security rules that have been mandated for the 
particular public or private sector.
Competition
Most boards of directors want to know how the security strategy 
and investment compares with the strategy of their competitors. The 
objective in many companies is to spend no more and no less than that 
of their competitors, unless security is seen to provide a competitive 
advantage that is worth the additional investment. It can be very diffi-
cult in practice to ascertain what the competitors are actually spending 
on information security, as this information is not generally shared. 
Companies may discretely obtain information from social media 
websites (e.g., job profiles on LinkedIn articulating current function 
and activities for individuals in security roles) or from attendees at 
conferences. They may also have information from other employees 
that were hired away from competitors. Intelligence, whether formal 
or informal, is obtained at some level by an organization, hopefully 
through ethical means, to enable the organization to differentiate 
their products and services to obtain a competitive advantage.
The reason organizations prefer to spend the same amount on 
information security as their competitor is that an organization must 
allocate funds across the different business units in a way that maxi-
mizes profitability. Spending more on a function such as information 
security, which is traditionally viewed as an overhead cost (i.e., does 
not increase revenue), would normally be viewed as money that is 
not available to grow the business. This assumption makes security 
investment a hard sell in most organizations; however, being able to 
articulate competitor investments in developing the strategy is one 
way to garner support for the strategy. This is especially true if the 
competitor will be using this knowledge to bid on or obtain new busi-
ness that the company is also pursuing. Spending the same amount in 
this context provides the board of directors the comfort that it are not 
overspending, while at the same time, providing the comfort that it is 
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exercising due diligence in funding the security efforts. If a security 
breach occurs in the future and the company is subject to external 
governmental review or a lawsuit, the board can provide justification 
that it spent an appropriate amount on information security given the 
business climate in which the company operates.
Emerging Threats
Many information security threats are common across industries in 
that they represent vulnerabilities to generally available software. 
Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office or the latest vulnerability found 
within Adobe Reader represent opportunities for the hacker to exploit 
the code, irrespective of the industry in which the company resides. 
The ability to exploit the opportunity has more to do with how wide-
spread the technology is used within the organization and the manner 
by which defense-in-depth strategies have been deployed to protect 
the information assets.
The strategy needs to consider the emerging threats in building 
the security strategy. As discussed further in Chapter 5, certain types 
of information will need more protection focus than others and will 
need further protection strategies. For example, an organization that 
processes credit card information or handles social security numbers, 
will want to know where that information is located via the data clas-
sification activities. This information is more likely to be the subject of 
a targeted attack and will need to be protected appropriately.
Technology Cost Changes
When developing an information security strategy it may appear that 
the costs for a particular solution may be cost prohibitive when the 
strategy is initially developed. Since technology costs are continually 
dropping due to competition, increasing technology advances, impact 
of mergers and acquisitions, and by companies trying to increase 
market share, once a security strategy is put in place, the initial cost 
assumptions should be revisited. For example, it was not uncommon 
for database administrators to be reluctant to implement logging of 
the database servers due to the perceived impacts to performance 
and the requirement that large amounts of disk space be used. As 
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recently as the mid-1990s, the cost for this disk space could easily run 
into the millions of dollars for a few terabytes of storage. Today, we 
know that the local electronics or office supply store can provide the 
same storage capacity for less than $50. Thus, the cost of implement-
ing a logging and monitoring solution today involving terabytes of 
information would not be nearly as expensive and should be part of 
the strategy for an organization with the appropriate resources.
External Independent Research
Organizations such as Gartner, Forrester, The Burton Group, and 
others are valuable sources for product evaluations, emerging strate-
gies, and emerging trends. These organizations provide predictions, 
typically 2 to 3 years out, of what vendors and products are leaders 
in their field. They also provide a vast amount of information on the 
products themselves and how they may fit into the security solution. 
Organizations do not have the funds to research all of these products 
themselves, even through a request for proposal (RFP) process. RFPs 
can yield a great deal of information for a given security business need, 
but at the same time require significant resource time to adequately 
send out the requests, evaluate the responses, score the responses, 
hold vendor presentations, and make a final selection. RFPs are good 
vehicles if the organization has the time and resources, or is narrow-
ing the selection of an expensive long-term solution. The external 
independent reports can serve as input into jump-starting the RFP 
process, or in less expensive solutions, quickly provide a cost-effective 
path toward product selection.
The Internal Company Culture
The company external environment is clearly important to information 
security strategies, as they represent how the world is interacting with 
our organizations. The internal company culture has a great impact on 
how successfully our security programs will be received. Although it 
would be nice to be able to copy another organization’s security strat-
egy, implement the strategy in ours and call it a day, unfortunately no 
two organizations have the same “norm of operation” and a security 
strategy that may work for one company may not work for another. 
21developIng InFormAtIon seCurIty strAtegy
The following are areas to give some thought to. It may not even be 
readily apparent how the organization is operating and may need the 
perspective of several individuals at different management and end 
user levels to achieve an accurate assessment.
Risk Appetite
A community banking organization may have a low risk appetite and 
will tend to make very risk-averse decisions. A small credit union, for 
example, may wait until the technology is well developed or many 
other companies have embraced the technology before committing to 
its use. Establishing an Internet banking presence in the early days, 
for example, was only embraced by the large banks with sufficient 
resources to commit to the technology, thus minimizing the risk. 
Today, even small organizations have embraced the online banking 
technology as a business imperative. The risk is perceived to be less 
when the application has been installed by several hundred banks and 
supported by a software vendor with the ability to spread the security 
development costs over multiple customers versus building the appli-
cation with the limited resources of a single small credit union.
Risk-averse organizations will tend to have more rigid rules for 
information security and less likelihood to grant exceptions. On the 
other hand, innovative organizations promoting creativity or research 
will tend to allow more creatively. Users may be allowed to purchase 
and download designer or specialized software on their machines that 
a more structured environment would not allow. For example, a com-
pany such as Apple that is very innovative would be more permissive 
internally to promote creative expression than a pharmaceutical man-
ufacturer would be with those engaged in tracking product shipments. 
This is not to say that one organization cares about security and the 
other does not, as both are concerned about the protection surround-
ing intellectual property within their companies. What differs is the 
internal approach to information security and securing the informa-
tion in a way that provides security that is consistent with the culture, 
business operations, and management direction, and at the same time 
provides an adequate level of protection from unauthorized users.
Some organizations view new technology like oil wells and are 
willing to invest the money in multiple initiatives knowing that 
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several will fail, understanding there will be one that is successful and 
will make up for the others. These organizations have the ability to 
invest larger amounts because they can spread their costs across many 
more users, systems, or products and services. If the solution does 
not turn out to be effective within a few years, the same organiza-
tion will invest funds to replace it with a better solution. The smaller 
organization is more likely to select a product that will last for a longer 
period of time, and live with or incrementally enhance the usage of 
the product.
Speed
Organizations move at different speeds, some acquiring one busi-
ness and then acquiring another before the first acquisition is fully 
implemented. A major airline published its new innovative sales 
promotions in the newspaper about 3 weeks prior to when the IT 
department needed to have the systems available for processing the 
new promotion. Several programmers made sure they read the ads in 
the newspaper each day so they could be aware of what the marketing 
department was selling. This strategy was done to ensure that the pro-
motion was kept under wraps until absolutely necessary so that the 
competition did not find out. This is an example of an organization 
working with lightning speed. How long do projects typically take? 
Weeks? Months? Years? An 18-month implementation will not be 
very well received in an organization that typically implements initia-
tives in a 3-month timeframe. The security strategy needs to mirror 
the speed culture of the organization.
Collaborative versus Authoritative
Organizations structured in a command-control-type organization 
where the subordinates are expected to follow the directives of their 
immediate supervisors tend to operate in an authoritative manner. 
Individuals may be encouraged within the organizations to sug-
gest improvements to existing practices or suggest new processes; 
however the decision-making authority resides within the superior 
manager and is pushed down through the organization. Security poli-
cies and procedures are introduced via directives and established at 
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higher levels within the company. Alternatively, collaborative organi-
zations tend to request input and more discussion prior to the decisions 
made. Decisions are made collectively by a team or steering committee 
to achieve consensus on a particular direction. Security councils are 
very well received within this type of organization, and security poli-
cies are less likely to emerge solely as directives from one department.
Knowing who are the individuals in an authoritative structure 
whose opinions shape most of the company actions and plans would 
be beneficial. Time would be well spent with these individuals early 
in the strategy planning process to get them behind the strategy. In 
the collaborative organization, the senior executive may be looking for 
clues that opinions were solicited from others within their organiza-
tion before they will agree to the strategy.
Trust Level
An organization with low trust levels is a very difficult organization to 
work within, as it is unclear as to whom the message needs to be com-
municated to for it to be effective and who is ultimately in control. In 
this type of organization, it may be necessary to increase the number 
of stakeholders that need to accept the security strategy. By garnering 
broader support it will be harder for a single individual acting on his 
own to undermine the security strategy. Trust level can be evaluated 
by matching the statements made and the actions observed. Two-way 
trust is obviously preferred to exist at the beginning of strategy devel-
opment. However, the security officer may have to take the first step 
by implementing projects within the committed timelines and func-
tionality promised to build the trust over time.
Individuals may also have hidden agendas related to their own 
advancement that the security officer should be conscious of. If a secu-
rity strategy is viewed as adding time to a project that the individual 
is responsible for implementing, or it is perceived that the project may 
not meet the deadline as a result of a new security policy, the indi-
vidual may not fully support the implementation. The worst case may 
come when the manager appears to support the security initiative 
publicly, meanwhile does little to advance the effort. The manager 
could also not like the constraints that security places on operations, 
not like structure, or may have been dissatisfied with the length of 
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time it takes the security department to onboard a new employee. 
Whatever the reason, it is important to understand which individu-
als are advocates for the security program and which individuals will 
serve as detractors.
Growth Seeker or Cost Cutter
Stocks can be classified in many different ways, such as large capital-
ization stocks (greater than $1.5 billion revenue), small capitalization 
stocks, domestic, international, or by the sector or industry in which 
they operate. Stocks are also classified as to whether they are consid-
ered a growth stock or a value stock. A growth stock is one in which 
there appears to be significant opportunities for the stock to grow in 
the future. These stocks typically represent either new start-ups or 
innovative established companies with product ideas that have not 
reached their full potential. Value stocks are those stocks where com-
panies are perceived to be worth more than their book asset value, but 
for some reason, have been beaten down by the market and are now 
out of favor. These stocks are purchased in the hopes that someday 
the negative events pushing down the stock price are changed and the 
stock will rise in value.
All companies want to increase revenues and cut costs. The distinc-
tion that is important here is that growth companies tend to invest 
more money than value companies in future product development and 
are more likely to embrace a growth security strategy that projects ini-
tiatives into the future that may not have immediate payback. Value 
companies, on the other hand, may be out of favor and are looking for 
significant cost reductions to increase the stock value. Projects may 
be cut and layoffs may be the norm to regain financial viability. If an 
organization is in cost-cutting mode, and the security officer suggests 
a project with a large financial commitment with a payoff several years 
into the future, this may be embraced by a growth-oriented company 
that is willing to take the risk, but not by the value-oriented com-
pany that is searching for new ways to cut costs. There needs to be an 
immediate or short-term payback to gain the support of leadership 
with the cost-cutting company.
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Company Size
Large companies tend to be more willing to invest in more initiatives 
as noted earlier, in large part because the total impact to the budget 
of the organization will be less when initiatives do not work out as 
anticipated. In other words, larger organizations have the ability to 
hedge their bets. On the flip side, larger organizations are sometimes 
more bureaucratic, with more buy-in and management approval nec-
essary before the initiative can move forward. Security strategies need 
to take this into account when establishing timeframes for implemen-
tation. Whereas a smaller organization may readily accept a contract 
from a vendor without challenging it due to the lack of legal support 
or leverage with the large vendor, a large organization may require 
a couple of months to move the contract through the legal process. 
Similarly, a small organization may not need the level of documen-
tation that a large organization may need to conduct business. For 
example, a small doctor’s office with an office staff of two people may 
not need as formal of a termination process ensuring that the keys to 
the office are changed versus a large organization of 100,000 employ-
ees that would need card access systems and documented proximity 
badge collection policies, recertification policies, and new badge issu-
ance policies. The small organization still needs to address each of the 
security domains within the security strategy. However, the degree 
of definition, documentation, and approach to satisfying the domain 
will be vastly different.
Outsourcing Posture
The security strategy should consider the company’s inclination to 
outsource functions or processing. What has been the history of 
the company? Is someone else currently providing the IT services 
for the organization? Is processing occurring outside of the United 
States? The outsourcing posture has implications not only for how 
the security organization should be managed as a function (employ-
ees, contractors, or outsourcing of pieces of the security function), but 
also for the controls that must be put in place for information assets 
being processed by another company or beyond our borders. If the 
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cost savings are significant or if the quality of work is viewed to be 
superior to the work that could be done internally, the security strat-
egy must be written to incorporate controls that make the processing 
feasible. Quite often, the outsourcing decisions are made at a very 
high company level with limited detailed input of costs at the time of 
agreement, as they tend to be kept very confidential. Few individuals 
are in the loop at this juncture.
The security strategy needs to ensure that contractual obligations 
are established and it is clear how the external functions will be man-
aged. Take the case of outsourcing the server support to an external 
company. The question that should be addressed by the security strat-
egy is who is responsible for the disaster recovery of the information 
if it is lost. Is the outsourcer responsible for maintaining and testing 
backup tapes on a regular basis? Is there a hot site in the strategy or 
is there redundant hardware supported by the outsourcer? There is 
nothing inherently wrong with outsourcing functions, where it typi-
cally goes wrong is when expectations are not clear. Finding out that 
the outsourcer only retains backup tapes for 1 month when the secu-
rity strategy indicates that the organizations servers are recoverable 
for a period up to one year could cause an unwanted issue for the orga-
nization. Without the proper strategy and agreements in place, such 
as service level agreements, the lack of backups beyond 1 month may 
not be discovered until there is a need for recovery of critical informa-
tion, a point that would be too late and could have been prevented by 
creating the appropriate security outsourcing strategy.
Prior Security Incidents, Audits
Evaluation of the prior security incidents can be of great value in 
developing an information security strategy. Did an end user leave a 
box of confidential information in his car with the engine running, 
only to have it stolen? Did an executive share her password with her 
administrative assistant so she could access her e-mail? Was the busi-
ness strategy sent unencrypted across the Internet? Was a misconfig-
ured firewall responsible for an external party using the mail server 
to send spam? Did a review of external background checks by the 
contracting company reveal that only 5 out of 25 background checks 
occurred? Incidents provide a wealth of information as to what actions 
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are not being performed within the company. Security incidents are 
like mice—where you see one, you must have many more that are not 
seen. The question to ask when building the security strategy is, Do I 
have a stated control in place, as evidenced by the existence of a pol-
icy, procedure and implemented activity which serves to mitigate or 
reduce the likelihood or impact of this event occurring? If the answer 
is no, then this item needs to be included in the security strategy. The 
tendency to evaluate how important an incident is by the number of 
occurrences should be avoided, as there may only be one incident, but 
the potential impact may be large.
Internal and external audits also provide significant knowledge as 
to the process breakdowns within an organization. For instance, com-
panies may do a very good job in documenting the policies and proce-
dures, but may do a very poor job of executing them. Is the problem one 
of communication (awareness)? Is the problem due to shortcuts taken 
to implement a new system or change a system by the weekend? Is the 
problem one of misinterpretation? Or is there a personal disagreement 
with the standard or lack of supporting technical controls to support 
the policy? Audits should be reviewed and unresolved findings should 
be used to enhance the security strategy. Previously resolved findings 
can also provide input, as an issue may have been resolved by a quick 
fix to remove the finding, but a better long-term solution may be war-
ranted and should be reflected within the security strategy.
External audits may or may not provide recommendations to miti-
gate the audit issue depending upon the nature of the audit (some 
firms will not provide recommendations in the post-Enron era as this 
may be viewed as a conflict of interest as it could possibly be viewed 
as providing consulting services). If they are providing an attestation 
of the controls, they are not supposed to provide advice. However, 
many auditors will informally be willing to provide their opinions 
outside of the formal written report as to what types of actions would 
have made the situation be a nonissue and not result in a finding. 
This information can be very valuable in constructing the strategy, as 
the auditors are exposed to many different solutions across industries 
and companies.
If the organization is in the business of contracting work to other 
organizations, the government, or a parent company, other formal 
reviews of past performance should be reviewed. Reviews of past 
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performance may include metrics such as quality, timeliness, meet-
ing project deadlines, and so forth. These reviews can highlight areas 
where information security may be able to help. For instance, if there 
are delays in the early morning call center availability due to virus 
scans starting at undesirable times, the information security strategy 
could examine methods to shift the running of the scans, reduce the 
time of the scans by allocating more hardware or faster desktops, or 
examine alternative products for deployment.
Security Strategy Development Techniques
Specific information security strategy considerations for each of the 
information security domains are noted in the appropriate security 
control determination chapter for the primary managerial (Chapter 8), 
technical (Chapter 9), and operational (Chapter 10) controls. These 
provide some insight into the questions that should be asked to formu-
late the information security strategy. Following are some of the tech-
niques that can be used to develop the strategy specific to the company.
Mind Mapping
Mind mapping (Buzan, 1996) is a very powerful technique to extract 
thoughts out of different individuals and subsequently organize those 
thoughts. Mind mapping encourages the free flow of thought and 
organizes these thoughts together. The greatly simplified process 
works according to the following steps:
 1. The topic is drawn in a circle in the center of a flip chart for a 
group or on a piece of paper if done individually.
 2. Lines are drawn outward from the circle in a spider-like fash-
ion to represent the main thoughts. These lines are labeled 
with the thought.
 3. Thoughts come to people’s minds from the main spokes 
drawn in step 2 and are added as smaller perpendicular lines 
from the main spokes and labeled.
 4. This process is repeated, drawing more perpendicular lines 
or branches from the prior lines until the majority of the 
thoughts around the subject noted in the circle are expressed.
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For example, if the circle in the middle was labeled “Develop an 
Information Security Program” some of the thoughts that may come 
to mind are policies, procedures, staffing, vulnerability testing, access 
control, business continuity planning, and strategy development. 
These could form the spokes coming from the circle and then as the 
brainstorming continued, more thoughts could be added. The word 
“staffing” may cause expression of the words experience, certifica-
tions, education, years in the industry, security tool knowledge, bud-
gets, number of staff, and training. Then the training spoke could be 
explored and the concepts of cost, training organization, type, prereq-
uisites, tracking, and so forth could be added to the training branch. 





























































Figure 2.4 Strategy Mind Map example. (created with Mind Mapping software, www.smartdraw.
com.)
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The power comes from obtaining multiple thoughts from differ-
ent people with different perspectives or vantage points of the issue 
being discussed. Many ideas can be captured in quick succession. As 
an experiment, at a conference of IT auditors, each person was given 
1 minute to draw a mind map with at least 10 thoughts coming from 
the word “happiness.” As one can imagine, happiness means many 
different things to many different people. Amazingly, out of about 
150 people in the room, there were only a handful of matches, on 
concepts such as travel and children. While some people matched 
on these commonalities, it was even more alarming to see that few 
people even matched on those. The key takeaway here is that even as 
experienced as the security officer may be, he or she should recognize 
that the organizational knowledge, experience, and ideas contained in 
others needs to be understood. The mind mapping tool is an excellent 
method of capturing the components that should be addressed in an 
information security strategy. As a side note, each chapter of this book 
started with the creation of a mind map to capture the starting point 
for the chapter.
SWOT Analysis
When businesses are embarking on a new business venture a SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis is typically 
used to determine the organization’s current ability to compete in that 
marketplace. The process involves a facilitated brainstorming discus-
sion whereby a box is drawn divided into four quadrants (each repre-
senting one of four dimensions of the SWOT acronym) and each of 
the quadrants are then evaluated by the team. An example SWOT 
analysis for a security program is shown in Figure  2.5. In practice 
much time is usually spent on defining the strengths and weaknesses 
as these appear to be easier to grasp as they tend to be based upon past 
observations of performance within the organization. Opportunities 
require an understanding of items that are more abstract, such as pos-
sibilities of the future without necessarily being currently equipped 
to develop the product or service. Threats are those actions that may 
serve to derail future plans or disrupt the existing environment.
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Applied to information security strategy development, the SWOT 
process can illuminate areas where security could make a positive, 
proactive impact to the organization (opportunity), but to date has not 
acted. For example, creating and deploying an identity management 
system that would ease the manual burden of submitting paper forms 
while providing faster access to the needed systems would benefit the 
business process by making it more efficient. Other benefits could 
be added into the security strategy such as the integration with the 
corporate help desk ticketing system, enabling password resets, and 
reducing the number of profiles by implementing role-based access. 
Each of these would represent an opportunity to the business.
In the aforementioned example, through the SWOT analysis it 
may be determined that the skills are not available in-house to imple-
ment a complex identity management product and resources from 
outside need to be obtained. It may also be identified that it is not 
well understood what access should be granted to what job func-
tion, making the construction of accurate profiles difficult or that 
a role-discovery tool is needed to jump-start the effort. Strengths 
• Reduction in costs to
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Figure 2.5 Security program Swot analysis example.
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may include project management expertise in-house, knowledge of 
the existing processes, or the ability to receive excellent pricing on the 
security software.
Balanced Scorecard
The balanced scorecard was developed by Kaplan and Norton and 
gained popularity after the idea was published in the Harvard Business 
Review (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Essentially the balanced scorecard 
approach encourages organizations to not only examine the financial 
measures of profitability, but rather to also continuously examine the 
measurements of how well the customer, process (quality), and learn-
ing perspectives are being attained. Each of these processes eventually 
contribute to the financial measures and by focusing upon these other 
measures as well as the financial measures, the overall financial profit-
ability of the organization will be improved.
Some organizations identify a few key measures such as growth 
in the number of customers, nonconformance to processes, or the 
percentage of staff that have acquired a new skill. Other organiza-
tions drive the balanced scorecard concept to an individual employee 
level, whereby goals are created for each employee and rolled up into 
higher-level goals (or vice versa). In either case, the balanced scorecard 
provides a mechanism to review the progress of the organization in 
meeting their goals. As management guru Peter Drucker noted, “If 
you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it” (Drucker, 1993).
Security strategies can be developed using the balanced scorecard 
approach and building appropriate measures to track whether the cus-
tomer, quality, learning, or financial perspectives are being enhanced 
by the security strategy.
Face-to-Face Interviews
Face-to-face interviews are not as formal as the other techniques, albeit 
it can be very effective in understanding what is really important to the 
management and technical staff in the organization. The security offi-
cer schedules a 1-hour meeting with each senior management mem-
ber, middle management, front-line supervisors, and a cross-section 
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of end users and key technical staff. In the first 20 minutes, the secu-
rity officer discusses at a high level some of the information security 
concerns today facing companies with respect to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information. It may be helpful to pro-
vide some statistical information, new stories of events within similar 
industries, and some specifics of events that have occurred with the 
company. This is then followed with a brief 10-minute discussion of 
the functions of the information security department and ways that 
the security department can help. The next 30 minutes is then devoted 
to listening to the challenges of the business area and identifying 
where the security area may be able to help. Through this process, 
a champion or two for the security strategy may emerge in addition 
to learning what the issues are. For example, it may be learned that 
an executive is trying to reduce the costs per trans action and that the 
facility costs are a major expense. He also indicated that he does not 
want to incur the expense of maintaining another machine for each 
individual. As a possible solution, he was thinking about a work-at-
home solution and did not know if this would increase the likeli-
hood that information would become exposed. As the security officer, 
this should ring a bell that maybe a secure virtual private network 
(VPN) solution coupled with virtualization of the desktop may be a 
feasible alternative.
Face-to-face interviews also serve to build rapport with key people 
within the business. By just taking the step of demonstrating that 
the security department cares about their needs, concerns, and issues 
begins to build the relationship. These are the same individuals that 
may be called upon later to support the implementation of the strategy 
by the departmental projects that are initiated.
Key to each of these techniques is to not try to determine the security 
strategy without the input of the business leaders and appropriate tech-
nical staff. What may appear as an important security concern heard 
at a security conference may not be the largest security concern facing 
the business. The CEO may have some real concerns concerning brand 
image at the moment, and an opportunity would be missed by not con-
necting the security strategy to the needs of the CEO. Demonstrating 
how applying the proper security controls can protect the brand, for 
example, would enable maturity of the security program.
34 InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
Security Planning
Strategic, tactical, and operational plans are interrelated and each 
provides a different focus towards enhancing the security of the orga-
nization. Planning reduces the likelihood that the organization will 
be reactionary towards the security needs. With appropriate planning, 
decisions on projects can be made with respect as to whether they are 
supporting the long-term or short-term goals and have the priority 
that warrants the allocation of more security resources.
Strategic
Strategic plans are aligned with the strategic business and information 
technology goals. These plans have a longer-term horizon (3 to 5 years 
or more) to guide the long-term view of the security activities. The 
process of developing a strategic plan emphasizes thinking of the com-
pany environment and the technical environment a few years into the 
future. High-level goals are stated to provide the vision for projects to 
achieve the business objectives. This type of plan is the outcome from 
the top-down, vision-driven approach to security strategy previously 
discussed and shown in Figure 2.2. These plans should be reviewed 
minimally on an annual basis or whenever major changes to the busi-
ness occur, such as a merger, acquisition, establishment of outsourcing 
relationships, major changes in the business climate, or introductions 
of new competitors. Technological changes will be frequent during a 
5-year time period, so the plan should be adjusted. The high-level plan 
provides organizational guidance to ensure that lower-level decisions 
are consistent with executive management’s intentions for the future of 
the company. For example, strategic goals may consist of
• Establish security policies and procedures
• Effectively deploy servers, workstations, and network devices 
to reduce downtime
• Ensure all users understand the security responsibilities and 
reward excellent performance
• Establish a security organization to manage security entity-wide
• Ensure that risks are effectively understood and controlled
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Tactical
Tactical plans provide the broad initiatives to support and achieve 
the goals specified in the strategic plan. These initiatives may include 
deployments such as the establishing an electronic policy develop-
ment and distribution process, implementing robust change control 
for the server environment, reducing the likelihood of vulnerabilities 
residing on the servers, implementing a “hot site” disaster recovery 
program, or implementing an identity management solution. These 
plans are more specific and may contain multiple projects to com-
plete the effort. Tactical plans are shorter in length, such as from 6 to 
18 months to achieve a specific security goal of the company.
Operational/Project Plans
Specific plans with milestones, dates, and accountabilities provide the 
communication and direction to ensure that the individual projects are 
being completed. For example, establishing a policy development and 
communication process may involve multiple projects with many tasks:
• Conduct security risk assessment
• Develop security policies and approval processes
• Develop technical infrastructure to deploy policies and 
track compliance
• Train end users on policies
• Monitor compliance
Depending upon the size and scope of the efforts, these initiatives 
may be steps of tasks as part of a single plan or they may be multiple 
plans managed through several projects. The duration of these efforts 
are short term to provide discrete functionality at the completion of 
the effort. Traditional waterfall methods of implementing projects 
spent a large amount of time detailing the specific steps required to 
implement the complete project. Executives today are more focused 
on achieving some short-term or at least interim results to demon-
strate the value of the investment along the way (Fitzgerald, 2007). 
Demonstration of value along the way maintains organizational inter-
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est and visibility to the effort, increasing the chances of sustaining 
longer-term funding. The executive management may grow impatient 
without realizing these early benefits.
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DefininG the Security 
manaGement orGanization
Sow a thought, and you reap an act;
Sow an act, and you reap a habit;
Sow a habit, and you reap a character;
Sow a character, and you reap a destiny.
Samuel Smiles, 1812–1904
The role of the information security leader has been being chang-
ing quite dramatically over the past few decades. Even as recently 
as 10 years ago, the position of chief information security officer 
was largely unheard of except for in the largest banking institutions. 
Emerging laws and regulations have pushed the need for informa-
tion security to the forefront of business and are seen as strategic and 
tactical issues that require an appropriate investment. The role of the 
information security officer has also received attention from multiple 
organizations providing awards for “Executive Security Officer of 
The Year” or “Chief Information Security Officer of the Year,” fur-
ther providing visibility to the profession.
History of the Security Leadership Role Is Relevant
Prior to the start of the new millennium, information security 
departments were buried deep within the information technology 
(IT) departments, typically within an infrastructure team or oper-
ations area focused on the deployment of servers, networks, and 
applications. The primary focus was on what was known as security 
administration, or in today’s nomenclature, identity management 
or access management. The primarily functions involved (1) setting 
up accounts, (2) providing access to resources after proper approval 
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was obtained, and (3) monitoring. The scope was primarily centered 
on ensuring that users were provisioned the access needed to per-
form their jobs when they needed access. This is not to say that other 
functions were not provided, however, the predominant focus was on 
logon ID administration.
Disaster recovery was typically thought of as a data center oper-
ation and not really well-coordinated with the concept of business 
continuity, whereby the organization recognizes the complete pro-
cess that is required to maintain operations in the event of a disaster. 
Disaster recovery terminology has been largely associated with bring-
ing the organization’s computing resources back to an operational 
level to conduct business. More important, disaster recovery was typi-
cally managed outside of the information security department and 
while seen as important to those performing the function, it was usu-
ally seen as an added cost that was one of the first to be trimmed 
back during staff reductions. Business leaders rationed that if nothing 
had happened in the last several years, it was unlikely to happen and 
the resources could be redeployed to work on revenue-producing or 
cost-reducing efforts. This sentiment shifted in the new millennium 
after the tragic terrorist attack at the World Trade Center in New 
York City on September 11, 2001, and damage caused by Hurricane 
Katrina in August 2005. Audit firms were very busy following these 
events constructing business continuity and disaster recovery plans.
The passage of regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Final Security Rule (February 
2003) requiring that responsibility for information security must be 
assigned; Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) Section 404 bring-
ing attention to the need for information security controls to ensure 
accurate financial statements; Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), 
also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
whereby the Safeguards Rule required that at least one employee be 
denoted as having responsibility for information security; and the 
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 
also known as the E-Government Act of 2002, does not specifically 
require that a security officer be named, however, it does require that 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guid-
ance be used, which promotes the designation of an information secu-
rity leader role in Special Publication 800-12, “An Introduction to 
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Computer Security: A NIST Handbook,” and Special Publication 
800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 
Systems and Organizations.” Each of these regulations has an under-
lying theme: someone must be designated to manage the information 
security program.
These actions were deliberate in the laws, as it was clear that orga-
nizations were not providing the proper investment toward informa-
tion security and designating someone to the role. The impact of these 
changes in the law are very significant, as it was the real beginning 
for organizations to commit the resources necessary to secure their 
information assets. Without this legislation, it is doubtful that orga-
nizations below the Fortune 100 would have designated someone at 
a high enough level to make a significant impact in properly securing 
the resources. The net result of the regulations was to squarely send 
a message to financial, healthcare, publically listed, government, and 
contracting organizations that information security was important 
and that the commitment to the function needed to be evidenced by 
an individual charged with the responsibility for the organization’s 
security. None of these regulations made mention as to the time com-
mitment (i.e., full or part time) that would be required to permit scal-
ability with the size of the organization, however, it needed to be 
appropriate with the size and resources available to the organization. 
In other words, a large organization with $50 billion in annual rev-
enues having one person dedicated to information security would be 
judged woefully insufficient when stacked up against its peers, whereas 
another organization with 50 employees may be judged adequate to 
designate part of one person’s job as being responsible for leading the 
information security efforts.
The period from 2001 to 2005 was predominantly characterized 
by organizations scurrying to meet the demands on SOX, HIPAA, 
GLBA, and so forth ahead of the compliance mandates, which were 
typically two years out. Security assessments or gap analyses were the 
norm, as many organizations were unclear as to where they stood with 
respect to the broad spectrum of information security and not clear as 
to where they stood with respect to the new legislation. Large- and 
medium-tier audit firms were extremely busy during this period help-
ing organizations to beef up security. The Payment Card Industry 
(PCI) Security Standards Council issued version 1.0 in 2006 and added 
40 InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
more security requirements that had to be complied with in subsequent 
updates. The impact of these regulations was to bring an auditable 
focus to the security programs of these companies. As various audit 
and consulting organizations developed standardized approaches to 
assess the security posture of the organization, these services would 
be increasingly utilized by security officers as one of “the first steps in 
office” to understand the challenges that were before them.
The New Security Officer Mandate
So why is the past decade of information security so important with 
respect to the emergence of the information security officer? The 
importance lies in the recognition that the security officer position, as 
we know it today, is in its infancy. With the data processing profes-
sion being very young itself, dating to the 1950s, and becoming more 
mainstream in the 1960s for back-office-type operations, the leader 
of information security of today for most organizations has been in 
place for less than a decade. Factoring in that prior to the year 2000 
many IT organizations spent the preceding years leading up to Y2K 
engaged in retiring old, nonconforming applications and upgrading 
the infrastructure, the focus on security was not prevalent until the 
early years of the new millennium with the passage of the aforemen-
tioned laws and regulations. Considering that these laws passed in the 
2002 to 2003 timeframe, with mandates for compliance extending 
two years, this suggests that most organizations had established infor-
mation security roles for leaders by 2004–2005, midway into the new 
decade. Relatively speaking, 5 to 10 years puts the information secu-
rity officer role as we know it today as being low on the maturity curve. 
This means that the industry is continually shaping and defining what 
the role is, how the individual should operate, in what capacity and 
level the role should be placed, to whom the role should report to, how 
the individual relates to the rest of the organization, and the roles of 
others in participating in the protection of the information assets.
Although this ambiguity may be unnerving to some, it can be 
invigorating to others that are shaping the information security 
industry. The following sections contain the components which need 
to be considered to construct an effective security management orga-
nization. Security organizations will vary across organizations due 
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to the resources available and the specific needs of the organiza-
tion. However, each of the functions indicated need to be managed 
by someone within the organization, or this presents an information 
security management risk that may be unacceptable to the organi-
zation. Regulations will continue to increase and competitors will 
continue to get smarter about information security, and failure to keep 
up will leave the company at a disadvantage.
Day 1: Hey, I Got the Job!
Congratulations, Mr. or Ms. Security Officer, you now have the job. 
This may be welcome news or not, depending upon whether you 
(1) chose this career path and interviewed extensively for the position, 
(2) raised your hand at the wrong time during the meeting, (3) didn’t 
attend the selection meeting, or (4) were the last guy in the IT shop 
and now “you’re it!” Hopefully, the honor of being the security officer 
was something that was chosen and aligns with a passion to protect 
the information assets for the customers of your company.
Leading information security today is hard work, surrounded by 
audits that seem to come one right after another, the continual threat 
of the impact breaches will have on the reputation of the company, 
separating the hype from the reality of information security products, 
and the increasing pressure to do more with less resources. Whereas 
information security departments of the past were primarily internally 
focused to ensure that the only the right users had access to the infor-
mation, today’s external connectivity has given rise to an increased 
focused at protecting the perimeter and the evaporating perimeter 
characterized by the mobile workforce, Internet connectivity, distrib-
uted company locations, and increased external threats. This does not 
suggest that the internal threats have dissipated but rather that orga-
nizations must now deal with another set of problems that become 
added to the mix. One minute the security officer is in the hot seat 
trying to determine if the USB stick that was lost by Ashley con-
tained personally identifiable information on it, and the next minute 
was preparing for a 15-minute presentation for the board of directors 
to explain the progress made toward attaining compliance in one of 
the many government regulations, to the next minute developing an 
information security program for the end users aimed at minimizing 
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the susceptibility of the end users being “phished.” The security officer 
is then wondering what the next day, Tuesday, will bring.
The security officer must be astute enough to not get bogged down in 
the day-to-day issues or the crisis of the moment, such that a long-term 
strategy is not laid out. Methods for achieving the long-term strategy 
were noted in the Developing Information Security Strategy chapter 
(Chapter 2). Time must be set aside daily, if not at least once a week, to 
review the information security strategy and the progress made toward 
it. Senior management needs to have a comfort level that progress is 
being made toward increasing security of the information assets to an 
acceptable level, which also serves to lessen the culpability in the event 
that a breach does occur. For example, if the executives are aware that 
patching is done on a regular basis on the company’s externally facing 
databases, monitoring through vulnerability scans is occurring, the 
latest penetration tests found minimal problems, and the informa-
tion was breached through the use of a very new exploit, management 
may be more forgiving given that industry-accepted practices were 
followed and procedures were regularly followed. If on the other hand 
there were no long-term strategy and no understanding or communi-
cation of the database protection processes in place, it may be difficult 
for the security officer to survive the breach.
Security Leader Titles
Mark Sanborn (2006), in his book You Don’t Need a Title to Be a Leader, 
says “People who lead—whether or not they have a title—strive to 
make things better.” Again, as evidence of a security leader profession 
in its earlier stages, titles of the person leading information security 
programs may be one of chief information security officer (CISO), chief 
security officer (CSO), security director, security manager, security 
practice leader, or other. A recent survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
indicated that 43% of consumer products/retail companies had some-
one in the role of CISO, whereas 83% of the financial services compa-
nies had someone in a similar position. A Computer Security Institute 
survey indicated that their respondents, primarily of the information 
security field, were composed of 23% holding the security officer title, 
13% CISO, 12% systems administrator, 6% CSO, 8% CIO, 7% CEO, 
and a full 32% in the “other” category. This is representative of the 
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security profession as a whole, where the CISO/CSO/Vice President 
title is often used in very large organizations, with the security direc-
tor and manager or security administrator titles appearing in small- to 
medium-sized organizations.
The actual title is less important than the fact that there is someone 
designated to drive and lead the information security program to a 
level that did not exist previously and one that the executive manage-
ment would be pleased with in terms of cost and benefit.
Techie versus Leader
Why would anyone want a job in the first place where a really bad 
day could be your last? Why would anyone sign up to deal with the 
plethora of government regulations, auditors, and users that have to 
comply with extra controls to get their work done? The answer is sim-
ple: Security officer is a very cool and rewarding job and profession. 
No matter what level of the organization the security officer is start-
ing out, given the appropriate skills, experience, and relationships, the 
opportunities are endless.
In the not too distant past, people were moved into the role of 
information security leader due to their success as a technician. Maybe 
the individual was a firewall administrator, system administrator, 
network administrator, security administrator, or jack-of-all-trades. 
The individual was promoted to the role of information security offi-
cer because of his or her technical knowledge and because informa-
tion security was primarily thought of as an IT function. Although 
the technical skills are still valued, they are not valued as much as the 
leadership skills necessary to hold the position in the long term.
Leadership skills separate the technical analyst from becoming an 
effective information security leader that provides added value to the 
business. This is not an issue that is new to IT, as organizations have 
dealt with the promotion issue for years within IT organizations. 
Many organizations promoted individuals who were very successful 
in their technical jobs, understanding standards, applying solutions 
to problems, fighting fires, developing new technology products based 
on emerging technologies, and so forth, and not based on their lead-
ership and people competency skills. These individuals, while tech-
nically sound, have to develop the same competencies that they are 
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missing, just as a new programming language must be learned. This is 
not to say that technical individuals are not successful in these roles, 
but rather to be successful requires recognition that these additional 
competencies must now be developed in the role of the security officer.
Left-brain thinking is necessary to bring the logical and analyti-
cal competencies to technical projects and is much different than the 
right-brain competencies necessary to manage relationships and the 
feelings of individuals involved in projects. The selection of the secu-
rity officer that is able to influence the organization to adopt secure 
practices, inspire a staff to go the extra mile, and maintain credibility 
within the organization over a long period of time, requires a good 
look into the “soft skill” side of the individual. Granted, the secu-
rity officer must understand the technology well enough to commu-
nicate with the technical staff, vendors, and be able to discern where 
the technologies will provide benefit to the business. As much as the 
technical security language is viewed as a baseline competency for 
security officers, the language of leadership must also be viewed as a 
baseline skill. Understanding the layers of TCP/IP are useful when 
designing security architectures, but have little relevance when try-
ing to explain to the board of directors why continuing investments 
need to be made in the information security program.
The Security Leaders Library
Just as the technical specialist has learned his trade through attend-
ing technical conferences and seminars and reading targeted techni-
cal books on the technology, so must the information security leader 
invest in books on leadership skills to continue the education in the 
skills that are important. Earlier in my career, I managed two groups 
of totaling forty-five Database Modelers and Database Analysts, 
including seven technical project managers for a major airline. During 
each monthly staff meeting, I created a 25-question multiple-choice 
quiz based upon one of the database development magazines at the 
time and offered a prize for answering 100% of the questions. I also 
challenged the team members to invest $1,000 of their own money 
annually on books and training materials. Some members took up 
the challenge; others disagreed that they should have to do this. This 
exercise and the suggestion that they invest their own money in their 
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careers served two purposes: (1) since I had to write the questions, I 
had to understand the content as well, which increased my learning 
and also showed the team members that I was committed to their 
work, and (2) each person has a responsibility to invest in his or her 
education, whether or not it is employer sponsored. The commitment 
to learning about leadership principles must be just as strong for the 
information security officer as learning how to optimize SQL and as 
database performance is to the database analyst.
Many books have been written on leadership skills over the years. 
Leadership books tend to be a favorite staple at airport newsstands, 
as business people seem to be on the constant search for understand-
ing the answers to the questions such as: What is leadership? What 
makes successful companies more successful than their competitors? 
Are leaders born or made? Is there a secret formula? The books are 
presented as short stories such as The Present (Johnson, 2003) pro-
viding parables on learning from the past, living in the present, and 
planning for the future; how-to books like The Effective Executive 
(Drucker, 2004) providing insights on managing knowledge workers 
from great leadership analysts such as the late management guru Peter 
Drucker; or the slicing and dicing of companies in the same industries 
to discern the differences in books such as Good to Great. Alternatively 
there are the abridged versions of leadership available through small 
paperbacks such as Tom Peter’s Leadership Essentials (2005) series, or 
books packed full of time-management-type tips such as Never Check 
E-Mail in the Morning (Morgenstern, 2004). Otto Kroeger and Janet 
M. Thuesen leverage individual personality differences in the work 
environment in psychology titles such as Type Talk at Work (1992). Of 
course there is the staple leadership series by Stephen R. Covey on 
the Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (2004). Each of these books 
contributes in their own way to some facet of leadership, helping to 
recognize the leadership capacity of individuals and companies.
Security Leadership Defined
Definitions are useful to provide the context and create a common 
language. Security leadership is about the application of the soft skill 
competencies to the business of information security. Many of the 
leadership books focus on the growth of their organizations through 
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product innovation, increasing market share, cost containment and 
reduction, engaging the workforce in the company’s vision, expanding 
services and markets, leveraging information technology, and devel-
oping appropriate strategies and action plans. Information security 
should be regarded as a business within a business, whereby the lead-
ership strategies presented in the leadership literature are adopted to 
create a successful, sustaining, long-term business that supports the 
mission of the parent business. In other words, the information secu-
rity department must lead in such a way that enables the core business 
function to depend upon their supporting services to meet the overall 
vision of the company. Effective security leadership blends the techni-
cal, business, and soft skill knowledge to support the business needs.
Security Leader Soft Skills
Security officers today now find themselves interacting with many 
different levels across the organization, from the board of directors, 
C-suite, senior and middle management, peers, and end users. They 
are no longer communicating with just the IT staff and those front-
line managers end users needing logon IDs and access to systems. 
Security officers are being increasingly involved in determining strat-
egy, engaging in new product releases, and providing input to solutions 
that reduce the bottom-line costs to the organization (e.g., outsourc-
ing, off shoring, usage of personal mobile devices) without increasing 
risk beyond an acceptable level. The interaction with individuals from 
multiple levels and different disciplines in a team environment require 
a new set of skills, primarily soft or nontechnical skills to advance 
the security agenda. Figure 3.1 from a survey of 100 security leaders 
shows the relative importance of the different skill areas (Fitzgerald 
and Krause, 2008). Notice that technical knowledge was not the most 
important, but rather those skills such as oral and written communi-
cation, influence, teamwork, collaboration, and self-confidence were.
Seven Competencies for Effective Security Leadership
There are seven key areas that information security officers should 
honestly evaluate themselves as to where they stand. Why seven? 
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The reason is that the human mind has difficulty juggling more than 
seven things at once. Too many goals lead to frustration, confusion, 
hopelessness, and procrastination to start any of them. Narrowing the 
focus to a number of key areas and developing an action plan to build 
upon the strengths and enhance the areas needing improvement will 
contribute greatly to a security leader’s career. When a technical secu-
rity analyst is faced with a situation where something does not work, 
the approach is to go to the documentation, manuals, and test; seek 
advice from colleagues; and try, try again until a solution is found. The 
same approach applies to enhancing leadership skills; it is an iterative 
process of trial and error, and focus on the discipline of leadership. 
Stephen Covey’s landmark book, The Seven Habits of Highly Effective 
People (2004), first explored the value of providing a seven-step, easy 
to comprehend method to achieve greater results. These competencies 
are not the soft skills noted in the earlier section, but rather represent 
the higher-level application of the soft skills toward organizational 
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Figure 3.1 Security management competencies/skills. (Fitzgerald, t., and Krause, M, 2008, 
CISO Leadership Essential Principles for Success, new york, auerbach.)
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the security leader should be able to use that knowledge to achieve 
greater results by practicing the seven competencies. The seven com-
petencies for effective security leadership are shown in Figure 3.2.
1. Understand the Organizational Culture
Organizations establish a culture or “the way things are done around 
here” that is unique to the organization. Culture is created over time 
based upon the past and present leadership, history, geographic dis-
persion, collaborative versus hierarchical decision making, profit-
ability, industry regulations, and each individual person within the 
organization. Every individual brings their own unique set of values, 
backgrounds, experiences, and capabilities into the workplace every 
day, in other words their own individual “culture.”
The effective security officer understands how the organization 
works, what is accepted and what is not. Do people normally bend 
the rules to get the job done? Does the organization reward taking 
chances for innovation or does it view those activities as violating 
the prescribed rules? Does a strong individual in a position of for-
mal authority make decisions unilaterally, or is consensus building 
and collaboration expected? Are individuals regularly working 60 to 
70 hours a week with high energy and commitment, or is there stress 
and burnouts evidenced by continuous turnovers and new-hire recruit-
ing? Are individuals recognized or is there an effort to recognize the 
contributions of the entire team? Is customer service the key driver 
1. Understand
    the Organizational
    Culture
2. Communicate Real Risk 3. Engage Associates
    at all Organizational Levels
4. Pay Attention to
    Technical Competence
5. Be an Insider6. Set Realistic, but
Aggressive Goals
7. Collaborate and Network





Figure 3.2 Seven competencies of effective security leadership.
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of the organization at all costs or is the focus on engineering the best 
new product, in other words, where is the organization placing its 
investment dollars? Spending time to understand this focus will help 
the security officer position the programs effectively and learn how to 
get the deliverables accomplished.
2. Communicate Real Risk
The sky is falling! The sky is falling! Security is not either (1) in place 
or (2) not in place. As security professionals, there is obviously the 
desire to secure the environment through managerial, technical, and 
operational controls to the highest degree possible; however, there are 
degrees of protection between no security and absolute 100% security 
that are acceptable for the business. Executives are used to dealing 
with risk, every single day. Business risk is accepted by underwriting 
new insurance policies, entering new markets, adding new services, 
outsourcing business lines, merging with or acquiring other compa-
nies, making technology investments, and so forth.
To be adept in communicating with the business executives about 
risk, the security officer must be able to capture metrics, meaningful 
metrics, by which the value of security can be seen by the business. 
This is not an easy task, as it depends very much on first understanding 
what is important to the business. Companies mired in government 
regulations may want metrics related to the compliance efforts. It may 
be useful in product- or service-focused companies to relate the secu-
rity metrics of availability and loss prevention to the individual product 
lines and services that are produced by the company, demonstrating 
the business value, or contribution, of security to the key products. 
Executives also want to know what their competitors are doing, with 
the goal being to match the security practices of the competitor. Why 
match? Matching ensures that the organization is spending enough 
on security, while not spending an excessive amount. The only excep-
tion may be in an environment where security can be promoted as a 
competitive advantage to gain the trust of the consumer. In today’s 
environment, these competitive advantages for security appear to be 
evaporating and have become expected as the norm.
Lengthy, risk-analysis-by-the-pound documents should be a 
thing of the past. Although these analyses may be very detailed, 
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thorough, and accurate in describing the risk, in practice, these 
documents become shelfware and as such offer limited value. 
Qualitative approaches permit faster analysis and getting the results 
in front of the executives in a way that the issues can be discussed. 
Even if a detailed quantitative approach is the chosen method, the 
pragmatic security officer will reduce the voluminous data into clear, 
manageable, summarized proposals that relate the risk to the busi-
ness product or service that will be impacted if the risk is not miti-
gated or reduced.
3. Engage Associates at All Organizational Levels
Security happens at all levels within the organization, from the board 
of directors to the end users to the middle management and front-line 
supervisors in between. The security officer must be visible, accessible, 
and approachable to all associates. The security awareness programs 
provide an excellent opportunity for the security officer to develop 
relationships with all associates. Establishing these relationships are 
very important for the security officer to discern what is really going 
on within the organization, beyond the documented policies and pro-
cedures. When the rapport is established, individuals are much more 
likely to seek out the security officer for security advice, concerns, or 
to report security incidents.
Security councils with management representation for each of the 
primary business units, human resources, information technology, 
legal, compliance, risk management, internal audit, physical security, 
and so forth are effective tools for establishing the buy-in of developed 
policies. These councils also establish a linkage between the security 
department and the business where the business concerns and impedi-
ments to the business can be discussed. Security departments these 
days want to be viewed as enablers of the business; however, with-
out the existence of a council, the departments may still be viewed as 
the controllers of getting the work done, or “some techie department 
within information technology” that does not understand the business 
needs. Whether this would be a fair representation depends upon the 
actions of the security department. An added advantage of the security 
council is that the mere existence of such a body promotes the percep-
tion that the security department is there to support the business.
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4. Pay Attention to Technical Competence; It Is Still Needed
Understanding the business and developing the business acumen is 
undoubtedly a key element to the security officer’s success. Continuing 
to stay abreast of technology developments is also important so that the 
security officer is aware of the technical capabilities, which may bene-
fit the business. The security leader must have a broad understanding of 
the technologies available, leaving the deep technical understanding 
to the information security analysts and other IT professionals. The 
security officer must be able to converse with business people in non-
technical terms and with information technology people in technical 
terms. With access to the Internet, free newsletters, webinars, and 
security conferences, there is no reason that the security officer cannot 
dedicate one hour per day to maintaining the technical discipline.
This is different than the technical skills that were referred to ear-
lier as being less important. The difference here is that the security 
officer is not engaging in the mastery of the technical skills, but rather 
is maintaining (1) a sufficient awareness of the technology that exists, 
and (2) the ability to obtain information through self-study and lever-
aging the knowledge of the technical staff to provide strategic and 
tactical security direction in support of the company initiatives.
5. Be an Insider
Does it seem like you are the last one to know what is going on in the 
organization? Do you wait for the org chart to come out to see if you have 
a seat on the bus? Build internal relationships and support colleagues 
with their projects. They need to also know who you are and what value 
you bring to the organization. Organizations are designed to get work 
done to accomplish the organizational goal. Taking accountability for 
individual actions, delivering the services when promised, and being a 
good team player working to contribute to other individual’s projects, 
as well as the security initiatives, builds trust within those relationships.
6. Set Realistic But Aggressive Goals
Goals need to be set around a vision, strategy, and concrete action 
plans. These plans should be multiyear created through a realistic, 
but aggressive mind-set. The first question should be, What does the 
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business need from information security to be successful? Visions and 
strategies that are not connected with specific action plans with deliv-
erables and discrete completion dates do not move the security pro-
gram forward. Success also needs to be delivered within the first three 
to four months of a security officer’s arrival to build the confidence 
for future endeavors. It is better to miss a goal that was established 
than to never set one and use hope as a strategy. Action plans are 
essential to establishing accountability, responsibility, and ensuring 
that the appropriate resources are dedicated to security.
7. Collaborate and Network Outside of the Company
The security field is very complex and has many areas of specialization. 
Some individuals have focused their activities on security awareness, 
computer forensics, disaster recovery, physical security, access control 
across multiple platforms, identity management, remote access, vulner-
ability, penetrating testing, and the list goes on. One must understand 
the vertical industry, how market share is achieved, competitor profiles, 
marketing strategies, product development, and the specific language of 
the business. It is unreasonable to expect that one individual has all they 
need to know about any of these topics. There are many opportunities 
for networking through security conferences, participation in industry 
advisory groups, attending external business meetings with business 
partners, and establishing relationships with individuals met at the 
various forums. In today’s e-mail, text messaging, Xbox–PlayStation-
paced, “iPhone, iPad, Android, BlackBerry person at the click of a 
button” world, answers to questions from peers are invaluable. Many 
people are more than willing to share their expertise with someone that 
is passionate about their work. These collaborations reveal many other 
people that are struggling with the same issues. Collaboration is a two-
way street, where deposits need to be made (sharing own expertise) 
before substantial withdrawals can be taken (obtaining expertise).
Security Functions
Learning from Leading Organizations
In an effort to understand what leading organizations were doing to 
meet the information security challenges, the General Accounting 
53deFInIng the seCurIty mAnAgement orgAnIzAtIon
Office (GAO) studied several leading organizations in 1998 to deter-
mine what activities we performed by organizations that were leaders 
in information security. It found that five critical functions were con-
sistently applied as shown in Figure 3.3.
Assess Risk and Determine Needs To many security practitioners assess-
ing the risk and determining needs would appear as a logical, if not 
obvious, first step. However, how many times have we have seen a 
knee-jerk reaction to implement a new policy or procedure, or buy 
a technical product without first understanding what the real busi-
ness risk is to the organization? Assessing risk, which is provided in 
more detail in Chapter 5, weighs the cost of implementing the control 
against the losses that would be experienced by the organization if the 
risk is not mitigated. The analysis may bear out the fact that it is more 












Figure 3.3 Security leadership, learning from leading organizations. (united States General 
accounting office. 1998. Executive guide: Information security management; Learning 
from leading organizations. http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ai98068.pdf)
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For example, an organization sponsoring the annual auto show of new 
cars could perceive that there is the potential threat of someone angry 
with a car manufacturer from a personal bad experience (e.g., they 
may have purchased a “lemon” in the past or had a car’s brakes mal-
function at a critical time) and may want to retaliate against the car 
company by keying or vandalizing the display vehicle. The auto show 
could implement controls such as roped-off areas around the cars or 
by requesting that each person deposit their keys in a container before 
approaching the car. Most of us would find either of these controls 
as silly or unwarranted, as most people would be well-behaved and 
not present a risk. Implementation of a control of this type would 
be unnecessary and would be viewed by many as an overreaction. 
Conversely, many times cars in the $100,000 and up range will typi-
cally have their doors locked, as they do not want to risk damage to 
the shifting mechanisms on the cars. People appear to understand 
why these vehicles have additional security controls. Cameras are also 
installed in the convention center, so any damage that would result 
would be detected versus prevented.
The car example illustrates what can happen in organizations if the 
security department does not take into account the business needs 
of the operation and unilaterally implements security controls. The 
purpose of the risk assessment is to determine what the adequate level 
of controls needs to be. Organizations that best manage security view 
the risk assessment as a critical first step in the process.
Implement Policies and Controls Once the risk is determined, the 
appropriate policies and controls to support the policies are imple-
mented. Policies are specific to the organization and take into account 
the needs of the organization and support the business operations. 
Controls are selected that match the risk profile of the organization 
and reduce the likelihood and impact of a security breach. In the care 
example, the implementation of cameras may be a sufficient control, 
while still permitting individuals to experience the auto show and 
be able to sit in the vehicles they may be interested in. Policies that 
govern the implementation of cameras and salesperson monitoring 
of the customers need to be written to ensure that those individuals 
coordinating the show know what is expected of them. The NIST has 
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produced an excellent special publication (800-53) for federal infor-
mation systems for control selection titled “Recommended Controls 
for Federal Information Systems and Organizations.” This reference 
contains controls for low-, medium-, and high-risk systems and can be 
applied to nongovernment environments as well. The publication ISO/
IEC 27002: Security Techniques—Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management is also an excellent resource for the types of 
control that should be implemented, albeit this framework does not 
go to the level of detail as that of NIST publication 800-53.
Traditionally, laws have not been very prescriptive in defining the 
information security controls needed, as this must be governed by 
the risk of the system, the technology that is available, scalability, and 
the resources that are available to the organization. Hence, the assess-
ment of adequate controls is somewhat subjective and depends upon 
the exposure of the individual performing the assessment to different 
alternatives that have been successfully implemented in organizations 
with similar size and similar issues. Guidance is starting to emerge 
from the experiences within vertical industries to create best practices, 
good practices, essential practices, and so forth to deal with some of 
the issues. One organization may determine that it is willing to accept 
the risk of smartphone protection by requiring a password be imple-
mented on the phone. Other organizations may view this control as 
insufficient and require that the password also be made a strong pass-
word by company policy, requiring that the password be eight charac-
ters, include at least one upper and one lower case character, along with 
at least one special character (@, &, $, %, etc.). Another organization 
may require even stronger controls and require that the password be 
technically enforced and that the device is remotely wiped after three 
invalid attempts, and the user attest to a smartphone security train-
ing if a reset is required. Another organization may decide that the 
technology of the Android or iPhone is not appropriate for business 
usage and are not allowed, while another may yet encourage the use 
the use of a non-company-owned device and provide complete sup-
port with the addition of a third-party security product. The choices 
may seem endless for each decision that must be made, which further 
illustrates the importance of performing an adequate risk analysis and 
then implementing the appropriate controls to mitigate or reduce the 
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risk to an acceptable level. Just as new risks are continually emerging, 
so are the methods with which to mitigate the risk.
Promote Awareness Most people want to do the right thing in life; they 
just need to be aware of what the right thing is. If policies and con-
trols are not properly communicated, this step becomes very difficult. 
Security departments often will draft voluminous policy documents and 
then wonder why they are not being followed (techniques for increasing 
the success of security policy development are noted in Chapter 6 about 
security policy development). People cannot be held responsible for pol-
icies that they have not seen or understand. As much effort that went 
into determining the risk and deciding what controls were appropriate, 
should also be placed in ensuring that the individuals responsible for 
executing the policies and procedures understand and are able to imple-
ment the controls. Otherwise, nice documents exist, but the security 
controls are not protecting the information assets as desired.
Monitor and Evaluate If everything worked well the first time around, 
monitoring would be unnecessary. Unfortunately, security controls 
may be effective at the time they are first implemented; however, due 
to changing circumstances, they must be re-evaluated periodically to 
remain effective. Threat levels may increase, technology changes, pro-
cedures are found to be implemented differently than designed, busi-
ness requirements change, and so forth. Organizations may change 
and the person that once was very diligent in performing the control 
has now left and the new person has not been executing the control as 
frequently or, worse yet, not at all. Or the policy changes such that all 
employees visiting another office outside of their home office is consid-
ered a visitor and must sign out at the end of the day. Without proper 
monitoring to ensure the policy and control are being executed, it may 
never be discovered that employees were not made aware of the policy 
change and it was not being practiced consistently. Monitoring would 
also discover if all of the security guards themselves were appropri-
ately notified of the change in policy.
Central Management Leading organizations also recognized that 
someone needed to be focused on ensuring that the aforementioned 
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four activities were occurring. Organizations are busy, dynamic insti-
tutions that have many competing demands for expenditures and 
resources. Just as other parts of the organization need management 
to set direction and ensure that resources are being appropriately 
used to meet the mission of the business, management is also needed 
to be focused on managing information security. While there will be 
components that may be decentralized, typically due to business unit 
differences or geographic differences, the overall security program 
should be unified to provide the sharing of practices across the mul-
tiple business units and locations.
This model while appearing simple can be a very powerful way to 
address information security management by guiding an informa-
tion security program to perform the right activities. Every organi-
zation is constrained by the resources available to it, whether time, 
cost, materials, or labor, and by starting with the risk assessment to 
determine the real needs and implementing the appropriate controls, 
communicating those controls, and following up to ensure that the 
controls are still adequate and properly implemented, the organiza-
tion will continually enhance the security of the environment it oper-
ates within.
What Functions Should the Security Officer Be Responsible For?
If we accept the proposition that leading organizations address each 
of the five critical functions in the model previously described and 
depicted in Figure 3.4, then a useful approach would be to identify 
the related security activities that must be performed to achieve the 
due diligence suggested by the model. Organizations may have all of 
these functions reporting to the information security officer or may 
decide to segregate the functions between multiple departments, 
such as a chief security officer maintaining responsibility for policy 
development, while an IT security manager retains responsibility for 
security violation monitoring. Before delving into the discussion as to 
what functions should report where, let’s describe the core security 
functions that must be addressed somewhere within the organization 
as shown in Figure 3.4.
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Assessing Risk and Determining Needs Functions
The three security functions that support the assessing risk and deter-
mining needs activity in the model are risk assessment/analysis, sys-
tems security plan development, and external penetration testing. In 
other words, performing these three activities will satisfy this activity 
within the model. These should be considered functions that need to 
be performed somewhere within the company. Larger organizations 
may have whole departments performing risk assessments, whereas 
smaller organizations may assign one person to complete the risk 
assessment and systems security plan development and may outsource 
external penetration testing. What is important is that someone per-
forms each of these functions, otherwise an important component of 
information security will be missed and the controls chosen may not 
be sufficient to protect the information assets.
Risk Assessment/Analysis Risk assessment, or also known as risk 
analysis, is the formal process of reviewing the threats facing the 
criticaL Function reLated activity
assess risk and determine needs risk assessment/analysis
System security plan development
external penetration testing
implement policies and controls Security policy development
Security architecture
Security control assessment
identity and access management
Business continuity and disaster recovery
Promote awareness end user security awareness training
intranet site and policy publication
targeted awareness




Management of managed services
incident response
Forensic investigations
central management audit liaison
Plan of action and milestones
Figure 3.4 Security critical functions and related security activities.
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organization, reviewing the likelihood or probability that vulnerabil-
ity could be exploited, and the impact of the event should it occur. 
This is a key function of the information security department and 
performing the risk assessment as accurately as possible is the key to 
ensuring that money is spent in the more productive manner to reduce 
the security risk. This is also one of the most difficult functions to per-
form for the information security department, as it can be very chal-
lenging to obtain information on what the real risk may be. At the end 
of the day, risk assessments become subjective in nature. For example, 
what is the risk that a newly drafted first-round National Football 
League quarterback will face a career-ending injury during the first 
5 years after the draft? Or the likelihood that the quarterback will 
take the team to the Super Bowl within 5 years? Past statistics may be 
used; however, as noted in many investment recommendations, past 
performance does not guarantee future results. Sometimes it is very 
difficult to determine the risk by not having a particular security con-
trol in place. Organizations many times do not have the broad per-
spective to determine what the risk would be and will hire an external 
consultant to provide an assessment or gap analysis of the security 
controls. External consulting organizations, whether they are large 
Big Four accounting firms or smaller security firms, can bring the 
experience gained from multiple assessments at multiple clients into 
the organization. This is not to suggest that adequate risk analysis 
cannot be done solely from staff within the organization. However, to 
leverage the external experience from other organizations, this is one 
area where external firms are typically engaged as a first step. Once 
the organization has more experience performing risk assessments 
and has a clearer understanding of the threats, vulnerabilities, and 
controls in place, it may decide to perform the risk assessment solely 
in-house.
Systems Security Plan Development The name “systems security plan” 
is somewhat misleading, as a systems security plan (SSP) is not really 
a plan at all but rather a document that provides a snapshot of the 
security controls at a point in time. The SSP contains the contact 
information for the system; documents the criticality/sensitivity level 
of the system; describes the business use of the system; defines the 
system boundaries and system interconnections; and describes the 
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managerial, operational and technical controls that are in place to 
protect the information assets contained within the system. Systems 
may be general support systems, whereby they represent intercon-
nected sets of information resources under the same direct manage-
ment control that shares common functionality, or they may be major 
applications that are defined because they require special attention 
due to risk and magnitude of harm resulting from loss, misuse, or 
unauthorized access or modification of information in the application.
Developing an SSP is much more than just a documentation exer-
cise, as the process of creating the plan brings clarity to the information 
system, the boundaries, and how it is protected. In medium to large 
organizations, a common answer when asking people about specifics 
of the computing environment or security controls is, “I don’t know.” 
The larger the organization and the more specialized the knowledge is 
across knowledge workers (e.g., information security, midrange infra-
structure, network, and application development), the more this type 
of response should be expected. Individuals in different areas know 
their piece of the puzzle and are not necessarily expected to know what 
is going on in the rest of the organization. For example, the firewall 
administrator on the network team may know what firewalls are in 
place, what ports are open, and what baselines are applied, but might 
not know how often the firewall logs are reviewed by the security net-
work monitoring team reporting to the IT security operations man-
ager or what types of events are being monitored. So, depending upon 
whether the organization views the development of the SSP as purely 
a documentation exercise or if it is viewed as an opportunity to obtain 
clarity around the security controls will determine the ultimate value 
to the risk assessment process.
External Penetration Testing External penetration testing provides 
some comfort, or discomfort, that the security controls intended to 
block external entry into the systems are functional and working as 
designed. These are typically performed minimally on an annual basis, 
usually in conjunction with an overall risk assessment. Penetration 
testing is also typically done by an external organization, as most 
organizations do not have the resources available to keep up with the 
latest tools and attacks that may be used to gain unauthorized access 
from an external source. The value of external penetration tests is 
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subject for debate, as it shows at one point in time the controls that 
a skilled attacker may be able to circumvent. Since organizations do 
not have the resources to spend to be 100% secure, it is likely with 
the budgets of more security departments that the attacker will find 
some way to infiltrate the organization. Technical means through the 
use of a step-by-step procedure to locate weaknesses through the run-
ning of foot printing and reconnaissance tools, as well as the use of 
social engineering (e.g., pretending to be someone from the help desk 
to obtain information or entering the building and plugging into an 
open LAN jack in a conference room), are both used to attempt entry. 
Odds are that the penetration test will reveal one or more vulnerabili-
ties within the environment. Security managers are often required 
to have penetration testing performed at least once a year to meet a 
compliance regulation, or may use penetration testing as a method to 
raise visibility to security vulnerabilities to obtain more resources or 
funding to reduce the risk.
Implement Policies and Control Functions
Security Policy Development Security policy development is covered 
extensively in another chapter, but suffice it to say that without a for-
mal, documented information security policy, the organization has no 
assurance that there is a common set of rules or practices that can be 
depended upon. The information security policy is the most visible 
document that the information security department creates. The docu-
ment is necessary to guide the actions of everyone with respect to infor-
mation security and need to be easily available and read by everyone.
Security Architecture Security architecture provides the security 
research and technical review of information security products to 
ensure that the appropriate security tools are purchased to solve the 
right problems. There are different methods to protect the envi-
ronment, such as deciding between one vulnerability scanner over 
another. One may have more robust reporting features, whereas the 
other may be more accurate, delivering fewer false positives and rep-
resenting more value to the organization. Likewise security archi-
tecture needs to be considered when purchasing products to ensure 
that they are compatible with existing products that are already in 
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use. The purchase of an identity management system running on a 
Unix platform may not have interfaces with the Windows-based help 
desk ticketing system and require custom coding to make the sys-
tem operational. Alternatively, the product may come bundled with 
an internal ticketing system that may not be as robust. The purchaser 
of the potential system would typically issue request for proposals 
(RFPs); talk with industry analysts such as Gartner Group, Burton, 
or Forrester and perform independent research; have vendors provide 
presentations; and talk with existing customers of the product. The 
goal of security architecture is to define a set of compatible products 
and processes to support the security controls that are necessary to 
mitigate the risks discovered in the risk assessment.
Security Control Assessment If the risk assessment is the brain of the 
security program, the security controls are the heart. Keeping the secu-
rity controls flowing through the organizational veins on a continuous 
basis provides the protection needed. Security controls can be divided 
into three primary classifications—managerial, operational, and tech-
nical. Because the implementation of the security controls is core to 
the creation of a good security program, the controls are covered in 
detail in Chapters 8 through 10. Controls should be assessed on an 
annual basis at a minimum, and in practice are examined more often 
by internal and external auditors. A good practice is to review all con-
trols annually and further test one-third of the controls each year. 
Processes and technologies rarely stay static year after year and should 
be tested when changed.
Identity and Access Management Identity and access management is 
typically a department on its own due to the size of the staff required 
to administer the function and the focus being primarily operational 
in nature. This area ensures that logon IDs are created and access is 
appropriately authorized by management and provisioned to the end 
user. Organizations that are more mature have embraced automation 
of the ID creation, whereby access is then requested based upon a 
profile (set of predefined accesses for a particular job function or role 
versus an individual need) and access is automatically provisioned. 
The benefit of this approach is the speed by which requests can be 
filled, as once the electronic approvals are received from the manager, 
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the system is performing the provisioning work. These products are 
still in their infancy and applications typically require custom cod-
ing to provide the automation, which can be very expensive. These 
implementations can cost well into the millions, placing them out of 
reach for small- to medium-sized companies. Short of purchasing a 
product, simplified solutions using electronic forms and e-mail can be 
created at a relatively low cost to reduce the workflow time to man-
age the access administration. This function is the function that most 
people think of when they think of information security. Increasingly, 
this function is being challenged with finding ways to lower costs and 
perform the same work with fewer resources, as this area represents an 
operational, nonstrategic overhead cost to the business.
Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Business continuity provides 
the analysis as to whether the business can sustain operations in the 
event of a disaster, whereas disaster recovery is largely thought of as 
bringing the information technology resources back online in the 
event of a disaster. As seen in recent years, the world has no shortage 
of disasters, whether it is an East Coast power grid blackout, flood-
ing in North Dakota, earthquakes in Japan, oil spills in the Gulf 
of Mexico, closing of European airports due to volcanic ash, or the 
collapse of a major bridge in Minnesota. Each disaster brings new 
attention to business continuity and disaster recovery practices. The 
business continuity and disaster recovery teams need to exercise tests 
each year to ensure that the computer systems can be brought up in a 
remote location. They also conduct mock tests with different depart-
ments to ensure their business continuity plans are still accurate, and 
also lead emergency crisis management teams, made up of senior 
management, to ensure that the organization can react to a crisis or 
unexpected event. For example, if there are blizzard conditions near 
the call center, should the call center close? Will call center employ-
ees be able to work from home and provide the same level of service? 
Should the work shift to another, geographically different location to 
handle the calls? How will people get to work if the offices remain 
open? Who makes the decision and based upon what information? 
All of these questions would be answered by the business continuity 
and disaster recovery function. This function would also create busi-
ness impact assessments (BIAs) to determine the amount of time the 
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company could afford to be without the information. They would also, 
with business participation, prioritize the systems in the order they 
needed to be brought back online.
Each of these functions contributes toward defining the requisite 
controls to protect the information system. Due to the different skills 
required in each of the control areas, as well as the diverse interest 
areas, it is also likely in medium- to large-sized organizations that 
different individuals are performing each of these functions. For 
example, security policy development requires the ability to translate 
technical jargon into communications that the nontechnical end user 
can understand. Likewise, the business continuity and disaster recov-
ery areas require the ability to work with management and understand 
where business needs may not be met in the event of a disaster, as well 
as manage the technical ability to bring up the system operating envi-
ronment and coordinate end user testing to ensure the functionality 
is present. Identify and Access management requires the ability to be 
customer service oriented and manage multiple “gotta have it now” 
requests and complete the access requests in a timely basis.
Promote Awareness Functions
The goal of promoting awareness is to ensure that the security policies 
and procedures are available to those beyond the information security 
department. Everyone in the organization should be able to locate 
them. A random test asking questions about the security policy across 
the organization would reveal how effective the communications are. 
Many organizations put much effort into the development of infor-
mation security policies, only to see them not followed because of a 
lack of communication. Timely security incidents or currents news 
items can be leveraged in a subtle way to highlight the existence of 
internal security policies.
End User Security Awareness Training End users need to be able to do 
two basic actions with respect to information security: (1) recognize 
when an incident occurs or what could cause an incident to occur, 
and (2) where to report the incident when the incident does happen. 
The end users are the eyes and ears of information security and a 
crucial piece in ensuring that security is being administered. Security 
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“awareness” is just that—not the in-depth technical understanding 
that a security analyst may need for their jobs, but rather an under-
standing of how they are to handle and protect information entrusted 
to them. This function ensures that this training is provided prior 
to any systems access, refreshed and administered at least annually, 
and supplemented with interim e-mails, newsletters, awareness cam-
paigns, and so forth.
Intranet Site and Policy Publication The security policies need to be 
readily accessible by all associates and contractors within the organiza-
tion. The policies can be posted on the intranet site, or made available 
through policy management software that can track user acknowl-
edgement that they have read, understood, and accepted the security 
policies. Providing the end users with a Google-type search engine 
is also very useful in delivering security policy content to enable end 
users to quickly locate information.
Targeted Awareness Delivering the information security message 
should not be limited to the training sessions and posting of the poli-
cies, as the message needs to be continually communicated at all lev-
els. The security department should establish a formal communication 
plan, whereby different audiences are made aware of the information 
security requirements. Information can be distributed through par-
ticipation by a standing agenda item in the managers’ meetings, IT 
steering committees, or by monthly attending a different departmental 
staff meeting to communicate plans and listen to their issues. Specific 
technical training should also be provided to those areas in need, such 
as the server engineer that needs to understand the security settings 
in the active directory, or the network administrator that learns about 
the audit capabilities for the network firewalls and routers. Although 
all users can benefit from the generalized end-user security awareness 
training, others will need training adapted to their specific needs.
Monitor and Evaluate Functions
The following functions are excellent candidates for the creation of 
a security operations center or SOC team within the information 
security department. This group provides the oversight for the other 
66 InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
areas outside information security to ensure that security is given the 
appropriate attention. Separating the function provides stronger con-
trol through the separation of duties.
Security Baseline Configuration Review Each computing platform 
should have a defined security baseline to limit the exposure of exploits. 
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has developed 
a series of checklists known as Security Technical Implementation 
Guides (STIGs) that contain the security settings that should be in 
place to protect the environment. For example, parameters such as 
password lockout attempts, revision history, or what services should 
be enabled are set. The security department should ensure that the 
security configurations are reviewed and monitored on a frequent 
basis, preferably quarterly at a minimum.
Maintenance of the security baselines typically resides in the oper-
ational, infrastructure areas that are responsible for those platforms. It 
is important that baselines be developed for each platform and are fre-
quently reviewed when new releases of the standards are available. This 
can be a time-consuming task to ensure (1) baselines are developed for 
each operational platform (e.g., Windows, Unix, Mainframe, RACF, 
Oracle, SQL databases, virtualization servers, network devices, desk-
tops), (2) baselines are kept up to date, (3) baselines are properly docu-
mented, (4) exceptions to the baselines are approved by management 
and documented, (5) baselines are tested prior to rolling out to pro-
duction, (6) all devices are monitored and compared to the baseline, 
(7) a corrective action plan process exists to upgrade to the current 
baseline if necessary, and (8) quarterly reviews of compliance are con-
ducted. The information security department is in the best position 
to provide leadership to ensure that the baselines are being kept up to 
date and applied to the devices within the environment.
The security department can coordinate weekly meetings with 
the operational areas to review the compliance with the baselines 
and track the process that is being made. The additional oversight 
increases the likelihood that security baselines will receive the proper 
attention. The security department can also play a role in ensuring 
that changes to the standards the baselines are built upon (i.e., DISA, 
Federal Desktop Core Configuration [FDCC]) are communicated to 
the operational areas in a timely manner.
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Logging and Monitoring An organization cannot be really sure what 
attempts are being made to exploit vulnerabilities to access informa-
tion unless there is an active monitoring program in place. Some 
organizations do a great job of collecting logs, however, there is no 
formal log review process in place and the logs are merely saved in the 
event an investigation is initiated. This can cause undesired events to 
go undetected, as the reliance then becomes dependent upon some 
other external stimulus to kick off an investigation. Log monitoring 
should be a daily event to be effective, even if a subset of the informa-
tion is reviewed (e.g., administrator privilege access).
Since log data can be voluminous, security departments will often 
use a security information and event management (SIEM) product to 
aggregate and correlate the log information, a reporting tool, or cre-
ate scripts to reduce the amount of data that must be reviewed. Logs 
are reviewed for external infiltration events and administrator access 
attempts, as well as the review of internal users and excessive login 
attempts. A threshold of the number of violations should be estab-
lished, after while follow-up is required. Training can then be provided 
to the habitual user that is not following information security access 
policy. Due to the time-consuming efforts in reviewing the log, auto-
mation has a large payoff in this area. Many times the reports produced 
for the platforms are rudimentary and can be difficult to use unless 
some automation of the output is created to determine the exceptions.
Vulnerability Assessment Vulnerability assessments are frequently con-
fused with penetration testing, and they represent two different 
activities. Penetration testing is the practice of attempting to gain 
entry to the system and typically obtaining higher-level privileges 
to demonstrate that the information assumed to be protected by the 
organization could be disclosed, modified, corrupted, or deleted by an 
unauthorized user outside of the organization. Vulnerability assess-
ments on the other hand test for flaws in the system, mainly soft-
ware and hardware, to determine where the exposures are that could 
be potentially exploited. The vulnerabilities are usually determined 
by running software tools (e.g., Tenable’s Nessus, nCircle’s IP360, 
Application Security’s DbProtect) against the computing platform. 
Individual identifiers are associated with each vulnerability for track-
ing and remediation purposes. The risk level is also reported by the 
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tools so that those of the highest risk can be acted on immediately. 
Most tools also provide the links to the patch or release level that 
should be applied to fix the issue.
The vulnerability scans should be run on a frequent basis, at least 
quarterly at a minimum. A good process is for information security to 
administer the scans and feed the information into a tracking docu-
ment for the high and medium risk items, such as an access database 
or Excel spreadsheet, and establish owners and commitment dates 
for mitigation of the issues found in the scans. Weekly meetings to 
resolve the issues can be held, and the expectation to complete all 
issues within 90 days of the scan, or a senior executive (e.g., chief 
information officer [CIO]) justification and approval is needed. There 
will always be some issues that the operational areas will not be able 
to complete within 90 days; however, these should be the exceptions 
due to a lengthy process to resolve or a major system implementation 
or upgrade that is preventing progress. For example, a vendor product 
may require a version of Java that is five versions back that contains 
known exploits, however, the product is not scheduled for update/
new release until 6 months from now. The organization may decide to 
temporarily accept the risk until the new release is available.
Vulnerability scans are necessary to ensuring that holes have not 
been inadvertently created within the computing infrastructure.
Internet Monitoring/Management of Managed Services Companies that 
do not have the staff to provide 24/7 monitoring of the externally 
facing devices may consider the use of managed security services to 
provide the monitoring. These organizations can achieve economies of 
scale by monitoring multiple clients in different shifts. Outsourcing 
to an external company does not dismiss the need of internal staff to 
respond to the security incidents. It typically requires an on-call per-
son on the company security team that will be able to respond if there 
is a critical theat. Service level agreements should be put in place as 
to the services that will be provided and the timeframes expected to 
respond to issues.
Incident Response The ability to respond quickly to incidents depends 
largely on how well the process is thought out in advance. Valuable 
time can be lost during an incident if there is not a process in place, 
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and the result may be following a very chaotic, unorganized process 
of determining what has happened, containing the security inci-
dent, and eradicating the damage that was caused. Mistakes can be 
made without a well-defined process. The security department’s role 
should be to facilitate the resolution of the incident to ensure that 
all of the right departments are engaged and the computer security 
incident response team (CSIRT) process defined by the organization 
is generally followed. Not all incidents will require the enactment of 
the CSIRT, so it should be understood under what conditions the 
team will be invoked. Other departments, such as the business own-
ers, infrastructure teams (server, desktop), and network teams are also 
engaged, either as a responsible party or an informed party.
Forensic Investigations Forensic investigations have not received much 
attention within information security departments and tend to receive 
little investment. If the number of investigations is low, outsourcing 
this function may be a viable alternative. The time required to build 
a level of forensic expertise can be very extensive. Performing this 
function in-house can also be risky if the evidence is to be presented 
in court, primarily because the opposing counsel will ask, “How 
many forensic investigations have you performed?” “What training 
have you had that ensures you have the sufficient level of knowledge?” 
or “Demonstrate that the appropriate chain of custody was followed 
completely throughout the process.” Still, this is valuable expertise to 
develop within the organization at a basic level, as the act of going 
through forensic investigations will highlight gaps in the current log-
ging, monitoring, or configuration processes, as well as creating fur-
ther learning opportunities for the information security staff.
Central Management Functions Along with providing the gen-
eral management of the information security program, the security 
department must also provide the following two functions to inter-
face with the audit requirements and ensure that issues are formally 
tracked to closure.
Audit Liaison The security controls may be audited frequently 
depending upon the type of industry in which the company is partici-
pating. The security area is well advised to have someone designated 
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to coordinate these audits that understands information security con-
trols. Although the internal audit department may lead the overall 
audit with the audit firm, they may not have the technical expertise to 
understand what is being requested, or the potential alternative, com-
pensating or mitigating controls within the environment that can be 
provided. Information security can provide the expertise and contrib-
ute to a smoother running audit, which is explained in more detail in 
Chapter 11.
Plan of Action and Milestones Security deficiencies need to be tracked 
and corresponding plan of actions and milestones (POA&Ms) are devel-
oped to establish interim steps and dates for completion. Care should 
be taken in setting realistic dates, or these POA&Ms are recorded as 
delayed. A formal approval process for the submission of evidence, to 
whom, and who will review and approve the items for closure should be 
established. The security operations center team would be an excellent 
organizational position to close company-generated issues. Issues sur-
faced by an external audit firm on behalf of another agency (e.g., govern-
ment contractor–government agency relationship, Office of Inspector 
General, PCI Assessor) would need to be reviewed by the assessor and 
closed during his process, which may be during the next onsite audit.
Reporting Model
The security officer and the information security organization should 
report as high in the organization as position to (1) maintain visibil-
ity of the importance of information security and (2) limit the dis-
tortion or inaccurate translation of messages that can occur due to 
hierarchical, deep organizations. The higher up in the organization, 
the greater the ability to gain other senior management’s attention to 
security and the greater the capability to compete for the appropriate 
budget and resources. Where the information security officer reports 
in the organization has been the subject of debate for several years 
and depends upon the culture of the organization. There is no one 
best model that fits all organizations, but rather pros and cons asso-
ciated with each placement choice. Whatever the chosen reporting 
model, there should be an individual chosen with the responsibil-
ity for ensuring information security at the enterprise-wide level to 
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establish accountability for resolving security issues. The discussion in 
the next few sections should provide the perspective for making the 
appropriate choice for the target organization.
Business Relationships
Wherever the information security officer reports, it is imperative that 
he or she establishes credible and good working relationships with 
executive management, middle management, and the end users that 
will be following the security policy. Information gathered and acted 
upon by executive management is obtained through its daily interac-
tions with many individuals, not just executive management. Winning 
its support may be the result of influencing a respected individual 
within the organization, possibly several management layers below 
the executive. Similarly, the relationship between the senior execu-
tives and the information security officer is important if the security 
strategies are to carry through to implementation. Establishing a track 
record of delivery and demonstrating the value of the protection to 
the business will build this relationship. If done properly, the secu-
rity function becomes viewed as an enabler of the business versus a 
control point, which slows innovation, provides roadblocks to imple-
mentation, and represents an overhead cost function. Reporting to an 
executive that understands the need for information security and is 
willing to work to obtain funding is preferable.
Reporting to the CEO
Reporting directly to the CEO greatly reduces the message filtering 
of reporting further down the hierarchy and improves the communi-
cation, as well as demonstrating to the organization the importance 
of information security. Firms that have high security needs, such as 
credit card companies, technology companies, and companies whose 
revenue stream depends highly upon website purchases, such as eBay 
or Amazon, might utilize such a model. The downside to this model 
is that the CEO may be preoccupied with many other business issues 
and may not have the interest, time, or enough technical understand-
ing to devote to information security issues.
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Reporting to the Information Systems Department
In this model, the information security officer reports directly to the 
CIO, director of information systems, the vice president of systems, or 
whatever the title of the head of the IT department is. Most organiza-
tions are utilizing this relationship, as this was historically where the 
data security function was placed in many companies. This is due to 
the history of security being viewed as only an information technol-
ogy problem, which it is not. The advantage of this model is that the 
individual to which the security officer is reporting has the under-
standing of the technical issues and typically has the clout with senior 
management to make the desired changes. It is also beneficial because 
the information security officer and his department must spend a 
good deal of time interacting with the rest of the information sys-
tems department, which builds the appropriate awareness of project 
activities and issues and builds business relationships. The downside 
of the reporting structure is the conflict of interest. When the CIO 
must make decisions with respect to time to market, resource allo-
cations, cost minimization, application usability, and project priori-
ties, the ability exists to slight the information security function. The 
typical CIO’s goals are more oriented toward delivery of application 
products to support the business in a timely manner. If the perception 
is that implementation of the security controls may take more time or 
money to implement, the security considerations may not be provided 
equal weight. Reporting to a lower level within the CIO organiza-
tion should be avoided, as noted earlier; the more levels between the 
CEO and the information security officer, the more challenges that 
must be overcome. Levels further down in the organization also have 
their own domains of expertise they are focusing on, such as computer 
operations, applications programming, or computing infrastructure.
Reporting to Corporate Security
Corporate security is focused on the physical security of the enterprise, 
and most often the individuals in this environment have backgrounds 
as former police officers, military, or were associated in some other 
manner with the criminal justice system. This alternative may appear 
logical; however, the individuals from these organizations come from 
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two different backgrounds. Physical security is focused on criminal 
justice, protection, and investigation services, whereas information 
security professionals usually have different training in business and 
information technology. The language of these disciplines intersects 
in some areas but is vastly different in others. Another downside may 
be the association with the physical security group may evoke a police-
type mentality, making it difficult to build business relationships with 
business users. Establishing relationships with the end users increases 
their willingness to listen and comply with the security controls, as 
well as to provide knowledge to the security department of poten-
tial violations.
Reporting to the Administrative Services Department
The information security officer may report to the vice president of 
administrative services, which may also include the physical security, 
employee safety, and human resources departments. As in reporting 
to the CIO, there is only one level between the CEO and the infor-
mation security department. The model may also be viewed as an 
enterprise function due to the association with the human resources 
department. It is attractive because of the focus on security for all 
forms of information (paper, oral, electronic) versus residing in the 
technology department, where the focus may tend to be more on elec-
tronic information. The downside is that the leaders of this area may 
be limited in their knowledge of information technology and the abil-
ity to communicate with the CEO on technical issues.
Reporting to the Insurance and Risk Management Department
Information-intensive organizations such as banks, stock brokerages, 
and research companies may benefit from this model. The chief risk 
officer is already concerned with the risks to the organization and the 
methods to control those risks through mitigation, acceptance, insur-
ance, and so forth. The downside is that the risk officer may not be 
conversant in the information systems technology, and the strategic 
focus of this function may give less attention to day-to-day opera-
tional security projects.
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Reporting to the Internal Audit Department
This reporting relationship can create a conflict of interest, as the inter-
nal audit department is responsible for evaluating the effectiveness and 
implementation of the organization’s control structure, including those 
of the information security department. It would be difficult for the 
internal audit to provide an independent viewpoint, if the attainment 
of meeting the security department’s objectives is also viewed as part of 
its responsibility. The internal audit department may have adversarial 
relationships with other portions of the company due to the nature of 
its role (to uncover deficiencies in departmental processes), and through 
association the security department may develop similar relationships. 
It is advisable that the security department establishes close working 
relationships with the internal audit department to facilitate the control 
environment. The internal audit manager most likely has a background 
in financial, operational, and general controls, and may have diffi-
culty understanding the technical activities of the information security 
department. On the positive side, both areas are focused on improving 
the controls of the company. The internal audit department does have 
a preferable reporting relationship for audit issues through a dotted-
line relationship with the company’s audit committee on the board of 
directors. It is advisable for the information security function to have 
a path to report security issues to the board of directors as well, either 
in conjunction with the internal audit department or through its own.
Reporting to the Legal Department
Attorneys are concerned with compliance with regulations, laws, and 
ethical standards, performing due diligence, and establishing poli-
cies and procedures that are consistent with many of the information 
security objectives. The company’s general counsel also typically has 
the respect or ear of the CEO. In regulated industries, this may be a 
very good fit. On the downside, due to the emphasis on compliance 
activities, the information security department may end up perform-
ing more compliance-checking activities (versus security consulting 
and support), which are typically the domain of internal audit. An 
advantage is that the distance between the CEO and the information 
security officer is one level.
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Determining the Best Fit
As indicated earlier, each organization must view the pros and cons 
of each of these types of relationships and develop the appropriate 
relationship based upon the company culture, type of industry, and 
what will provide the greatest benefit to the company. Conflicts of 
interest should be minimized, visibility increased, funding appro-
priately allocated, and communication effective when the optimal 
reporting relationship is decided for the placement of the informa-
tion security department.
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Politics are almost as exciting as war, and quite as dangerous. In war, 
you can only be killed once, but in politics many times.
Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, 1874–1965
Along with the rapid rise in visibility of information security within 
medium- to large-sized organizations has also emerged the desire to 
gain a seat at the table with the members of the C-suite. Obtaining 
the ear of the chief executive officer (CEO), chief information offi-
cer (CIO), chief financial officer (CFO), and the vice presidents of 
the business areas often becomes a mission for the individual manag-
ing the information security program. Security officers attending the 
information security conferences frequently ask the questions, “How 
do I get the attention of the executive management? How do I obtain 
their support for the information security program?” What these 
questions are really trying to ask is, “How do I ensure that informa-
tion security becomes one of the critical priorities for the organization 
and is sustained on a long-term basis?”
Organizations are much like people, where thoughts and activities 
are compartmentalized and prioritized so that they do not overwhelm 
us. Information security is not different in this regard, as it is typi-
cally categorized as an IT function, so it becomes the responsibility 
of the CIO. The activities surrounding this are often placed, in the 
eyes of the CEO, in the hands of the CIO, so that the CEO can focus 
on the items that are in his or her box that require attention, such as 
defining the vision, mission, and strategy for the organization to grow 
the business; developing new products and services; and increasing 
market share and revenues. The CEO does not depend upon the CIO 
to perform these functions, albeit information technology can serve 
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as a large enabler of the growth strategy, so this becomes an area that 
the CEO has to keep inside his own box. Information security can be 
delegated from the CEO’s perspective, and thus ends up in someone 
else’s box to ensure that it is appropriately taken care of.
There is nothing inherently wrong with the CEO designating 
ownership of the information security function to another executive, 
and the process works well as long as the assets are protected ade-
quately and the organization is not experiencing any major incidents. 
However, when the organization faces a major incident, and the CEO 
has not been aware of the true security posture of the organization, 
then the incident takes over the CEO’s valuable time to question 
how the incident happened, who is accountable, and what steps are 
being taken to prevent the incident from reoccurring in the future.
No one likes surprises, especially Wall Street, where earnings 
surprises are routinely punished. A better model is that the CEO is 
informed as to the security posture of the organization on a peri-
odic basis, so he or she can become an advocate in the advancing 
the security program. The more the CEO and the rest of the executive 
suite understand about why the lack of adequate controls places undue 
risk upon the business operations, the more likely funding support 
for future investments will be made available. No department within 
an organization is truly independent, although many organizations 
operate in a silo manner, because financially and programmatically 
they are interdependent upon each other. Funding made available to 
the marketing department for a new ad campaign, for example, is less 
funding that can be made available to the information security area 
and vice versa. Every decision, whether characterized that way in con-
versation or not, is subtly asking the question, “What is the risk to the 
organization if we don’t invest the money in this activity?”
Communication between the CEO, CIO, Other Executives, and CISO
The chief information security officer’s effectiveness in large part 
depends upon the support of the executive management, as it is this rela-
tionship that provides the necessary funding and support for the secu-
rity initiatives to move forward to implementation. Communicating 
with the C-suite requires a different language from what is normally 
used with the end users or technical staff. Descriptions of security 
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initiatives using technical jargon is analogous to a financial analyst 
providing a presentation to the organization on internal rates of 
return, present value, or the interest rate yield curve to the marketing 
staff. The language that must be used must speak in terms of the busi-
ness value that the security initiatives will provide to the organization. 
In many ways, the chief information security officer and the other 
executives have very complimentary goals, and the security officer 
should make the connection between the organization’s goals and the 
goals of information security. For example, the organization may have 
a goal to increase revenue by 10% in the coming year. The security 
officer has a goal to protect information assets from loss, destruction, 
and unavailability. Both of these goals are very related, as it would 
be very difficult to increase revenue if the brand is tarnished by the 
public disclosure of a breach. A bank seeking to gain new customers 
to increase the revenue and market share would have a difficult time 
expanding the customer base if the new smartphone application that 
was deployed disclosed sensitive information to unauthorized users. 
Or the mishandling of protected health information (PHI) by a hos-
pital may make people change their hospital of preference if they felt 
that the privacy of their operation would be disclosed.
Several of these shared goals between the company executives and 
the chief information security officer (CISO) are shown in Table 4.1. 
A good exercise for information security is to run through the list of 
management objectives and understand what the company’s position 
Table 4.1 Management and information Security Goals
ManaGeMent oBjective Security oBjective
increase shareholder value Protect information from loss, destruction, unavailability
increase revenue/market share enable secure development of new products
reduce administrative costs ensure efficient service
accept reasonable business risk implement effective and appropriate risk-based controls
increase worker productivity develop secure remote-worker access strategies
attract and retain talented workforce Provide assurance through continuous control practices
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is on these strategies before communicating with the CEO, CIO, 
CFO, and so forth. The connections should then be drawn between 
these objectives and the information security objectives. The stronger 
the relationship and the more developed this bridge is made between 
information security program and the management objectives, the 
stronger the support will be for the initiatives needed to protect 
the information assets.
13 “Lucky” Questions to Ask One Another
As children we are told to raise our hand and speak up in class. In prior 
generations, the mantra was children should be seen and not heard. 
Today’s Generation Y has grown up with technology and are used to 
communicating in a somewhat virtual world. The question is not so 
much the medium that we are communicating, but rather what we are 
communicating and are we asking the right questions? Most of us com-
municate by stating our opinions, desires, concerns, and spend less time 
actually asking questions and listening to what other individuals think 
is important. Each of us feels that our job is the most important job at 
hand, as we have invested years of training into our professions, so it 
becomes the center from where our conversations start. However, to 
be an effective communicator, we have to move away from our own 
center and enter the uncomfortable area of understanding the needs of 
others first. Our effectiveness is greatly enhanced if the security initia-
tives that are desired by information security can meet the needs of the 
executives. The only way to really determine this is by asking the right 
questions, listening to the answers, and then determining the strategy 
to meet and exceed those needs. Similarly, the chief information secu-
rity officer needs to be prepared for the questions that may be asked of 
them, so that answers can be readily available. When we go on a job 
interview it is common practice to think through the questions that 
might be asked. Each interaction with a company executive should 
be regarded as a job interview, where small incremental judgments 
are continually made about the information security program and the 
value to the organization.
The following sections provide thirteen questions that the CISO 
should be prepared to answer from the CEO, thirteen questions from 
the CIO, and 13 questions that the CISO should ask of both the 
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CEO and CIO (Fitzgerald, 2007). Being prepared for and asking 
these questions will increase the credibility for information security.
The CEO, Ultimate Decision Maker
The CEO is faced with challenges and opportunities on a daily basis. 
The CEO may be oriented toward improving efficiency by reducing 
administrative costs as one of the management objectives in the previ-
ous discussion, or may be confronted with challenges of merging with 
another organization, increasing revenues by X%, improving market 
share, or introducing new innovative products for the company. A 
CEO’s role is to create an inspiring vision and mission for the organi-
zation and to ensure that the actions of the culture match this vision. 
Consider the difference in culture between a processor of health care 
claims and that of a company such as Apple that produces the popular 
iPad. The former may be very focused on providing excellent cus-
tomer service at the lowest possible administrative cost, whereas the 
later may be focused on creating an environment where creativity and 
innovation can flourish. This does not mean that the health insurer 
does not care about innovation or that the iPad manufacturer does 
not care about costs, but rather that the emphasis in priorities and the 
subsequent decision making is likely to be consistent with the most 
important values.
CEOs are the big picture people. So what should be their role with 
respect to security? Equal support. Equal support means that CEOs 
should be expected to (1) support the security department’s initiatives 
as they relate to the mission of the business, (2) ensure responsible 
funding is provided for ongoing security operations, and (3) hold the 
components of the business accountable for achieving their objec-
tives in a secure manner. In other words, the responsibility of the 
CEO to security is no different that their responsibility to any other 
part of the business or any other executive. Consider that you are the 
CEO in charge of manufacturing an automobile. Although you may 
be responsible for meeting quarterly sales and production goals at a 
tactical level, the key role is to ensure that over time, the company 
continues to produce automobiles demanded by consumers over the 
long term at a reasonable profit to attract investors and create sustain-
able shareholder value. Although a great design could take many years 
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and multiple focus groups, and could be built with the highest quality 
imaginable by spending more in production and time, the reality is 
that the car may never make it to market in time or may cost too much 
if these parameters are ignored.
Since CEOs are dealing with financial, operational, and business 
risk decisions on a continuing basis, they need to have enough infor-
mation to make a fact-based decision that will not expose the organi-
zation to regulatory compliance issues, risk to the business reputation, 
or decrease the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization’s capa-
bility to produce. When launching a new product or service, if there is 
not a clear understanding of the security risks, the organization could 
end up closing its doors due to the lack of controls.
Many CEOs today are aware of the security risks that have cre-
ated financial and public relations nightmares related to the loss of 
information. Astute CEOs take the time to understand this risk 
and ensure that appropriate responsibility is designated for reduc-
ing the risk. The stories of data loss that have been in the news are 
endless: Card Systems is out of business after 40 million customers 
were potentially exposed, TJX stores incurred a large financial impact 
after 45 to 90-plus million customers had their credit card accounts 
exposed, Bank of America had 1.3 million people exposed due to a 
missing backup tape, and Eli Lilly disclosed confidential informa-
tion in an e-mail to 669 people on Prozac, which ended up costing 
millions in fines and oversight by the Federal Trade Commission for 
20 years (FTC, 2002). The key takeaway from these stories is not 
so much in the exposure themselves, but rather that these are events 
that have set up the potential for real loses by the consumers. A much 
smaller fraction of actual personal damages really occurs. The mes-
sage for the CEO is that once the breach happens, the possibility of a 
loss by a customer sets off a chain reaction of events that involve costly 
public relations; incident response; increased audits; implementation 
of additional processes, people, and technology; offer of free credit 
monitoring; and so forth. This does not include the intangible costs 
that much management and technical staff attention is focused away 
from the core business issues to respond to the security event. Money 
is also diverted from projects or projects are delayed to enable the 
mitigation of the incident.
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Funds are a finite resource within any organization. The CEO 
must weigh the costs of a breach, the costs of other initiatives, and 
decide the appropriate amount to be spent on information security. 
Typically, after an incident, the checkbook seems to be open. When 
nothing is going wrong, the concern might if we have too much staff. 
Could we do this for less? This makes providing the appropriate 
amount of information by the security officer to influence the CEO a 
challenging task. Security is a typically viewed as a cost to the busi-
ness. There is nothing sexy about a security project, because in and of 
itself, it does not produce increased revenues or reduce costs for the 
organization. Revenues that are produced are a result of the products 
and services that are created, and administrative costs are a result of 
the assets, people, or processes that can be eliminated or reduced. 
Security investments are a choice for the CEO, not an absolute. Just 
as other departments may implement technology or create efficient 
manual processes, there are trade-offs. The CEO should be asking the 
following questions of the security officer when security investments 
are being solicited.
Question 1: How Will This Level of Funding Ensure That I Have an 
Adequate Control Environment That Ensures I Am Performing the 
Documented Activities on a Consistent Basis? Notice the question is not 
“How will this level of funding ensure that we have the best security 
across all of our peers?” Although this may be a strategic initiative 
depending upon the industry of the company, most CEOs was to 
ensure that they are spending just enough to get the job done. If the 
marginal benefit does not outweigh the marginal cost, then it would 
most likely not be considered a wise investment. The question also 
expects consistency within the security department. In other words, 
if the person in charge of security is handed X dollars, the expecta-
tion is that they can run their program primarily on X dollars without 
frequently returning for more funds.
Question 2: Will Our Security Controls Meet the Regulatory Compliance 
Requirements We Are Exposed to (GLBA, SOX, HIPAA, FISMA, PCI 
Standard, etc.)? Executives are concerned with regulatory compli-
ance, as some of the regulations have large financial impacts to the 
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organization, as well as to them personally. Failing to meet regula-
tory compliance can also result in criminal prosecution, albeit it is 
rare that this would occur for failure to meet security controls. 
Nonetheless, failure to meet regulatory compliance can have negative 
consequences for the company and may require additional oversight. 
For example, several organizations have been found by the Federal 
Trade Commission to have violated their published privacy practices 
and were required to pay fines of as much as $15 million and subject 
themselves to 10 to 20 years of additional oversight.
Question 3: What Level of Funding Are Our Competitors Doing? Related 
to question number 1, companies want to spend the appropriate 
amount and not overspend on security, as this represents resources 
that can be deployed elsewhere.
Question 4: How Will This Security Investment Reduce My Business 
Reputation Risk (i.e., Keeping Us out of the Headlines)? In some ways 
the security incidents are not shocking news anymore, as they seem 
to occur much more frequently. However, no organization wants to 
be associated with bad news, especially if the implication is that the 
organization is not capable of protecting the business relationship and 
the information that consumers and other businesses are entrusting 
to the company’s care. People have too many choices today and have 
much less loyalty to a particular brand. Not only is the brand dam-
aged when an incident occurs, the time that must be invested from a 
public relations viewpoint can be very costly. Instead of focusing on 
the daily business and the next business acquisition, the CEO has to 
spend time receiving updates on the situation, ensuring that the prob-
lem is being properly addressed, and ensuring the appropriate media 
message is being communicated by the organization.
Question 5: How Will This Investment Support a Key Product or Service 
That Supports Our Corporate Vision? Security is much more valuable 
if it can be linked to a product or service offering versus seen as an 
overhead function. Most security activities fall under the category 
of overhead, but there may be cases where security can be directly 
tied to the enablement of a product. For example, developing the 
security controls to ensure a secure virtual desktop environment 
85InterACtIng wIth the C-suIte
would permit the company to promote a work-at-home policy due to 
the secure controls being designed and developed within the infra-
structure. Without this investment, the confidentiality of informa-
tion or the reliability of the network would not be attainable. The 
more that the information security department can articulate this 
value, the more in-tune with the business the security department 
will be perceived.
Question 6: Will These Investments Have an Impact on the Reduction of 
Ongoing Audit Issues? Audit issues are viewed negatively in most 
organizations (versus viewed as quality self-checking of the controls 
within the enterprise), and as such, the CEOs want to be sure that 
these are addressed in a timely manner. The expectation of the CEOs 
is that given an adequate level of funding, there should be minimal 
audit issues, and no issues should persist or be repeated that would 
represent a high risk to the company.
Question 7: Is There Support from the Other Executives for This Investment? 
The other executives in the company should be regarded as the trusted 
advisors to the CEO, just as the U.S. president has a cabinet of senior 
leaders that help shape the president’s decisions. Failure to engage 
these executives and garner their support is a mistake, especially if 
one of the executives has a larger ear of the CEO than the others and 
has the ability to turn the security initiatives into a success or sabo-
tage their implementation.
Question 8: Can This Investment Be Performed at a Lower Cost by an 
External Consultant or Outsourcing the Process? As the CEO is always 
looking for lower costs, if becomes very important to remain com-
petitive with outside services. The security officer must be sure that 
they are spending the appropriate time on the right areas to remain 
competitive. If the security officer spends 70% of his or her budget 
drafting the security policies, there is little left over to implement the 
technical controls that may be necessary.
Question 9: Does This Investment Require a Multiyear Commitment? 
Security investments are typically within a 3- to 6-month time-
frame, however, sometimes the commitment for a large initiative 
86  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
(e.g., identity and access management) may need to be spread across 
multiple years. When this is done, the security officer should be 
prepared to defend the remaining expenditures during each budget 
cycle and to continue to gain support from other (new) executives to 
the work effort.
Question 10: Are There Short-Term Paybacks That Can Be Realized 
through a Phased Project Implementation? Where multiyear commit-
ments are required it is important to show incremental deliverables 
along the way. A multiyear project with no substantial deliverables is 
likely to get cut before the end of the project.
Question 11: What Other Resources within the Organization Are Required? 
Security implementations are rarely conducted by just the information 
security department to the exclusion of the business areas, infrastruc-
ture, applications development, computer operations, facilities, human 
resources, and so forth. The costs of these resources are often hidden 
costs as they may not charge specifically to a security project to sup-
port the security initiatives.
Question 12: Where Is This Type of Security Investment on the Adoption 
Curve? In Other Words, Are We an Early Adopter (Higher Risk, Such 
as an Identity Management Effort), or Is This a More Mature Practice 
(Lower Risk, Such as Implementing Antivirus/IDS Technologies)? The 
risk appetite of the organization often determines the type of adopter 
the organization is. Companies that view themselves as highly inno-
vative are likely to invest in multiple technologies and understand 
that some of the projects will fail. Others are happy to wait until the 
products have matured and are generally accepted in the marketplace, 
where the pricing is typically lower, before deciding to commit to the 
technology. As little as 15 years ago some leading-edge companies 
were deciding on how to use the Internet for business and if this made 
sense. Today, that would be a silly question for a business to ask (if it 
should have a Web presence). The barriers to entry and cost are much 
less today than they were during this prior period, making more sense 
for many more companies. CEOs need to understand if the proposals 
are bleeding edge (interpreted as high risk) or have been mainstream 
for some time (perceived as low risk).
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Question 13: Do We Have the Skills within Our Organization to 
Adequately Execute This Investment or Is Additional Expertise Needed to 
Lower the Risk? The answer to this question is many times yes to 
both parts. Security technology implementations can be very complex 
and require an individual that has intimate knowledge of the product 
to help with the initial implementation. Security policy development 
and compliance assessments may require additional manpower than 
what is in-house, or may require the services of an auditor to accurately 
capture the correct documentation. Obtaining external resources may 
be due to a skill issue or a lack of resource issue. To meet the time-to-
market demands it may be necessary to bring in additional resources.
The CEO Needs to Know Why
The security officer needs to be able to provide the CEO with the 
answer to the most important question: Why? Even after an incident 
occurs at a competitor company within the same industry, the why 
is still not necessarily a given. The CEO should challenge the cur-
rent control infrastructure, soliciting input from the security officer, 
CIO, and the business executives to ascertain whether the event could 
happen within their organization. It may be that the current level of 
security investment is still appropriate and additional funding is not 
needed. It may be that the security area is not spending money in the 
highest risk areas and funds need to be reallocated.
The CIO, Where Technology Meets the Business
The role of the CIO has evolved over the past 15 to 20 years to the 
point where in medium and large organizations the existence of the 
role is expected. In some respects, the evolution of the chief infor-
mation security officer (CISO) is following a similar path of (1) an 
understanding that the role is needed, followed by (2) role ambiguity, 
(3) maturation of the role to be the intersection between the business 
and the technology versus being the most knowledgeable technology 
person in the organization, and eventually (4) obtaining an execu-
tive presence on par with the business executives and being invited 
to the table so to speak. Much of this evolution in today’s world can 
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be attributed to the significant role that technology plays in business 
effectiveness and efficiency.
Although the earlier staffing of the CIO came predominantly from 
the information technology ranks and, more specifically, from those 
individuals responsible for running the data center or in charge of 
development of the mission-critical applications for the business. 
These areas were chosen for their knowledge of how technology sup-
ported the business (applications) or how to run the IT business (data 
center operations). In today’s environment, the CIO is just as likely to 
be chosen from the business side of the house, as they bring with them 
the knowledge of what needs to be accomplished through information 
technology. In the end, the how is figured out by the middle and first-
line management and their technical staffs.
Some organizations still run with an IT focus at the CIO level 
versus a business focus. In either case, CIO is usually under pressure 
to (1) deliver the projects on time and within budget to the business, 
and (2) to ensure availability. Most IT projects involve a high degree 
of variability and interdependencies, and rarely meet time and budget 
estimates. To manage the variability, project goals must be developed 
to constrain the deliverables. The security implications are that in order 
to meet the deadlines, security investments must be pragmatic and be 
introduced at the appropriate time during the project life cycle. For 
example, if the security department first reviews the implementation 
of access controls during the testing phase, the project team will not 
be excited about having to go back and rewrite code to meet the new 
security requirements. As an alternative, if security is represented on 
the project team during the initial analysis and design phases, the proj-
ect can proceed without these roadblocks. The CIO needs to ensure 
that a system development life cycle is followed and the appropriate 
parties and deliverables are identified to avoid this situation. Attention 
to security should be on a risk-adjusted basis, with the higher priority 
projects receiving increased, formalized attention, while the smaller 
efforts could be accomplished by the development team through the 
use of internal peer reviews of the security requirements.
Since availability is critical to the organization, the CIO must 
ensure through a business impact analysis (BIA) that critical applica-
tions are identified, along with their recovery time objectives (RTO) 
to ensure that there is minimal impact to the business in case there 
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is an outage or disaster. This will involve working with the business 
to determine its priorities. The CIO must also ensure that servers are 
configured according to documented baselines, applications are coded 
using secure coding techniques, access to the networks by third par-
ties are controlled, and audit issues (internal and external) are fol-
lowed up promptly by IT management. Each of these items not only 
supports the confidentiality and integrity security requirements, but 
also reduces the risk of unexpected unavailability. It is a given these 
days that proper investments must be made in firewalls, antivirus soft-
ware, spam filtering, and spyware. Many of the security vulnerabili-
ties identified through penetration testing or vulnerability assessments 
are typically the result of failure to analyze what settings were appro-
priate or failure to consistently adhere to a defined process, not that 
more technology was necessary. Purchasing an elaborate aggregation 
tool for logs is of little value if the most important events have not been 
identified or no one is reviewing the logs on a consistent basis. The 
informed CIO understands the impact of not performing all of these 
tasks and the impact it can have in causing unexpected downtime.
Just as the CEO must be aware of the external environment, the 
CIO needs to be able to depend upon the CISO to provide accurate 
information as to the risk of doing nothing and what issues the com-
petitors are facing. When the Veterans Administration (VA) lost a 
laptop containing personal information on 26.5 million individuals, 
and subsequently required that all of its laptops be encrypted, many 
organizations took notice. The VA ultimately also ended up paying 
$20 million to the active duty troops and veterans impacted by the 
incident (CNN, 2009). Although security programs should not be run 
by the “incident of the week,” due to the widespread media coverage, 
such major incidents put the CIO in the position of having to answer 
the question of could this happen to us. Savvy CIOs will not want 
to accept the risk of this type of situation and will require their IT 
management and systems security to develop a proposal with several 
different cost alternatives that would mitigate the problem.
Question 1: What Is the Minimum Necessary Effort Required to Produce 
Code That Is Secure? The CIO will want input from the CISO to 
ensure that the developers are creating code that minimizes the pos-
sibility of exploit. Over the past few years, the Web applications that 
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are Internet facing have become great opportunities for external 
hackers. Secure coding guidelines need to be developed by the orga-
nization, along with code reviews to ensure that the standards are 
being followed.
Question 2: What Do We Need to Do to Avoid Audit Issues in the 
Application Development Process without Adding Significant Expense or 
Delays to Our Projects? The CIO has committed to deliver products 
to the business to meet the business needs in a timely manner and 
is driven by the time tables such as new product launches, a sales 
promotion, or to meet a contractual obligation of a bid. Rarely does 
information security have the ability to hold up an implementation 
at the last minute, so it is vitally important that the requirements are 
communicated during the development process.
Question 3: Do You See Your Role as an After-the-Fact Reviewer of Security 
Controls or Engaged in the Implementation of the Controls? This ques-
tion is getting to the heart of the involvement of the CISO and his 
or her team. Are they hands-on advisors, consultants, partners in the 
process, or are they reviewers and approvers after the fact? This will 
depend upon the organizational culture, as the collaborative orga-
nization may lean toward inclusion of information security profes-
sionals upfront, whereas the more bureaucratic organization may see 
the role of security as the final approver (more likely rejecter) of the 
security controls.
Question 4: What Technologies Are Available to Reduce the Labor-Intensive 
Process of Keeping Up with the Latest Patches, System Vulnerabilities, 
Configuration Management and Compliance Monitoring? The more 
manual the process, the more time consuming it will be, and the pos-
sibility that key resources that could be performing other work will be 
tied up in security activities. If it takes 70 to 80 hours a month for a server 
engineer to determine whether the virtualization servers are in com-
pliance with the latest Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) versus 5 hours per 
month with an automated tool, then the tool may be more cost effec-
tive. The hidden costs are the projects that are delayed because the key 
resource is now unavailable.
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Question 5: Can You Provide Information on the “Real Risks” That Are 
Present in Our Specific Industry and the Appropriate Implementation 
Alternatives That Companies Use to Mitigate These Risks? The CIO 
wants to cut through the sky is falling hype with this question to 
enable his team to appropriately focus on the areas that have the larg-
est payback. This requires networking with other companies to have a 
broad view of solutions that other companies have implemented.
Question 6: How Can We Ensure That We Have Reduced Our Exposure to 
an Acceptable Risk? How do we make this determination? Through 
risk analysis (as described in Chapter 5) a systematic process of deter-
mining and documenting risk should be implemented to be able to 
articulate the risk level of the organization. What is an acceptable 
level? The executives and not the security officer must determine this.
Question 7: What Tangible Benefit Will We Receive from the Security 
Investments That Will Enable the Business? Information security 
practitioners understand the vulnerabilities that may be exploited if 
a particular security control is not implemented. It may also be able 
to communicate in general terms what will happen to a business if a 
breach occurs. However, it is very important that the security officer 
examine the security investments in the context of what will it do 
for the business, beyond the basic statement that “we will be more 
secure.” This is an assumed outcome, and the stronger the security 
officer can tie the investment to how it will ease business operations, 
enable more business opportunities, reduce the time needed to gain 
access (increase productivity), or benefit the systems development pro-
cess, the greater the acceptance of the initiatives will be.
Question 8: Which Internal and External Audit Issues Will These 
Investments Eliminate? Just as the CEO is concerned over the audit 
issues, so is the CIO, as these represent areas of work to fix exist-
ing problems that are not nearly as exciting as developing new appli-
cations. In many cases the CIOs rely on the information security 
department that still reports to the CIO in many organizations, to 
lead the charge for the IT department to reduce the number of find-
ings under the CIOs control.
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Question 9: What Other Information Technology Resources Are Required, 
in Addition to Systems Security Staff, to Implement the Security Solution 
Presented? What Support Is Required from the Business? These hidden 
costs need to be understood to enable appropriate resource alloca-
tion of the remaining IT resources. If a network engineer is spending 
40% of his or her time reviewing the baseline configurations, moni-
toring the network devices, and upgrading to the latest versions/patch 
levels, then only 60% of his or her time will be available for project 
work and other maintenance. There will always be constant pressure 
of the information security area to reduce these expenditures.
Question 10: How Do the Security Requirements Integrate with the 
Systems Development Life Cycle? Are We Performing These Tasks Already? 
Organizations may develop a systems development life cycle in 
response to an audit finding, desire to be certified as being compliant 
with a standard, such as the Capability Maturity Model Integration 
(CMMI) from the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute 
or the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), to dem-
onstrate that a consistent process for developing software has been 
implemented. Organizations that do not have a periodic review pro-
cess in place tend to find that the documented system develop life 
cycle becomes shelfware after a while, as there is not enforcement 
mechanism. Developers, like most people, given the choice to fol-
low their own process with less documentation, may opt to do so. As 
system develop life cycles have emerged, security controls are added 
at a greater frequency. A few years ago, the Information International 
Systems Security Certification Consortium Inc. (ISC2) recognized 
the need for recognizing the knowledge and experience in this area 
and created the Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional des-
ignation. Security must be added into all phases of the life cycle and 
include areas such as planning, costing, research of potential controls, 
control design, security testing, implementation, and follow-up and 
ongoing maintenance of these controls. Applications and platforms 
also need to have planned technology reviews and upgrades as tech-
nology advances, as the existing controls may no longer be sufficient 
to protect the information assets. For examples, Windows servers 
running version 2000 or 2003 may no longer be able to be adequately 
patched and would also no longer be on support, necessitating an 
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upgrade in the infrastructure. The applications running on these soft-
ware versions may in turn break and need to be upgraded to a more 
current version. Therefore a holistic view must be taken with develop-
ing software and the subsequent upgrades necessary.
Question 11: Do We Have the Necessary Experience In-House to 
Implement These Solutions? Should We Consider Outsourcing Some of the 
Functions? To outsource or not is a question that swings as often 
as the pendulum on a grandfather clock. Companies should periodi-
cally examine the possibility of outsourcing, as this may represent an 
opportunity to acquire a skill set that has not been available within 
the organization and deliver cost savings. Outsourcing also forces 
an organization to look more closely at its information security pro-
cesses and eliminate those processes that are no longer necessary. This 
occurs because activities that used to be considered as “free” within 
the organization, in other words there was no billing or chargeback 
for the activity, is now identified as an activity by the outsourcer and 
typically charged on a per-request basis (i.e., a security password reset 
is charged a $25 to $35 help desk call for every reset). Outsourcing of 
entire functions can also be beneficial, such as the case where there is 
a lack of in-house staff that is able to staff a 24/7 security operations 
team. Outsourcing the function to a managed systems security pro-
vider (MSSP) would enable the in-house staff to remain more focused 
on projects and be alerted when there are significant events that must 
be dealt with.
Question 12: What Are the Critical Success Factors for Achieving Success 
in Our Security Efforts? How Much Security Is Enough? Security can 
always be enhanced, the question is should it. Just as the CEO must 
answer the question for the organization, the CIO will want to deter-
mine what percentage of resources should be allocated to informa-
tion security. Is 4% of the IT budget sufficient? 5%? 10%? The range, 
depending upon the industry and the organization performing the 
study, seems to be somewhere in the 3% to 9% range of the IT budget. 
These numbers need to be evaluated with caution, as different orga-
nizations include different items into what constitutes the overall IT 
budget, different industries have different information security needs, 
and the larger the organization, the larger the budget and the smaller 
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expenditure that should be expected to implement similar controls 
due to advantages in pricing, implementation of more cost-effective 
tools, and the economies of scale.
Question 13: How Can You Help Reduce the Time I Spend on Compliance-
Related Efforts in Gathering Documentation and Audit Samples? 
Compliance activities require taking IT professionals away from their 
normal work to collect and produce the standard operating proce-
dures, evidence, participate in interviews, and so forth in support of 
an audit. The security department should be an enabler, provision-
ing information with minimal distraction for these resources, as this 
becomes very costly not only in the hourly cost but in the potential 
delays in other work that may not be getting done.
CIO’s Commitment to Security Is Important
The CIO may find himself from time to time serving in the role of 
arbitrator between the IT management and systems security for secu-
rity issues. IT projects are driven by deadlines to produce the required 
functionality. As a result, shortcuts may be taken in the testing, 
change control, documentation, peer review, or training processes in 
preference to spending more time and resources in the code develop-
ment process. Shortcuts in these areas can lead to segregation of duties 
issues, lack of appropriate documentation, and lack of evidence that 
the correct processes were being followed. For example, live produc-
tion data may have been used in the testing environment, potentially 
disclosing more information than needed to be known by the devel-
opers. Additionally, change control procedures may not have been 
followed by the server engineers, thus increasing the possibility that 
the baselines are not matching the intended configuration. This also 
increases the risk that external auditors will not have the documented 
evidence necessary for their review.
CIOs have a responsibility for sustaining the information tech-
nology investment on behalf of the business and to ensure that the 
information is being made only available to those who are authorized 
in a secure manner. It is a continuous balancing act of allocating the 
appropriate resources to systems security, while ensuring that ample 
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resources are available to operate the infrastructure and create new 
functionality through innovative business applications for the business.
The Security Officer, Protecting the Business
The security officer must have a sense of what the real risks are to the 
business and not feel that every event has the ability to cripple the 
business. True, budgets do get cut, performing more with less money 
than was provided the prior year is oftentimes expected in business, 
and security is no exception. It is only logical, as increasing numbers of 
security investments are made, that a point is reached where the cost of 
maintaining a service should be less than the cost to build the service. 
Imagine building a complex interstate highway interchange with sup-
porting bridges over a period of several years. The costs are typically 
very large for engineering, moving the soil, removing the old infra-
structure, moving the new beams in place, constructing the bridge, 
and managing traffic flow during the process. To support the bridge in 
an ongoing manner, periodic road surfacing, bridge inspections, and 
repainting of the lines are necessary; however, the original investment 
is not. Security works the same way, and security officers must be able 
to separate (1) new investments that provide increased functionally and 
(2) support for the ongoing security operation. After the initial “we 
better fix our security program and do something” dies down, the CIO 
and CEO will be expecting that costs are managed efficiently and either 
more work is being performed at a level cost or the costs are reduced. 
Implications for the new security officer are that this life cycle of spend-
ing should not be unexpected. Since security departments are typically 
considered overhead, a cost center, or a non-revenue-producing depart-
ment, pressures to cut any unnecessary costs will be continuous. As the 
old adage is applied here, that a good day for the security officer is when 
nothing happens, it is a challenge to be rewarded with increased invest-
ments for “nothing happening” when other departments are investing 
to make things happen.
Security officers have the opportunity to talk about the techni-
cal controls in place in the organization with technical detail to the 
CIO and CEO, or they have the opportunity to communicate how 
their department’s activities contribute to enabling the delivery of the 
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latest new company product. Savvy security officers provide infor-
mation related to the latter or show how they are reducing ongoing 
costs, reducing the wait time necessary for business user access to sys-
tems, or reducing the lost productivity that happens as a result of a 
virus. The CEO may be interested in how the government regulatory 
compliance requirements are being satisfied or how the audit issues 
are being reduced year to year. The CIO may have the same desires 
for information as well as how well the security area is working with 
the other IT management areas.
Security has become a broad discipline with the security officer 
responsible for facilitating the implementation and ongoing compliance 
with the multiple domains of the common body of knowledge, such 
as risk management, operations security, physical security, business 
continuity, laws and ethics, network security, and so forth. Obviously, 
detailed expertise for these domains resides in many different individ-
uals. The security officer is expected to have broad security knowledge 
and why each of these areas is important to the business. The abil-
ity to work up and down the organization translating technical jargon 
into a language appropriate for the CEO, CIO, business executives, 
middle management, end users, and external parties is an essential 
skill. Leadership involves influencing, written and oral communica-
tion skills, and building relationships with business partners for the 
bigger picture (of supporting the vision and mission of the business).
Question 1: What Are the Top Three Business Priorities within the Next 
12 to 18 Months? When the security officer asks this question, this 
creates the perception that information security is concerned not 
only with protecting the information assets but it also cares about 
how the information security activities can contribute to the success 
of the business. The question needs to be framed with a short-term 
horizon, so that investments in information security can be viewed as 
supporting the business today and not through a theoretical point in 
the future.
Question 2: If We Could Develop and Implement Solutions for Two Security 
Issues Tomorrow, What Would They Be? In Other Words, What Are Your 
Biggest Pain Points? Each CEO and CIO is wrestling with many 
issues each day, and 80% of the issues reside in 20% of the projects. 
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Understanding these pain points will help the security department to 
direct activities to these visible areas to help solve their most nagging 
problems. Information security may not be able to help solve these 
issues, but if we assume that we know what they are, the real issues 
may never be known to us, thereby passing up opportunities.
Question 3: What Would Be the Best Way to Engage You to Ensure That 
You Get What You Expect out of the Information Security Program? The 
CIO may be the type of person that wants to know all the detail and 
have cost–benefit calculations before making a decision, or he may be 
the type that responds to a reasonable proposal and thinks it will move 
the organization in the right direction. He may also want to approve 
each step or be notified when the initiative is finished. She may want 
a weekly detailed status report of the process along with a weekly 
meeting or may be satisfied with a monthly two-slide PowerPoint 
presentation during a staff meeting on the progress. Simply asking 
this question will avoid wasting time by the security department to 
prepare detailed analysis or be embarrassed when presenting a two-
slide presentation and being grilled for the detail. The business often 
relies upon the CIO’s judgment as to the adequacy of the technical 
infrastructure and in this role the CIO needs the assessment of the 
information security officer. The information must be delivered in a 
manner that is expected by the CIO.
Question 4: What Level and Frequency of Reporting Would You Like to 
See? What Metrics Would Be the Most Meaningful to You? As put so 
well in the old adage “You can’t improve what you don’t measure,” 
security improvement is the same way. Consider how well our stu-
dents would function if there were no tests and no grades published? 
Aside from some students rejoicing, probably the ones on the lower 
end of the grading scale, and some students being upset, most likely 
those being on the top-end of the grading scale, it would be very 
difficult to know how the school’s students were performing. CIOs 
want to know how well the investments are performing, just as the 
Dow Jones or S&P500 Index tracks stocks, to enable them to make 
future decisions about the worthiness of investing more money in that 
area. For example, investing in an e-mail filtering product to reduce 
the amount of spam should result in a reduction of the number of 
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unwanted e-mails that end up in employees’ inboxes. This is a metric 
that can be measured by the number of e-mails that are blocked at the 
perimeter. Initially, the CIO may want frequent monitoring of the 
metric before and after implementation, and as time goes on may only 
want to see a trending graph on a less frequent basic (e.g., quarterly).
Question 5: What is the Period of Time That You Expect Medium- and 
High-Risk Issues Identified by the Internal or External Auditors to be 
Resolved by the Organization? Audits typically occur on an annual 
cycle, with the auditors closing off the prior year’s findings on their 
next visit or sooner with the appropriate documentation. Letting 
these issues remain open for an extended period of time places man-
agement in a precarious situation, as its now know about an issue but 
has failed to take prompt action. Resolving most issues within 90 days 
or less would be a good standard and could be proposed to the CIO, 
whereby any issues requiring longer than this period would require 
written authorization by the CIO. Gaining these agreements up front 
is important for the rest of the organization to follow the process.
Question 6: How Involved Would You and Your Management Like to Be 
in the Development of the Information Security Policies? Engaged in the 
Development? Formal Approval? Informed? Additionally, What Resources 
Are You Willing to Commit and at What Organizational Level? The 
CIO or his team may want to be engaged in policy development from 
the start or may be satisfied with the information security department 
taking the lead and providing them with the draft for discussion.
Question 7: What Have You Read in the News That You Would Not Want 
Associated with Our Company? CEOs have read the stories from 
technology magazines, mainstream magazines and newspapers, and 
online articles. Understanding their hot button issues can be very use-
ful in constructing the appropriate security program that plays to the 
CIO’s needs. Is the CIO more concerned about the unauthorized dis-
closure of information or the backup of the data center in the event 
of a disaster?
Question 8: Would You Characterize Our Organization as an Early Adopter, 
Innovator, or Follower Utilizing Mature Technologies? Organizations 
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that are early adopters generally have funds that are allocated to new 
technology projects that take the form of pilots, proof concepts, pro-
totypes, and so forth. They are willing to experiment, knowing that 
all projects do not see production implementation. The security officer 
must be careful in interpreting the stance of the organization, as it 
may include “innovation” in the mission/vision statements, but fail 
to provide funds outside the normal business operations to truly be 
innovative or may show a track record of terminating individuals that 
lead failed projects. Most organizations by definition are followers 
and implement mature technologies where there are more resources 
with experience to carry out the implementation, thus reducing the 
risk. An organization may be a hybrid organization, implementing 
new, unproven technologies such as a foray into cloud computing for 
their e-mail services, but operating in mature security technologies 
with the implementation of secure token identification devices.
Question 9: Would You Characterize Our Organization as a Risk Taker 
or Risk Averse? Security is all about managing risks to the company, 
so it is important that the security officer ensure that the risk appe-
tite that is taken by information security is consistent with the risk 
appetite of the C-suite executives, or the security officer risks losing 
his audience when discussing the risks determined through the risk 
analysis or assessment process.
Question 10: What Are Your Expectations for How Information Security 
Can Support the Organizational Goals within the Next 12 Months? 
18–24 Months? Beyond 3 Years? As an extension to question 1, secu-
rity needs to plan for those initiatives that are longer in the making. 
The company may be planning to relocate to a new office building or 
data center under construction and waiting 2 to 3 years would miss 
the window of opportunity to prepare for the eventual move.
Question 11: What Products or Services Would You Like to be Able to 
Provide Right Now, But Are Apprehensive Due to the Perceived Security 
Exposures?  The company may be considering the development of an 
e-commerce site that could have issues with the handling of credit 
card information, or it could want to deploy reports to its hospital 
providers on the Internet versus mailing the weekly reports, but are 
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concerned that only the appropriate individuals should be able to 
access the information. The security department may not have the 
complete solutions to these issues, as they may be new to the depart-
ment as well, but they can serve as the catalyst to partner with another 
company to provide the necessary expertise if this is the case.
Question 12: If We Were to Have a Significant Incident Happen to Us, 
What Are Your Expectations of My Area? Other Business Areas? Where 
Does the Responsibility Lie? The security officer needs to understand 
what is the existing protocol for incident reporting and response, and 
when the information security department should become engaged 
and lead the resolution of the incident. The security officer will need to 
determine where the CIO or CEO will need to be engaged in the 
computer security incident response team (CSIRT) plan.
Question 13: How Else Can I Help You? This final question is a very 
simple, albeit powerful question to ask the CIO or CEO. The open-
endedness of the question serves two purposes: (1) it again establishes 
that information exists to support the business and not the other way 
around, and (2) it reveals any needs that were not provided by asking 
the questions.
The CEO, CIO, and CISO Are Business Partners
In a sense, the CEO, CIO, and CISO are each running a business 
with a vision, mission, and a set of operating principles, policies, and 
procedures for effective and efficient operation. There is conflict when 
the norms of the three individuals and their supporting organizations 
are not aligned with each other. Information technology and security 
provide support to the business and only exist because of that rela-
tionship. The business vision and mission must drive the projects, the 
risk profile, and the investments required. Each individual is respon-
sible for different facets of information security, from establishing and 
maintaining an organizational culture that supports the activities and 
the implementation of secure technology projects to the ensuring that 
ongoing security operations are appropriately managed. Although the 
CEO and CIO roles are more clearly defined due to the maturity of 
the job description, the CISO role continues to evolve.
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Building Grassroots Support through an Information Security Council
Individuals that have been unable to secure the attention or financial 
commitment from the senior leadership of their respective organi-
zations typically voice concerns that management is not involved or 
committed to the security program. The statement is usually accom-
panied with frustration as a result of multiple attempts to obtain 
funding, only to be faced with flat budgets, cuts to the current expen-
diture levels, or the elimination of separate information security bud-
gets. Although each organization has different values, principles, and 
strategies to move the business forward in a secure manner, the fol-
lowing section explores some techniques for building management 
commitment through the implementation of a successful information 
security council. Experience indicates that security councils are excel-
lent mechanisms for establishing buy-in across middle management, 
senior management, and the end users of the organization.
Establishing the Security Council
The information security council forms the backbone for sustaining 
organizational support for comprehensive information security pro-
grams. Additionally, the security council serves as the governance or 
oversight function for the information security program. The vision 
of the security council must be clearly defined and understood by all 
members of the council. Before the appropriate representation of the 
council can be decided, the purpose of the council must be decided. 
Although the primary purpose is to provide governance and over-
sight for the security program and provide a mechanism to sustain 
the organizational security initiatives, the purpose that will be most 
meaningful to the specific organization will depend upon the current 
organizational culture and the maturity of information security prac-
tices, as discussed in other sections of this book.
A clear vision statement should be in alignment with and support 
the organizational vision. Typically, the statement would draw upon 
the security concepts of confidentiality, integrity, and availability to 
support the business objectives. The vision statement is not techni-
cal and should focus on the advantages to the business. People will 
be involved in the council from management and technical areas 
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and have limited time to participate, so the vision statement must be 
something that is viewed as contributing to the business. The vision 
statement should be short, to the point, and achievable.
Mission statements are objectives that support the overall vision. 
These become the roadmap to achieving the vision and help the coun-
cil clearly view the purpose for their involvement. Some individuals 
may choose nomenclature such as goals, objectives, and initiatives. 
A sample mission statement is shown in Figure 4.1. Effective mis-
sion statements do not need to be lengthy, as the primary objective 
is to communicate the goals so technical and nontechnical individuals 
readily understand them. The primary mission of the security council 
The information security council provides management direction and a sounding 
board for the SocialBook Company’s information security efforts to ensure that 
these efforts are
• appropriately prioritized
• Supported by each organizational unit
• appropriately funded
• realistic given SocialBook’s information security needs
• Balanced with business needs with respect to cost, response time, ease of use, flexibility, 
and time to market
The information security council takes an active role in enhancing our security 
profile and increasing the protection of our assets through
• approval of organization-wide information security initiatives
• coordination of various workgroups so that security goals can be achieved
• Promoting awareness of initiatives within their organizations
• discussion of security ideas, policies, and procedures and their impact on the organization
• recommendation of policies to the SocialBook company it steering committee
• increased understanding of the threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards facing our 
organization
• active participation in policy, procedure, and standard review
The SocialBook Company information technology steering committee supports 
the information security council by
• developing the strategic vision for the deployment of information technology
• establishing priorities, arranging resources in concert with the vision
• approval of the recommended policies, standards, and guidelines
• approval of major capital expenditures
Figure 4.1 Sample security council mission statement.
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will vary by organization but should include statements that address 
the following.
Oversight of Security Program By establishing the goal of security pro-
gram oversight in the beginning, the members of the council begin 
to feel that they have some input and influence over the direction 
of the security program. This is key, as many security decisions will 
impact their areas of operation. This also is the beginning of man-
agement commitment at the committee level, as the deliverables 
produced through the information security program now become rec-
ommended or approved by the security council versus the information 
security department.
Decide on Project Initiatives Each organization has limited resources, 
that is, time, money, and people to allocate across projects to advance 
the business. The primary objective of information security projects is 
to reduce the organizational business risk through the implementa-
tion of reasonable controls. The council should take an active role in 
understanding the initiatives and the resulting “business” impact.
Prioritize Information Security Efforts Once the security council 
understands the proposed project initiatives and the associated posi-
tive impact to the business, it can be involved with the prioritization 
of the projects. This may be in the form of a formal annual process 
or may be through the discussion and expressed support for individ-
ual initiatives.
Review and Recommend Security Policies Review of the security policies 
should occur through a line-by-line review of the policy, a cursory 
review of the procedures to support the policies, and a review of the 
implementation and subsequent enforcement of the policies. Through 
this activity, three key concepts are implemented that are important 
to sustaining commitment:
 1. Understanding of the policy is enhanced.
 2. Practical ability of the organization to support the policy 
is discussed.
 3. Buy-in is established to subsequent support of implementa-
tion activities.
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Champion Organizational Security Efforts Once the council under-
stands and accepts the policies, it serves as the organization’s cham-
pion behind the policies. Why? Because the council members were 
involved in the creation of the policies. They may have started review-
ing a draft of the policy created by the information systems security 
department, but the resulting product was only accomplished through 
their review, input, and participation in the process. The security 
leader must involve the business areas in the creation of policies to 
create ownership of the deliverable, which generates a desire to see the 
security policy or project succeed within the company.
Recommend Areas Requiring Investment Members of the council have 
the opportunity to provide input from the perspective of their individ-
ual business units. The council serves as a mechanism for establishing 
broad support for security investments from this perspective. Resources 
within any organization are limited and allocated to the business units 
with the greatest need and the greatest perceived return on invest-
ment. Establishing this support enhances the budgetary understand-
ing of the other business managers, as well as the chief financial officer, 
which is essential when obtaining the appropriate funding.
A mission statement that incorporates the previous concepts will 
help focus the council and also provide the sustaining purpose for 
their involvement. The vision and mission statements should also be 
reviewed on an annual basis to ensure that the council is still func-
tioning according to the values expressed in the mission statement, as 
well as to ensure that new and replacement members are in alignment 
with the objectives of the council.
Appropriate Security Council Representation
The Security Council should be made up of representatives from mul-
tiple organizational units that are necessary to support the policies in 
the long term. Possible participants shown in Figure 4.2 include
Human resources—The human resources department is essen-
tial to provide knowledge of the existing code of conduct, 
employment and labor relations, termination, and disciplin-
ary action policies and practices that are in place.
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Legal—The legal department is needed to ensure that the lan-
guage of the policies is stating what is intended, and that appli-
cable local, state, and federal laws are appropriately followed.
Information technology—The information technology depart-
ment provides technical input and information on current 
initiatives, and the development of procedures and technical 
implementations to support the policies.
Business unit representation—The individual business unit rep-
resentation is essential to understand how practical the poli-
cies may be in carrying out the mission of the business.
Compliance and ethics—Compliance department representa-
tion provides insight on ethics, contractual obligations, and 
investigations that may require policy creation.
Information security—The security officer should represent the 
information security department and members of the security 

















Figure 4.2 Security council representation.
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The security council should be comprised primarily of manage-
ment-level employees, preferably middle management. It is diffi-
cult to obtain the time commitment required to review policies at a 
detailed level by senior management. Reviewing the policies at this 
level is a necessary step to achieve buy-in within management; how-
ever, it would not be a good use of the senior management level in 
the early stages of development. Line managers are very focused on 
their individual areas and may not have the organizational perspective 
necessary (beyond their individual departments) to evaluate security 
policies and project initiatives. Middle managers appear to be in the 
best position to appropriately evaluate what is best for the organi-
zation, as well as possessing the ability to influence senior and line 
management to accept the policies. Where middle management does 
not exist, then it is appropriate to include line managers, as they are 
typically filling both of these roles (middle and line functions) when 
operating in these positions.
The information security officer (ISO) or the CISO should chair 
the security council. The ISO is in a better position knowledge-wise to 
chair the council, however, politically it may be advantageous for the 
CIO to chair the council, where he may be able to better communi-
cate support through the information technology department. It is my 
experience that the stronger argument is for the council to be chaired 
by the ISO, as it provides for better separation of duties and avoids the 
“rooster in the hen house” perception if the CIO chairs the council. 
This is true even if the ISO does not report through the information 
technology organization. In addition to the ISO, the council should 
also have one to two members of the systems security department 
available to (1) provide technical security expertise and (2) understand 
the business concerns so that solutions can be appropriately designed.
Many issues may be addressed in a single security council meet-
ing, which necessitates having someone record the minutes of the 
meeting. Since the chairperson’s role in the meeting is to facilitate the 
discussion, ensure that all viewpoints are heard, and drive the discus-
sions to decisions where necessary, another participant should record 
the proceedings. Recording the meeting is also helpful to capture key 
points that may have been missed in the notes, so that accurate min-
utes are produced.
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“-Inging” the Council: Forming, Storming, Norming, and Performing
Every now and then, an organization will recognize that collaboration 
is not taking place between the functional departments and it is time 
to talk about enhancing the team development process. This is usually 
the result of poor or no communication between the departments. 
Why wait for the problems to occur? When committees are formed, 
they are not magically functional the moment they are formed, but 
rather must go through a series of necessary steps to become an opera-
tional team. The classic four phases of team development are shown 
in Figure 4.3 (Tuckman, 1965). Let’s visit each of the concepts briefly 
and how they apply to the security council.
Forming Forming is the stage where the efforts are moving from an 
individual to a team effort. Individuals may be excited about belong-
ing to something new that will make a positive change. The tasks at 
hand and role of the council are decided (as described earlier). Teams 
should be communicating openly and honestly about their likes and 
dislikes, deciding what information needs to be gathered to carry out 
their mission, and should be engaging in activities that build trust and 
communication with each other. It is critical to draw out the responses 
of those that may appear to be silent in the meetings, as they may be 
thinking some very valuable thoughts, but may be afraid at this stage 
that their ideas may be rejected. It is important to have patience at this 
stage and let the team form and not rush the discussion. The leader 
Forming Storming Norming Performing
Figure 4.3 Four stages of tuckman’s group development model.
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must serve as a facilitator for bringing the parties together, but not be 
overly authoritative, as that can jeopardize or slow the buy-in process.
Storming Now that the objectives are understood and the team has 
had the chance to discuss some of the challenges that it is tasked to 
resolve, doubt may settle in. Some members may become resistant 
to the tasks and return to their old comfort zones. Communication 
between members starts to erode and different sections of the team 
form alliances to counterpositions. The team becomes divided and 
there is minimal collaboration between the individuals. At this stage, 
it may be necessary to reestablish or change the rules of behavior for 
the council, negotiate the roles and responsibilities between the coun-
cil members, and possibly return to the forming stage and answer 
any open questions about the purpose and clarity of the council. And 
finally, listen to the concerns of the council members and let them vent 
any frustrations. They may have some very valid concerns that need 
to be addressed in order to be successful. The leader must continue to 
reemphasize the importance of the security council and the impor-
tance of gaining alignment with objectives that everyone can live with. 
Specific frustrations of members should be explored and brainstorm-
ing sessions should be held with the entire council to resolve the frus-
trations. The leader must recognize that this dissention is a critical step 
for individuals to feel that their individual concerns will be heard and 
reacted to during the long-term operation of the council.
Norming At the norming stage the members of the council begin to 
accept their roles, the rules of behavior, their role on the team, and 
respect the individual contributions that others on the team can pro-
vide. Now wouldn’t it be nice if the storming stage could be skipped 
and the security council just moved to the norming stage? Think of 
a child learning to ice skate. The concept of ice skating is explained 
in vague terms such as, “Put these skates on your feet, then stand up, 
and skate around the rink.” The child has an idea of how this works 
because she has seen others skating and it looks pretty easy. However, 
when the child stands up, she is in for a big surprise … boom! The 
same applies for teams, as much as individuals have seen other teams’ 
success, worked on other teams until the issues are worked out, the 
team cannot feel how bad the fall will hurt until this particular team 
109InterACtIng wIth the C-suIte
falls down. As the norming stage progresses, competitive relationships 
may become more cooperative, more sharing is present, the sense of 
“we are a team” evolves, and the team members feel more comfortable 
working together. This stage of development should focus on detailed 
planning, creation of criteria for completion of goals, and continuing 
to encourage the team and build upon the positive behaviors dem-
onstrated within the team and to change the unhealthy ones. The 
leader must seize the opportunity provided during the team norming 
stage to focus on meaningful work. The council will lose patience if 
there are still discussions in this stage about what the vision statement 
should be, as the council has limited time and needs to now see prog-
ress toward the objectives.
Performing The team is now functioning as a unit focused upon the 
objectives of the security council. The team has the best opportu-
nity at this stage to meet deadlines, utilize each member’s unique tal-
ents, and produce quality deliverables. The members of the team have 
gained insight into the unique contributions to everyone on the team 
and recognize that the team can accomplish much more than any one 
individual on the team. The leader must recognize in this stage that 
the council can slip back into earlier stages if individual concerns are 
ignored. Council members also may change over time and new coun-
cil members need to be assimilated into the process.
The security council may be formed in a day but does not become 
a team in a day. Understanding the path that every team traverses can 
be helpful in knowing where the team is currently functioning, as well 
as to permit the application of strategies to move the team to the next 
stage. Depending upon the organizational culture and the individuals 
involved, the Security Council may become a functioning team within 
weeks or months. What is important is that the commitment to getting 
to the team stage has a level of persistence and perseverance equal to the 
passion to build a successful security program within the organization.
Integration with Other Committees
As indicated earlier, management has limited time to be involved in 
efforts that may not seem to be directly related to their department. 
Examine the performance objectives and performance reviews of the 
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management of most organizations, and it becomes readily appar-
ent that the majority of the performance rewards are based upon the 
objectives of the individual department goals. There is typically lit-
tle incentive for participating to “enhance the corporate good” even 
though that may be communicated by the organization’s vision, mis-
sion, goals, and objective statements. Therefore, committees where 
there is not a direct benefit or their involvement is not seen as critical 
will be met with a lukewarm reception.
So when the information security department decides to “add a few 
more committees,” this is likely to be met with resistance. A practical 
approach is to leverage the committees that are already established, such 
as an information technology steering committee, electronic commerce 
committee, standards committee, a senior management leadership 
committee, or other committee that has a history of holding regularly 
scheduled (and attended!) meetings. Tapping into these committees and 
getting 30 minutes on the agenda reserved specifically for security will 
provide ample airtime for security issues and the appropriate linkage 
to the company decision makers. In committees such as the informa-
tion technology steering committee, many of the issues discussed have 
information security issues embedded within them and being present 
provides the mechanism to be at the table for these issues.
Since the time allocated for discussing information security issues 
tends to decrease as the management chain is traversed to higher lev-
els of management, it is important to ensure that the security coun-
cil is well established and performing in the norming or performing 
stages. Participation at the higher levels should be limited to review, 
discussion, communication of initiatives, and primarily decision mak-
ing (approval of policies and projects). The senior management stamp 
of approval is necessary to win broad organizational support and is a 
key component for successful implementation. If the security coun-
cil does not perceive that the recommendations are important to the 
senior leadership, it will lose interest. If the senior leadership does not 
approve the security policies, organizational management and staff 
support will also dissipate. Therefore, it is important to get on the 
agenda and stay on the agenda for every meeting. This also creates 
the (desired) perception that security is an ongoing business process 
necessary to implement the business objectives.
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Once it is decided which committees would be the best candidates 
for integration, then a decision needs to be made as to how the com-
mittees will function together. Is the IT steering committee the 
mechanism for policy and project approval? Is there a dollar thresh-
old required for it approval? How are changes to the security policies 
made at this level? Do they go back to the security council for re-
review, or are they changed and considered final at this point? Much 
of this will depend upon each individual cultural norm of how teams 
and committees function.
Establish Early, Incremental Success
Organizations tend to get behind individuals and departments that 
have demonstrated success in their initiatives because they believe that 
the next initiative will also be successful. Organizations lose patience 
for 15- to 18-month initiatives (these tend to be labeled as long-term 
strategies these days). Projects should be divided into smaller discrete 
deliverables versus trying to implement the entire effort. This allows 
the organization to reap the benefits of the earlier implementation 
while waiting for the results of the longer-term initiative. The early 
initiative may also help shape or redefine the longer-term initiative 
through the early lessons learned.
The early initiatives should provide some benefit to the organiza-
tion by making their processes easier, enabling new business function-
ality, providing faster turnaround, reducing paper handling, making 
more efficient or effective processes. The primary objective should 
not be something that benefits the information security department 
but rather provides benefit to the business (although it most likely 
will provide information security benefit even though this is not the 
“sell”). Management may be skeptical that the investment in infor-
mation security will produce an equal amount of benefits. Nothing 
helps future funding opportunities more than through establishing a 
track record of (1) developing projects that contribute to the business 
objectives, (2) establishing cost-effective aggressive implementation 
schedules, and (3) delivering on time, (4) delivering within budget, 
and (5) delivering what was promised (at a minimum).
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Let Go of Perfectionism
Imagine being a dancer of 15 years, dancing since you were 2½ years old, 
practicing a couple of nights a week learning jazz and ballet. Imagine 
the hours of commitment to a discipline, which makes movements that 
would be difficult for most of us, appear to be purposeful, graceful, and 
flow with ease. Imagine that it is the big night for showcasing this enor-
mous talent, the recital, and the dancer is rightfully filled with excite-
ment in anticipation of performing in front of friends and family. As 
the curtain rises, and the dancers are set to begin the performance, a 
dancer’s hairpiece falls off as the dance begins. Oh no, what to do? Does 
she stop to pick up the hairpiece? Does the dancer look at the floor to 
avoid stepping on the hairpiece? Does the dancer break into tears, stop 
and say, “I messed up?” No, none of the above. While it is preferred 
that dancers firmly attach their hairpieces, and that is what was planned 
for and practiced, in the scope of the dance, it is not a big deal. In fact, 
few people in the audience would actually notice it unless the dancer 
pointed it out. The dancer dances on, smiling with great pride, demon-
strating the skill that she has possessed to the audience’s delight.
We should all strive to perform to the best of our ability. The 
argument could be made that the security profession is made up of 
many individuals that are control oriented, primarily detail oriented, 
and analytical and logical decision makers. These personality prefer-
ences suit the profession very well, as these attributes are many times 
necessary to master the information security skills. However, one of 
the traits also represented by the profession is that of perfectionism, 
the need to get it right, do the right thing. Security professionals often 
speak in terms of musts and wills versus shoulds and mights. For 
example, imagine a policy written that would state, “As an employee, 
you may choose to create an eight-character password made up of 
a combination of the alphabet, numbers, special characters, or you 
may choose something less if you have a hard time remembering it. 
If KATE123 or your dog’s name is easier to remember, then just use 
that.” That would be absurd. We tell users not only the rules, but how 
to implement them and that they must do that action.
Carrying the perfectionist standard forward into every project is a 
recipe for failure. First, resulting project costs will be higher trying to 
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get everything right. Second, the time to implement will be longer and 
opportunities to create the business benefit when needed may be missed.
When other individuals across the business units are asked to par-
ticipate in security initiatives, they may not have a complete under-
standing of what is expected of them, and some tolerance for this gap 
in understanding should be accounted for. It may be that they believe 
that they are supplying the right level of support or are completing 
the deliverables accurately given their knowledge of what was com-
municated to them. The minimum expected deliverable for security 
initiatives should be that if 80% of the goal is completed, then the 
risk absorbed by the company is considered as reasonable. Achieving 
the remaining 20% should be viewed as the component that, if imple-
mented, would return increased benefits and opportunities, but not 
necessary to achieve the minimum level of risk desired. Taking this 
posture permits the information security initiatives to drive toward 
perfection but not require attainment of complete perfection to main-
tain a reasonable risk level. This approach keeps the costs of security 
implementations in balance with the reduction of risk objectives.
Sustaining the Security Council
Humpty Dumpty sat on the wall, Humpty Dumpty had a great … 
well we know the rest of this story. Putting the pieces back together 
again is much more difficult than “planning for the fall.” As mentioned 
in the section titled “‘-Inging’ the Council,” the team will go through 
various stages. Frustration, boredom, impatience, and inertia may set 
in as the sizes of the efforts are realized or their roles in the process 
become blurred. When we know that something is likely to occur, 
it is much easier to deal with. Understanding that these events will 
occur can be helpful to the leader of the security council to continue 
the mission and not give up hope. Members of the organization may 
view the security council as a vehicle to deposit their security issues 
for resolution. Alternatively, the council may be viewed as a commit-
tee that produces no tangible benefits and consumes the most valuable 
resource—time. The truth is that both views will exist simultaneously 
within the organization based upon how the council personally affects 
each person’s individual role. There will be periods where individuals 
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will become disinterested and it may be necessary to bring in some 
new blood into the council, thereby expanding the knowledge of the 
council. It is also a good practice to periodically bring new individuals 
into the council to inject new ideas and skills to the team. As this is 
done, it is important to revisit the mission and vision steps as this per-
son and the rest of the team (with respect to the new individual) is 
repeating the forming, storming, norming, and performing process.
End User Awareness
The existence of the security council and the relationships with the 
other committees should be embedded in the security awareness 
training for every end user within the organization. By establishing 
the message that the security policies are business decisions (versus 
information technology decisions emanating from the information 
systems security department), there is likely to be greater acceptance 
for their implementation. If the message is constructed in such a way 
that it is clear that middle management and senior management have 
reviewed and agree with all of the policies line by line, this can be a 
very powerful message. Line managers and supervisors are less likely 
to ignore the policies, as they understand that the directives are com-
ing from management and not another functional unit, which they 
consider to be their peers. This assumes that the organization is fol-
lowing the necessary practice of training all management with the 
security training as well as the end users.
If there are multiple organizational units participating in the policy 
development and review process in addition to the security council 
(e.g., IT steering committees, executive leadership team reviews, 
focused business and or technical workgroups), then the relationships 
between these committees and their associated functions should be 
explained in concise terms at a high level. For example, if the role of 
the security council is to review and recommend policies to the IT 
steering committee, which approves the policies, then state these basic 
functions so that the end users understand the role. If the role of the 
security council is to establish the security strategy for the organiza-
tion, prioritize projects, and implement the mission through these ini-
tiatives, then state that as well. The advantage to having the end users 
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understand the role of the security council is threefold by (1) helping 
them to understand how these policies are created, (2) conveying that 
their management is involved in the direction of information security 
(versus security mandates), and (3) providing individual understand-
ing to keep their own management in line with the security policies.
Is end user awareness of the security council’s existence really a 
critical success factor? To answer that question, we need to look no 
further than what the ultimate goal of a security program should be: 
to have every user of an organization’s information protect it with 
the same diligence as if it was the purse around their shoulder or the 
wallet in their back pocket. The answer is, you bet! Although they 
may not need to understand the working dynamics of the Security 
Council, they do need to understand that the organizational structure 
exists, is operating, and is effective at balancing the needs of security 
and the need to operate the business.
Establishing the security council may be seen as threatening to 
some managers at first, as it means that now some decisions will not 
be made by the security manager, director, or officer, but rather by 
the security council. Some security leaders may not want that sort of 
insight into or control of their activities. However, to be truly effec-
tive and truly maintain management commitment, the continued 
participation by business unit managers is essential. This can also be 
established informally without a security council, but the time com-
mitment is much greater and the collaboration between the business 
unit managers is less likely to occur.
The security council is not the answer to resolving all of the man-
agement commitment issues, as there will always be other business 
drivers impacting the decisions. Mergers and acquisitions may put 
security efforts on hold. Debates over the constraints of the technol-
ogy on the business operations may stall projects. Budget constraints 
due to a drop in sales volume or public sector funding may preclude 
security investments. Acceptance of risk by insurance or outsourcing 
initiatives may change the company’s security posture. Other company 
high-priority projects may consume the needed internal resources for 
security projects. Each of these can serve to limit the information 
security focus and related investments. These are normal events in 
the course of business. However, consider the individual responsible 
116  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
for information security having to address these issues alone (lack 
of management commitment) versus acting on these issues with the 
collaboration of the security council (supportive management com-
mitment), and the advantages of the security council can be read-
ily appreciated.
Security Council Commitment
The word commitment according to the Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary 
of Law is defined as “an agreement or promise to do something in the 
future.” According to the Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary, com-
mitment is defined as “a consignment to a penal or mental institution.” 
As security practitioners, hopefully we would agree that the former 
definition is much preferred over the later. Alternatively, if we fail to 
get the lawyer’s definition of commitment, we might end up with the 
medical definition of commitment.
Management commitment is not something that can be held, 
touched, or seen, but rather it is a state of being. It is also a current 
state, subject to change at any moment. The level of commitment is 
arrived at by management’s memory of historical events that led up to 
the present and paves the path for the future. If these experiences have 
not been good, then their commitment to spending large investments 
on future security initiatives will also not be good. Therefore, appro-
priate care must be taken to deliver upon the promises made through 
the security council by the security team, information technology 
departments, and the business unit representatives, or the next project 
will not be met with enthusiasm. Security councils are an essential 
element to building management commitment, and continued deliv-
ery provides the necessary oxygen to keep the council functioning.
Commitment is the two-way street; if commitment is expected 
from management, once it is obtained, the security program must 
also be committed to deliver on the expectations agreed upon. Doing 
less makes withdrawals from the goodwill that has been established, 
doing more creates increased satisfaction and confirmation that the 
investment choices supported by management were, in fact, the right 
choices. This also increases their trust in their own ability to make 
decisions supporting the security program.
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Finally, each security officer should evaluate their own commitment 
to enhancing the security of the organization and the current cultural 
view toward security. Where does the organization stand? It will feel 
uncomfortable at first to establish the council, but it is well worth the 
effort. So assemble the security champions from legal, information 
technology, human resources, the individual business units, and begin.
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manaGinG riSk to an 
acceptable level
Attachment is the great fabricator of illusions; reality can be attained 
only by someone who is detached.
Simone Weil, 1909–1943
Risk analysis is a much discussed area in the information security 
field for several reasons. First, risk analysis is core to understanding 
the state of information security that exists within the company. 
The process of risk analysis uncovers how well the control envi-
ronment is protecting the information assets. Second, risk analysis 
helps organizations target the information security expenditures 
where they are most needed and are used to allocate funds to the 
appropriate security controls. Finally, risk analysis and management 
is very subjective in nature and tends to be more art than science. 
Even though the process may be more art than science, there are 
still processes that can be followed to increase the likelihood that 
the risk analysis will be useful to the organization and provide vis-
ibility into the risks that the organization is exposed to. Artists are 
very creative in nature and can look at an object and see something 
different that a normal person may see. He then paints that object 
using techniques, or the science, that he has learned to create the 
appropriate texture, shading, design, symmetry, and so forth to 
express the image he is feeling. Many times the artist explores with 
different substances and types of painting, drawing, sculpturing, 
and so on to provide the desired end state through trial and error. 
The security officer or risk manager creates a risk assessment in a 
similar manner, starting with a methodology, concepts, and experi-
ences, and formulating the best depiction of the organization. Just 
as the finished painting is an expression of a snapshot in time, so is 
the risk assessment.
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Risk in Our Daily Lives
Everyday we are subject to threats and are vulnerable to some event 
happening that is not desired and not within our control. We can-
not stop the threat from occurring, however, we can minimize the 
impact of the event by the steps that we have taken or will take when 
the event happens. Consider the protection we implement daily to 
protect our automobiles from theft. Most of us lock the car doors 
when we park our car at the mall. The car manufacturers have decided 
that on more expensive cars that the risk of being stolen is perceived 
to be greater and therefore have implemented alarms and flashing 
lights inside the cars to act as a deterrent. Some consumers feel an 
alarm is not enough and have equipped their vehicles with a tracking 
device, such as one made by LoJack, to notify the police of vehicles’ 
whereabouts if stolen. Other consumers have felt that a lock over the 
steering wheel, known as the “club” would provide the adequate level 
of protection. And then there is the limousine driver that would not 
leave his vehicle unattended under any conditions.
In the automobile example, each of us may make a different deci-
sion when it comes to the security that we would place on our car. 
We arrive at our decisions based upon our past experiences, the value 
we place on our cars, the likelihood that we believe it will be stolen, 
will be reimbursed for the car if it is stolen through insurance, or our 
general feeling that society is either a good place with primarily good 
people or an inherently bad place with many ill-intentioned people. 
Some individuals may feel it is perfectly normal to leave the engine 
running while running into the mall for “ just a second.”
We take risks unconsciously every day whether or not we recognize 
it at the time. We may cross the street 30 times a day and it never 
enters our mind of the risks we are taking. Then one day, you receive 
a phone call that your 17-year-old son has been hit by a car going 
25 miles per hour through a crosswalk protected by a school crossing 
guard. Is the solution to keep him home from school in the future? 
Erect a bridge over the street to cross? Put up additional signs advis-
ing cars to slow down more in the school zone? Each of these could 
be implemented, albeit at different costs. So we accept the risk, and 
after an event happens, we are typically more cautious and aware of 
the potential dangers. Our goal should be to identify as many threats 
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up front so that we do not have to incur the damage of each event to 
learn from it. We should not need to be hit by a car to understand the 
risks of crossing the street or have our car stolen before we lock our 
car doors.
Accepting Organizational Risk
Just as we accept a certain amount of risk in our daily lives, organiza-
tions accept daily risk also, whether or not they have completed a for-
mal risk analysis. Risk in inherent in everything that we do and there 
is no such thing as a risk-free activity. Why do banks offer an interest 
rate to hold your money in the form of a certificate of deposit (CD)? 
Because there is a risk that the money will be worth less in the future 
due to inflation and we need to be compensated for that risk that our 
money will be worth less in the future. The stock market compen-
sates traditionally at 11% over time for stocks. Why? Because of the 
risk we are taking in investing in these companies that their products 
or services may not produce the expected income. Whether investors 
recognize this or not, whether investing in CDs or stocks, they are 
taking on risk and are being compensated for the risk.
The danger for an organization occurs when risks are being 
accepted implicitly without providing the visibility that the risk is 
being accepted. In this scenario, the company may be taking on more 
risk than they can afford to take on. For example, say that a small 
office space is available at a great price on the second floor of a build-
ing occupied by other tenants. The company could proceed on the 
basis that the office space is the perfect size and very cost competitive. 
However, if the buildings surroundings were not evaluated properly, 
they may be taking on too much risk. If, for example, there was a 
restaurant directly below them, they would be taking on the risk of 
business disruption or permanent loss should the restaurant have a 
fire. A risk analysis would reveal the threat, and while the threat could 
still be accepted (e.g., off-site backups or paperless scanning put in 
place to minimize the impact of the damage should a fire occur), the 
acceptance would be a conscious decision based upon review of the 
facts. This approach is much better than waiting until the event hap-
pens and being unaware of the risks that are being implicitly accepted.
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Just Another Set of Risks
Executives face risk-based decisions every day. Should the new prod-
uct be launched? Should we open 100 more stores? Does it make sense 
to merge with this other organization? Should we close this factory 
and move the jobs to another state? Should we compete for this busi-
ness? And so on. The risks related to protecting the information assets 
of the organization represent just another set of risks.
The security officer needs to be cognizant of this fact when deliv-
ering the risk message. Just as the executive must accept a certain 
amount of risk to proceed with any plan, the security officer must 
be willing to facilitate the risk discussion without an all-or-nothing 
approach to risk. Security departments traditionally have been criti-
cized for their first reaction to a new idea being similar to “No, we 
can’t do that, it would not be secure.” This posturing has earned many 
security departments of the distinction of being the “‘no’ department.” 
What does this say about the level of risk acceptance that the security 
officers feel the organization should accept? The answer is none. A 
better approach is to examine what the desired end state the executive 
is trying to achieve and work toward a solution to enable the use of 
the technology or process in a secure manner.
Management Owns the Risk Decision
The security officer acts as the facilitator for the risk decisions and 
should not be the one making them. Risk is owned by the manage-
ment of the company, as it is through their operational areas that the 
risk is present and through their areas with which the risk must be 
controlled. The security officer must manage risk within his or her 
own departments as well, and they are the owners ensuring that 
agreed upon policies and procedures are followed to mitigate the risk.
Security officers and their teams bring security expertise to the dis-
cussion, which will assist in management making informed decisions. 
Alternatives can be presented and recommendations made, however, 
the level of risk accepted is decided by management after the informa-
tion has been presented. One useful technique to ensure that risk is 
appropriately understood and accepted is to formally require that the 
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person accepting the risk sign a document accepting the risk. When 
some people have to apply their signature to a document, they tend to 
review what is being agreed upon more closely.
A risk acceptance agreement could include the following key items:
• Description of the threat/vulnerability
• Description of the mitigating controls currently implemented
• Residual (remaining) risk to the organization
• Controls evaluated but not implemented and reason why
• Justification for accepting risk
• Level of risk (high, medium, low)
• Timeframe of the acceptance (typically no more than 1 year)
• Future plans to mitigate risk
• Departments impacted
• Approximate dollar impact expected should the vulnerability 
be exploited
• Signature(s)/title(s)
By including these variables, it should be clear that the risk must 
have a business justification, is not approved for an indefinite period, 
and must have a plan for mitigating the risk now as well as providing 
for a future scenario where the acceptance form is not needed.
Qualitative versus Quantitative Risk Analysis
One of the difficulties with performing risk analysis is the availability 
of objective risk information from past experiences. Companies do 
not typically share information of the risks they have accepted or the 
occurrence of unfavorable events. Consulting firms typically estab-
lish a practice for risk consulting and leverage their firm’s internal 
knowledge across clients, or databases that have been accumulated by 
the government of other software companies producing risk manage-
ment products.
Quantitative risk analysis attempts to place a dollar value on the 
cost of accepting risk versus the cost of implementing controls to 
reduce the risk level. These analysis can be very voluminous as each 
risk is measured using statistical information or historical dollar val-
ues and probabilities of the event occurring.
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Qualitative risk analysis is widely used due to the relative each 
of understanding and speed of the analysis. This analysis estimates 
the potential loss or impact and the likelihood that the events would 
occur in a manner similar to the quantitative analysis, with the excep-
tion of using values such as Low, Medium, and High for probabilities 
and impacts. This is in contrast to attempting to use dollar values for 
the impacts, which is very difficult to obtain agreement, and prob-
ability factors for the likelihood. Since there is no universally accepted 
master accurate “probability database,” the quantitative method tends 
to try to apply precision to an assessment that is inherently subjec-
tive. For this reason, the quantitative method has limited use and the 
qualitative method is easier for management to quickly grasp the risks 
of terms of Low, Medium, and High values.
Risk Management Process
The quantitative risk analysis process has the ability to provide 
a great deal of information, however, for many organizations, a 
qualitative risk analysis can arrive at similar conclusions in less 
time with less cost. Quantitative analyses give the appearance of 
providing precise measurements or dollar amounts related to the 
risk; however, these calculations are also many times based upon 
the same subjective probability measures that the qualitative mea-
sures are based upon. In practice, management seems to grasp the 
more simplistic high, medium, and low assignments to risk com-
ing out of the qualitative analysis. For this reason, the subsequent 
sections outline a very pragmatic step-by-step approach to risk 
analysis that can be used for almost any size organization. Those 
familiar with the NIST 800-30 risk management process will rec-
ognize the approach, as this is consistent with the concepts articu-
lated there (NIST, 2002).
Risk Analysis Involvement
To properly conduct a security risk analysis, the right technical and 
management staff need to be included. The resulting analysis is only 
as good as the accurate picture that can be painted of the current envi-
ronment. The list of involved participants should include
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• Chief information officer




• System and information owners
• Business and functional management owners
• IT security practitioners
• Infrastructure personnel
There will be others that may need to be called into the process to 
participate in the interviews, such as facilities, data center manager, 
human resources, and physical security.
Step 1: Categorize the System
Documenting the business application of the system ensures that the 
system or area being assessed is clear to those involved in the interviews 
and the person analyzing the system. The business description should 
include only the business specifics of the system. What is the system 
being used for? Who will be the users? What is the primary function-
ality? The definition establishes the scope and boundaries under review.
Once the business functions have been written, the technical 
description of the infrastructure, at a high level, is documented. This 
provides the basis for review of the technical components of the sys-
tem that is supporting the business function.
The controls that are implemented to protect a system and its 
information ultimately depend upon the criticality and sensitivity 
categorization of the system. For low criticality systems, it would be 
unnecessary to spend the same amount for controls as what is spent to 
protect systems that have been categorized as high criticality or sensi-
tivity. This is analogous to building a 15-foot-high fence around your 
house to keep the neighbors from looking into your yard.
The Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 199 provides 
guidance for categorizing systems according to their attributes of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (NIST, 2004). As shown in 
Table 5.1, a system is categorized as high for confidentiality if the loss 
of confidentiality could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic 
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adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or 
individuals. If the loss of confidentiality was deemed to have a serious 
effect, then the system would be categorized as medium with respect 
to confidentiality. Likewise, if the effect is determined to be limited, 
then categorization would be low for confidentiality.
The categorization continues by looking at the dimensions of integ-
rity and availability using similar criteria. If the loss of integrity could 
be expected to have a severe or catastrophic effect on organizational 
Table 5.1 System categorization
FiPS PuBLication 199 Low Moderate HiGH
confidentiality the loss of 
confidentiality 
could be expected 
to have a limited 






the loss of 
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could be expected 
to have a serious 
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integrity the loss of integrity 
could be expected 
to have a limited 






the loss of integrity 
could be expected 
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could be expected to 








availability the loss of 
availability could 
be expected to have 







the loss of 
availability could 
be expected to have 







the loss of availability 
could be expected to 








Source: national institute of Standards and technology (niSt). 2004. Standards for security cate-
gorization of federal information and information systems, FiPS PuB 199. http://csrc.nist.
gov/publications/fips/fips199/FiPS-PuB-199-final.pdf
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operations, assets, or individuals, this would cause the categoriza-
tion with respect to integrity to be categorized as high, serious would 
cause the categorization to be medium, and if limited it would be low. 
Similarly, the availability dimension is categorized as high, medium, 
and low depending upon the severe or catastrophic, serious, or limited 
effects of a loss of availability.
The final categorization of the system is done by reviewing each of 
the categorizations for confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and 
selecting the categorization that best protects the system. For example, 
if both confidentiality and availability are considered high, and integrity 
is considered a medium concern, then an appropriate response would 
be to select those controls that would provide a high level of assurance. 
For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
determined that the health records of the Medicare population should 
be rated as high, primarily due to the high confidentiality requirement 
and the damage that would be caused if the records were inadvertently 
disclosed to the wrong parties (CMS, 2009). This would undermine 
the trust in the government’s (and their contractors) ability to pro-
tect the health insurance information. Availability is important, but 
a lesser concern, as the information is not needed on an immediate, 
real-time basis for the payment of claims. This would contrast with a 
provider of ATM services, where although confidentiality would be 
very important, availability would be very important as well.
By now the question that may be coming to mind is, “How do I 
accurately decide between severe, catastrophic, serious, or limited?” 
This assessment, as with much of risk analysis as previously stated, 
is of a subjective nature. The best way to answer this is to evaluate 
what the impact would be in terms of shutting down the business for 
a few days, or causing a high public relations nightmare, or causing 
an unrecoverable situation. The higher the categorization of the sys-
tem, the more stringent and more expense will have to be incurred to 
protect the system. Google and Yahoo Internet-facing search engines 
would assuredly garner a high availability rating and require security 
controls of high redundancy hardware to ensure the availability. They 
would also need extensive monitoring for attacks and proactive mea-
sures to detect denial of service attacks. In other words, classifying 
the system is an important step as all other controls that are selected 
flow from the categorization. The NIST 800-53 controls (shown in 
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Chapters 8 to 10) provide a set of controls and enhancements to the 
controls based upon the categorization of the system (high, medium, 
or low).
Step 2: Identify Potential Dangers (Threats)
Threats are those dangers that have the potential to cause harm to our 
business and the systems that we support. Threats are not necessar-
ily what have happened in the past but rather those dangers that our 
organizations face that we should have a response in place for. A threat 
may or may not be exploited, as we may not be vulnerable to that 
threat because of other control measures that have been implemented.
Each organization should brainstorm the specific threats specific 
to their industry, which may include human, environmental/physical, 
or technical threats.
Human Threats As long as we have people working in our organiza-
tions, they will be our most valuable asset and also at the same time 
considered a threat. Through acts of carelessness, inadvertent com-
promises of security or malicious intent, the human factor must be 
considered as a threat source. A listing of potential human threats are 
shown in Figure 5.1
Environmental/Physical Threats Environmental risks typically are 
focused on the environmental systems protecting the computing envi-
ronments in data centers and server rooms where temperature and 
humidity control is important to protect the associated equipment. 
Data Entry Errors Impersonation












Figure 5.1 Human threats.
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Other threats such as fires, lack of power, and so forth are noted in 
Figure 5.2.
Technical Threats Technical threats such as authorized access, infra-
structure intrusion, or inadvertent configuration errors can permit an 
intruder to exploit the vulnerabilities of the system and compromise or 
gain access to information. Technical threats are shown in Figure 5.3.
Step 3: Identify Vulnerabilities That Could Be Exploited
Once the threat has been defined, the next step is to identify the vul-
nerabilities that can be exploited by the threat. The threat may be 
thought of as the source of the attack, and the vulnerability is that 
which is exploited to cause harm. A burglar standing outside a ware-
house may be considered a threat, and the degree that he will be able 
to break into the warehouse depends upon the level of vulnerabili-





































Figure 5.3 technical threats.
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windows could be broken, the doorjamb could possibly be opened 
with a credit card, or the lock could be picked. The burglar could also 
pose as a warehouse worker and gain entry during the daytime hours.
Vulnerabilities may exist within our computing environments if we 
have not applied the most current patch levels or applied a consistent, 
current baseline configuration to our systems. The intruder decides to 
gain unauthorized access (the threat) and exploit one or more vulner-
abilities, such as a vulnerability found within the Windows 7 operat-
ing system, application software, in-house developed software, or a 
customized vendor product.
A good question to ask when determining vulnerabilities that may 
be exploited is to ask the question: What could go wrong? A technique 
that may have been invented by 3-year-olds worldwide is to ask why 
five times to get to the real root cause of the issue, while along the way 
this will also identify the vulnerabilities and the controls that could be 
implemented. After the vulnerabilities are determined, the risk analy-
sis can proceed forward with examining the existing controls.
Step 4: Identify Existing Controls
Since our organizations are not starting at day one when the risk 
analysis is conducted, odds are that we have implemented controls 
to manage some of the risk. In the warehouse burglar example noted 
earlier, we may have implemented bars over the windows, cameras 
scanning the parking lot, visitor badge control, and a night-duty 
guard to protect the premises. We may have also placed steel plates 
over the doorjambs to prevent tampering with the door. The controls 
that we believe are mitigating some of the risk of exploitation of the 
vulnerability should be listed.
The chapters on managerial, technical, and operational controls 
(Chapters 8, 9, and 10) provide a good starting reference to deter-
mine what types of controls should be considered. There tends to be a 
preference to provide automated controls to replace manual controls, 
however, there are instances where the manual controls may still be 
more effective. For example, few organizations have done away com-
pletely with security guards, as they still provide an effective deterrent 
when used in addition to technical controls such as mounted cameras, 
proximity readers, and alarm systems.
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Step 5: Determine Exploitation Likelihood Given Existing Controls
Step 5 is where the rubber starts to meet the road, where an assess-
ment of the first factor in determining risk, likelihood, or prob-
ability is determined. This is not a mathematical calculation based 
upon statistical probabilities as may be the case in the quantitative 
method. This value is an expression of the likelihood that the vul-
nerability is likely to be exploited given the existing control envi-
ronment. A qualitative description is assigned to the likelihood 
starting from a low of negligible likelihood (unlikely to occur) 
to extreme (likely to occur multiple times per day) as shown in 
Figure 5.4.
This assessment should be made by individuals responsible for the 
business and facilitated by the security officer. Ownership of the like-
lihood determination cannot occur if the security officer is determin-
ing how often an event may occur, unless it is related to vulnerability 
within his domain that he has knowledge of. Let’s say for example 
that there is a policy in place that users are not to share user accounts, 
but there is no control in place that would prevent concurrent log-
ins other than a formal policy instructing the users not to share an 
account. The security officer may learn through the incident reporting 
process that individuals are sharing an account at least several times 
a month. In the absence of a technical control to prevent this access, 
this would be assigned a likelihood of very high based upon the fre-
quency of the event.
An important point to note is that likelihood is one component of 
risk, and at this point the “risk level” has not been determined. It is 
advisable to keep the conversation about the likelihood of occurrence 
LiKeLiHood deScriPtion
negligible unlikely to occur
very Low Likely to occur two to three times every 5 years
Low Likely to occur once every year or less
Moderate Likely to occur once every 6 months or less
High Likely to occur once per month or less
very High Likely to occur multiple times per month
extreme Likely to occur multiple times per day
Figure 5.4 Likelihood of occurrence.
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and not about risk, or managers will immediately jump to discussing 
high, medium, or low risk level without having the complete founda-
tion (likelihood and impact) to determine risk. A “hold off, we’re get-
ting to that next” stance is warranted here.
The warehouse burglar in the earlier example may have had a low 
likelihood of exploiting the vulnerability given the existing controls 
that were in place, as it appears that most of the known areas of vul-
nerability were already implemented (since this company was broken 
into frequently in the past, last year it upgraded its control environ-
ment as a result of the prior risk analysis).
As with the rest of the risk analysis, the likelihood should be exam-
ined with a fresh set of eyes, meaning that what was decided as the 
likelihood last year is irrelevant. New controls may have been put in 
place, existing controls may have been removed, and the intensity of 
the threat may have changed. For example, tracks may have been laid 
for a new high-speed train going past the data center or a fuel storage 
plant may be constructed, both creating potential vulnerabilities that 
did not previously exist. Alternatively, an office may have closed and 
the vulnerabilities that were identified with the office are no longer 
relevant. A prudent approach is to review and update the risk assess-
ment annually and perform a ground-up risk assessment every 3 years.
Step 6: Determine Impact Severity
This step assumes that the vulnerability has been exploited and now 
the organization must deal with the harm that was done by the action. 
An impact designed as minor, according to Figure 5.5, would require 
minimal effort to repair the system. If the impact was large, des-
ignated as critical, then the impact would be expected to result in 
an extended outage. Figure 5.5 provides a quick means to assign an 
impact to the event.
Management and technical staff are in the best position to explain 
what would happen if the system was lost for a day or a shipment was 
not delivered. Finance areas are also excellent sources of information 
when calculating the loss of productivity per hour when a system is 
down. E-commerce websites can calculate the approximate lost dol-
lar volume when their sites become unavailable. Depending upon 
the time of year, the severity may increase, such as online retailers 
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during the holiday season. A recently quoted statistic indicated that 
13% of Black Friday sales came from Cyber Monday (the Monday 
following Black Friday).
If the burglar was able to break into the warehouse in our exam-
ple, this would have caused considerable damage, as the warehouse 
was full of shipments to a key manufacturer that needed the goods 
shipped tomorrow. If those goods were damaged or stolen, we could 
iMPact Severity deScriPtion
insignificant • will have almost no impact if the threat occurs or vulnerability is 
exploited
• will result in minimal loss of functional integrity
• requires little or no recovery cost
Minor • will have some minor effect on the business function or system
• May cause minor financial loss, but will not result in negative publicity 
or political damage
• will require only minimal effort to complete corrective actions and 
continue or resume operations
• will require minimal effort to repair or reconfigure the system
Significant • will result in some tangible harm, albeit negligible, and perhaps only 
realized by a few individuals or agencies
• May cause political embarrassment, negative publicity, and moderate 
financial loss
• will require a moderate expenditure of resources to repair
damaging • May cause damage to the reputation of system management, cMS, 
and/or notable loss of confidence in the ability for cMS to complete its 
stated business mission, system resources, and services
• May result in legal liability, and will require significant expenditure of 
resources to repair or to complete corrective actions and restore 
operations
Serious • May cause considerable disruption in the business function, system 
outage, and/or loss of customer or business partner confidence
• May result in compromise of large amount of government information 
or services, a substantial financial loss, and the failure to deliver cMS 
public programs and services
critical • May cause an extended disruption in the business function, system 
extended outage
• May require recovery in an alternate site environment or hot site 
environment
• May result in full compromise of cMS’ ability to provide public 
programs and services, and ability to complete the stated business 
mission
Figure 5.5 Severity of impact.
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have lost a client. According to Figure 5.5, this may be assessed as 
damaging, or damage to reputation, loss of public confidence.
Step 7: Determine Risk Level
Step 7 is where the risk level is determined based upon the likeli-
hood and the impact level. Using the table shown in Figure 5.6, the 
likelihood of occurrence is located in the first column, and the impact 
severity is located in the row across the top. These are then used to 
find where the likelihood and impact intersect in the table, indicating 
a risk level of low, moderate (or medium), or high. For example, in our 
burglar example, the likelihood was low and the impact severity was 
damaging, resulting in a risk level of moderate.
This process is repeated for each of the threat and vulnerability 
pairs until each has been addressed and assigned a risk level. The 
risks are then prioritized from high to medium to low. The low risks 
should be worked on only after the high and medium risks have been 
addressed, unless they are simple changes that will not divert substan-
tial resources from addressing the higher risk items.
The best part about this method is that the risk was determined by 
focusing the discussion on (1) likelihood of occurrence and (2) impact 
severity. Nowhere in the discussion was risk mentioned up until this 
step. This step still does not debate risk but merely establishes the risk 
based upon the matrix. Management can always decide to raise or 






















Negligible Low Low Low Low Low Low
Very Low Low Low Low Low Moderate Moderate
Low Low Low Moderate Moderate High High
Moderate Low Low Moderate High High High
High Low Moderate High High High High
Very High Low Moderate High High High High
Extreme Low Moderate High High High High
Figure 5.6 risk determination.
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this should be based upon a reevaluation of the likelihood or the sever-
ity. Sometime management may have good reason to increase the risk 
rating to ensure that it receives some attention within the organization.
Step 8: Determine Additional Controls
Now that the risks have been identified, it is necessary to identify 
controls to mitigate or reduce the risk level to an acceptable level. 
Typically the focus is on the high risks that should be remediated as 
soon as is feasible. Moderate or medium risks should also be handled 
urgently and plans created to address their implementation. It may not 
be clear at the moment precisely what solutions will be implemented 
at this juncture, but plans of action to investigate the alternatives can 
be created until it is clear what solutions will be implemented.
Once the control has been identified that will reduce the risk, the 
residual likelihood, residual severity impact, and the resulting residual 
risk is recalculated. Controls should at least bring the high risks to 
medium, the mediums to lows, and if the lows are addressed at this 
time, they should be eliminated. Some organizations will retain all 
risks as a low risk, because even though the vulnerability has been 
addressed by a control, there is always a risk (albeit low) that the vulner-
ability may be exploited. Other organizations take the viewpoint that 
they do not want to see any mitigated vulnerabilities on the report, as 
it gives the wrong impression. The security officer needs to be aware of 
the culture of the organization and how the risk level will be perceived.
Risk Mitigation Options
The preceding overview of the risk analysis process provides a frame-
work for conducting a risk analysis. The most likely outcome is that 
new risks will be uncovered through the analysis and the company can 
focus resources toward mitigating the vulnerabilities and reducing the 
risk levels. In addition to implementing their own controls to resolve 
the issue, there are other additional options for managing the risk.
Risk Assumption
The organization may decide that the risk does not represent an 
unacceptable risk outside the company’s risk appetite and chooses to 
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accept the risk. The organization may continue to operate, or plan to 
implement additional controls in the future. This strategy is perfectly 
acceptable provided that the risk being assumed has been analyzed 
and the financial implications have been accepted by the appropriate 
parties. As indicated in an earlier section, formalizing this process 
with a risk acceptance letter is preferable.
Risk Avoidance
Risk can be avoided by eliminating the cause of the risk or the con-
sequence. A server may have an old version of the operating system, 
such as Windows 2000, which has much vulnerability that can be 
exploited due to the aging of the system. Instead of upgrading the sys-
tem to a new operating system, the system itself may be retired, thus 
eliminating the vulnerability.
Risk Limitation
Adding other preventative or detective controls to the process might 
reduce the adverse impact of the risk. In the earlier example of shared 
logins, software may be purchased to prevent the concurrent login on 
those systems (such as windows) that do not have the native capability 
and configuration settings made on other systems that do. Monitoring 
of logs could also be implemented.
Risk Planning
All vulnerabilities may not be able to be addressed at the present time 
and the construction of a plan for mitigating the current and future 
vulnerabilities would be put in place.
Risk Research
If the vulnerability cannot be immediately remediated, the fact that 
the vulnerability exists may be acknowledged with plans to research 
viable alternatives.
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Risk Transference
Losses are compensated for by purchasing insurance or transferring 
risk via contract. Rates are many times dependent upon the level of 
security controls that exist or external evaluations of the controls.
Conclusion
Risk analysis must be done for each organization to address the unique 
circumstances and risks they face. The process described in this chap-
ter provides a very logical, systematic process for determining the risks 
that are specific to the company. If these processes are followed con-
sistently, over time the review process of the existing threats becomes 
easier and more time can be spent addressing the new threats to 
the organization.
The process does not have to be a lengthy one either. The facili-
tated risk analysis process (FRAP), for example, may be completed in 
days versus weeks or months (Peltier, 2001). Having personally been 
involved in the FRAP for an electronic commerce site, whereby a group 
of individuals get together for a couple of days in a conference room to 
analyze and come to consensus on the risks, there are clearly approaches 
such as this that can gather information quickly and provide an assess-
ment of the risk that can be very effective. The risks determined from 
these approaches can then be managed according to their risk level and 
be managed as part on an ongoing risk management program.
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We haven’t the time to take our time.
Eugène Ionesco, 1912–1994
When organizations first recognize that they need to ensure that the 
information assets of the organization are adequately protected, this 
usually results in asking the question, “What applicable policies are in 
place?” There may be some human resource policies that might apply 
or corporate policies noted in the ethics and compliance code of con-
duct, however, these are normally insufficient to address the breadth 
of the information security needs. The next step is for the organiza-
tion to embark upon the time-consuming task of developing informa-
tion security policies.
Why Information Security Policies Are Important
To the seasoned information security practitioner, asking why infor-
mation security policies are important may seem like a question with 
an obvious answer. The question is not so obvious to the end users of 
the organization, as many of them may feel that if everyone applies 
common sense, there is no need for them to read and sign off on 
voluminous sets of policies. The reality is that each person has a dif-
ferent interpretation of what is common sense. For example, leav-
ing a scruffy old backpack containing books in a car may seem like 
a reasonable act to one employee who wonders why would anyone 
want to steal a bag full of books. Another employee might think that 
because of the condition of the backpack, no one would want to steal 
it. Another might think that their car is parked in broad daylight in 
a heavily traveled area, which would make the risk of stealing it quite 
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low. Another employee may think that the car alarm would be a suf-
ficient deterrent from anyone wanting to go through the trouble of 
stealing the backpack.
Then along comes the information security officer, whose job it is 
to evaluate the course of action that will provide reasonable security. 
The security officer knows the stories of break-ins all too well, and 
knows that criminals do not know for sure what is in the backpack. 
The criminal might assume that there is a laptop, money, or credit 
cards that could be sold for a nominal amount to buy drugs, alcohol, 
or support rudimentary living expenses. Thus, the opportunity and 
motivation presents an unacceptable risk that must be mitigated. The 
organization cannot afford to leave these individual decisions up to 
the common sense internal barometer of thousands of employees. The 
organization must set forth advice or a baseline of what behavior is 
expected for each employee, and not leave this up to individual dis-
cretion. This advice, and expected behavior, is manifested through 
a set of information security policies. The policies form the corner-
stone of the information security program and are representations of 
management’s intention that are needed to control the information 
security assets.
Avoiding Shelfware
Although information security policies are very important, they can 
easily become shelfware if their development, management, and dis-
tribution are not handled appropriately. Countless security depart-
ments have filled binders full of policies over the years that remain 
unread and require frequent dusting. As the Intranet-based envi-
ronments started to take hold in the mid-’90s, these environments 
moved from paper-based shelfware to electronic-based shelfware. 
The security department may have had a large project to develop the 
information security policies, place them on the Intranet, and then 
they were “done.” Lengthy, technical documents with all the techni-
cal jargon may have sounded impressive to the security department, 
but fail when end users are required to read them because they are not 
understandable. Who would read these lengthy documents? The same 
individuals that would read the complete car owners manual after 
purchasing a new car before they put the key into the ignition—in 
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other words, a very small segment of the population. The security 
policies should be written in a language from the user and be brief 
enough to get the point across without overwhelming the end user. 
More detailed descriptions can be placed in standards documents that 
the users can read if they need additional information. An organiza-
tion security policy beyond 30 to 60 pages is normally much more 
than would be required by any medium- to large-sized organization. 
Beyond that level, the policies are likely to go unread.
Electronic Policy Distribution
To avoid shelfware in electronic policies, they need to be kept (1) brief, 
(2) updated, and (3) relevant. Web-based policies should each be 
no more than two online pages to get the point across as to what 
is expected (Fitzgerald, 2004). Resumes are kept to two pages for a 
reason—people stop reading them if they have not received what is 
needed within the first two pages. Daily online articles on sites such 
as Yahoo and USA Today are no more than two pages, as the reader 
may lose interest after that.
The policies need to be updated at least annually to ensure that the 
management direction is still desired. As employees comes across a 
policy that was last updated 4 years ago, they may make the conclusion 
on their own that the policy no longer applies. The organization may 
have gone through a merger, and the conflicting policies may exist 
for the two organizations or worse yet, if the policies have never been 
integrated, the employees of the acquired company may make the 
erroneous assumption that they should still follow their old company 
policies and may not be aware of the new acquiring company policies.
Policies need to maintain their relevancy to remain effective. For 
example, if an organization has not addressed the use of social media 
in their policies, the management and end users will have to rely on 
the existing policies to determine whether social media is acceptable. 
Or, suppose an employee just purchased an iPad tablet computer, 
but the policy indicates that no personal desktop or laptop comput-
ers may be used within the company. Should the iPad be allowed? 
Technically, according to the policy, the iPad “tablet” computer has 
not been addressed, and the associate may leave it to an interpretation 
more favorable to the employee as to whether to use the device.
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Policies posted online should always ensure that the revision his-
tory is provided as well, so that users can see what changes were 
made to the documents and also determine if they are looking at the 
correct version. Even with many companies moving toward green, 
 environmental-friendly initiatives to reduce wasteful printing and 
disposal costs, many end users still prefer to have a paper document 
that can be referenced when needed. The revision update date and his-
tory help ensure that the correct document is being utilized.
Several security vendors have products that will provide an elec-
tronic distribution of security policies and also provide a mechanism 
for end users to confirm that they have read, accepted, and under-
stood the policy contents. The results are then recorded in a database 
that can be queried as needed. This information becomes very useful 
during incident investigations, terminations, and lawsuits where the 
company wants to demonstrate that the employee had clear knowl-
edge of the policy and chose to violate it against the corporate policy.
Canned Security Policies
Consulting organizations have sets of policy templates that are used 
to jumpstart a client’s need for information security policies. These 
are then tailored to the needs of the organization. This process may 
be more effective than writing the information security policies from 
scratch, as long as the policies meet the compliance, laws, regulations, 
and desires of the organization. It is not unusual to see where an orga-
nization has implemented a copied policy verbatim, sometimes even 
forgetting to change the company name on the template. During the 
2010 BP oil spill, it was revealed that the business continuity/ disaster 
recovery documents from several major oil companies appeared to have 
used the same templates for their disaster recovery plans (Gupta, 2010).
Although developing the complete information security policy is 
beyond the scope of this book, there are several information security 
books available with sample polices that can be used to jumpstart the 
development. Two very good sources are Information Security Policies 
and Procedures—A Practitioner’s Reference (Peltier, 2007) and Information 
Security Policies Made Easy by Information Shield (Wood, 2009). Both of 
these sources contain valuable information at a fraction of the cost of a 
security consultant for one day.
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Policies, Standards, Guidelines Definitions
Organizations typically do not have a consistent understanding as to 
what a “policy” is. This seems like such a simple concept, so why the 
difficulty? The reason is not the lack of understanding that a policy 
is meant to govern the behavior within the organization. The reason 
for the confusion has more to do with the fact that in the interest of 
saving time, organizations will combine policies, procedures, guide-
lines, and standards into one document and call it the policy. This is 
not really a time saver because it makes it more difficult by introduc-
ing inflexibility into the policy each time the policy needs to change. 
This is similar to denormalizing a database structure to make the per-
formance more efficient, when in fact it becomes harder to add new 
data elements to a particular table without redesigning the table. The 
policies and procedures end up getting fused together, and so when 
the procedure changes, the policy document by default is changing 
as well when the policy does not need to change. Or, the employ-
ees begin to think that the procedure is the only way the policy can 
be implemented, when there may be multiple procedures across the 
organization that are implemented to comply with the policy. For 
example, an organization might have a policy that all systems need a 
full backup weekly and they need to be maintained off site. The data 
center may have a procedure that ensures that tape backups are taken 
weekly and the tapes are picked up by a vendor and transported to the 
secure off-site storage. The midrange server infrastructure team may 
have a procedure to ensure that full backups are taken weekly through 
the online data vaulting process, in addition to the daily incremental 
backups at the remote site. The desktop support department may have 
a procedure that ensures that company critical information is stored 
on network drives, also subject to the weekly online backup process. 
In this case, each area has designated local procedures that ensure that 
they are in compliance with the higher-level corporate policy.
Policies Are Written at a High Level
Policies should be written at the highest level possible to still be able 
to communicate the intentions of the company. The higher the level 
of the policy, the more likely the policy is able to stand the test of 
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time. Companies do not want to be reissuing policies on a frequent 
basis unless they have to. This involves resources for development and, 
more important, the time and expense of each person to reread the 
complete policy. Whereas changes in technology, company structure, 
laws and regulations, emerging trends, and so forth warrant changes 
to the security policy, frequent changes due to minor technology 
changes are not desired. The reaction of most users will be, didn’t we 
just do this? For example, if password standards are written into the 
password policy for a primarily Windows-based environment, what 
happens when a Unix server for the SQL server data warehouse proj-
ect is introduced? Will the password policy need to be redistributed 
and attested to by thousands of users, when the change impacted only 
a small number of users?
Security officers and their teams are charged with the responsibility 
of creating the security policies. The policies must be written and com-
municated at a level that is understood by the end users of the orga-
nization if there is to be any chance of compliance. If the policies are 
poorly written or written at too high of an education level (common 
industry practice is to focus the content for general users at the sixth- 
to eighth-grade reading level), the policies will not be understood.
Whereas security officers may be charged with the development 
of the policies, the effort is normally a collaborative effort to ensure 
that the business issues are addressed. Utilization of an security coun-
cil, executive oversight committee, or a subgroup of that committee, 
depending upon the policy being drafted, is an approach that con-
siders the business impacts of a security policy decision. Developing 
the policies solely within the information technology department and 
then distributing the policies without business input is likely to miss 
important business considerations. As always, deciding on the appro-
priate security controls is a decision of risk by the organization, which 
ultimately should be decided by the business leaders. The organization 
is also more likely to accept security policies that have been approved 
and endorsed by the business leaders versus the security officer or the 
information technology department.
Once these different documents have been created, the basis for 
ensuring compliance is established. These deliverables form the basis 
for organizational compliance with the security policies. The most 
current versions of the documents need to be readily accessible by 
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those that are expected to follow them. Many organizations have 
placed these documents electronically on their intranets or shared file 
folders to facilitate communication of the most current documents. 
Placement of these documents plus checklists, forms, and sample 
documents can save time for the individual and be an added value 
provided by the security department.
Policies
Policies define what at a high level the organization needs to accom-
plish and serves as management’s intentions to control the operation 
of the organization to meet business objectives. The why should be 
stated in the form of a policy summary statement or purpose. If end 
users understand the why, they are more apt to follow the policy. As 
children, we were told what to do by our parents and we just did it. 
As we grew older, we challenged those beliefs (as 4- and 5-year-olds 
and again as teenagers) and needed to understand the reasoning. The 
rules had to make sense to us. Today’s organizations are no different; 
people need to understand the why before they can really commit.
Security Policy Best Practices
Someone once said, “Writing security policies is like making sausage. 
You don’t know want to know what goes into it, but what comes out 
is pretty good!” Writing policies does not have to be a mystery, and 
there are several guidelines for creating good security policies prac-
ticed in the industry.
• Clearly define policy creation practice—A clearly defined process 
for initiating, creating, reviewing, recommending, approving, 
and distributing the policies communicates the responsibili-
ties of all parties necessary and the time expectations of their 
participation. This can be accomplished by process flows, 
swim lanes, flowcharts, or written documentation.
• Write policies to survive 2 to 3 years—Policies are high-level 
statements of the objectives of the organization. The under-
lying methods and technologies to implement the controls to 
support the policies may change. By including these in the 
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other related documents (procedures, standards, guidelines, 
and baselines), the policy statements will need less frequent 
change. This avoids frequent updates and subsequent distri-
bution to the organization.
• Use directive wording—Policies represent expectations to be 
complied with. As such, statements such as must, will, and 
shall communicate this requirement versus using weaker 
directives such as should, may, or can. This latter type of lan-
guage is better reserved for guidelines or areas where there 
are options.
• Avoid technical implementation details—Policies should be 
written to be technology independent, as the implemented 
technology may change over time.
• Keep length to a minimum—Policies published online should be 
limited in length to two to three pages maximum per policy. 
The intent for the policies is for the end user to understand and 
not to create long documents for the sake of documentation.
• Provide navigation from the policy to the supporting documents—
If the implementation of the policy is placed online, then 
hyperlinking the procedures, standards, guidelines, and base-
lines can be an effective method to ensure that the appropriate 
procedures are being followed. Some of the internal security 
procedures would not be appropriate for general knowledge, 
such as the procedure for monitoring intrusions or review-
ing log files, and these need to be accessible by the security 
department and properly secured from general distribution.
• Thoroughly review before publishing—Proofreading policies by 
multiple individuals can catch errors that may not be readily 
seen by the author.
• Conduct management review and sign off—Senior management 
must endorse the policies if they are to be effectively accepted 
by all management levels and subsequently the end users of 
the organization.
• Avoid techno speak—Policies are oriented to communicate to 
nontechnical users. Technical jargon is acceptable in technical 
documentation but not in high-level security policies.
• Review incidents and adjust policies—Review of the security 
incidents that have occurred may indicate the need for a new 
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policy, a revision to an existing policy, or the need to redis-
tribute the current policy to reinforce compliance.
• Periodically review policies—A formalized review process pro-
vides a mechanism to ensure that the security policies are still 
in alignment with the business objectives.
• Develop sanctions for noncompliance—Effective policies have 
consistent sanction policies to enable action when the policies 
are not followed. These sanctions may include “disciplinary 
action up to and including termination.” Stronger language 
can also be added for prosecution for serious offenses.
Policies provide the foundation for a comprehensive and effective 
security program. The company is protected from surprises and gives 
the necessary authority to the security activities of the organization. 
By communicating the company policies as directives, accountability 
and personal responsibility for adhering to the security practices is 
established. The policies are utilized in determining or interpreting 
any conflicts that may arise. The policies also define the elements, 
scope, and functions of the security management.
Types of Security Policies
Security policies may consist of different types, depending upon the 
specific need for the policy (NIST, 2003). The different security poli-
cies work together to meet the objectives of the comprehensive secu-
rity program. Different policy types include:
• Organizational or program policy—This policy is issued by a 
senior management individual who creates the authority and 
scope for the security program. The purpose of the program 
is described and the assigned responsibility is defined for car-
rying out the information security mission. The goals of con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability would be addressed in 
the policy. Specific areas of security focus may be stressed, 
such as the protection of confidential information for a credit 
card company or heath insurance company, or the availabil-
ity focus for a company maintaining mission-critical, high- 
availability systems. The policy should be clear as to the 
facilities, hardware, software, information, and personnel 
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that are in scope for the security program. In most cases, the 
scope will be the entire organization, however, in larger orga-
nizations the security program may be limited in scope to a 
division or geographic location. The organization policy sets 
out the high-level authority to define the appropriate sanc-
tions for failure to comply with the policy.
• Functional, issue-specific policies—Although the organizational 
security policies are broad in scope, the functional or issue-
specific policies address areas of particular security concern 
requiring clarification. The issue-specific policies may be 
focused on the different domains of security and address areas 
such as access control, contingency planning, segregation of 
duties principles, and so forth. They may also address specific 
technical areas of existing and emerging technologies, such as 
use of the Internet, e-mail and corporate communication sys-
tems, wireless access, or remote system access. For example, 
an acceptable use policy may define the responsibilities of the 
end user for using the corporate computer systems for busi-
ness purposes only, or may allow the person some incidental 
personal use provided the restrictions of ensuring usage is free 
from viruses, spyware, downloading inappropriate pictures or 
software, or sending chain letters through e-mail. These poli-
cies will depend upon the business needs and the tolerance for 
risk. The policies contain the statement of the issue, the state-
ment of the organization’s position on the issue, the applica-
bility of the issue, compliance requirements, and sanctions for 
not following the policy.
• System specific policies—Areas where it is desired to have 
clearer direction or greater control for a specific technical or 
operational area may have more detailed policies. These poli-
cies may be targeted for a specific application or platform. For 
example, a system-specific policy may address which depart-
ments are permitted to input or modify information in the 
check writing application for the disbursement of accounts 
payable payments.
The more detailed and issue specific the policy, the higher likeli-
hood that the policy will require more frequent changes. Typically, 
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high-level organizational security policies will survive for several 
years, whereas those focused on the use of technology will change 
much more frequently as technology matures and new technology is 
added to the environment. Even if an organization is not currently 
utilizing a technology, policies can explicitly strengthen the message 
that the technology is not to be used and is prohibited. For example, a 
policy regarding removable media such as USB drives, or one regard-
ing the use of wireless devices or camera phones in the workplace, 
would reinforce the management intentions around the acceptance or 
nonacceptance of these devices.
Standards
Whereas policies define what an organization needs, the standards 
take this a step further and define the how. Standards provide the 
agreements that provide interoperability within the organization 
through the use of common protocols.
Standards are the hardware and software security mechanisms 
selected as the organization’s method of controlling security risks. 
Standards are prevalent in many facets of our daily lives, such as the 
size of the tires on automobiles; specifications of the height, color, and 
format of the stop sign; and the wiring details of the RJ11 plug on 
the end of the phone jack cable. Standards provide consistency in the 
implementation as well as permit interoperability with reduced con-
fusion. There are many security standards that could be chosen to 
implement a particular solution. For example, when selecting a control 
for remote access identification and authentication, an organization 
could decide to utilize login IDs and passwords, strong authentica-
tion through a security token over dialup, or a virtual private network 
(VPN) solution over the Internet.
Standards simplify the operation of the security controls within the 
company and increase the efficiency. It is more costly to support multi-
ple software packages, which do essentially the same activity. Imagine 
if each user was told to go to the local computer store and purchase 
the antivirus product that they liked the best. Some users would ask 
the sales person’s opinion, some would buy the least expensive to meet 
their budget needs, and others might get the most expensive assum-
ing this would provide the greatest protection. Without a consistent 
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product standard for antivirus products, the organization would be 
unsure as to the level of protection provided. Additionally, each of 
these different products would have different installation, update, 
and licensing considerations contributing to complex management. It 
makes much sense to have consistent products chosen for the organi-
zation versus leaving the product choice to every individual.
Determination of which standards meet the organization’s needs 
must be driven by the security policies agreed by management. The 
standards provide the specification of the technology to effectively 
enable the organization to become successful in meeting the require-
ments of the policy. If in the example of the remote access the organi-
zation was restricting information over the Internet or had many users 
in rural areas with limited Internet access, then the VPN standard 
over the Internet may not be a plausible solution. Conversely, for end 
users transmitting large amounts of information, the dial-up solution 
may be impractical. The policy defines the boundaries within which 
the standards must be supportive.
Standards may also refer to those guidelines established by a stan-
dards organization and accepted by management. Standards creators 
include organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and National Security 
Agency (NSA).
Procedures
Procedures are step-by-step instructions in support of the policies, 
standards, guidelines, and baselines. The procedure indicates how 
the policy will be implemented and who does what to accomplish the 
tasks. The procedure provides clarity and a common understanding 
to the operation required to effectively support the policy on a con-
sistent basis. Procedures are best developed when the input of each of 
the interfacing areas are included in the development of the proce-
dure. This reduces the risk that important steps, communication, or 
required deliverables are left out of the procedure.
Companies must be able to provide assurance that they have 
exercised due diligence in the support and enforcement of company 
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policies. This means that the company has made an effort to be in 
compliance with the policies and has communicated the expectations 
to the workforce. Having documented procedures communicated to the 
users, business partners, and anyone utilizing the systems as appropri-
ate, minimizes the legal liability of the corporation.
Creating documented procedures is more than a documentation 
exercise for the sake of documentation. The process itself creates a 
common understanding between the developers of the procedure of 
the methods used to accomplish the task. Individuals from different 
organizational units may be very familiar with their work area but 
not as familiar with the impact of a procedure on a department. This 
is the “beach ball effect,” where organizations sometimes appear as a 
large beach ball, and the individuals working in different departments 
can only see their side of the beach ball and may not understand the 
other parts of the organization. The exercise of writing down a single, 
consistent procedure has the added effect of establishing agreement 
between the parties. Many times at the beginning of the process, 
individuals will think they all understand the process, only to come 
to understand that people were really executing different, individual 
processes to accomplish the task.
Consistent documentation of the procedures permits the ability to 
improve the procedures. Once everyone understands the initial pro-
cedure, enhancements can be applied and communicated to everyone. 
This provides a method to incorporate the best thinking on the single 
procedure versus having multiple procedures for the same operation 
with a mixture of good and bad practices.
Baselines
Baselines provide descriptions of how to implement security pack-
ages to ensure that implementations are consistent throughout the 
organization. Different software packages, hardware platforms and 
networks have different methods of ensuring security. There are many 
different options and settings which must be determined to provide 
the desired protection. An analysis of the available configuration set-
tings and subsequent settings desired form the basis for future, con-
sistent implementation of the standard. For example, turning off the 
telnet service may be specified in the hardening baseline document 
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for the network servers. A procedure for exceptions to the baseline 
would need to be followed in the event that the baseline could not 
be followed for a particular device, along with the business justifica-
tion. The baselines are the specific rules necessary to implement the 
security controls in support of the policy and standards, which have 
been developed.
Testing of the implemented security controls on a periodic basis 
assures that the baselines are implemented according to the docu-
mented baselines. The baselines themselves should be reviewed peri-
odically to ensure that they are sufficient to address emerging threats 
and vulnerabilities. In large environments with multiple individuals 
performing systems administration and responding to urgent requests, 
there is an increased risk that one of the baseline configurations may 
not be implemented properly. Internal testing identifies these vulner-
abilities and provides a mechanism to review why the control was 
or was not properly implemented. Failures in training, adherence to 
baselines and associated procedures, change control, documentation, 
or skills of the individual performing the changes may be identified 
through the testing.
Guidelines
Guidelines are discretionary or optional controls used to enable 
individuals to make judgments with respect to security actions. 
A good exercise is to replace the word guideline with the word 
optional. If by doing so, the statements contained in the “optional” 
category are what is desired to happen at the user’s discretion, then 
it is an appropriate guideline. If on the other hand, the statements 
are considered as required to adequately protect the security of the 
organization, then this should be defined as part of a policy, stan-
dard, or baseline.
Guidelines are also those recommendations, best practices, and tem-
plates provided by other organizations such as the Control Objectives 
for Information and Related Technology (COBIT), the Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM), ISO 17799, British Standard 7799, secu-
rity configuration recommendations such as those from the NIST or 
NSA, organizational guidelines, or other governmental guidelines.
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Combination of Policies, Standards, Baselines, Procedures, and Guidelines
Policies, standards, baselines, procedures, and guidelines are closely 
related to each other and may be developed as the result of new regu-
lations, external industry standards, new threats and vulnerabilities, 
emerging technologies, upgraded hardware and software platforms, or 
risk assessment changes. Sometimes these different areas are combined 
into single documents for ease of management of all the documents. 
Keeping policies separate from the implementation components (stan-
dards, baselines, and procedures) increases the flexibility and reduces 
the cost of maintenance as the policies typically change less frequently 
than the supporting processes to achieve compliance with the policy. 
The relationships between the policies, standards, baselines, procedures, 
and guidelines and the laws and regulations providing the requirement 
to implement these governing activities is shown in Figure 6.1.
Policy Analogy A useful analogy to remember the differences between 
policies, standards, guidelines, and procedures is to think of a com-
pany that builds cabinets, which has a hammer policy. The different 
components may be as follows:
• Policy—“All boards must be nailed together using company-
issued hammers to ensure end product consistency and worker 
safety.” Notice the flexibility provided to permit the company 
to define the hammer type with changes in technology or safety 
issues. The purpose is also communicated to the employees.
Laws, Regulations, Requirements, Organizational
Goals, Objectives
General Organizational (Information Security)
Policy Representing Management Directives












Figure 6.1 relationships between policies, standards, procedures, baselines, and guidelines.
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• Standard— “Eleven-inch fiberglass hammers will be used; 
only hardened-steel nails will be used with the hammers; 
automatic hammers are to be used for repetitive jobs >1 hour.” 
Technical specifics are provided to clarify the expectations 
that make sense for the current environment and represent 
management’s decision.
• Guideline—“To avoid splitting the wood, a pilot hole should 
be drilled first.” The guideline is a suggestion and may not 
apply in all cases or all types of wood. This does not represent 
a requirement, but rather a suggested practice.
• Procedure—“(1) Position nail in upright position on board. 
(2) Strike nail with full swing of hammer. (3) Repeat until nail 
is flush with board. (4) If thumb is caught between nail and 
board, see Nail First-Aid Procedure.” The procedure indicates 
the process of using the hammer and the nail to clarify what 
is expected to be successful. Following this procedure, with 
the appropriate standard hammers, and practicing guidelines 
where appropriate, will fulfill the policy.
Analogies such as this can be effective when leading the team to 
develop security policies to ensure that they are on the same wave-
length and not mixing policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines. 
These can also be useful in security awareness training to indicate 
when a particular user should refer to a policy, standard, procedure, 
or guideline.
An Approach for Developing Information Security Policies
Let us assume for a moment that the guidance in the preceding sec-
tions were followed, and the organization now has a set of informa-
tion security policies that are easy to read, kept current, and generally 
available in a nice format on the Web. However, if no one seems to be 
reading them or following them, what could be the problem? Many 
times the root cause is a lack of management support. How could this 
be? After all, if the information security officer has been designated 
with the role of developing and distributing information security poli-
cies, why would there be a low acceptance rate?
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The answer usually lies in the fact that while the information secu-
rity officer may have done an excellent job researching and developing 
security policies, the same diligence was not applied in ensuring that 
the rest of management was on board with the policies prior to roll-
out. The security officer may decide to push out the policies once his 
department has developed them. As such, the policies become those 
“owned” by the security officer and not the rest of the management. 
These are then treated as departmental policies that have no greater 
enforcement requirements than the policies and procedures that are 
created by their organizational area. Then, when there is a conflict 
between the departmental desires and the security policy, the depart-
mental desires win. For example, if an organization has to get infor-
mation quickly to a customer, it can fax or e-mail the information as 
part of its normal procedure. However, the information security pol-
icy may require that all transmissions over an open network, as in the 
case of e-mail, or that only the transmission of all confidential infor-
mation be encrypted with the most stringent government standard 
encryption, such as Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 
140-2 encryption requirements. The department sending the infor-
mation may have a disagreement with the security department on the 
information classification of “confidential” in the information security 
policy, or may feel that the requirement is a bit over the top and does 
not agree with the policy at all, as it would hamper the speed of doing 
business and cause inferior relationships with customers. Who is 
right? In this case, neither; the security officer failed to obtain agree-
ment with the policy before the procedures were executed and the 
executive from the other department is incorrect in not adhering to 
the policy. Unfortunately, this situation is all too common. The good 
news is that this can be avoided by following a different approach to 
developing and distributing the security policies.
Utilizing the Security Council for Policies
Management support is essential in the development of information 
security policies. So, how is that attained? One method that is very 
effective is to form a security committee, also known as an information 
security council as introduced in Chapter 4. The security council can 
review the policies proposed by the information security department. 
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The benefits of this approach are (1) consensus of the policies are first 
built at the front-line supervisor/middle management/ technical staff 
level, (2) senior management has greater comfort that the policies 
will be accepted by the organization as the management team has 
reviewed them before approval, and (3) it builds grassroots ownership 
of the information security policies. Although the information secu-
rity council can also serve as oversight for other security initiatives, 
serve as a sounding board, and prioritize information security efforts, 
it can be especially effective in vetting and discussing the information 
policies that are needed by the organization.
The Policy Review Process
Now that the organization has identified an individual responsible for 
the development and implementation of security policies the security 
council has been created, and an understanding of what makes a good 
policy has been communicated, there needs to be a process for review-
ing the policies. This process may be developed during the creation 
of the security council. What is important is that the policy devel-
opment process is thought out ahead of time to determine who will 
(1) create, (2) review and recommend, (3) approve the final version, 
(4) publish, and (5) read and accept the policies. The time spent in this 
process, up front, will provide many dividends down the road. Many 
organizations jump right in and someone in the security department 
or information technology department to draft then email the policy 
without taking these steps. Proceeding along that path ends up with a 
policy that is not accepted by the organization’s management and thus 
will not be accepted by the organization’s end users. Why? Because 
the necessary discussion, debate, and acceptance of the policies by the 
leaders of the organization never took place. In the end, the question 
of management commitment again surfaces, when there was never a 
process in place to obtain the commitment.
The process could be depicted in a swim-lane-type chart showing 
the parties responsible, activities, records created through each activ-
ity, and decision boxes; or a flowchart format. Senior management will 
want this presented at a high level, typically no more than one to two 
pages of a process diagram. The process will vary by organizational 
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structure, geographic location, size, and culture of decision making. 
However, a successful process for review should contain the following 
steps, as depicted in Figure 6.2.
 1. Policy needs to be determined—Anyone can request the need 
for a policy to the information security department. Business 
units may have new situations that are not covered by an exist-
ing security policy. If no security policies exist in the organi-
zation, the information security department needs to take the 
lead and establish a prioritization of policies that are necessary.
 2. Create, modify existing policy—The information security depart-
ment creates an initial draft for a new policy that can be 
reacted to. Caution must be taken not to copy and distribute 
these policies taken from books or Internet sources as is as 
they may not be completely appropriate, enforceable, or sup-
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Figure 6.2 Security council policy development, approval, and distribution process.
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 3. Internal review by security department—People within the 
security department will have varying levels of technical 
expertise, business acumen, and understanding of the orga-
nizational culture. By reviewing within the team first, many 
obvious errors or misunderstandings of the policy can be 
avoided before engaging management’s limited review time. 
This also increases the credibility of the information systems 
security department by bringing a quality product for review. 
It also saves time on minor grammatical reviews and focuses 
the management review on substantive policy issues.
 4. Security council reviews and recommends policy—This is argu-
ably the most critical step in the process. This is where the 
policy begins the acceptance step within the organization. The 
policies are read, line by line, during these meetings and dis-
cussed to ensure that everyone understands the intent and 
rationale for the policy. Management’s commitment begins 
here. Why? Because the management feels like part of the 
process and have a chance to provide input, as well as think-
ing about how the policy would impact their individual 
departments. Contrast this method with just sending out the 
policy and saying “this is it” and the difference becomes read-
ily apparent. These are the same management people that are 
being counted on to continue to support the policy once it is 
distributed to the rest of the workforce. Failing in this step 
will guarantee failure in having a real policy.
  If we buy into the notion that a security council is a good 
practice, logical, practical, and appears to get the job done, 
what is the downside? Some may argue that it is a slow pro-
cess, especially when senior management may be pushing to 
“get something out there to address security” to reduce the 
risks. It is a slow process while the policies are being debated. 
However, the benefits of (1) having a real policy that the 
organization can support, (2) buy-in from the management 
on a continuing basis, (3) reduced need to rework the poli-
cies later, and (4) increased understanding by management 
of the policies’ meanings and why they are important out-
weigh the benefits of blasting out an e-mail containing poli-
cies that were copied from another source, the name of the 
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company changed, and distributed without prior collabora-
tion. Policies created in the later context rarely become “real” 
and followed within the organization, as they were not devel-
oped with thorough analysis of how they would be supported 
by the business in their creation.
 5. Information technology steering committee approves policy—A 
committee made up of the senior leadership of the organiza-
tion is typically formed to oversee the strategic investments 
in information technology. Many times these committees 
struggle with balancing decisions on tactical firefighting 
on short term issues versus dealing with strategic issues, and 
this perspective needs to be understood when addressing this 
type of committee. The important element in the membership 
of this committee is that it involves the decision leaders of 
the organization. These are the individuals that the employees 
will be watching to see if they support the policies that were 
initially generated from the security department. Their review 
and endorsement of the policies is critical to obtain support in 
implementing the policies. Also, they may be aware of strate-
gic plans or further operational issues not identified by middle 
management (through the security council) that may make a 
policy untenable.
  Since time availability of the senior leadership is typically 
limited, these committees meet at most on a monthly basis, 
but more typically on a quarterly basis. Therefore, sufficient 
time for planning policy approval is necessary. This may 
seem to run counter to the speed at which electronic poli-
cies are distributed. However, as in the case with the security 
council review, the time delay is essential in obtaining long-
term commitment.
 6. Publish policy—Organizations that go directly from step 2 to 
this step end up with shelfware, or if e-mailed, “electronic 
dust.” By the time the policy gets to this step, the security 
department should feel very confident that the policy will be 
understood by the users and supported by management. Users 
may agree or disagree with the policy, but will understand the 
need to follow it because it will be clear how the policy was 
created and reviewed. Care must be taken when publishing 
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policies electronically, as it is not desirable to publish the same 
policy over and over with minor changes to grammar and ter-
minology. Quality reviews need to be performed early in the 
development process so that the security council and informa-
tion technology steering committee can devote their time to 
substantive issues of the policy versus pointing out the typos 
and correcting spelling. End users should be given the same 
respect and should expect to be reviewing a document free 
from error. The medium may be electronic but that does not 
change the way people want to manage their work lives. With 
the amount of e-mail already in our lives, we should try to 
limit the amount of “extra work” that is placed upon the read-
ers of the policies.
  The Web-based policy management tools provide the 
facilities to publish the policies very quickly. Since tracking of 
reading the policies is a key feature of these products, once the 
policy is published, they typically cannot be changed unless a 
new policy is created! This has major implications for the dis-
tribution of the policy. This means that any change made will 
require the republishing of the policy. Imagine thousands of 
users in the organization that now have to reread the policy 
due to a minor change. This situation should be avoided with 
the review process in place in the preceding steps. The elec-
tronic compliance tracking software is usually built this way 
(and rightly so), so that it is clear which policy version the user 
actually signed off on.
It should be clear by now that even though some of the policy devel-
opment tools support a workflow process within the tool to facilitate 
approvals of the policies through the various stages (such as draft, 
interim reviews, and final publishing), there is no substitute for the 
oral collaboration on the policies. Electronic communications are very 
flat and do not provide expression of the meaning behind the words. 
Through the discussions within the various committees, the docu-
mented text becomes clearer beyond just those with technical skills. 
The purpose is more apt to be appropriately represented in the final 
policies through the collaborative process.
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Information Security Policy Process
Security policy development is a repetitive process, where existing 
policies are updated and new ones are created as needed. The majority 
of the work is in creating the initial security policies, and hopefully, 
if these policies were written to the appropriate level, modification of 
the policies should be minimal. The majority of the work in policy 
development is evaluating the policies against the introduction of 
new technologies, law and regulation changes, and changes to the 
business. Most often, the existing polices will suffice and not require 
major change. This rate of small change can cause organizations to 
not pay the appropriate attention to the policy review and update.
As a final note, it should be clear through the activities presented 
in this chapter that the information security officer is the facilita-
tor of the information security policy development, but should not 
own them. The security policies should be owned by the organiza-
tion, which in most cases, is represented by the CEO and the execu-
tive management. There will be much less challenging of the security 
policy if it is owned and issued at this level, than if it is owned by the 
security officer, who may reside at a lower level within the organiza-
tion (except for large organizations where the CISO may be part of 
the executive team).
All other security procedures, standards, guidelines, and imple-
mentations are dependent upon the construction of a consistent, 
easy-to-understand, coherent, and comprehensive information secu-
rity policy. The time investment in this step is very valuable and the 
impact to the organization should not be underestimated. Following 
the steps in this chapter will lead to more efficient and effective infor-
mation security policy development and subsequent acceptance.
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Security compliance uSinG 
control frameworkS
The cautious seldom err.
Confucius, 551–479 BC
Security Control Frameworks Defined
Control frameworks and security standards are often interchange-
able terms depending upon the creator. Just to confuse things 
further, ISO 27001, from the International Organization for 
Standardization, posits an information security management “sys-
tem” (ISMS) and the controls are contained within the ISO 27002 
Code of Practice (ISO, 2005). The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53 (NIST, 2009), 
titled Recommended Security Control for Federal Information 
Systems, breaks the controls into 18 control families and 3 classes 
(managerial, operational, and technical) of controls. COBIT, 
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology frame-
work, defines a control framework as a tool for business process 
owners that facilitates the discharge of their responsibilities through 
the provision of a supporting control model. Alternatively, COBIT 
defines a standard as a business practice or technology product that 
is an accepted practice endorsed by the enterprise or information 
technology (IT) management team.
COBIT adapted the control from the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) report “Internal 
Control–Integrated Framework” (COSO, 1992) to mean “the poli-
cies, procedures, practices, and organizational structures designed to 
provide assurance that business objectives will be achieved and that 
undesired events will be prevented or detected and corrected.”
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For the purposes of this discussion, control frameworks, controls, 
and standards are interchangeable, as the intent of each of them is to 
provide some definition to a practice or set of practices that if performed 
will protect the organization’s information assets. These consist of doc-
umented, executed, tested, implemented, and monitored controls that 
reduce the risk of threats succeeding against company vulnerabilities.
Security Control Frameworks and Standards Examples
The following are some examples of the control frameworks and stan-
dards that address information security requirements.
Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
The Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
final rule for adopting security standards was published February 20, 
2003, which required a series of administrative, technical, and physi-
cal security procedures for entities to use to assure the confidentiality 
of protected health information (PHI). The standard was intention-
ally nontechnology specific and intended to provide scalability to 
small providers and large providers alike.
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)
Primary purpose of the Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA) is to provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring 
the effectiveness of security controls over information resources that 
support federal operations and assets. The law also provided fund-
ing for NIST to develop the minimum necessary controls required to 
provide adequate security. The government publishes an annual report 
card based upon its assessment of compliance with the framework.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Recommended 
Security Controls for Federal Information Systems (800-53)
The NIST Special Publication 800-53 standards and guidelines 
reference the minimum set of controls that must be implemented 
to protect the federal system based upon the risk level determined. 
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Implementation of the 18 families of security controls establishes a 
level of “security due diligence” for federal agencies and the contrac-
tors that perform work for the government. These standards are very 
comprehensive, freely available, and an excellent resource to supple-
ment other control frameworks.
Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM)
Issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly known 
as the U.S. General Accounting Office), the Federal Information 
System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) provides guidance for 
information systems auditors to evaluate the IT controls used in sup-
port of financial statement audits (GAO, 1999). This is not an audit 
standard, but is included here because auditors are typically testing the 
control environment in government audits using this standard. There 
has been increased emphasis on the use of NIST 800-53 controls and 
the NIST 800-53A assessments. However, FISCAM is still utilized 
by government auditors, and, therefore, it is worthwhile to understand 
the contents.
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 Information Security 
Management Systems—Requirements
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 provides a model for establishing, implement-
ing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving 
an information security management system (ISMS). This was an 
evolution from British Standard (BS) 7799-2 and ISO 17799.
The UK Department of Trade and Industry Code of Practice 
(CoP) for information security, which was developed from support 
of industry in 1993, became BS 7799 in 1995. The BS 7799 standard 
was subsequently revised in 1999 to add certification and accredi-
tation components, which became part 2 of the BS 7799 standard. 
Part 1 of the BS 7799 standard became ISO 17799 and was published 
as ISO 17799:2000 as the first international information security 
management standard by the ISO and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC). ISO 17799 standard was modified in June 2005 
as ISO/IEC 17799:2005 containing 134 detailed information secu-
rity controls based upon the following 11 areas:
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• Information security policy
• Organizing information security
• Asset management
• Human resources security
• Physical and environmental security
• Communications and operations management
• Access control
• Information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance
• Information security incident management
• Business continuity management
• Compliance
ISO standards are grouped together by topic areas and the ISO/IEC 
27000 series has been designated as the information security manage-
ment series. For example, ISO 27002:2005 Information Technology—
Security Techniques—Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management replaced the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Information 
Technology—Security Techniques—Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management document. This is consistent with how ISO has 
named other topic areas, such as the ISO 9000 series for quality man-
agement. ISO/IEC 27001:2005 was released in October 2005 and 
specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, operating, 
monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving a documented 
information security management system taking into consideration 
the company’s business risks. This management standard was based 
on the BS 7799 part 2 standard and provides information on building 
information security management systems and guidelines for auditing 
the system.
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Information Technology—Security Techniques—
Code of Practice for Information Security Management
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 provides 11 security control clauses, as noted ear-
lier. The code of practice specifies the controls necessary and the imple-
mentation guidance by specifying the controls with may be chosen to 
build the ISMS specified through application of ISO/IEC 27001:2005.
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Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT)
COBIT is a framework and supporting toolset that allow manag-
ers to bridge the gap with respect to control requirements, technical 
issues, and business risks, and then communicate that level of control 
to stockholders. COBIT can be used to integrate other standards as 
an umbrella framework.
COBIT is published by the IT Governance Institute and con-
tains a set of 34 high-level control objectives, one for each of the IT 
processes, such as define a strategic IT plan, define the information 
architecture, manage the configuration, manage facilities, and ensure 
systems security. Ensure systems security has been broken down fur-
ther into control objectives such as manage security measures, iden-
tification, authentication and access, user account management, data 
classification, and firewall architectures.
The COBIT framework examines the effectiveness, efficiency, con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability, compliance, and reliability aspects 
of the high-level control objectives. The model defines four domains 
for governance, namely, planning and organization, acquisition and 
implementation, delivery and support, and monitoring. Processes and 
IT activities and tasks are then defined within these domains. The 
framework provides an overall structure for IT control and includes 
control objectives, which can be utilized to determine effective secu-
rity control objectives that are driven from the business needs.
COBIT gained increasing popularity through implementation to 
demonstrate compliance with Sarbanes–Oxley regulations, which 
were enacted in 2002 to require management and the external auditor 
to report on internal controls over financial reporting.
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is a 
set of comprehensive requirements for enhancing payment account 
security, formed by several major credit card issuers, to facilitate the 
broad adoption of a comprehensive security standard designed to 
protect cardholder data. The standard applies to all parties that are 
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involved in credit card processing, such as merchants, processors, 
acquirers, issuers, and service providers as well as other entities that 
store, process, or transmit cardholder data. The standard contains 
requirements to address each of the following areas:
• Build and maintain a secure network (proper network 
device configuration)
• Protect cardholder data (storage and encrypted transmission 
across open networks)
• Maintain a vulnerability management program (e.g., secure 
systems, antivirus software)
• Implement strong access control measures (logical and physi-
cal access, need to know)
• Regularly monitor and test networks (regularly test, track, 
and monitor access)
• Maintain an information security policy (maintain a policy 
that addresses information security for all personnel)
The reviews are to be performed annually to ensure that cardholder 
data is protected. Depending upon the size of the entity participating in 
the program, the review may need to be conducted by an external assessor.
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a set 
of books published by the British government’s Stationary Office 
between 1989 and 1992 to improve IT service management. The 
framework contains a set of best practices for IT core operational 
processes such as change, release, and configuration management; 
incident and problem management; capacity and availability manage-
ment; and IT financial management. ITIL’s primary contribution is 
showing how the controls can be implemented for the service man-
agement IT processes.
Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) 
and National Security Agency (NSA) Guides
Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) and National 
Security Agency (NSA) Guides are configuration standards for the 
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Department of Defense Information Assurance. They are freely avail-
able and used as the basis for technical standards for many private 
organizations. These standards, if implemented, support many of 
the high-level requirements specified within requirements such as 
FISMA, HIPAA, PCI, NIST, COBIT, ISO 27001, and GLBA 
(Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act).
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
IT Examination Handbook
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
is empowered to provide uniform principles, standards, and report-
ing forms for the examination of financial institutions by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Several 
booklets have been issued by the council, including Audit, Business 
Continuity Planning, Development and Acquisition, Electronic 
Banking, Management, Operations, Outsourcing Technology Services, 
Retail Payment Systems, Supervision of Technology Service Providers, 
Wholesale Payment Systems. Information Security was also added as 
a booklet in July 2006, which includes guidance for the security pro-
cess, risk assessment, security strategy, security controls implementa-
tion, and security monitoring as well as the examination procedures 
and related laws. The handbook issued by the FFIEC serves as a sup-
plement to the member agencies expectations for meeting the GLBA 
501(b) requirements. These documents provide the detail necessary to 
evaluate an information security program.
The World Operates on Standards
The fact about standards is that they are useful and the world is made 
up of many of them, from the minimum weight in the passenger seat 
that must be met before the airbag protection will become active, to the 
specification of the size of a #8 screw, to the standard formats for elec-
tronic data interchange of electronic transactions between healthcare 
providers, payers. and clearinghouses. Standards ensure that products 
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are built to specifications and allow us to simplify the complexity of 
the world by creating a common deliverable and common language. 
Imagine if every time a manufacturer wanted a product built they 
had to design a screw that could be potentially different from any 
other screw a manufacturer created. Not only would this process be 
very expensive, it would also be very time consuming for the customer 
and the supplier, and would be very error-prone. Nonstandardized 
processes also slow the delivery of the product or service. Henry Ford 
recognized many years ago that there were efficiencies and increases 
in quality by creating vehicles that looked the same and were painted 
the same color (black). Although the cars were available in other col-
ors, the primary color produced was black for efficiency. Imagine if 
stoplights were each made with different colors to represent stop, slow 
down, and go. Imagine roadways that used different types of striping 
to indicate passing versus nonpassing lanes based upon the state in 
which you live. The world would be very chaotic with each individual 
interpreting the colors and passing lanes as they drove, many times 
potentially making the wrong decision.
Sometimes we like the standards, sometimes we do not. Sometimes 
they just do not make intuitive sense to us nor do they seem effective. 
For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
originally did not allow nail clippers on the airplane and reversed 
the decision in 2005 after negative public opinion (however, there 
are varying accounts as to whether it was the TSA that banned nail 
clippers or if thee ban was pre-TSA). Lighters were also subsequently 
allowed in July 2007 by the Federal Aviation Administration. Laws, 
regulations, and the standards that support them are sometimes 
developed without the extensive analysis of their necessity, or in 
reaction to a major event and the need to do something, only to be 
rescinded later for their lack of effectiveness. This is understandable, 
as government and private industry must react to new situations, 
making decisions on the data available at the time. In defense of the 
TSA, decisions to limit what was brought on an airplane had to be 
made quickly on the heels of September 11, 2001, and its focus was 
on objects that had the potential to harm. Thus, the standard of no 
nail clippers was enacted. As time went on, this standard was modi-
fied to reflect a reevaluated risk. Liquid restrictions such as being 
able to carry only a 1 quart bag of 3.4 oz bottles of shampoo and 
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other liquids on board were placed on travelers due to an incident 
with liquid explosives (TSA, 2009).
Standards Are Dynamic
Over time, the standards evolve, and they change to meet the societal 
and technological needs. Although the intent of many security standards 
appears to stay the same over time, the underlying technologies that must 
be supported are constantly changing. Just as in the “no liquids” ban on 
airplanes was first introduced, and then evolved into “as long as the liq-
uids are 3 oz or less and fit in a 1 qt plastic bag,” and then may morph 
into “no requirements at all” due to investments in more advanced scan-
ning technology, information security standards also need to change. 
Alternatively, increased protections may be added, such as the x-ray body 
scanners and pat downs, which were added at most airports in late 2010.
Most control frameworks are written at a higher, broader level, 
which provides flexibility to implement controls to satisfy the specific 
technological request. For example, the ISO 27002:2005 Information 
Technology—Security Techniques (Code of Practice) control 10.5.1d 
indicates that “the back-ups should be stored in a remote location, 
at a sufficient distance to escape any damage from a disaster at the 
main site.” This leaves much interpretation up to the implementer of 
the standard. How far away is far enough? Before Hurricane Katrina 
inflicted extensive damage on New Orleans, Louisiana, and other 
surrounding areas in 2005, many individuals felt that storage a few 
miles away was sufficient. Today, when companies are assessing their 
business continuity plans, they typically point to Katrina and quickly 
decide that 50 to 100-plus miles away would greatly reduce the risk. 
Others have invested in new replication technologies and the avail-
ability of inexpensive storage to ensure availability of the information.
Changing environments necessitate the ability to change the imple-
mentation strategies to meet the lower cost of technology, increased 
effectiveness of controls, and conformance to emerging regulations.
The How Is Typically Left Up to Us
As the aforementioned example illustrates, the good news is that the 
standards may be written to be flexible over time. The bad news is 
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that they are written to be flexible over time. In other words, stan-
dards often lack the specificity of the ‘how’ that would be useful to 
implementing the standard. Obviously, this is by design. However, it 
leaves the implementer of the standard to figure out, based upon the 
available alternatives, what the best method of implementation should 
be for their particular environment and cost constraints.
The best practices terminology has received criticism over the past 
several years, as the beauty is in the eye of the beholder. A practice that 
works for one organization may not fit for another. One organization 
may implement a policy banning USB drives due to their small size, 
whereas another may allow them as long as the contents are automati-
cally encrypted with the company-approved software. Still another 
may prohibit their use by policy to most users, but allow adoption by 
those who establish a business need (as specified in ISO 27002:2005 
10.7.1f), as well as taking the additional step of controlling access 
through active directory authorization and a vendor product. Which 
is the best practice? It depends on the organizational culture, appetite 
for risk, cost constraints, and so forth. It may also be the case that 
the individuals within the organization do not have access to sensitive 
information, thus limiting the exposure.
Therefore, the best practice for an organization must take in many 
factors not defined within the individual standard. Typically, an orga-
nization would be prudent to follow the trends within their particular 
vertical industry, and pay attention to what the “herd” is doing. If 
70% of the sheep are heading for the hills, it may be worth heading 
in that direction. It is also important to understand why another 10% 
is going in another direction (assuming 20% are standing still) and 
may be headed to a better best practice. In the tape backup exam-
ple, maybe the 10% that are utilizing online, high-speed compressed 
disk-to-disk backup strategies are the best practice that is right for 
the organization.
Whatever these practices are named for our individual organiza-
tions, each must recognize that the practices must satisfy the standard 
and where they do not, sufficient business justification and risk accep-
tance must be documented. In this manner, the standards become the 
reference point for making informed business decisions.
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Key Question: Why Does the Standard Exist?
Before deciding how to implement the standard, it is a useful exercise 
to examine the selected control within the standard and analyze why 
the control exists in the first place. What threat is it addressing? What 
would the risk be to my organization if I decided to ignore addressing 
the control? In other words, how is implementing the control increas-
ing the security, protection, or information assurance of the informa-
tion assets within the organization? Understanding the “what if I don’t” 
can quickly lead to a deeper understanding of the intent of the control 
versus trying to ensure compliance with every detail of the control.
For example, if there is a control within the standard that says that 
logs of activity to the system must be retained for 1 year and access 
must be restricted to only those with a need to know, understanding 
why this standard exists will contribute to how it should be imple-
mented. If the intent of the control is to be able to go back and analyze 
incidents, then the individuals who need read access are the systems 
security operations team or those responding to the incidents. The 
files may also need to be online if there is a frequent occurrence of 
investigation. Alternatively, the logs may not be able to be reviewed 
due to resource (human) constraints and may necessitate the invest-
ment in a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool 
that aggregates and correlates the information.
Understanding the intent of the control also assists in interpreting 
the terminology used within the control. Many different organizations, 
committees, and geographic representations promulgate the standards. 
The NIST uses terminology in the 800-53 standard (Recommended 
Security Controls for Federal Information Systems) with roots in the 
government sector that would be familiar to many accustomed to 
working for or contracting with government agencies. Contrast that 
with the IT Governance Institute’s COBIT framework (ITGI, n.d.), 
which is reviewed by an internationally represented committee.
Compliance Is Not Security, But It Is a Good Start
Checking off each of the controls specified within a standard is analo-
gous to completing the weekend honey-do list at home—it may be 
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done at the end of the weekend, but wait for the household audi-
tor to see if it was done well. When HIPAA, GLBA, FISMA, PCI 
DSS, and other regulations arrived on the scene, some organizations 
reviewed the “compliancy with the standard” as the primary goal and 
subsequently created a checklist approach to satisfying the controls 
with the minimum that would be needed for compliancy, without the 
benefit of a real risk assessment. The danger in this is that the security 
controls implemented may prove to be ineffective to addressing the 
vulnerabilities of the organization and the threats that they face.
However, even though compliance with standards may not be suf-
ficient to mitigate the risk level to an acceptable level for the organiza-
tion, the fact that the organization is adopting a control framework 
provides the opportunity to create a baseline and enhance the secu-
rity level over time. Without such a framework in place, there is less 
chance that the environment will be secure, as items can be missed 
too easily.
Integration of Standards and Control Frameworks
Each of the standards and control frameworks contributes in their 
own way and the astute security professional will become familiar 
with each of them. COBIT provides an excellent overall governance 
framework that ties together business goals, governance drivers, busi-
ness outcomes, and IT resources, processes, and goals. ISO 27001 
provides a nice control framework for establishing an ISMS, ensur-
ing that risks are assessed, controls are implemented, management is 
actively involved, and the documentation is up to date. NIST 800-53 
provides the detailed controls with tailored enhancements with the 
specifications for assessing the controls (800-53A document). The 
HIPAA Final Federal Security Rule provides the framework for 
implementing protection for the healthcare vertical industry. FISMA 
relies on the controls specified by NIST to comply with the regula-
tion instead of creating a new set of controls. The ITIL provides the 
control areas for providing effective and efficient service delivery, and 
overlaps the security areas specified in the other control areas.
Several organizations, such as NIST and the IT Governance 
Institute, have recognized the commonality of these standards as 
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evidenced by their work in mapping controls between HIPAA, NIST 
800-53, COBIT, FISMA, ITIL, and others. Although the wording, 
level of the control, and measures for assessment may have differ-
ent criteria, there is much commonality amongst the controls. For 
example, controls regarding configuration management and the need 
to develop baselines may not be specifically called out in HIPAA and 
FISMA as they are in ISO27001 and NIST, however, the need for 
securing the computing devices are represented within the controls for 
technical controls and the implementation of systems security plans.
Auditing Compliance
Once a control framework or set of standards has been chosen and 
implemented, it is imperative that the framework be internally and 
externally audited on a regular basis. Gaps in process are typically 
uncovered during these audits, and if these gaps are mitigated quickly, 
the security program becomes more complete over time. Care must 
be taken to address reasonable risk, as it is rare that an organiza-
tion will execute every control every time. What is important is that 
there are mitigating or compensating controls that catch the anoma-
lies before they become major issues, and prompt follow-up and cor-
rection actions are taken. Audit testing of the control frameworks 
will take many forms including interviewing, determining and test-
ing samples, performing vulnerability assessments, review of policies 
and procedures, and conducting external penetration tests. Each audit 
should be viewed as an opportunity to determine the effectiveness of 
the control framework and potentially modify the existing controls. 
Preparing for the auditing of the controls is covered in more depth in 
Chapter 11.
Adoption Rate of Various Standards
Whatever the industry, it seems that there are always many standards 
from which to choose. Each standard has occurred due to a lack of 
security in a certain area, and laws or rules were put in place. HIPAA 
emerged due to a concern about creating electronic medical records/
claims information and the privacy concerns that would result over 
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aggregating the data. PCI emerged as cardholder information was 
being stored and not properly protected. FISMA was enacted to pro-
vide a common evaluation of the security across government agencies 
and their contractors.
ISO 27001/2 Certification
The aforementioned laws needed standards containing a listing of con-
trols that could be implemented, such as ISO 27001/2, NIST-800-53 
Controls, COBIT, PCI, ITIL, and HITRUST (Health Information 
Trust Alliance), to protect the information assets that were being tar-
geted (government, financial, healthcare, or all industries). However, 
the adoption rates of the different standards have varied from orga-
nization to organization. For example, some organizations are basing 
their security program on ISO27001/2, whereas others use COBIT as 
a framework, and others still are using NIST 800-53 controls. Others, 
such as those in healthcare, might be using the NIST 800-53 controls 
mapped to HIPAA (as available from the NIST website in document 
800-66) to satisfy the requirements of HIPAA. Others yet are using 
the HITRUST model to determine compliance. So, this begs the 
question, why isn’t everyone using NIST 800-53? Or ISO 27001/2?
To answer this question, it is useful to look at the number of com-
panies that are currently ISO 27001 certified, which varies greatly 
by country. For example, Japan has the most number of certifications 
(3720), followed by India (509), China (494), United Kingdom (455), 
Taiwan (401), and then the list drops off with Germany at 145 and 
so forth. The United States has approximately 100 companies that 
are certified in its information security management system. With 
the number of years that the ISO security standard has been around 
(approximately 20 years), one would think the adoption rate would 
be much higher. The reality is that many companies are utilizing 
the standard to frame their security programs; however, they have 
not taken the step to obtain certification. The rationale, anecdotally 
expressed at numerous security conferences, is (1) it can be a timely, 
rigorous process involving extra (unnecessary) expense; (2) the benefit 
of certification is not easily determined, as the auditors will still pull 
samples and audit according to their audit program; and (3) there is 
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currently no law or mandate requiring that ISO 27001/2 be utilized 
and certified as the control standard. Without a law requiring its use, 
organizations have chosen the ISO 27001/2 standard to demonstrate 
compliance with areas such as HIPAA, Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 
(Section 404), GLBA, SAS070 requirements, but have stopped short 
of pursuing certification. Audits are expensive in terms of audit time, 
business interruption time, and cost, and an ISO audit represents an 
extra expense over and above the other required audits.
NIST Certification
U.S. government agencies are all too familiar with NIST 800-53 con-
trols, as they are required by FISMA to be implemented by all fed-
eral agencies and their contractors. There is no requirement that the 
federal agencies implement the set of ISO 27001/2 controls; however, 
they are mapped to the NIST 800-53 controls as a reference. There 
is much overlap in these controls. However, the NIST controls are 
at a more detailed level than the ISO controls. In fact, the NIST 
controls are an excellent supplement to the ISO controls if this is the 
framework that is selected. There does not exist, at this time, a NIST 
security “certification” per say of the 800-53 controls; however, there 
is a process by which the government certifies the systems security 
plan and risk assessment, which embody the 800-53 controls and how 
they are implemented within the general support system defined by 
the systems security plan.
NIST 800-53 controls and guidance offer an excellent integration 
opportunity to supplement the ISO and COBIT controls in building 
the information security program. Although the controls are required 
for use in federal agencies, they are also very applicable to the private 
sector and best of all they are freely available for download from the 
NIST site on the Internet.
Control Framework Convergence
Why can’t we have just one standard? On the surface, this appears to 
be a simple, logical question. As Eckhart Tolle (2005) promotes in his 
book A New Earth that individuals create stress in their lives by not 
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accepting “what is.” The reality is that laws and regulations will con-
tinue to emerge from different organizations, and as security profes-
sionals, adapting to the emerging laws and regulations and applying the 
appropriate standards and control frameworks will be key. This is not to 
say that efficiencies cannot be gained, as controls can be implemented 
that would support multiple control frameworks. Sometimes, a control 
only needs to be tweaked to satisfy multiple controls and standards.
Over time, the practices that are common do emerge and become 
generally accepted. Even as recent as a few years ago, laptops were 
not universally encrypted by companies, with IT departments citing 
the expense, complexity, lack of necessity, files stored on the network 
by company policy, and so on. So what was the tipping point that 
changed the practice to companies encrypting the laptops? It was 
when the Veterans Administration lost a laptop containing informa-
tion on 26.5 million veterans in 2006 causing a public outrage. Today, 
few companies would want to admit that they are not encrypting their 
laptops due to the shift in the herd mentality to encryption. The sheep 
have headed for the hills, and the slow sheep are vulnerable to being 
left behind. Upon reviewing the standards and control frameworks, 
it is clear that the requirements for protecting mobile devices and 
media were specified prior to 2006. It could be argued that proac-
tive attention to these frameworks would save much in the long run. 
The Veterans Administration suffered in terms of public reputation 
and financially ($20 million lawsuit to settle claims), all which could 
have been avoided. What happened to this government agency could 
happen to any of our organizations if the controls are not in place. 
Adherence to the control frameworks and standards increases the 
likelihood that breaches will not have a devastating effect on the con-
fidentiality, integrity, or availability of the information assets.
The 11-Factor Compliance Assurance Manifesto
The regulations, control frameworks, standards, technical implemen-
tation guides, and penalties for noncompliance provide insight into 
what needs to be achieved to provide the organizational compliance 
assurance to the various security-related regulations. Now this begs 
the next question: What actions need to be taken to achieve and 
maintain compliance with the regulations?
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To answer that question, the 11-Factor Security Compliance 
Assurance Manifesto (Fitzgerald, 2008), as shown in Figure 7.1, sets 
out the principles by which compliance assurance may be achieved.
 1. Designate the individual responsible for compliance assurance 
oversight—Whereas many of the policy-type regulations may 
not appear to change on a frequent basis, the supporting doc-
uments, technical specifications, and current areas of concern 
do change over time. New laws are also created, such as the 
new incident breach reporting laws implemented as part of 
the HITECH Act (Chapter 13), where state-by-state adop-
tion of some form of the law is enacted. Similarly, when the 
HIPAA privacy rule was being made effective, each state had 
groups that were focused on creating a preemption analysis. 
Staying on top of these changes and ensuring that someone 
1
• Designate Individual Responsible for Compliance
  Assurance Oversight
2
• Establish Security Management Governing Body
3
• Select Control Framework/Standards
4
• Research and Apply Technical Controls
5




• Implement Formal Remediation Process
8
• Dedicate Staff, Automate Compliance Tasks
9
• Report on Compliance Metrics
10
• Enforce Penalties for Non-Compliance to Policy
11
• Collaborate and Network Externally
Figure 7.1 11-Factor Security compliance assurance Manifesto.
180  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
is directing the security compliance efforts is essential. In 
medium-sized organizations, this is likely to be the man-
ager or director of security, whereas in larger organizations 
the chief information security officer, chief security officer, or 
security officer is likely be responsible for ensuring that the 
security compliance assurance activities are performed. The 
chief information officer’s organization and the other business 
units carry out the mitigation work as appropriate.
 2. Establish a security management governing body—To achieve 
support for the implementation of security policies throughout 
the organization and to ensure that the security policies do not 
disrupt the business, it is advisable to establish an information 
security council. Councils made up of representatives from IT, 
business units, human resources, legal departments, physical 
security, internal audit, ethics and compliance, and informa-
tion security can be effective in achieving compliance with the 
regulations. Their oversight and interaction provide feedback 
as to whether the security activities planned are feasible and 
whether there is a high probability of compliance success.
 3. Select control framework and standards—The frameworks men-
tioned, such as COSO, ITIL, ISO 17799, COBIT, NIST, 
and FISCAM, offer an excellent place to map the security 
controls that are in place to the framework, uncover the gaps 
in compliance, and create action plans to increase the security 
assurance with these objectives. Multiple control frameworks 
can be selected for different levels of detail. For example, 
COBIT may be selected to provide a governing framework, 
whereas ISO 17799 controls may be mapped to the framework 
(already available from the IT governance institute) and then 
linked to the NIST control objective families and supported 
by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) STIGs. 
The mapping provides a mechanism to review how a set of 
technical controls supports the higher-level statements in the 
other frameworks. The same controls serve multiple purposes. 
Comprehensive frameworks are created through this process, 
enabling the other compliance assurance activities.
 4. Research and apply technical controls—There are many approaches 
at the technical level for being compliant with the control 
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objectives. Analysis must be performed to determine the best 
control based upon the risk profile of the organization. For 
example, achieving compliance with a requirement to pro-
vide adequate off-site backups of information in the event of a 
disaster could be achieved in a small regional office by placing 
a daily tape in a fireproof safe and rotating the weekly tape 
off site. Alternatively, a small office may decide to store the 
backup tapes remotely with a tape storage facility, transmit 
the backup information securely over the Internet for backups, 
or assign an individual to take home the backup tape nightly. 
Each of the scenarios has its own costs and risks inherent in 
the control selection.
 5. Conduct awareness and training—The documented security 
policies and procedures are necessary; however, if individuals 
do not truly understand their responsibilities to comply with 
the security controls, the likelihood that the appropriate pro-
cesses will be followed is greatly diminished.
 6. Verify compliance—Vulnerability assessments, penetration test-
ing, and internal audit reviews of the security controls ensure 
that the policies and procedures that were created are being 
followed. Implemented security on the computing platform 
can be tested and compared with the documented baselines, 
configurations, and change control records to provide assur-
ance that the security controls are being maintained per the 
requirements implemented through the control frameworks.
 7. Implement a formal remediation process—When weaknesses in 
the security controls are discovered through internal audits, 
external audits, vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, or 
other internal reviews, the issue must be logged and tracked 
to completion. Accountability should be placed at a middle 
management or senior management level to ensure the appro-
priate attention and priority are placed on remedying the issue. 
Completion dates must be assigned (preferably no later than 
90 days after creation of the action plan). Documentation of 
the remediation (evidence) must be provided when the issue 
has been resolved. The existence of formal tracking of the 
security issues provides the assurance that security is an ongo-
ing, management-supported process.
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 8. Dedicate staff, automate compliance tasks—Compliance initia-
tives are very time consuming and drain the organization of 
resources to collect evidence, provide explanations, participate 
in interviews, and locate the policies and procedures that sup-
port the regulations. Without an organized automated process, 
this activity becomes even more challenging and time is wasted 
on inefficiencies. The same information may be requested mul-
tiple times to answer similar questions, where one report may 
have provided a reasonable answer. Initially, more staff should 
be allocated to the compliance efforts to provide a focus to the 
activity. When the compliance tasks are added to the regular 
jobs of predominantly IT staff, they may be given lower prior-
ity and resources. As automation increases, the staff required to 
support the compliance efforts should either remain constant 
or decrease. A constant staff may be needed to ensure that the 
new regulations and changes are adequately addressed.
 9. Report on compliance metrics—Dashboards of red, yellow, and 
green, or heat maps are useful tools to demonstrate where 
security is weak within the organization and where more 
focus should be placed. These metrics should be reported in 
a manner that is meaningful to the business, such as unavail-
ability issues, which could impact major, mission critical 
applications, or confidentiality concerns that may affect the 
consumer trust in the brand.
 10. Enforce penalties for noncompliance to policy—Does one grin and 
bear it when the security control objectives are not followed or 
grit one’s teeth? This is one area that needs teeth! There must be 
sanctions in place for those that do not follow the security poli-
cies. Associates must also be trained that compliance with the 
security controls is part of their job responsibilities. The indi-
vidual responsible for compliance assurance must ensure that 
the guidelines are established for sanctions and that the appro-
priate parties follow through with the sanction (which may be 
the manager, and legal and human resources representatives).
 11. Collaborate and network externally—Many organizations must 
comply with the same regulations. Why not leverage that 
experience? Working with peers within the industry verti-
cal for dealing with industry-specific regulations and across 
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industries for understanding various methods to implement 
the control frameworks, standards, and technical controls can 
be invaluable. For example, nonprofit organizations, such as 
the HIPAA Collaborative of Wisconsin, were formed to bring 
together healthcare providers, payers, and clearinghouses to 
discuss approaches to implementing HIPAA. The presenta-
tions, network contacts, and information sharing that happen 
are phenomenal. Attending conferences and industry associa-
tions such as the Information Systems Security Association 
(ISSA), Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
(ISACA), Computer Security Institute (CSI), Management 
Information System Training Institute (MISTI), SANS 
(SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute, and others 
helps to gain a common understanding of the regulation and 
implementation approaches. This also provides input as to 
what the herd is doing to be compliant with the regulation.
The Standards/Framework Value Proposition
Control frameworks and standards provide the roadmap to build a 
successful information security program. Once in place, continuous 
review of the policies, standard operating procedures, and implemen-
tation of the controls will enhance the effectiveness of the program. 
Monitoring through audits accompanied by corrective actions and 
tracking enables refinement of the control framework and standards 
to reduce the risk of a security event impacting the business in a sig-
nificant way. Think of the various security control frameworks as each 
contributing in some way to the infrastructure of a super six-lane free-
way. Rather than manage our security programs by ourselves, on an 
old gravel road at 20 miles per hour, it is time to get on the super-
highway supported by the strong plethora of control frameworks and 
standards and enjoy the ride!
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It is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything 
as if it were a nail.
Abraham Harold Maslow, 1908–1970
The previous chapter provided an overview of the security stan-
dards and framework landscape, and illustrated the importance of 
adhering to a set of security controls to enhance security and dem-
onstrating compliance to the organization and to the auditors. Each 
of the different standards has controls at different levels of detail. The 
standards chosen by an organization may be aligned to a particular 
vertical industry or generally applicable across industries as shown in 
Table 8.1.
Security Control Convergence
The next three chapters cover the minimum controls that should be 
considered for a functioning information security program. These 
chapters cover the detailed controls for the managerial, operational, 
and technical classes of controls across 18 families of controls. The 
basis of the controls is from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) 800-53 Recommended Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations. Although these controls 
were developed with the U.S. government in mind, this control set 
forms one of the most comprehensive, detailed control specifications 
that currently exist. An organization may decide that this level of con-
trol is not necessary for its organization. However, it is very useful to 
start with these controls and by performing a risk assessment of the 
control, determine whether the control is necessary. If the controls 
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are approached in this manner, which could also be referred to as a 
bottom -up approach, it is unlikely that key controls will be missed.
As noted in the previous chapter on controls, a preferred approach 
would be to use the NIST 800-53 security controls in conjunction 
with ISO/IEC 27001 controls (from Annex A; published by the 
International Organization for Standardization and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission), the COBIT controls, and the security 
requirements that are specified for the specific industry. If the con-
trols are used in this manner, the best of all worlds can be achieved. 
COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and related Technology) 
can be used to supply the overall information technology (IT) frame-
work and provide the accepted structure for future auditing of the 
framework to establish compliance (i.e., Sarbanes–Oxley). ISO 27001 
can provide the notion of a formalized information security manage-
ment system (ISMS) and a description of the processes that could be 
chosen to make up the ISMS. The NIST 800-53 controls can take 
the controls to a lower, more granular level to support the security 
processes as well as provide some criteria for assessing the lower level 
controls via the 800-53A special publication providing auditors guid-
ance on assessing the controls. Finally, the vertical industry set of con-
trols, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) Final Security Rule can provide the higher-level require-
ments necessary to be in compliance with the promulgated regulation. 
Each of these standards, control frameworks, or regulations are not 
in conflict with one another but can be very complimentary. Granted 
they exist at different levels of detail, come from a different focus, and 
may have more or less stringent requirements from one another, by 
implementing the sum of these requirements, the security program 
can be made very effective and reduce the risk of loss. An illustra-
tion of an example relationship between NIST 800-53, COBIT, ISO 
27001, and HIPAA are shown in Figure 8.1.
Controls may be tailored to fit the needs of the organization and 
controls may or may not be applicable. For example, an organization 
that outsources the data center processing to another organization may 
not have to set up contracts and testing of disaster recovery with 
another off-site data center. However the organization would need to 
187mAnAgerIAl Controls
ensure that the function is being provided by the data center that they 
are contracting their workload to. The organization should be asking 
how often the data is being backed up, how often is it restored, and 
how often disaster recovery tests are performed. It may be asked to 
participate in the tests for the contracted data center. In other words, 
it is important to review the intent of the control, and then determine 
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Figure 8.1 niSt 800-53, coBit, and iSo 27001 relationship example.
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Security Control Methodology
The controls in the next three chapters are presented by (1) a discussion of 
the control family area (e.g., access control) and the practical security con-
siderations for addressing this family are;, (2) a table showing the map-
ping between the NIST 800-53 control and ISO/IEC 27001, COBIT 
4.1, and HIPAA as an example of a vertical industry mapping. In some 
cases, there was no related ISO/IEC 27001 mapping, and this is noted in 
the table. When there was a COBIT mapping, this is noted. Likewise, 
when there was no specific HIPAA reference, one was not noted.
The practical security considerations provide a discussion for each of 
the 18 control families as a guide for approaching the creation of con-
trols within each area. The 18 control families are shown in Table 8.2. 
The size and resources of the organization will dictate how much can be 
invested within each control. Larger companies are expected to devote 
more resources to the security controls and implement more automated 
solutions to address the issues. Smaller organizations need to decide 
what is feasible to adequately protect the resources and may need to 
engage external resources to provide the adequate protection. For 
example, a small community bank may not be able to afford an in-house 
staff to perform vulnerability assessment testing on the infrastructure, 
but may be able to secure the Internet entry point into the organization 
and ensure that the 15 employees receive adequate information secu-
rity awareness training. This approach would not be sufficient for an 
organization of 40,000 employees spread across 100 locations. The risk 
assessment for these two organizations would lead to different conclu-
sions. Clearly the security officer would like to spend as much money on 
the security controls as possible, however, the reality of balancing the 
other company demands with overspending on information security 
will limit the investment. Therefore, the practical security discussion 
provides an interpretation of what the NIST 800-53 controls, COBIT 
controls, ISO 27001 controls, and in this case the HIPAA controls are 
really trying to achieve and some considerations for implementation.
Security Assessment and Authorization Controls
The security assessment and authorization control family (CA) controls 
shown in Table 8.3 ensures that the policies and procedures are developed 
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and followed, security controls are reviewed by the organization on a 
periodic basis, and that a person in position of high enough authority 
has approved the security controls for operation of the system. In effect 
this approval is contingent upon the acceptance of the risk assessment 
and the security control environment being adequate to present a reason-
able level of risk to the approver. Government entities will have a formal-
ized assessment and authorization process (formerly known as security 
certification and accreditation). However, each organization should 
develop a process whereby the security controls and the residual risk are 
approved and accepted by senior management. This creates awareness of 
the controls and the risk that the organization is accepting.
The security assessments may be done internally or externally, depend-
ing upon the expertise available to perform the assessments. In either 
case, the individuals performing the assessment should be independent so 
that bias does not impact the assessment. When gaps are found with the 
security controls, these need to be documented formally through a docu-
ment such as a plan of action and milestones (POA&M). By reviewing 
the plans on a monthly basis, the organization can direct the appropriate 
attention to the controls. A process should be developed for closing the 
plans upon receipt of the documentation demonstrating that the issue 
was fixed, along with a reporting mechanism to management for items on 
the monthly POA&M, especially those items showing delayed status or 
ones that have missed the estimated implementation date.
The intent of these controls is to ensure that there is some oversight on 
the assessment process and that the items that are determined to be gaps 
are promptly closed. A goal of this process should be to close items within 
90 days from issue identification. Although not all issues will be able to be 
mitigated within that timeframe, this can be set as a standard to address 
most security issues that an organization will face. For those items that 
could take longer, the process could be built to require business justifica-
tion and subsequent executive management approval (i.e., from the chief 
technology officer, chief information officer, or chief executive officer) for 
any initiatives that will take longer than 90 days to implement.
Planning Controls
The old adage “If you don’t know where you are going, all roads will 
lead you there” certainly applies to the security planning control 
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family (PL) shown in Table 8.4. Security can happen by chaos, but as 
indicated by the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI), an 
organization can become more effective by adopting a more proactive, 
planned approach.
The key document in this section is the systems security plan (SSP) 
containing descriptions of the business, computing infrastructure, 
major applications, and key controls that support the documentation 
of the environment. The document needs to be updated annually or 
whenever there are significant changes in the environment. These 
may be caused by changes in applications, outsourcing of informa-
tion technology, mergers and acquisitions, adding a managed secu-
rity service provider (MSSP), and so forth. The plan should not be 
viewed as merely a documentation exercise that is performed by one 
individual in the security department, but rather as an opportunity 
to engage individuals from different business and IT departments to 
construct the plan. It is not uncommon for different people to have 
different understandings of what systems are in place, technology 
infrastructure, and security controls to support the business applica-
tion or support system defined in the plan. In other words, the process 
of constructing the plan can be an eye-opening experience.
The security team should also have a weekly meeting to discuss the 
current initiatives and their status, including a review of the dates and 
deliverables. For security to be viewed as an ongoing program versus 
a point-in-time initiative to resolve the issues created by a recent inci-
dent, then the security program should be expected to be managed as 
a business. This can be as simple as creating a red–green– yellow col-
ored spreadsheet (for behind, completed, and in process) and shared 
at a weekly meeting or as elaborate as using project management soft-
ware for each project and having a biweekly comprehensive review. 
What is important is that there is a constant focus on what the activi-
ties are that are in process as well as what activities need to be added 
within the next 0–6, 6–12, and 12–18 month time frames to keep 
them on the radar.
Risk Assessment Controls
Risk assessments are the topic of much discussion these days and 
rightfully so. The risk assessment should represent a documented 
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meeting of the minds between information security and senior man-
agement. This is the process that, in very simple terms, documents the 
risks to the organization, documents the mitigating controls, identi-
fies the residual risk, and provides an understanding of what needs to 
be done to bring the security profile of the organization in line with 
its risk appetite. The risk management process was discussed exten-
sively in Chapter 5 and the risk assessment control family controls are 
depicted in Table 8.5.
Vulnerability scanning is performed as part of the risk assessment 
to provide the status of the technical controls and where improve-
ments need to be made. The risk assessment may be performed on 
an annual basis; however, the vulnerability scanning should be done 
more frequently due to the vulnerabilities introduced daily that could 
impact the computing environment. A minimum quarterly scanning 
frequency with a subsequent 90 fix-cycle to address the vulnerabilities 
found during the scan would be preferred. If the organization is able 
to perform the scanning on a weekly or daily basis through the use of 
automated tools, this would be a good goal to strive toward. Once the 
process is in place and the initial list of vulnerabilities is mitigated, 
the amount of time required to remove the subsequent vulnerabilities 
should decrease and become more manageable. An organization may 
choose to use multiple tools to provide increased security, whereby 
one tool might not pick up the same vulnerability as another.
As with the systems security plans, the risk assessment constitutes 
a key security document and should be approved by senior manage-
ment including the CEO, CIO, and business owner of the system. 
The systems security department should view itself as the facilitator 
of the risk assessment, but the final acceptance of risk is whoever is 
designated within senior management to assume that role. Senior 
management has a fiduciary responsibility to protect the organiza-
tion’s resources from loss, and the Risk Assessment document is a 
key document in its ability to consciously understand and accept the 
appropriate level of risk.
System and Services Acquisition Controls
The system and services acquisition control family (SA) controls 
shown in Table  8.6 ensure that the computer code supporting the 
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business environment, whether running internally or externally, has 
been created by following a system development life cycle whereby the 
appropriate security controls are analyzed, designed, implemented, 
and tested according to a defined process.
Software usage and licensing is also addressed to make sure that 
only the authorized software in the appropriate quantities is running 
within the environment. This can be controlled by tracking spread-
sheets, discovery tools, and removing administrative access from most 
users machines and creating policies of the approved software that 
may be requested from the desktop support team, help desk, or the 
group managing the software licenses. Allowing end users to install 
software, even versions of approved software, on their own might 
introduce vulnerabilities as they may be installing a version with 
vulnerabilities not internally reviewed or an older version. Software 
installs should be centrally controlled for vulnerability management 
and license tracking. Having too many unused licenses installed costs 
Table 8.1 vertical industry control Standard alignment
Standard/controL FraMeworK/reGuLation verticaL induStry
Health insurance Portability and accountability 
act (HiPaa) addressable and required 
standards
Health insurance
Payment card industry data Security Standards Financial
national institute of Standards and technology 
(niSt) recommended Security controls for 
Federal information Systems (800-53)
Government, federal contractors (detailed 
controls may be applied to all industries) to 
support Federal information Security 
Management act (FiSMa)
iSo/iec 27001:2005 information security 
management systems—requirements and 
iSo 27002:2005 information technology—
Security techniques—code of practice for 
information security management
international standard may be applied to all 
industries
control objective for information and related 
technology (coBit)
international standard may be applied to all 
industries; used heavily to evaluate and 
demonstrate compliance with internal 
controls for Sarbanes–oxley regulation
information technology infrastructure Library 
(itiL)
adopted largely by it operational areas to 
improve service, applicable across industries
Federal Financial institutions examination 
council (FFiec) it examination Handbook 
(supports Gramm–Leach–Bliley act)
Financial
north american electric reliability corporation 
(nerc) critical infrastructure Program (ciP)
u.S. bulk power systems
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the company money as well as the potential for fines by the software 
vendors for not having enough licenses.
Program Management Controls
The program management (PM) control family was added in NIST 
800-53 Rev3 to provide the controls in support of managing an infor-
mation security program (see Table  8.7). The other controls could 
be viewed as tactical implementation of security controls, whereby 
this control ensures that there is someone designated with the role 
of information security and carries out the mission of managing the 
information security program. The ISMS within ISO 27000 has long 
had the requirements for the establishment of an information security 
program. Chapter 2 of this book discussed creating the information 
security strategy, and Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the management 
roles and responsibilities to achieve the appropriate structure and rela-
tionships to carry out the program.
Table 8.2 niSt 800-53 18 control Families
identiFier FaMiLy cLaSS
ac access control technical
at awareness and training operational
au audit and accountability technical
ca Security assessment and authorization Management
cM configuration management operational
cP contingency planning operational
ia identification and authorization technical
ir incident response operational
Ma Maintenance operational
MP Media protection operational
Pe Physical and environmental protection operational
PL Planning Management
PS Personnel security operational
ra risk assessment Management
Sa System and services acquisition Management
Sc System and communications protection technical
Si System and information integrity operational
PM Program management Management
Source: niSt Special Publication 800-53 revision 3, table 1-1. august 
2009. includes May, 1, 2010, updates.
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ca-1 Security assessment and 
authorization Policies and Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. Formal, documented security 
assessment and authorization 
policies that address purpose, 
scope, roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, 
coordination among organizational 
entities, and compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
security assessment and 
authorization policies and 


















 a. develops a security assessment 
plan that describes the scope of 
the assessment including:
• Security controls and control 
enhancements under assessment
• assessment procedures to be used 
to determine security control 
effectiveness
• assessment environment, 
assessment team, and assessment 
roles and responsibilities
 b. assesses the security controls in 
the information system 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency] to determine the extent 
to which the controls are 
implemented correctly, operating 
as intended, and producing the 
desired outcome with respect to 













 c. Produces a security assessment 
report that documents the results of 
the assessment; and
 d. Provides the results of the security 
control assessment, in writing, to 







ca-3 information System connections
the organization:
 a. authorizes connections from the 
information system to other 
information systems outside of the 
authorization boundary through the 
use of interconnection security 
agreements;
 b. documents, for each connection, the 
interface characteristics, security 
requirements, and the nature of the 
information communicated; and
 c.Monitors the information system 
connections on an ongoing basis 

















ca-5 Plan of action and Milestones
the organization:
 a. develops a plan of action and 
milestones for the information 
system to document the organiza-
tion’s planned remedial actions to 
correct weaknesses or deficiencies 
noted during the assessment of the 
security controls and to reduce or 
eliminate known vulnerabilities in 
the system; and
 b. updates existing plan of action and 
milestones [assignment: organiza-
tion-defined frequency] based on 
the findings from security controls 
assessments, security impact 
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 a. assigns a senior-level executive or 
manager to the role of authorizing 
official for the information system;
 b. ensures that the authorizing 
official authorizes the information 
system for processing before 
commencing operations; and















the organization establishes a 
continuous monitoring strategy and 
implements a continuous monitoring 
program that includes:
 a. a configuration management 
process for the information system 
and its constituent components;
 b. a determination of the security 
impact of changes to the 
information system and 
environment of operation;
 c. ongoing security control 
assessments in accordance with 
the organizational continuous 
monitoring strategy; and
 d. reporting the security state of the 


















Planning PL-1 Security Planning Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented security 
planning policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
security planning policy and 










Planning PL-2 System Security Plan
the organization:
 a. develops a security plan for the 
information system that
• is consistent with the 
organization’s enterprise 
architecture;
• explicitly defines the 
authorization boundary for the 
system;
• describes the operational context 
of the information system in 
terms of missions and business 
processes;
• Provides the security 
categorization of the information 
system including supporting 
rationale;
• describes the operational 
environment for the information 
system;
• describes relationships with or 
connections to other information 
systems;
Continued
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• Provides an overview of the 
security requirements for the 
system;
• describes the security controls in 
place or planned for meeting 
those requirements including a 
rationale for the tailoring and 
supplementation decisions;
• is reviewed and approved by the 
authorizing official or designated 
representative prior to plan 
implementation;
 b. reviews the security plan for the 
information system [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency]; 
and
 c. updates the plan to address 
changes to the information system/
environment of operation or 
problems identified during plan 









Planning PL-4 rules of Behavior
the organization:
 a. establishes and makes readily 
available to all information system 
users, the rules that describe their 
responsibilities and expected 
behavior with regard to information 
and information system usage; and
 b. receives signed acknowledgment 
from users indicating that they 
have read, understand, and agree 
to abide by the rules of behavior, 
before authorizing access to 















Planning PL-5 Privacy impact assessment
the organization conducts a privacy 
impact assessment on the information 








Planning PL-6 Security-related activity Planning
the organization plans and coordinates 
security-related activities affecting the 
information system before conducting 
such activities in order to reduce the 
impact on organizational operations 
(i.e., mission, functions, image, and 
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risk assessment ra-1 risk assessment Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented risk 
assessment policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
risk assessment policy and 











risk assessment ra-2 Security categorization
the organization:
 a. categorizes information and the 
information system in accordance 
with applicable federal laws, 
executive orders, directives, 
policies, regulations, standards, 
and guidance;
 b. documents the security 
categorization results (including 
supporting rationale) in the 
security plan for the information 
system; and
 c. ensures the security categorization 
decision is reviewed and approved 
by the authorizing official or 














risk assessment ra-3 risk assessment
the organization:
 a. conducts an assessment of risk, 
including the likelihood and 
magnitude of harm, from the 
unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction of the 
information system and the 
information it processes, stores, or 
transmits;
 b. documents risk assessment results 
in [Selection: security plan; risk 
assessment report; assignment: 
organization-defined document];
 c. reviews risk assessment results 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency]; and
 d. updates the risk assessment 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency] or whenever there are 
significant changes to the 
information system or environment 
of operation (including the 
identification of new threats and 
vulnerabilities), or other conditions 










risk assessment ra-5 vulnerability Scanning
the organization:
 a. Scans for vulnerabilities in the 
information system and hosted 
applications [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency 
and/or randomly in accordance 
with organization-defined process] 
and when new vulnerabilities 
potentially affecting the system/
applications are identified and 
reported;
Continued
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 b. employs vulnerability scanning 
tools and techniques that promote 
interoperability among tools and 
automate parts of the vulnerability 
management process by using 
standards for:
• enumerating platforms, software 
flaws, and improper 
configurations;
• Formatting and making 
transparent, checklists and test 
procedures; and
• Measuring vulnerability impact
 c. analyzes vulnerability scan reports 
and results from security control 
assessments;
 d. remediates legitimate 
vulnerabilities [assignment: 
organization-defined response 
times] in accordance with an 
organizational assessment of risk; 
and
 e. Shares information obtained from 
the vulnerability scanning process 
and security control assessments 
with designated personnel 
throughout the organization to help 
eliminate similar vulnerabilities in 
other information systems (i.e., 














Sa-1 System and Services acquisition 
Policy and Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented system and 
services acquisition policy that 
includes information security 
considerations and that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
system and services acquisition 















Sa-2 allocation of resources
the organization:
 a. includes a determination of 
information security requirements 
for the information system in 
mission/business process 
planning;
 b. determines, documents, and 
allocates the resources required to 
protect the information system as 
part of its capital planning and 
investment control process; and
 c. establishes a discrete line item for 
information security in 









Sa-3 Life cycle Support
the organization:
 a. Manages the information system 
using a system development life 
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 b. defines and documents information 
system security roles and 
responsibilities throughout the 
system development life cycle; and
 c. identifies individuals having 









the organization includes the following 
requirements and/or specifications, 
explicitly or by reference, in information 
system acquisition contracts based on 
an assessment of risk and in 
accordance with applicable federal 
laws, executive orders, directives, 
policies, regulations, and standards:
 a. Security functional requirements/
specifications;
 b. Security-related documentation 
requirements; and










Sa-5 information System documentation
the organization:
 a. obtains, protects as required, and 
makes available to authorized 
personnel, administrator 
documentation for the information 
system that describes:
• Secure configuration, 
installation, and operation of the 
information system;
• effective use and maintenance of 
security features/functions; and
• Known vulnerabilities regarding 
configuration and use of 
administrative (i.e., privileged) 
functions; and
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 b. obtains, protects as required, and 
makes available to authorized 
personnel, user documentation for 
the information system that 
describes:
• user-accessible security 
features/functions and how to 
effectively use those security 
features/functions;
• Methods for user interaction with 
the information system, which 
enables individuals to use the 
system in a more secure manner; 
and
• user responsibilities in 
maintaining the security of the 
information and information 
system; and
 c. documents attempts to obtain 
information system documentation 








Sa-6 Software usage restrictions
the organization:
 a. uses software and associated 
documentation in accordance with 
contract agreements and copyright 
laws;
 b. employs tracking systems for 
software and associated 
documentation protected by 
quantity licenses to control copying 
and distribution; and
 c. controls and documents the use of 
peer-to-peer file sharing technology 
to ensure that this capability is not 
used for the unauthorized 
distribution, display, performance, 










the organization enforces explicit rules 
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Sa-8 Security engineering Principles
the organization applies information 
system security engineering principles 
in the specification, design, 
development, implementation, and 










Sa-9 external information System 
Services
the organization:
 a. requires that providers of external 
information system services comply 
with organizational information 
security requirements and employ 
appropriate security controls in 
accordance with applicable federal 
laws, executive orders, directives, 
policies, regulations, standards, 
and guidance;
 b. defines and documents 
government oversight and user 
roles and responsibilities with 
regard to external information 
system services; and
 c. Monitors security control 





















Sa-10 developer configuration 
Management
the organization requires that 
information system developers/
integrators:
 a. Perform configuration management 
during information system design, 
development, implementation, and 
operation;
 b. Manage and control changes to the 
information system;
 c. implement only organization-
approved changes;
 d. document approved changes to the 
information system; and













Sa-11 developer Security testing
the organization requires that 
information system developers/
integrators, in consultation with 
associated security personnel 
(including security engineers):
 a. create and implement a security 
test and evaluation plan;
 b. implement a verifiable flaw 
remediation process to correct 
weaknesses and deficiencies 
identified during the security 
testing and evaluation process; 
and
 c. document the results of the 








Sa-12 Supply chain Protection
the organization protects against 
supply chain threats by employing 
[assignment: organization-defined list 
of measures to protect against supply 









the organization requires that the 








Sa-14 critical information System 
components
the organization:
 a. determines [assignment: 
organization-defined list of critical 
information system components 
that require re-implementation]; 
and
 b. re-implements or custom develops 
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PM-1 information Security Program Plan
the organization:
 a. develops and disseminates an 
organization-wide information 
security program plan that:
• Provides an overview of the 
requirements for the security 
program and a description of the 
security program management 
controls and common controls in 
place or planned for meeting 
those requirements;
• Provides sufficient information 
about the program management 
controls and common controls 
(including specification of 
parameters for any assignment 
and selection operations either 
explicitly or by reference) to 
enable an implementation that is 
unambiguously compliant with 
the intent of the plan and a 
determination of the risk to be 
incurred if the plan is 
implemented as intended;
• includes roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, 
coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance;
• is approved by a senior official 
with responsibility and 
accountability for the risk being 
incurred to organizational 
operations (including mission, 
functions, image, and 
reputation), organizational 
assets, individuals, other 
organizations, and the nation;
 b. reviews the organization-wide 













 c. revises the plan to address 
organizational changes and 
problems identified during plan 




PM-2 Senior information Security officer
the organization appoints a senior 
information security officer with the 
mission and resources to coordinate, 
develop, implement, and maintain an 







PM-3 information Security resources
the organization:
 a. ensures that all capital planning 
and investment requests include 
the resources needed to implement 
the information security program 
and documents all exceptions to 
this requirement;
 b. employs a business case/exhibit 
300/exhibit 53 to record the 
resources required; and
 c. ensures that information security 






PM-4 Plan of action and Milestones 
Process
the organization implements a process 
for ensuring that plans of action and 
milestones for the security program 
and the associated organizational 
information systems are maintained 
and document the remedial 
information security actions to 
mitigate risk to organizational 
operations and assets, individuals, 





PM-5 information System inventory
the organization develops and 
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PM-6 information Security Measures of 
Performance
the organization develops, monitors, 
and reports on the results of 







the organization develops an enterprise 
architecture with consideration for 
information security and the resulting 
risk to organizational operations, 
organizational assets, individuals, 





PM-8 critical infrastructure Plan
the organization addresses information 
security issues in the development, 
documentation, and updating of a 






PM-9 risk Management Strategy
the organization:
 a. develops a comprehensive strategy 
to manage risk to organizational 
operations and assets, individuals, 
other organizations, and the nation 
associated with the operation and 
use of information systems; and
 b. implements that strategy 






PM-10 Security authorization Process
the organization:
 a. Manages (i.e., documents, tracks, 
and reports) the security state of 
organizational information systems 
through security authorization 
processes;
 b. designates individuals to fulfill 
specific roles and responsibilities 
within the organizational risk 
management process; and
 c. Fully integrates the security 
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PM-11 Mission/Business Process 
definition
the organization:
 a. defines mission/business 
processes with consideration for 
information security and the 
resulting risk to organizational 
operations, organizational assets, 
individuals, other organizations, 
and the nation; and
 b. determines information protection 
needs arising from the defined 
mission/business processes and 
revises the processes as necessary, 
until an achievable set of 








For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public 
relations, for nature cannot be fooled.
Richard Phillips Feynman, Report on 
space shuttle Challenger disaster (1986)
The controls specified in this chapter are the technical controls, or those 
controls that govern the ongoing technical mechanisms impacting secu-
rity. This chapter, along with the preceding Chapter 8 on managerial 
controls and the subsequent Chapter 10 on operational controls, com-
pletes the controls necessary for building the foundation for an infor-
mation security program. Each listing of the operational control family 
is preceded with some practical security considerations for reviewing 
the family of controls. These controls are also mapped to COBIT 4.1, 
ISO 27001, and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) where a relationship between them exists.
Access Control Controls
The access control (AC) family could be in some ways viewed as the 
primary focus of information security for the first several decades. This 
is the most tested area of information security and uncovers how well 
the security policies have been implemented. The AC control family 
requires that accounts are set up according to preestablished business 
reasons and that they are set up for individuals who have a need to 
know the information they are requesting. Identity management sys-
tems of recent years have been implemented to ensure that access was 
properly controlled and that terminated and transferred users no lon-
ger had access after their company or department tenure. Role-based 
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systems provide the ability to model user access based upon a consis-
tent profile. The profile can be as simple as creating a small number of 
roles, defining the access required by those roles, and then running a 
macro to create the access for the account requiring the access.
The AC family also promotes technical controls in place such that 
accounts are locked in the event that someone is attempting to access the 
account and repeatedly failing. The system notification messages should 
be made available when the user logs into the system as well as for other 
entry points, such as a logging onto a server (via the use of banner pages). 
The wireless, mobile device and remote device controls are in place to 
ensure that each entry point into the computing environment has been 
addressed by policy and procedures for gaining access. These procedures 
ensure that there is a consistent path for requesting and approving the 
access. The controls for the AC family are shown in Table 9.1.
Audit and Accountability Controls
The audit and accountability controls family (AU), as shown in 
Table 9.2, specifies controls to ensure that the events are being moni-
tored and failures are being followed up. Due to the volume of audit 
records that may be generated, choices need to be made as to what 
items are most important to be audited. Logon failures, for example, 
may be monitored, but a threshold of 25 in a week may be used for 
the level requiring investigation. Alternatively a trending report may 
be developed and whereas the daily occurrence may be low, say 2, 
just under the threshold of 3 invalid login attempts before a lockout, 
resulting in over 60 during a month’s time. This could be the work of 
someone internally attempting to guess someone’s password and hav-
ing over 750 tries in a year.
Reviewing audit records can be a very time-consuming task and 
automation of some sort, whether it be through a Security Information 
and Event Management (SIEM) product or an off-the-shelf reporting 
tool used to reduce the input records to focus solely on the exceptions 
over the thresholds, the activity must be performed beyond merely 
logging of the records. Logging the records for forensic review in the 
event that other sources point to an incident may cause the organiza-
tion to miss valuable information such as that previously described 
that the audit records could be pointing to.
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Audit record storage and retention periods need to be defined. These 
may follow a multilevel strategy, whereby the online audit records are 
held for 90 days, followed by 1-year retention on a storage area network 
(SAN) device, and then rolled off to tape for longer term archival in the 
event of an incident. By the time 1 year has passed, it is a small likeli-
hood that these records would be needed, unless requested through 
litigation to support e-discovery efforts. The record retention policies 
of the legal department need to be known before devising a strategy.
Identification and Authentication
The identification and authentication control family (IA) is shown in 
Table 9.3. These controls provide assurance that the individuals are 
each uniquely identified and are authenticated in a manner such that 
it is likely that the person accessing the computer system is who they 
say they are. This works with the access control family of controls to 
provide the appropriate access.
The strength of the authenticator may vary and may include media 
access control (MAC) addressing, public key infrastructure (PKI) 
methods, or may be using multifactor authentication through the use 
of a software or hardware token. The transmission of information 
would also need encryption controls to ensure that the authenticator 
is not being intercepted and used for playback.
System and Communications Protections
The systems and communications protections control family (SC) 
contains the controls shown in Table 9.4. These controls ensure that 
the endpoints of the communication systems are secured as well as 
sufficient management of the applications internally (e.g., application 
portioning). The content needs to be secured in transit and at rest (for 
data classified at a higher risk level) using encryption.
The security architecture needs to be reviewed to determine the appro-
priate access between servers, applications, placement of devices, and net-
work zones. Local, host-based firewalls are typically placed on mobile 
devices in addition to the network firewall protections. These protections 
need to be depicted in the systems security plan to demonstrate how the 
boundaries are being protected as well as the transmission of data.
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access control ac-1 access control Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented access 
control policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 





















access control ac-2 account Management
the organization manages information 
system accounts, including:
 a. identifying account types (i.e., 
individual, group, system, 
application, guest/anonymous, and 
temporary);
 b. establishing conditions for group 
membership;
 c. identifying authorized users of the 
information system and specifying 
access privileges;
 d. requiring appropriate approvals 
for requests to establish accounts;
 e. establishing, activating, 
modifying, disabling, and removing 
accounts;
 f. Specifically authorizing and 
monitoring the use of guest/






















 g. notifying account managers when 
temporary accounts are no longer 
required and when information 
system users are terminated, 
transferred, or information system 
usage or need-to-know/need-to-
share changes;
 h. deactivating: (i) temporary 
accounts that are no longer 
required; and (ii) accounts of 
terminated or transferred users;
 i. Granting access to the system 
based on: (i) a valid access 
authorization; (ii) intended system 
usage; and (iii) other attributes as 
required by the organization or 
associated missions/business 
functions; and
 j. reviewing accounts [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency].
access control ac-3 access enforcement
the information system enforces approved 
authorizations for logical access to the 
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access control ac-4 information Flow enforcement
the information system enforces 
approved authorizations for controlling 
the flow of information within the 
system and between interconnected 















access control ac-5 Separation of duties
the organization:
 a. Separates duties of individuals as 
necessary, to prevent malevolent 
activity without collusion;
 b. documents separation of duties; 
and
 c. implements separation of duties 












access control ac-6 Least Privilege
the organization employs the concept of 
least privilege, allowing only 
authorized accesses for users (and 
processes acting on behalf of users) 
who are necessary to accomplish 
assigned tasks in accordance with 






















access control ac-7 unsuccessful Login attempts
the information system:
 a. enforces a limit of [assignment: 
organization-defined number] 
consecutive invalid login attempts 
by a user during a [assignment: 
organization-defined time period]; 
and
 b. automatically [Selection: locks the 
account/node] for an [assignment: 
organization-defined time period]; 
locks the account/node until 
released by an administrator; 
delays next login prompt according 
to [assignment: organization-
defined delay algorithm] when the 
maximum number of unsuccessful 
attempts is exceeded. the control 
applies regardless of whether the 




access control ac-8 System use notification
the information system:
 a. displays an approved system use 
notification message or banner 
before granting access to the 
system that provides privacy and 
security notices consistent with 
applicable federal laws, executive 
orders, directives, policies, 
regulations, standards, and 
guidance and states that: (i) users 
are accessing a u.S. government 
information system; (ii) system 
usage may be monitored, recorded, 
and subject to audit; (iii) 
unauthorized use of the system is 
prohibited and subject to criminal 
and civil penalties; and (iv) use of 
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 b. retains the notification message or 
banner on the screen until users 
take explicit actions to log on to or 
further access the information 
system; and
 c. For publicly accessible systems: (i) 
displays the system use 
information when appropriate, 
before granting further access; (ii) 
displays references, if any, to 
monitoring, recording, or auditing 
that are consistent with privacy 
accommodations for such systems 
that generally prohibit those 
activities; and (iii) includes in the 
notice given to public users of the 
information system, a description 
of the authorized uses of the 
system.
access control ac-9 Previous Logon (access) 
notification
the information system notifies the 
user, upon successful logon (access), 




access control ac-10 concurrent Session control
the information system limits the 
number of concurrent sessions for 




access control ac-11 Session Lock
the information system:
 a. Prevents further access to the 
system by initiating a session lock 
after [assignment: organization-
defined time period] of inactivity or 
upon receiving a request from a 
user; and
 b. retains the session lock until the 
user reestablishes access using 












access control ac-14 Permitted actions without 
identification or authentication
the organization:
 a. identifies specific user actions that 
can be performed on the 
information system without 
identification or authentication; 
and
 b. documents and provides 
supporting rationale in the security 
plan for the information system, 




access control ac-16 Security attributes
the information system supports and 
maintains the binding of [assignment: 
organization-defined security attributes] 







access control ac-17 remote access
the organization:
 a. documents allowed methods of 
remote access to the information 
system;
 b. establishes usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance for each 
allowed remote access method;
 c. Monitors for unauthorized remote 
access to the information system;
 d. authorizes remote access to the 
information system prior to 
connection; and
 e. enforces requirements for remote 
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access control ac-18 wireless access
the organization:
 a. establishes usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance for 
wireless access;
 b. Monitors for unauthorized wireless 
access to the information system;
 c. authorizes wireless access to the 
information system prior to 
connection; and
 d. enforces requirements for wireless 












access control ac-19 access control for Mobile devices
 the organization:
 a. establishes usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance for 
organization-controlled mobile 
devices;
 b. authorizes connection of mobile 
devices meeting organizational 
usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance to 
organizational information 
systems;
 c. Monitors for unauthorized 
connections of mobile devices to 
organizational information 
systems;
 d. enforces requirements for the 
connection of mobile devices to 
organizational information 
systems;
 e. disables information system 
functionality that provides the 
capability for automatic execution 
of code on mobile devices without 
user direction;
 f. issues specially configured mobile 
devices to individuals traveling to 
locations that the organization 
deems to be of significant risk in 
accordance with organizational 











 g. applies [assignment: organization-
defined inspection and 
preventative measures] to mobile 
devices returning from locations 
that the organization deems to be 
of significant risk in accordance 
with organizational policies and 
procedures.
access control ac-20 use of external information 
Systems
the organization establishes terms and 
conditions, consistent with any trust 
relationships established with other 
organizations owning, operating, and/
or maintaining external information 
systems, allowing authorized 
individuals to:
 a. access the information system 
from the external information 
systems; and
 b. Process, store, and/or transmit 
organization-controlled information 







access control ac-21 user-Based collaboration and 
information Sharing
the organization:
 a. Facilitates information sharing by 
enabling authorized users to 
determine whether access 
authorizations assigned to the 
sharing partner match the access 
restrictions on the information for 
[assignment: organization-defined 
information sharing circumstances 
where user discretion is required]; 
and
 b. employs [assignment: list of 
organization-defined information 
sharing circumstances and 
automated mechanisms or manual 
processes required] to assist users 
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access control ac-22 Publicly accessible content
the organization:
 a. designates individuals authorized 
to post information onto an 
organizational information system 
that is publicly accessible;
 b. trains authorized individuals to 
ensure that publicly accessible 
information does not contain 
nonpublic information;
 c. reviews the proposed content of 
publicly accessible information for 
nonpublic information prior to 
posting onto the organizational 
information system;
 d. reviews the content on the publicly 
accessible organizational 




 e. removes nonpublic information 
from the publicly accessible 










au-1 audit and accountability Policy 
and Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented audit and 
accountability policy that 
addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
audit and accountability policy and 















 a. determines, based on a risk 
assessment and mission/business 
needs, that the information system 
must be capable of auditing the 
following events: [assignment: 
organization-defined list of 
auditable events];
 b. coordinates the security audit 
function with other organizational 
entities requiring audit-related 
information to enhance mutual 
support and to help guide the 
selection of auditable events;
 c. Provides a rationale for why the list 
of auditable events is deemed to be 
adequate to support after-the-fact 
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 d. determines, based on current 
threat information and ongoing 
assessment of risk, that the 
following events are to be audited 
within the information system: 
[assignment: organization defined 
subset of the auditable events 
defined in au-2(a) to be audited 
along with the frequency of (or 




au-3 content of audit records
the information system produces audit 
records that contain sufficient 
information to, at a minimum, 
establish what type of event occurred, 
when (date and time) the event 
occurred, where the event occurred, 
the source of the event, the outcome 
(success or failure) of the event, and 
the identity of any user/subject 









au-4 audit Storage capacity
the organization allocates audit record 
storage capacity and configures 
auditing to reduce the likelihood of 







au-5 response to audit Processing 
Failures
the information system:
 a. alerts designated organizational 
officials in the event of an audit 
processing failure; and
 b. takes the following additional 
actions: [assignment: 
organization-defined actions to be 
taken (e.g., shut down information 
system, overwrite oldest audit 












au-6 audit review, analysis, and 
reporting
the organization:
 a. reviews and analyzes information 
system audit records [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency] for 
indications of inappropriate or 
unusual activity, and reports 
findings to designated 
organizational officials; and
 b. adjusts the level of audit review, 
analysis, and reporting within the 
information system when there is a 
change in risk to organizational 
operations, organizational assets, 
individuals, other organizations, or 
the nation based on law 
enforcement information, 
intelligence information, or other 













au-7 audit reduction and report 
Generation
the information system provides an 










the information system uses internal 







au-9 Protection of audit information
the information system protects audit 
information and audit tools from 









the information system protects against 
an individual falsely denying having 
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au-11 audit record retention
the organization retains audit records 
for [assignment: organization-defined 
time period consistent with records 
retention policy] to provide support for 
after-the-fact investigations of 
security incidents and to meet 










 a. Provides audit record generation 
capability for the list of auditable 
events defined in au-2 at 
[assignment: organization-defined 
information system components];
 b. allows designated organizational 
personnel to select which auditable 
events are to be audited by specific 
components of the system; and
 c. Generates audit records for the list 
of audited events defined in au-2 








au-13 Monitoring for information 
disclosure
the organization monitors open source 
information for evidence of 
unauthorized exfiltration or disclosure 








the information system provides the 
capability to:
 a. capture/record and log all content 
related to a user session; and
 b. remotely view/hear all content 
related to an established user 











ia-1 identification and authentication 
Policy and Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented 
identification and authentication 
policy that addresses purpose, 
scope, roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, 
coordination among organizational 
entities, and compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
identification and authentication 












ia-2 identification and authentication 
(organizational users)
the information system uniquely 
identifies and authenticates 
organizational users (or processes 














ia-3 device identification and 
authentication
the information system uniquely 
identifies and authenticates 
[assignment: organization defined list 
of specific and/or types of devices] 









the organization manages information 
system identifiers for users and 
devices by:
 a. receiving authorization from a 
designated organizational official 
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 b. Selecting an identifier that 
uniquely identifies an individual or 
device;
 c. assigning the user identifier to the 
intended party or the device 
identifier to the intended device;
 d. Preventing reuse of user or device 
identifiers for [assignment: 
organization-defined time period]; 
and
 e. disabling the user identifier after 
[assignment: organization-defined 





the organization manages information 
system authenticators for users and 
devices by:
 a. verifying, as part of the initial 
authenticator distribution, the 
identity of the individual and/or 
device receiving the authenticator;
 b. establishing initial authenticator 
content for authenticators defined 
by the organization;
 c. ensuring that authenticators have 
sufficient strength of mechanism 
for their intended use;
 d. establishing and implementing 
administrative procedures for 
initial authenticator distribution, 
for lost/compromised or damaged 
authenticators, and for revoking 
authenticators;
 e. changing default content of 
authenticators upon information 
system installation;
 f. establishing minimum and 
maximum lifetime restrictions and 
reuse conditions for authenticators 
(if appropriate);
 g. changing/refreshing 
authenticators [assignment: 
organization-defined time period by 
authenticator type];
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 h. Protecting authenticator content 
from unauthorized disclosure and 
modification; and
 i. requiring users to take, and 
having devices implement, specific 













the information system obscures 
feedback of authentication information 
during the authentication process to 
protect the information from possible 









ia-7 cryptographic Module 
authentication
the information system uses 
mechanisms for authentication to a 
cryptographic module that meet the 
requirements of applicable federal laws, 
executive orders, directives, policies, 











ia-8 identification and authentication 
(non-organizational users)
the information system uniquely 
identifies and authenticates 
non-organizational users (or processes 
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Sc-1 System and communications 
Protection Policy and Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented system and 
communications protection policy 
that addresses purpose, scope, 
roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, 
coordination among organizational 
entities, and compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
system and communications 
protection policy and associated 












the information system separates user 
functionality (including user interface 








Sc-3 Security Function isolation
the information system isolates security 









Sc-4 information in Shared resources
the information system prevents 
unauthorized and unintended 







Sc-5 denial of Service Protection
the information system protects against 
or limits the effects of the following 
types of denial of service attacks: 
[assignment: organization-defined list 
of types of denial of service attacks or 





















 a. Monitors and controls 
communications at the external 
boundary of the system and at key 
internal boundaries within the 
system; and
 b. connects to external networks or 
information systems only through 
managed interfaces consisting of 
boundary protection devices 

















the information system protects the 

















the information system protects the 















the information system terminates the 
network connection associated with a 
communications session at the end of 
the session or after [assignment: 
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the information system establishes a 
trusted communications path between 
the user and the following security 
functions of the system: [assignment: 
organization-defined security functions 
to include at a minimum information 








Sc-12 cryptographic Key establishment 
and Management
the organization establishes and 
manages cryptographic keys for 










Sc-13 use of cryptography
the information system implements 
required cryptographic protections 
using cryptographic modules that 
comply with applicable federal laws, 
executive orders, directives, policies, 










Sc-14 Public access Protections
the information system protects the 
integrity and availability of publicly 










Sc-15 collaborative computing devices
the information system:
 a. Prohibits remote activation of 
collaborative computing devices 
with the following exceptions: 
[assignment: organization-defined 
exceptions where remote activation 
is to be allowed]; and
 b. Provides an explicit indication of 







Sc-16 transmission of Security 
attributes
the information system associates 
security attributes with information 













Sc-17 Public Key infrastructure 
certificates
the organization issues public key 
certificates under an [assignment: 
organization-defined certificate policy] 
or obtains public key certificates under 
an appropriate certificate policy from 








 a. defines acceptable and 
unacceptable mobile code and 
mobile code technologies;
 b. establishes usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance for 
acceptable mobile code and mobile 
code technologies; and
 c. authorizes, monitors, and controls 








Sc-19 voice over internet Protocol
the organization:
 a. establishes usage restrictions and 
implementation guidance for voice 
over internet Protocol (voiP) 
technologies based on the potential 
to cause damage to the 
information system if used 
maliciously; and
 b. authorizes, monitors, and controls 







Sc-20 Secure name/address resolution 
Service (authoritative Source)
the information system provides 
additional data origin and integrity 
artifacts along with the authoritative 
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Sc-21 Secure name/address resolution 
Service (recursive or caching 
resolver)
the information system performs data 
origin authentication and data 
integrity verification on the name/
address resolution responses the 
system receives from authoritative 







Sc-22 architecture and Provisioning for 
name/address resolution Service
the information systems that collectively 
provide name/address resolution 
service for an organization are 








the information system provides 
mechanisms to protect the 








Sc-24 Fail in Known State
the information system fails to a 
[assignment: organization-defined 
known state] for [assignment: 
organization-defined types of failures] 
preserving [assignment: organization-








the information system employs 
processing components that have 








the information system includes 
components specifically designed to be 
the target of malicious attacks for the 












Sc-27 operating System-independent 
applications
the information system includes: 
[assignment: organization-defined 







Sc-28 Protection of information at rest
the information system protects the 








the organization employs diverse 
information technologies in the 








the organization employs virtualization 
techniques to present information 
system components as other types of 







Sc-31 covert channel analysis
the organization requires that 
information system developers/
integrators perform a covert channel 
analysis to identify those aspects of 
system communication that are 







Sc-32 information System Partitioning
the organization partitions the 
information system into components 
residing in separate physical domains 







Sc-33 transmission Preparation 
integrity
the information system protects the 
integrity of information during the 
processes of data aggregation, 
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Sc-34 non-Modifiable executable 
Programs
the information system at [assignment: 
organization-defined information 
system components]:
 a. Loads and executes the operating 
environment from hardware-
enforced, read-only media; and
 b. Loads and executes [assignment: 
organization-defined applications] 








There is no such thing as a free lunch.
Attributed to Milton Friedman, 1912–2006
The controls specified in this chapter are the operational controls or 
those controls that govern the ongoing operational processes impact-
ing security spanning multiple departments. This chapter, along with 
the preceding security control chapters (Chapter 8 on managerial 
controls and Chapter 9 on technical controls) complete the controls 
necessary for building the foundation for an information security 
program. Each listing of the operational control family is preceded 
with some practical security considerations for reviewing the fam-
ily of controls. These controls are also mapped to COBIT 4.1, ISO 
27001:2005, and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) where a relationship between them exists.
Awareness and Training Controls
The awareness and training control family (AT) shown in Table 10.1 
serves to ensure that individuals within the organization have the 
appropriate level of training. All users of the organization need some 
level of training, and this includes all management levels and all end 
users. Records need to be maintained demonstrating that everyone has 
taken the training. End users need awareness training primarily so 
that they know what is expected of them, when a security breach has 
occurred, and how to report the breach. Executive management will 
also need the same training, potentially supplemented with training 
around risk management as it relates to security. Role-based train-
ing can provide technical staff with security-specific education, such 
as the network administrator on securing a firewall, or the security 
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analyst with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
training, or the server engineer on securing Windows/Unix servers. 
Additionally, management may need training for a new identity man-
agement system or handling terminations. The entire organization 
may need additional refresher training on a monthly basis.
End user awareness training should be provided prior to access-
ing the computer system and on an annual basis at a minimum. In 
Chapter 12 more ideas for security training are provided.
Configuration Management Controls
The configuration management control family controls (CM), as 
shown in Table 10.2, provide control of the configuration setting base-
lines and their ongoing integrity. Once the baseline is decided upon, 
there should be a periodic review to ensure that the baselines are being 
kept up with the latest changes by the issuing agency (e.g., Defense 
Information Systems Agency). The appropriate team members for the 
particular baseline (server, desktop, firewall, database, mainframe, 
etc.) should meet and determine the changes required to the baseline. 
The new baseline can then be constructed and applied according to 
the baseline procedures to all the devices of that type. Exceptions 
to the baseline standard need to be documented. The deviations from 
the baseline can be captured with automated tools, provided the upfront 
work has been done to populate the tool with the existing baseline.
Change control is a difficult area to ensure that changes are properly 
authorized for change and subsequently approved for production imple-
mentation prior to implementation. Programmers and those responsible 
for the infrastructure components may be pressed for time to implement 
a change and not receive proper approval beforehand. A change control 
board (CCB) can be very beneficial in this case, with individuals track-
ing the production implementations and following up on individuals that 
have not received the appropriate approvals. Managing the change con-
trol process provides the traceability of subsequent changes to the system.
Contingency Planning Controls
The contingency planning control family (CP) ensures that the sys-
tems can be brought up in a reasonable amount of time in the event of 
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a disaster. These controls, shown in Table 10.3, typically require that 
some form of testing be done to ensure that the system can be brought 
up in a reasonable time. The testing identifies gaps in the documenta-
tion and highlights information that may have been left out, such as 
a file or the knowledge of an administrator password that halted the 
testing. If an outsourced data center company handles these func-
tions, testing should still be performed to determine whether the net-
work at the site will be available in the event of a disaster.
Business continuity plans should be written for each department 
to ensure they are ready in the event of a disaster, not only in terms 
of the computing platform, but where will they work and how the 
equipment will be configured or delivered to a remote location, or for 
a work-at-home scenario.
Incident Response Controls
The incident response control family (IR), as shown in Table  10.4, 
ensures that the organization has a predefined mechanism in place to 
respond to an incident. Security incidents can range from not sending 
sensitive information encrypted through e-mail to having the infra-
structure penetrated through the use of structured query language 
(SQL) injection on the public facing website, for example. Not all inci-
dents will be of the magnitude to invoke the formation of a computer 
security incident response team (CSIRT), however, the CSIRT pro-
cedure created by the organization should spell out the conditions by 
which the CSIRT team will be invoked. A senior management crisis 
management team for significant events, such as threats of violence, 
bomb threats, and emergency weather conditions, should be estab-
lished. These teams need to be in place prior to the incidents occurring.
Incidents should be simulated by creating a scenario and walking 
though what would be done in the event of a crisis or a technical out-
age caused by an event, such as malware, antivirus, or an advanced 
persistent threat (APT) targeted toward the organization.
Maintenance Controls
The maintenance control family (MA) shown in Table 10.5 ensures 
that the equipment is properly maintained by having contracts in 
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place, service level agreements, spare parts available, and routine 
maintenance performed. Exposing the device to the employees of an 
external vendor carries the risk that the software, firmware, or data 
may be modified to create a subsequent entry point into the system, 
or information could be disclosed. The device also needs to be prop-
erly maintained and serviced on a regular basis to ensure appropriate 
availability. Contracts should be in place for spare parts availability, 
with 4 hours not being an unreasonable time frame in most cases. 
In the case of workstations or desktops, for most organizations, hav-
ing alternate equipment on-site can alleviate the need for immediate 
spare parts from a vendor. In this case, there should be agreements 
with hardware manufacturers to replace the items under warranty and 
documented procedures for handling the return of equipment.
There should be contracts in place for each computing platform in 
the environment. Mainframe contracts typically come in the form of a 
master services agreement with an annual renewal signoff. Procedures 
should also be in place for when vendors are required to service the equip-
ment on-site to ensure they are escorted, as well as procedures for vendor 
remote access. Vendors that require infrequent connections to the equip-
ment could be granted one-time ID/passwords along with secure tokens 
to access the equipment. The access should be also be logged, specifying 
the individual using the ID and the business reason for the access.
Media Protection Controls
The media protection control family (MP) controls shown in 
Table  10.6 address information wherever it may be stored. As the 
perimeter of the organization is disappearing with information mov-
ing closer to the end user (i.e., the information resides on laptops, 
USB drives, compact disks, DVDs, smartphones, and other types of 
flash memory chips), care must be taken to ensure that only those 
authorized individuals have the ability to copy information to these 
external sources. Due to the massive amount of information that can 
be stored on a portable drive (multiterabytes), or a USB stick (upward 
of 64 GB), these devices must be carefully managed.
Workstations can be locked down with technology to permit only cer-
tain users to write to an external device or CD/DVD writer. Due to the 
mobile nature and size of these devices, an encryption method should be 
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chosen by the organization to encrypt either the media using the software 
that comes with the USB drive or the files themselves prior to placing on 
the media. At least 128-bit encryption, and AES-256 encryption is desir-
able. Some encryption products are FIPS 140-2 certified, which provides 
the highest level of encryption and suitable for most organizations.
Policies regarding media disposal need to ensure that appropriate 
tracking and sanitization of the devices is performed prior to disposal, 
along with retention of the disposal records. The organization should 
be able to know where the devices are located from birth to death of 
the device. This is no easy task in larger organizations where devices 
are reimaged frequently and redeployed to other users.
Media protection also extends to paper forms of information and 
policies and procedures to support clean desk policies (i.e., no visible 
confidential information during the day, locked up during business 
off-hours), shredding of documents, and which items are approved for 
dumpster disposal. On-site shredding of paper, tapes, and CDs avoids 
the tracking of information sent off-site and the risks of information 
being intercepted or not being properly shredded.
Physical and Environmental Protection Controls
The physical and environmental protection control family (PE) con-
trols listed in Table 10.7 address the need for physical controls around 
the facility for employees, contractors, and visitors, as well as the envi-
ronmental controls for the computing equipment in the local area net-
works (LAN) rooms and data centers. Just as the logical access controls 
need to be addressed with authorizations for access, periodic recertifi-
cations, terminating access, and restricting access to sensitive areas, the 
physical access controls need these same controls. An organization 
may employ multiple methods of achieving the physical controls, 
from security guards, proximity readers, piggybacking policies, visitor 
sign-in, temporary badge issuance, guard stations, and so forth. One 
of the more difficult areas of managing the physical security for an 
organization is the lack of integration between the physical security 
systems capturing the ingress/egress to the buildings and the identity 
management systems authorizing the approval. Manual reconciliation 
between the systems is necessary to demonstrate that the access was 
removed from the physical system. As companies merge, investments 
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are required to merge the security systems of multiple offices. Small 
offices may also not have the same capabilities as systems purchased for 
the larger offices and may need to be managed separately.
The fire suppression, temperature, and water controls generally are 
focusing upon the data center and LAN room needs. Organizations 
need to decide on how power outages will be addressed (uninterrupt-
able power supply [UPS]), and diesel generators, equipment that must 
also have contracts and periodic servicing and testing. LAN closets 
need to be secured to only staff requiring access to perform their jobs 
along with unused ports disabled.
Personnel Security Controls
The personnel security control family (PS) controls listed in Table 10.8 
seek to place human resource policies and procedures around the 
employees to ensure that the individuals have backgrounds without 
damaging criminal histories, that their access is appropriately removed 
when they are no longer working for the company or have transferred 
to a different division, and finally to ensure that they understand their 
responsibilities with respect to the security controls while they are 
working for the company and after they have left the company.
Background checks must be completed before the employee is per-
mitted to work for the company. To ensure that this happens, the infor-
mation security department could withhold the login ID and password 
until the human resources department has provided evidence that the 
background check has been completed. This would serve as a second-
ary control to ensure the action took place. Individuals also need to be 
rescreened on a periodic basis. The simplest way to achieve this is to per-
form rescreens on those determined to be in sensitive positions (e.g., the 
information technology [IT] department, finance department, adminis-
trators) at the same time. Otherwise, the overhead of tracking individuals 
based upon anniversary dates, without an automated system to admin-
ister this process, could be manually intensive. For any contractors that 
are performing work on behalf of the company, the company may either 
request a background check, or require that the contracting firm provide 
evidence that a background check has been completed and is satisfactory.
Sanction policies must be in place to provide enforcement of the 
controls. The information security department should view itself as 
245operAtIonAl Controls
the provider of the supporting evidence for the infraction; however, 
the incident is best handled between human resources or ethics/
compliance with the individual and his or her manager. The security 
department can provide support for the events that occurred.
Due to the strong linkage between the employees on-boarding, 
compliance with security controls while an associate, and the termina-
tion procedures and the access provisioning of the information security 
department, an equally strong relationship between human resources 
and information security should be maintained. Documenting the infor-
mation flows between the human resource information systems (HRIS) 
and the identity management system can identify gaps in the processes.
System and Information Integrity Controls
System and information integrity controls (SI) listed in Table 10.9 focus 
on providing controls to protect the systems environment and handling 
such issues as malicious code; spam; systems monitoring; flaw remedia-
tion; and ensuring that applications are coded correctly with appropri-
ate input validation, error handling, and consistent failure prevention. 
Antivirus, malware, and spyware products should be installed at the 
entry points, such as servers, desktops, and firewalls, to restrict the 
entry of malicious traffic, in addition to the security awareness pro-
grams on these topics. Processes need to be built to manage the excep-
tions (e.g., when the antivirus is not applied to the desktops within a 
specified frequency, such as 1 to 3 days after distribution to the servers) 
to ensure that all desktops are appropriately being addressed within the 
system. There may be issues with the software pushing the updates or 
the asset inventory that needs to be rectified. End users should be made 
aware of the effects of malicious code as well as having the technical 
infrastructure to support them in the event a wrong decision is made.
Application code must be written such that information that would 
be useful to an intruder is not displayed. Input data needs to be vali-
dated to avoid buffer overruns and other programming errors, which 
could provide elevated command line access. This all works in concert 
with the systems development life cycle process, whereby secure cod-
ing guidelines would be established and certified to, either by attesta-
tion or the completion of a checklist indicating which guidelines were 
incorporated into the development.
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at-1 Security awareness and training 
Policy and Procedures
the organization develops, disseminates, 
and reviews/updates [assignment: 
organization defined frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented security 
awareness and training policy that 
addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
security awareness and training 
policy, and associated security 












the organization provides basic security 
awareness training to all information 
system users (including managers, 
senior executives, and contractors) as 
part of initial training for new users, 














the organization provides role-based 
security-related training: (i) before 
authorizing access to the system or 
performing assigned duties; (ii) when 












at-4 Security training records
the organization:
 a. documents and monitors individual 
information system security 
training activities including basic 
security awareness training and 
specific information system 
security training; and















at-5 contacts with Security Groups and 
associations
the organization establishes and 
institutionalizes contact with selected 
groups and associations within the 
security community:
• to facilitate ongoing security 
education and training for 
organizational personnel;
• to stay up to date with the latest 
recommended security practices, 
techniques, and technologies; and
• to share current security-related 
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cM-1 configuration Management Policy 
and Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented 
configuration management policy 
that addresses purpose, scope, 
roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, 
coordination among organizational 
entities, and compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
configuration management policy 















the organization develops, documents, 
and maintains under configuration 
control, a current baseline 







cM-3 configuration change control
the organization:
 a. determines the types of changes to 
the information system that are 
configuration controlled;
 b. approves configuration-controlled 
changes to the system with explicit 
consideration for security impact 
analyses;
 c. documents approved 
configuration-controlled changes to 
the system;
 d. retains and reviews records of 
configuration-controlled changes to 
the system;
 e. audits activities associated with 
















 f. coordinates and provides oversight 
for configuration change control 
activities through [assignment: 
organization-defined configuration 
change control element (e.g., 
committee, board] that convenes 







cM-4 Security impact analysis
the organization analyzes changes to 
the information system to determine 











cM-5 access restrictions for change
the organization defines, documents, 
approves, and enforces physical and 
logical access restrictions associated 












 a. establishes and documents 
mandatory configuration settings for 
information technology products 
employed within the information 
system using [assignment: 
organization-defined security 
configuration checklists] that reflect 
the most restrictive mode consistent 
with operational requirements;
 b. implements the configuration 
settings;
 c. identifies, documents, and 
approves exceptions from the 
mandatory configuration settings 
for individual components within 
the information system based on 
explicit operational requirements; 
and
Continued
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 d. Monitors and controls changes to 
the configuration settings in 







the organization configures the 
information system to provide only 
essential capabilities and specifically 
prohibits or restricts the use of the 
following functions, ports, protocols, 
and/or services: [assignment: 
organization-defined list of prohibited 






cM-8 information System component 
inventory
the organization develops, documents, 
and maintains an inventory of 
information system components that:
 a. accurately reflects the current 
information system;
 b. is consistent with the authorization 
boundary of the information 
system;
 c. is at the level of granularity 
deemed necessary for tracking and 
reporting;
 d. includes [assignment: 
organization-defined information 
deemed necessary to achieve 
effective property accountability]; 
and






cM-9 configuration Management Plan
the organization develops, documents, 
and implements a configuration 
management plan for the information 
system that:
 a. addresses roles, responsibilities, 

















 b. defines the configuration items for 
the information system and when 
in the system development life 
cycle the configuration items are 
placed under configuration 
management; and
 c. establishes the means for 
identifying configuration items 
throughout the system 
development life cycle and a 
process for managing the 
configuration of the configuration 
items.
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cP-1 contingency Planning Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, disseminates, 
and reviews/updates [assignment: 
organization defined frequency]:
 a  a formal, documented contingency 
planning policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
contingency planning policy and 



















 a. develops a contingency plan for the 
information system that:
• identifies essential missions and 
business functions and 
associated contingency 
requirements;
• Provides recovery objectives, 
restoration priorities, and 
metrics;
• addresses contingency roles, 
responsibilities, assigned 
individuals with contact 
information;
• addresses maintaining essential 
missions and business functions 
despite an information system 
disruption, compromise, or 
failure;
• addresses eventual, full 
information system restoration 
without deterioration of the 
security measures originally 
planned and implemented; and
• is reviewed and approved by 




















 b. distributes copies of the 
contingency plan to [assignment: 
organization-defined list of key 
contingency personnel (identified 
by name and/or by role) and 
organizational elements];
 c. coordinates contingency planning 
activities with incident handling 
activities;
 d. reviews the contingency plan for 
the information system [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency];
 e. revises the contingency plan to 
address changes to the 
organization, information system, 
or environment of operation and 
problems encountered during 
contingency plan implementation, 
execution, or testing; and
 f. communicates contingency plan 
changes to [assignment: 
organization-defined list of key 
contingency personnel (identified 





the organization trains personnel in 
their contingency roles and 
responsibilities with respect to the 
information system and provides 










cP-4 contingency Plan testing and 
exercises
the organization:
 a. tests and/or exercises the 
contingency plan for the 
information system [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency] 
using [assignment: organization-
defined tests and/or exercises] to 
determine the plan’s effectiveness 
and the organization’s readiness to 
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 b. reviews the contingency plan test/




cP-6 alternate Storage Site
the organization establishes an 
alternate storage site including 
necessary agreements to permit the 











cP-7 alternate Processing Site
the organization:
 a. establishes an alternate 
processing site including necessary 
agreements to permit the 
resumption of information system 
operations for essential missions 
and business functions within 
[assignment: organization-defined 
time period consistent with 
recovery time objectives] when the 
primary processing capabilities are 
unavailable; and
 b. ensures that equipment and 
supplies required to resume 
operations are available at the 
alternate site or contracts are in 
place to support delivery to the site 
in time to support the organization-











the organization establishes alternate 
telecommunications services including 
necessary agreements to permit the 
resumption of information system 
operations for essential missions and 
business functions within 
[assignment: organization-defined 
time period] when the primary 















cP-9 information System Backup
the organization:
 a. conducts backups of user-level 
information contained in the 
information system [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency 
consistent with recovery time and 
recovery point objectives];
 b. conducts backups of system-level 
information contained in the 
information system [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency 
consistent with recovery time and 
recovery point objectives];
 c. conducts backups of information 
system documentation including 
security-related documentation 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency consistent with recovery 
time and recovery point objectives]; 
and
 d. Protects the confidentiality and 














cP-10 information System recovery and 
reconstitution
the organization provides for the 
recovery and reconstitution of the 
information system to a known state 
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ir-1 incident response Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented incident 
response policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
incident response policy and 
















ir-2 incident response training
the organization:
 a. trains personnel in their incident 
response roles and responsibilities 
with respect to the information 
system; and









ir-3 incident response testing and 
exercises
the organization tests and/or exercises 
the incident response capability for the 
information system [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency] using 
[assignment: organization-defined 
tests and/or exercises] to determine 
the incident response effectiveness 









 a. implements an incident handling 
capability for security incidents 
that includes preparation, detection 














 b. coordinates incident handling 
activities with contingency 
planning activities; and
 c. incorporates lessons learned from 
ongoing incident handling 
activities into incident response 
procedures, training, and testing/





the organization tracks and documents 












 a. requires personnel to report 
suspected security incidents to the 
organizational incident response 
capability within [assignment: 
organization-defined time-period]; 
and
 b. reports security incident 











ir-7 incident response assistance
the organization provides an incident 
response support resource integral to 
the organizational incident response 
capability that offers advice and 
assistance to users of the information 









ir-8 incident response Plan
the organization:
 a. develops an incident response plan 
that:
• Provides the organization with a 
roadmap for implementing its 
incident response capability;
• describes the structure and 









Maintenance Ma-1 System Maintenance Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented information 
system maintenance policy that 
addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
information system maintenance 











Maintenance Ma-2 controlled Maintenance
the organization:
 a. Schedules, performs, documents, 
and reviews records of 
maintenance and repairs on 
information system components in 
accordance with manufacturer or 
vendor specifications and/or 
organizational requirements;
 b. controls all maintenance activities, 
whether performed on site or 
remotely and whether the 
equipment is serviced on site or 
removed to another location;
 c. requires that a designated official 
explicitly approves the removal of 
the information system or system 
components from organizational 
facilities for off-site maintenance 
or repairs;
 d. Sanitizes equipment to remove all 
information from associated media 
prior to removal from 
organizational facilities for off-site 











 e. checks all potentially impacted 
security controls to verify that the 
controls are still functioning 
properly following maintenance or 
repair actions.
Maintenance Ma-3 Maintenance tools
the organization approves, controls, 
monitors the use of, and maintains on 
an ongoing basis, information system 
maintenance tools.
Supplemental guidance: the intent of 
this control is to address the 
security-related issues arising from 
the hardware and software brought 
into the information system 
specifically for diagnostic and repair 
actions (e.g., a hardware or software 
packet sniffer that is introduced for 
the purpose of a particular 
maintenance activity). Hardware and/
or software components that may 
support information system 
maintenance, yet are a part of the 
system (e.g., the software 
implementing “ping,” “ls,” “ipconfig,” 
or the hardware and software 
implementing the monitoring port of 
an ethernet switch) are not covered by 
this control. related to MP-6.
iSo/iec 27001 
a.9.2.4, a.11.4.4
Maintenance Ma-4 non-Local Maintenance
the organization:
 a. authorizes, monitors, and controls 
non-local maintenance and 
diagnostic activities;
 b. allows the use of non-local 
maintenance and diagnostic tools 
only as consistent with 
organizational policy and 
documented in the security plan for 
the information system;
 c. employs strong identification and 
authentication techniques in the 
establishment of non-local 




260  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed




 d. Maintains records for non-local 
maintenance and diagnostic 
activities; and
 e. terminates all sessions and 
network connections when 
non-local maintenance is 
completed.
Maintenance Ma-5 Maintenance Personnel
the organization:
 a. establishes a process for 
maintenance personnel 
authorization and maintains a 
current list of authorized 
maintenance organizations or 
personnel; and
 b. ensures that personnel performing 
maintenance on the information 
system have required access 
authorizations or designates 
organizational personnel with 
required access authorizations and 
technical competence deemed 
necessary to supervise information 
system maintenance when 
maintenance personnel do not 






Maintenance Ma-6 timely Maintenance
the organization obtains maintenance 
support and/or spare parts for 
[assignment: organization-defined list 
of security-critical information system 
components and/or key information 
technology components] within 











Media protection MP-1 Media Protection Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented media 
protection policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
media protection policy and 















Media protection MP-2 Media access
the organization restricts access to 
[assignment: organization-defined 
types of digital and non-digital media] 
to [assignment: organization-defined 









Media protection MP-3 Media Marking
the organization:
 a. Marks, in accordance with 
organizational policies and 
procedures, removable information 
system media and information 
system output indicating the 
distribution limitations, handling 
caveats, and applicable security 
markings (if any) of the 
information; and
 b. exempts [assignment: 
organization-defined list of 
removable media types] from 
marking as long as the exempted 
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Media protection MP-4 Media Storage
the organization:
 a. Physically controls and securely 
stores [assignment: organization-
defined types of digital and 
non-digital media] within 
[assignment: organization-defined 
controlled areas] using 
[assignment: organization-defined 
security measures];
 b. Protects information system media 
until the media are destroyed or 
sanitized using approved 











Media protection MP-5 Media transport
the organization:
 a. Protects and controls [assignment: 
organization-defined types of 
digital and non-digital media] 
during transport outside of 
controlled areas using 
[assignment: organization-defined 
security measures];
 b. Maintains accountability for 
information system media during 
transport outside of controlled 
areas; and
 c. restricts the activities associated 












Media protection MP-6 Media Sanitization
the organization:
 a. Sanitizes information system 
media, both digital and nondigital, 
prior to disposal, release out of 
organizational control, or release 
for reuse; and
 b. employs sanitization mechanisms 
with strength and integrity 
commensurate with the 


















Pe-1 Physical and environmental 
Protection Policy and Procedures
the organization develops, disseminates, 
and reviews/updates [assignment: 
organization defined frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented physical and 
environmental protection policy 
that addresses purpose, scope, 
roles, responsibilities, 
management commitment, 
coordination among organizational 
entities, and compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
physical and environmental 
protection policy and associated 






















Pe-2 Physical access authorizations
the organization:
 a. develops and keeps current a list 
of personnel with authorized 
access to the facility where the 
information system resides (except 
for those areas within the facility 
officially designated as publicly 
accessible);
 b. issues authorization credentials;
 c. reviews and approves the access 
list and authorization credentials 
[Assignment: organization 
defined frequency], removing 












Pe-3 Physical access control
the organization:
 a. enforces physical access 
authorizations for all physical 
access points (including 
designated entry/exit points) to the 
facility where the information 
system resides (excluding those 
areas within the facility officially 
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 b. verifies individual access 
authorizations before granting 
access to the facility;
 c. controls entry to the facility 
containing the information system 
using physical access devices and/
or guards;
 d. controls access to areas officially 
designated as publicly accessible 
in accordance with the 
organization’s assessment of risk;
 e. Secures keys, combinations, and 
other physical access devices;
 f. inventories physical access devices 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency]; and
 g. changes combinations and keys 
[assignment: organization-defined 
frequency] and when keys are lost, 
combinations are compromised, or 





Pe-4 access control for transmission 
Medium
the organization controls physical 
access to information system 












Pe-5 access control for output devices
the organization controls physical access 
to information system output devices to 












Pe-6 Monitoring Physical access
the organization:
 a. Monitors physical access to the 
information system to detect and 
respond to physical security incidents;














 c. coordinates results of reviews and 
investigations with the 






the organization controls physical 
access to the information system by 
authenticating visitors before 
authorizing access to the facility where 
the information system resides other 













 a. Maintains visitor access records to 
the facility where the information 
system resides (except for those 
areas within the facility officially 
designated as publicly accessible); 
and













Pe-9 Power equipment and Power 
cabling
the organization protects power 
equipment and power cabling for the 











 a. Provides the capability of shutting 
off power to the information system 
or individual system components in 
emergency situations;
 b. Places emergency shutoff switches 
or devices in [assignment: 
organization-defined location by 
information system or system 
component] to facilitate safe and 
easy access for personnel; and
 c. Protects emergency power shutoff 
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the organization provides a short-term 
uninterruptible power supply to 
facilitate an orderly shutdown of the 
information system in the event of a 
primary power source loss.
Supplemental guidance: this control, to 
include any enhancements specified, 
may be satisfied by similar 
requirements fulfilled by another 
organizational entity other than the 
information security program. 









the organization employs and 
maintains automatic emergency 
lighting for the information system 
that activates in the event of a power 
outage or disruption, and that covers 









the organization employs and 
maintains fire suppression and 
detection devices/systems for the 
information system that are supported 







Pe-14 temperature and Humidity 
controls
the organization:
 a. Maintains temperature and 
humidity levels within the facility 
where the information system 
resides at [assignment: 
organization-defined acceptable 
levels]; and














Pe-15 water damage Protection
the organization protects the 
information system from damage 
resulting from water leakage by 
providing master shutoff valves that 
are accessible, working properly, and 







Pe-16 delivery and removal
the organization authorizes, monitors, 
and controls [assignment: 
organization-defined types of 
information system components] 
entering and exiting the facility, and 








Pe-17 alternate work Site
the organization:
 a. employs [assignment: 
organization-defined management, 
operational, and technical 
information system security 
controls] at alternate work sites;
 b. assesses as feasible, the 
effectiveness of security controls at 
alternate work sites; and
 c. Provides a means for employees to 
communicate with information 
security personnel in case of 








Pe-18 Location of information System 
components
the organization positions information 
system components within the facility 
to minimize potential damage from 
physical and environmental hazards 










the organization protects the 
information system from information 
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PS-1 Personnel Security Policy and 
Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented personnel 
security policy that addresses 
purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
personnel security policy and 




















 a. assigns a risk designation to all 
positions;
 b. establishes screening criteria for 
individuals filling those positions; 
and













 a. Screens individuals prior to 
authorizing access to the 
information system; and
 b. rescreens individuals according to 
[assignment: organization-defined 
list of conditions requiring 
rescreening and, where rescreening 















the organization, upon termination of 
individual employment:
 a. terminates information system 
access;
 b. conducts exit interviews;
 c. retrieves all security-related 
organizational information 
system-related property; and
 d. retains access to organizational 
information and information 











the organization reviews logical and 
physical access authorizations to 
information systems/facilities when 
personnel are reassigned or 
transferred to other positions within 
the organization and initiates 
[assignment: organization-defined 
transfer or reassignment actions] 
within [assignment: organization-












 a. ensures that individuals requiring 
access to organizational 
information and information 
systems sign appropriate access 
agreements prior to being granted 
access; and






















270  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed






PS-7 third-Party Personnel Security
the organization:
 a. establishes personnel security 
requirements including security 
roles and responsibilities for 
third-party providers;
 b. documents personnel security 
requirements; and

















the organization employs a formal 
sanctions process for personnel failing 
to comply with established information 













Si-1 System and information integrity 
Policy and Procedures
the organization develops, 
disseminates, and reviews/updates 
[assignment: organization defined 
frequency]:
 a. a formal, documented system and 
information integrity policy that 
addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
responsibilities, management 
commitment, coordination among 
organizational entities, and 
compliance; and
 b. Formal, documented procedures to 
facilitate the implementation of the 
system and information integrity 

















 a. identifies, reports, and corrects 
information system flaws;
 b. tests software updates related to 
flaw remediation for effectiveness 
and potential side effects on 
organizational information systems 
before installation; and
 c. incorporates flaw remediation into 









Si-3 Malicious code Protection
the organization:
 a. employs malicious code protection 
mechanisms at information system 
entry and exit points and at 
workstations, servers, or mobile 
computing devices on the network 
to detect and eradicate malicious 
code:
• transported by electronic mail, 
electronic mail attachments, web 
accesses, removable media, or 
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• inserted through the exploitation 
of information system 
vulnerabilities;
 b. updates malicious code protection 
mechanisms (including signature 
definitions) whenever new releases 
are available in accordance with 
organizational configuration 
management policy and 
procedures;
 c. configures malicious code 
protection mechanisms to:
• Perform periodic scans of the 
information system [assignment: 
organization-defined frequency] 
and real-time scans of files from 
external sources as the files are 
downloaded, opened, or executed 
in accordance with organizational 
security policy; and
• [Selection (one or more): block 
malicious code; quarantine 
malicious code; send alert to 
administrator; [assignment: 
organization-defined action]] in 
response to malicious code 
detection; and
 d. addresses the receipt of false 
positives during malicious code 
detection and eradication and the 
resulting potential impact on the 





Si-4 information System Monitoring
the organization:
 a. Monitors events on the information 
system in accordance with 
[assignment: organization defined 
monitoring objectives] and detects 
information system attacks;
















 c. deploys monitoring devices: (i) 
strategically within the information 
system to collect organization-
determined essential information; 
and (ii) at ad hoc locations within 
the system to track specific types 
of transactions of interest to the 
organization;
 d. Heightens the level of information 
system monitoring activity 
whenever there is an indication of 
increased risk to organizational 
operations and assets, individuals, 
other organizations, or the nation 
based on law enforcement 
information, intelligence 
information, or other credible 
sources of information; and
 e. obtains legal opinion with regard 
to information system monitoring 
activities in accordance with 
applicable federal laws, executive 





Si-5 Security alerts, advisories, and 
directives
the organization:
 a. receives information system 
security alerts, advisories, and 
directives from designated external 
organizations on an ongoing basis;
 b. Generates internal security alerts, 
advisories, and directives as 
deemed necessary;
 c. disseminates security alerts, 
advisories, and directives to 
[assignment: organization-defined 
list of personnel (identified by 
name and/or by role)]; and
 d. implements security directives in 
accordance with established time 
frames, or notifies the issuing 
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Si-6 Security Functionality verification
the information system verifies the 
correct operation of security functions 
[Selection (one or more): [assignment: 
organization-defined system 
transitional states]; upon command by 
user with appropriate privilege; 
periodically every [assignment: 
organization-defined time-period]] 
and [Selection (one or more): notifies 
system administrator; shuts the 
system down; restarts the system; 
[assignment: organization-defined 







Si-7 Software and information integrity
the information system detects 
















 a. employs spam protection 
mechanisms at information system 
entry and exit points and at 
workstations, servers, or mobile 
computing devices on the network 
to detect and take action on 
unsolicited messages transported 
by electronic mail, electronic mail 
attachments, web accesses, or 
other common means; and
 b. updates spam protection 
mechanisms (including signature 
definitions) when new releases are 
available in accordance with 
organizational configuration 















Si-9 information input restrictions
the organization restricts the capability 
to input information to the information 








Si-10 information input validation
the information system checks the 
validity of information inputs.
iSo/iec 27001 
a.12.2.1, a.12.2.2







 a. identifies potentially security-
relevant error conditions;
 b. Generates error messages that 
provide information necessary for 
corrective actions without revealing 
[assignment: organization-defined 
sensitive or potentially harmful 
information] in error logs and 
administrative messages that could 
be exploited by adversaries; and








Si-12 information output Handling and 
retention
the organization handles and retains 
both information within and output 
from the information system in 
accordance with applicable federal 
laws, executive orders, directives, 











Si-13 Predictable Failure Prevention
the organization:
 a. Protects the information system 
from harm by considering mean 
time to failure for [assignment: 
organization-defined list of 
information system components] in 
specific environments of operation; 
and
 b. Provides substitute information 
system components, when needed, 
and a mechanism to exchange 
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the auDitorS have 
arriveD, now what?
Truth exists, only falsehood has to be invented.
Georges Braque, 1882–1963
Auditors perform an essential role in protecting the information assets 
of the organization, which should be embraced versus feared. Many 
times when an audit is scheduled, whether internally or externally initi-
ated, the response is one of fear of what the auditors will find as gaps in 
the information security program. Analogous to how many people feel 
when they are scheduled for their annual performance review, anxiety is 
almost certain to be a normal response. Why is it that way? The answer 
is simple: No one likes to criticized for what they have put their best 
efforts into, and just like the potentially stressful performance reviews, 
audits have the potential to be taken very personally and viewed as a 
negative experience. A recent comment by an information security col-
league summed this up very well, in reference to the auditors judging 
his work by saying, “Whose baby are you calling ugly?”
The truth is that audits typically do cause anxiety and cause peo-
ple’s stress levels and outward emotions to reflect the pressure of being 
“ judged.” The truth is also that these can be extremely valuable learn-
ing experiences by which those leading information security programs 
can learn greatly from the auditors. Auditors are typically very detail 
oriented and as a result may see items that may be overlooked by big-
picture people. Auditors also typically follow a methodical, systematic 
approach to analyzing what that organization asserts are the controls 
that are in place. The systematic approach allows them to uncover 
what may be assumed is actually occurring by the company. For 
example, a manager may assume a policy in place that requires that all 
access be terminated for an exiting employee within 72 hours is being 
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followed. When the auditor reviews the policy, he or she may find that 
there was no documented standard operating procedure, thus raising 
doubts that a consistent procedure was actually being followed. The 
auditor may also find that while logical access was promptly removed, 
there was no equivalent procedure within physical security, creating a 
gap. Many times the auditor will request a full population of employ-
ees and request a random sample based upon the frequency of the 
process, say 25 or 45 for a daily process, and test to determine if the 
requirement was consistently met.
How often do the operational departments within an organiza-
tion perform an independent test of the product or service they are 
creating? Companies are doing their utmost best to just get the prod-
uct of service out the door. This creates a situation where compliance 
with the company policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines is 
assumed and not regularly tested. In this respect, we should be wel-
coming the auditors with open arms.
A byproduct of performing audits on a regular basis is that manag-
ers are more apt to pay attention to ensure that the standard operat-
ing procedures are actually accurate and reviewed on a periodic basis 
(minimally on an annual basis). Knowing that they will be judged 
on the basis of what process is written versus the current process, if 
different, even if the current process is better, will encourage manag-
ers to take the documentation more seriously. Documentation should 
be regarded as management directives to ensure that the appropriate 
activities are being performed at the right time.
Through experience gained through dozens of audits involving the 
Big Four accounting firms, audit firms occupying the middle-market 
tier, and boutique technical auditing firms, it is safe to say that no two 
audits are conducted the same or necessarily have the same goals in 
mind. However, there are some basic commonalities as to the flow of an 
audit and how the information security department should interact with 
the auditors. The next few sections walk through the anatomy of an IT 
audit and how the security professional should best prepare for the audit.
Anatomy of an Audit
From a security officer’s point of view, the audit can be separated into 
five phases: (1) audit planning, (2) on-site arrival, (3) audit execution, 
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(4) entrance/status/exit conferences, and (5) report issuance and find-
ing remediation. It is useful to look at the audit as a project, with a 
discrete set of steps, a beginning, and an end. Viewing the audit as 
an activity in this manner permits the prioritizing, scheduling, and 
resourcing of the audit similar to other projects within the company. 
The success of an audit depends upon having knowledgeable individu-
als available to answer the questions for which they are most qualified 
at the appropriate time.
External audits involve an up-front period of negotiations for the 
scope and pricing of the audit. This process is normally administered 
through the company’s internal audit department in response to a con-
tractual requirement for awarded business (e.g., government contract 
with Federal Information Security Management Act [FISMA] provi-
sions or Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [HIPAA] 
compliance requirements). Since the internal audit department may 
have many internal and external audits scheduled during a given year, 
the audit may not occur at the best time for the information technology 
(IT) department to have the resources available. Partnership with inter-
nal audit, information security, information technology, and compli-
ance areas can help mitigate the scheduling disruptions that can occur. 
Once the external audit dates are set, there is typically limited flexibility 
to move the schedule, as the external audit firms also must balance their 
resources with the needs of other clients. Teams are typically only put 
together a few weeks in advance at the most for the audit firm, but once 
they are, they tend to be locked in.
The phases shown in Figure  11.1 assume that the contract and 
schedule are now in place, and information security and the other 
departments need to prepare for the audit.
Audit Planning Phase
The audit planning phase ensures that the auditors have most, if not 
all, of the requested information delivered to them when they arrive for 
the audit. With sufficient resources dedicated to the up-front planning 
phase, the audit runs more smoothly as more time can be dedicated 
toward accurately answering the auditor’s questions and responding 
to follow-up requests versus scrambling for documentation or having 
less-than-optimal facilities for the auditors to conduct the audit.
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Preparation of Document Request List
The first step is to establish an audit coordinator for the information 
security/IT portion of the audit. This individual is usually some-
one within the IT organization that understands the interoperabil-
ity of the technical infrastructure, operations, and management of 
IT. Internal audit departments traditionally have focused upon the 
financial and operational audit areas and may or may not have the IT 
auditing skills. Even if they do have individuals with these skills, their 
role is to audit the organization. The role of the audit coordinator is 
to respond to the requests of the auditors, which may be internal or 
external. To mitigate any conflict of interest questions (auditors pre-
paring responses to their own managed audits), an audit coordinator 
position is established. The function of this individual is to coordinate 
all audit requests, ensure timely receipt and delivery of the artifacts, 
schedule meetings, communicate issues, and generally ensure that a 
smooth process is followed.
Anywhere from 3 to 5 weeks ahead of the audit, the auditors will 
prepare and deliver a request for documentation. The request goes by 
such names as prepared by client (PBC) listing, client assistance list 











Figure 11.1 Security audit phases and activities.
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the intent of the request is the same: a document typically in the 
form of a Word document or spreadsheet that contains the auditors’ 
request for documentation that they would like to have available when 
they start the audit. It is in everyone’s best interest to comply with 
the request and have 100% of the items requested available when the 
auditors start the audit. This permits the auditors to start right away 
reviewing and understanding the materials provided. By supplying all 
of the information at the beginning, it can also reduce the stress level 
by avoiding hurry-up requests that must be immediately supplied to 
the auditors. There will also be additional requests by the auditors that 
will consume valuable time during the audit, so it makes sense to solicit 
the materials in advance and give the departments as much of the 3 to 
5 weeks time as necessary to collect the artifacts. Failure to adequately 
allow ample preparation time causes the organization to respond on 
the fly and not necessarily provide the best responses due to the short 
time frame allowed during the audit to provide the responses.
If any of the audit requests are not clear, the audit coordinator may 
need to schedule a meeting to discuss the deliverables requested. The 
scope may not be clearly understood by the auditors or the client. As 
new auditors are brought into an engagement, they must quickly come 
up to speed with the organization, processes, and the business opera-
tions. Since the request list is typically based upon a generic template, 
assumptions may be made about the processing that is performed 
by the company being audited. For example, it may be assumed that 
the company is following a system development life cycle (SDLC) 
process to develop software, when in fact the organization may have 
outsourced the development and maintenance activities to a system 
integrator and is running these processes at the data center. If the 
audit of the data center is also in scope, the SDLC processes can be 
obtained through a separate audit of the data center.
The requests are usually organized into sections deemed as impor-
tant by the auditor and may or may not be numbered. The number of 
items requested varies, but typically 50 to 200 requests for different 
security elements are normal. There is little consistency between audit 
firms as to what is requested, as each audit firm has constructed its 
audit program based upon what it considers to be important, modi-
fied by the focus desired by the organization or branch of government 
requesting the audit. The number of auditors and scope may dictate 
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how much testing is performed within the audit. An audit that has 
2 to 3 auditors on site for 1 to 3 weeks will involve substantially less 
testing than a 4-week audit with 10 auditors on site.
An example of an audit request for documentation can be seen in 
Figure 11.2. A description of the contents of the request, an associ-
ated control ID, dates requested and dates received, and a field for 
comments are typical. One item that is not stated is how this docu-
ment will be used within the audit! The auditors do not necessarily tie 
the request to the control item being tested, nor do they necessarily 
want to make this clear. After all, this is an audit to test the opera-
tions, and if they are testing to determine if the controls are adequate 
to protect the information assets, then it should be irrelevant if the 
company knows what control is being tested when the documentation 
request is made—the organization should have the document in ques-
tion. On the other hand, it helps to know the context of the request in 
order to supply the correct documentation.
Once the request list is received, the items should be assigned an 
internal control number for tracking. This helps tremendously during 
the audit to track and determine what has and what has not been pro-
vided. The next step is to determine which (1) director, (2) manager, 
and (3) subject matter expert, or primary point of contact is in the 
best position, knowledge-wise, to respond to the request. The docu-
mentation request list can be modified to place these accountable and 
responsible positions in columns for each request so that it is clear 
who will own this deliverable. Although it may seem obvious, it is 
vitally important to establish who the correct owners are up front or 
time ends up being wasted when a manager indicates the day before 
the deliverable is due that they are not the correct owner. This action 
is unfair to the manager who now needs to scramble to complete the 
request and does not promote the generation of a quality product.
The updated spreadsheet with the internal tracking numbers, 
accountable management, and subject matter experts is then distrib-
uted to the organization by the audit coordinator, typically within 
1 week after receiving the initial request list. Managers should be 
given a couple of days to receive the listing and confirm that the items 
are theirs, and if not, recommend who should own the requested item. 
At this point they are not fulfilling the request but rather merely indi-
cating whether it is theirs to supply. It is best to place the responsibility 
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with the assigned manager to reach agreement with the department 
manager that should own the request and inform the audit coordina-
tor. This avoids multiple conversations between the audit coordinator 
and each party that can potentially increase the time to gain agree-
ment due to unavailability of all parties to the conversation.
Now that the documentation requests each have an owner associ-
ated with them, each owner can now begin the process of collecting 
the artifacts for submission. The audit coordinator should create an 
audit artifact repository of some sort to capture and organize the arti-
facts. This may be a simple directory structure, containing one folder 
for each item on the request list (the folder will most likely contain 
multiple documents to satisfy the request) or may be a more elabo-
rate homegrown database or vendor-created database. Either of these 
methods are preferred to subject matter experts sending the requests 
via e-mail, as the file sizes can typically exceed internal 5 to 10 mega-
byte limitations of the e-mail service or the storage of the audit par-
ticipants. Additionally, when others need to look up the audit artifacts 
that have been supplied, without a central network storage area, they 
may have been the recipient of the initial e-mail and will have to 
request the information be forwarded again. This in turn, increases 
the company’s storage requirements and is very inefficient.
Gather Audit Artifacts
Once each manager has accumulated all of the artifacts assigned to him 
or her for the audit, the manager needs to confirm with the audit coordi-
nator that the collection is complete. At this point, the audit coordinator 
can review the contents and determine whether all of the information 
has been provided. This quality assurance process increases the likeli-
hood that the information will not have to be re-requested. The auditor 
coordinator looks for such discrepancies as:
• Accuracy spot check—Check to determine if information 
supplied matches the information requested.
• Empty folders—Contents may have been placed in a different 
audit directory, accidently deleted, moved to another folder, 
or misplaced. It all happens.
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• An insufficient artifact—The audit coordinator has typically 
seen a similar request across audits over time and is usually in 
the best position to determine whether this artifact is complete.
• Time period not valid—If the audit is from October 1, 2012, 
to March 31, 2013, and a standard operating procedure 
updated April 8, 2013, is supplied, the new procedure would 
not have been effective during the period.
• Sizes too large—If the file sizes are too large, say >10 MB, 
then it may be difficult if the files need to be subsequently 
e-mailed to the auditor. It is best to break these directories 
into subdirectories prior to the audit.
• Outdated policies/procedures—A quick review of the last 
update date would indicate whether this might be an old artifact.
Whereas the management and subject matter experts are respon-
sible to ensure that the audit artifacts are accurate and comply with 
the information request, the spot checking by the audit coordinator is 
a value-added step that can find problems with the information prior 
to presentation to the auditors. Figure 11.3 shows a data model repre-
sentation of the audit artifacts.
Provide Information to Auditors
Once all of the information has been collected by the audit coordina-
tor for all of the items requested on the document request list, the audit 
coordinator can burn an initial CD, DVD, or USB drive containing 
all of the information. Since much of the information will be highly 
confidential (network diagrams, access control lists, employee listings, 
background checks, logs, etc.), the information must be encrypted. 
Encryption programs have substantially fallen in price in the past 
few years, so there is little justifiable reason to not protect this infor-
mation. Programs such as WinZip, SecureZip, PKZip, or programs 
based upon the zip format are used by most audit firms and can be 
opened by their auditors. This should be verified with the auditors 
prior to starting the engagement, as not all encryption programs are 
compatible. For example, Winzip or SecureZip cannot open a file 
encrypted using Pointsec software because it used as a proprietary 
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nonzip internal format. However, a file encrypted by Winzip (version 
9.0 or greater) or SecureZip can be opened by either program since 
the internal format used in both products is based on the zip format. 
Providing multiple copies to the auditors is typically appreciated to 
enable them to ramp up quickly while on site without having to spend 
time copying sizable files across a network or wait for others to com-
plete copying the files to their disks. Although most auditors in the 
profession utilize encrypted hard disks on their PCs to store the client 
files, it is advisable to confirm this with the auditors before providing 
them with the information.
Business Owner
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Figure 11.3 audit artifact data model.
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On-Site Arrival Phase
Auditors may schedule a pre-on-site meeting ahead of the audit to 
ensure that the appropriate logistics have been taken care of. A listing 
of the items typically requested by the auditors in advance is shown in 
Figure 11.4. The next sections discuss considerations for some of the 
key items requested by the auditors that are needed during the on-site 
arrival. In reality, these items are planned for in the audit planning 
phase, and utilized within the on-site arrival phase.
Internet Access
Even though the auditors are engaged at the client site, they still have 
responsibilities to the home office and need to communicate with 
other senior-level auditors and partners. They may need to share files, 
access e-mail, conduct conference calls, access home office software, 
and so forth. One method of providing this access is to provide inter-
nal network access and subsequent access to the Internet. This involves 
setting up the auditors similar to how contractors may be connected 
to the system—with a user account on the network and access to the 
Internet. The problem with this configuration is that the auditors are 
now resident on the network and may have access to more network 
files than desired. Auditors should be treated with the same security 





















Figure 11.4 Preaudit visit logistical items.
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need-to-know and least-privilege principles that are applied to other 
users of the organization’s information assets.
An alternative solution that serves to provide the access the audi-
tors need while simultaneously limiting the exposure of internal 
information outside the scope of the audit is to provide network access 
via a wireless broadband router. This relatively inexpensive solution 
provides the auditors with the access required and keeps the auditors 
from having to be set up on the organization’s computer network. Not 
only does this save time in set up, but it provides a fast solution to 
deploy to the auditors. In other words, the day they arrive on site, the 
wireless broadband router can be plugged in and they are ready to 
begin work. The router also permits sharing of the broadband con-
nection between the auditors. It is advisable to have one broadband 
router per every four auditors to ensure adequate bandwidth when 
downloading and uploading large files.
Once the availability of this device is known within the company, it 
is not unusual for the IT department to have more requests than there 
are routers. Given the inexpensive nature of an inexpensive piece of 
hardware (under $200 as of this writing) and the aircard monthly fees 
(generally $60/month or less depending upon pricing discounts and 
usage), it makes sense to ensure that there are extra routers that can be 
shipped to alternate audit locations to support the audit. The hid-
den costs of requesting accounts, setting up audit access, terminating 
accounts, requesting auditor names, and so forth are greater than the 
one time cost of the routers and monthly charges.
Reserve Conference Rooms
Depending upon the size and duration of the audit, a small or large 
conference room may be needed. Failure to provide a room with 
enough space for both the auditors and the auditees can create an envi-
ronment that increases the stress levels of both parties. The proper size 
conference room for the interviews may not be known until the inter-
view schedule has been created. Most organizations do not have extra 
conference rooms so these should be scheduled at the start of the audit.
The auditors may request that a room also be reserved for their 
private conversations that are separate from the room reserved for the 
289the AudItors hAve ArrIved, now whAt?
interviews and the other auditors. This permits sidebar discussions 
without disturbing the rest of the team. However, it is not unusual to 
see auditors with headphones on in large conference rooms to block 
out the distractions of the other auditors.
If possible, locate a conference room that is away from the individu-
als performing a bulk of the work that is being audited. This avoids 
embarrassing situations where someone may make a comment related 
to an aspect that is currently being audited and being overheard by 
the auditor. Although the comment may be accurate, it may be taken 
out of context by the auditor or substantiate an issue that the auditor 
was investigating. Staff should also be courteous to the auditors and 
respect the noise levels and conversations outside the conference room.
Temperature control is always a consideration. Although it may be 
tempting to smoke out or freeze up the auditors, this strategy is ill 
advised. While this may be obvious, keep in mind that there will be 
more individuals in the room at one time with the auditors and audi-
tees and body heat will tend to raise the temperature.
Physical Access
The degree of physical access needs to be defined in advance: What 
building? What times? Must the access be escorted? How long can 
they keep their badges? Some auditors will be using their own experi-
ences with the badging process to evaluate the physical visitor, con-
sultant, employee and contractor security controls. If the visitor log 
policy indicates that an individual is supposed to obtain a badge and 
sign out at the end of each day and this function is not required of 
the auditors, then this may result in an audit finding based upon the 
lack of control enforcement. Or, if the policy is that the auditor must 
be escorted and the auditor finds that during the course of the audit 
he was free to roam the building, this could also result in a finding.
Special auditor badges with predefined access and required to con-
form to a separate auditor visitor policy is recommended. Auditors 
generally work until the early evening hours or start early, so a 7 a.m. 
to 7 p.m. access policy would satisfy most auditor needs. As far as 
escorting, auditors are being entrusted with vast amounts of confiden-
tial information to perform an audit, so the risk of damage by allowing 
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the auditors in the building without an escort is low. Auditors could 
be granted access badges that permit entry the week during their 
audit and be required to return the badges at the end of the fieldwork. 
Agreements with the auditors should be made that they will confine 
their activities to the conference rooms, restrooms, and break rooms 
without needing an escort, but if they need to visit other operational 
areas that they must have an escort. The escort would preferably be 
the audit coordinator or his or her designate.
Conference Phones
Ever been on a phone conference and someone is shuffling papers, 
having a conversation on a cell phone, or hear dogs barking in the 
background? We all have, and it does not help the subject matter 
being discussed. A good quality conference phone, such as a Polycom, 
should be placed in each conference room where interviews will be 
held. Since interviews generally involve geographically dispersed 
individuals or will involve someone calling in while traveling, there 
will need to be a phone for the conference. The speakerphones on 
office phones are not designed to handle a room of people between 
4 and 8 feet away from the phone. A better setup is to have a confer-
ence phone with two microphones attached by 3- to 4-foot cords. The 
acoustics of the room should also be tested to ensure that outside, 
heating or air conditioning, or fan noise is not interfering with the 
sound quality level.
Schedule Entrance, Exit, Status Meetings
Entrance, exit, and status meetings should be scheduled at least a 
week in advance of the start of the audit, preferably 2 weeks or more, 
so that the appropriate management and technical staff can make 
themselves available to attend. Consideration should be given to those 
individuals who reside in different time zones, with the avoidance of a 
pre-8 a.m. meeting in any time zone if possible. Individuals should be 
at their best for the audit calls and for most staff this would be during 
their normal workday hours.
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Set Up Interviews
As with the entrance, exit, and status meetings, as many interviews 
as possible should be scheduled prior to the start of the audit. The 
document request list provides the procedures, reports, samples, and 
other evidence, but does not have the element of human interaction 
and explanation of what is written in the documents. The interview 
provides the auditor with the opportunity to ask clarifying questions 
of the information provided. This also represents an opportunity to 
provide an overall big picture description of a control or management 
area. For example, the information security manager could provide 
an overview of access management or security administration and 
how user IDs and logins are obtained; the business continuity/ disaster 
recovery manager could explain all of the activities involved in ensur-
ing continuity of operations; or the human resources manager could 
explain how a new hire is on boarded into the organization with ref-
erence checks, background checks, confidentiality statements, and 
PeopleSoft human resource/payroll transactions. Potential overview 
areas to be scheduled are listed in Figure 11.5.
Interviews should be scheduled for 1 to 1.5 hours each with at least 
30 minutes in between each interview to permit the auditors a chance 
to digest what they have heard and subsequently review their notes. 
They will also need time to prepare for the next interview. Generally, 
ManaGeriaL tecHnicaL oPerationaL
• overview of security 




• Systems security 
plans
• audit monitoring and 
issue tracking
• annual assessments
• Security planning and 
program management
• Logical access
• SdLc and change 
management
• network monitoring
• intrusion detection and 
incident response
• walkthroughs of logging, 
Security information and 
event Management 
(SieM), and vulnerability 
management tools
• access recertification
• Human resources procedures
• Physical access
• disaster recovery/business 
continuity planning
• Business process 
walkthroughs
• data center walkthrough
• Security awareness
• Baseline configuration 
reviews
• asset management (software 
and hardware)
Figure 11.5 Potential security audit interview areas.
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the interviews should be scheduled during the first week of a multi-
week audit so that the appropriate understanding of the environment 
controls and processes are understood by the audit early on in the 
process. This can avoid sample pulls of the wrong information or 
invalid assumptions when evaluating the documents provided, lead-
ing to rework for both parties. Given these constraints, it is generally 
advisable to spread the interviews out during the first week, with no 
more than two scheduled for a morning or an afternoon. Afternoon 
or morning status meetings will also be scheduled during these days 
as well. Given that the first day is a travel day, many auditors will 
request that no more than one interview be scheduled the afternoon 
of the first day in addition to the entrance meeting. The status meet-
ing is typically not scheduled on the first day, as there is nothing to 
report. The auditors also prefer this time to begin reviewing the docu-
ment request list items.
Finally, it is also useful to create a spreadsheet to map the indi-
viduals to the date and time of the interview to ensure that there are 
no availability issues. It should also be noted whether that person is 
required to be physically present for the interview. There is usually 
more interaction with a face-to-face interview and more rapport is 
established with the auditor. At a minimum the primary point of con-
tact should be present in the interview, with the secondary individuals 
available by phone. The audit coordinator should also be present in the 
interviews to monitor how the audit is performing as well as to initiate 
the conference calls, record the attendees, and continuously look for 
ways to improve the audit process.
Audit Execution Phase
The audit execution phase begins after the on-site arrival phase and 
continues until the end of the audit. Although the on-site arrival 
phase may last 1 to 4 weeks, the audit execution phase may extend 
several weeks or months past the on-site portion depending upon the 
scope of the audit. The extended time is necessary for off-site quality 
reviews by the audit firm. Even if the testing is completed during the 
on-site period, it may be several months before the draft, final draft, 
or final report is issued.
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Additional Audit Meetings
With appropriate planning in scheduling the meetings, the meet-
ings should flow from the entrance to the exit conference according 
to the schedule. Additional meetings will have to be scheduled as 
the auditor reviews the documents requested and performs tests of the 
audit plan. The security manager is best served by letting the auditor 
request these additional meetings, as they are only necessary if the 
auditor is having difficulty interpreting the information provided. In 
other words, volunteering to set up meetings to walk through every 
document requested when the auditor has not specifically requested 
the meeting only takes away from valuable audit time the auditor has 
to complete the audit. The auditor may have reviewed the information 
provided and decided that the evidence was sufficient and therefore 
needed no further explanation.
Establish Auditor Communication Protocol
Messages on the Internet get from person A to person B through a 
standard communications protocol. Teenage text messages are sent 
by understanding an agreed upon set of communications, some that 
make us LOL. To be really effective in working with the auditors 
to ensure that they have the right information, at the right place, at 
the right time, we need to establish an effective way of communi-
cating. Failure to do so ends up with the auditor saying things like 
“I requested that information 5 days ago and haven’t seen it,” pos-
sibly evoking the response, “But we sent it to your team three times 
already.” Who is right? At this point, it does not really matter, what 
matters is that the process of communication failed. At the end of the 
day, if the auditor does not receive the information requested during 
the audit time period, he cannot validate that the documented control 
is in place and working.
To increase the likelihood that the aforementioned scenario does 
not occur, the following activities should be agreed upon with the 
auditor no later than the first day of the audit. A good time to discuss 
this protocol is after the entrance meeting, between the audit coordi-
nator and the lead auditor and the audit team.
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• Track every information request from the auditor during the 
audit in a spreadsheet separate from the auditor document 
request list.
• Assign a unique number to each information request to 
enable tracking.
• Ensure during the audit that it is clear which information 
request referred to is being analyzed by referring to the track-
ing number.
• Implement a scheme (e.g., a, b, c, 01, 02, 03) to track follow-
up requests for information already provided. This helps to 
keep the information organized together.
• Require the auditors to put all requests in writing and assign a 
number to ensure that it is clear what the auditor is requesting.
• Determine the number of times a day the auditor would like 
to receive outstanding requests. Limiting to once or twice a 
day unless there are many requests increases both auditor and 
auditee efficiency.
• Require that all incoming and outgoing requests go through 
the audit coordinator so that they can be tracked.
The net effect of these items is that all information is tracked and the 
status is immediately known. When the status meetings are held and 
the auditor and the audit coordinator have tracked the requests, they 
can be compared to see where the gaps are and reconciled. Accurate 
tracking by a central person avoids the he-said-she-said discussion, as 
well as creating the impression that the company is working diligently 
to ensure that the auditor has the information on a timely basis. From 
an economic perspective, it is just better business to have to request 
and furnish the information one time.
Establish Internal Company Protocol
Just as it is important to have a protocol established with the auditors, it 
is equally important that the following protocol is followed internally:
• All audit requests for additional information are sent only 
from the audit coordinator.
• All responses to requests for additional information are sent 
to the auditor from the audit coordinator.
295the AudItors hAve ArrIved, now whAt?
• E-mail subject lines contain the year, audit name, tracking num-
ber, brief description of item to permit searching for requests.
• Information is placed in a directory related to the tracking 
number and a reply to the request from the audit coordinator 
from the person providing the information indicates that the 
information is complete and ready to be provided to the auditor.
• A protocol is established for moving the request from “com-
pleted status” to “sent to the auditor” by the audit coordinator.
• Audit requests are expected to be fulfilled within 24 hours 
(exceptions may be acceptable for items that must be retrieved 
from off site or other contractors/outsourced operations).
Figure 11.6 shows the flow of information from the initial request 
through fulfillment. By tracking each request in a spreadsheet and 
subsequently maintaining a tracking number throughout the process, 
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Figure 11.6 information request flow.
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information is less likely to be lost. As shown in the diagram, when 
the audit coordinator assigns the request, it is logged in a spreadsheet 
with a tracking number. The same number, in this case AC33, is used 
as the folder name under the directory REQ\041313 where 041313 is 
date the item was requested (April 13, 2013). Once the audit coordi-
nator receives the e-mail response from the point of contact assigned 
to fulfill the request in the folder that the information is complete, he 
proceeds to move the folder to the SENT\[today’s date] folder. He 
then provides this information to the auditor along with other items 
that are complete.
Using this method of SENT and REQ folders (1) provides a mech-
anism (a place) for the point of contact to place the items requested, 
and (2) provides knowledge that the information was subsequently 
provided to the auditor. The folder structure also serves as an addi-
tional validation of the tracking spreadsheet (e.g., no contents in the 
REQ folder indicate the request was completed).
Media Handling
The documents provided for the auditors’ review during the course 
of an audit contain confidential information that could cause harm if 
disclosed outside the organization or beyond the audit firm. For this 
reason, all information provided to the auditors should be encrypted, 
preferably with a product that is FIPS 140-2 compliant. This greatly 
reduces the risk that this information will be disclosed during the useful 
life. Documents such as security plans, baseline configurations, script 
output, and firewall rules contain highly confidential information.
Media may be passed to the auditors on site by burning the infor-
mation onto a CD or USB drive. In either case, it is not necessary 
to encrypt each file individually, but rather each submission to the 
auditor could be encrypted by encrypting the high level folder and all 
subdirectories. For example, the contents were copied to the \Security 
Audits\2013\SENT\041910a folder, where a equals the first submis-
sion of the day to the auditors, then this folder could be encrypted and 
the contents copied to a CD or USB drive.
Establishing a common password for the entire project makes the 
encryption process much easier and also increases the probability 
that after the audit files will be readable because one-time passwords 
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may not be well documented. The password should be communi-
cated to the team in a separate e-mail. The password should also be 
constructed as a strong password due to the nature of the audit arti-
facts that are being collected. A password comprised of at least eight 
characters (preferably ten), at least one uppercase, one lowercase, one 
numeric, and one special character should be sufficient. A password 
constructed in this way also tends to void the use of pet names, dic-
tionary names, birthdays, and so forth.
It is not advisable to send the audit artifacts by e-mail, as the aver-
age user has a plethora of e-mails on a daily basis and tracking who 
sent what when and to whom becomes a challenge. As previously 
mentioned, the better approach is to use the e-mail system for the 
audit coordinator to distribute the requests to the points of contact, 
requesting that the audit artifacts be placed in the appropriate REQ\
Date\ItemTrackingNo on the server for subsequent handling. These 
can be placed on the server in an unencrypted format, as the audit 
coordinator will encrypt the entire contents of the SENT\Date+suffix 
folder when the items are sent. It is also not uncommon for the size 
of many of these files or file collections to exceed the 10 MB range, 
which is typically a constraint imposed on the e-mails today.
It is to the company’s advantage to provide as much information to 
the auditors while on site due to these files easily fitting on 16, 32, or 
64 GB USB drives. Once the auditor has left the site, the files may 
have to be broken into 10 MB file sizes or less, the files encrypted, 
and multiple e-mails sent to the off-site auditors. This situation can be 
avoided by adequate preparation and confirmation that the auditors 
have received all of the required documents during the status meet-
ings and the site exit meeting. The file size may be so large (>100 MB) 
that it only makes sense to burn this information to a CD or copy to 
a USB and send it via overnight mail. This is not desirable, as there 
are still delays for the auditor in receiving the information, plus this 
adds unnecessary expense in having to provide rework. Some audit 
firms have secure FTP servers, and to avoid the necessity of validating 
the security of that environment, the audit coordinator could view the 
FTP transmission as that of being over an open network (even if it is 
encrypted), and subsequently still encrypt the file folder containing the 
audit evidence before FTPing the file. In this manner, the information 
is sure to meet the security requirements of the audited organization.
298  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
Audit Coordinator Quality Review
The point of contacts or subject matter experts that are supply-
ing the information are in the best position to ascertain whether 
they are meeting the audit request, as they are the ones that are 
closest to the business process. The audit coordinator still needs to 
briefly review the information provided to the auditors as a sec-
ond look to catch errors such as those similar to those previously 
noted in reviewing the initial document request list. Given that it 
may take an overnight process to extract requested information, and 
the auditors may not review the information provided immediately, 
it behooves the organization to provide the information requested 
correctly the first time. The QA process works to ensure complete-
ness of the response.
The Interview Itself
Auditees are expected to answer questions truthfully and failure 
to do so may constitute obstruction of a federal audit with U.S.- 
government- initiated audits, or constitute a company or industry 
ethics violation. Audits are intended to improve the organization’s 
control environment, and lying or misrepresenting the facts would 
serve little purpose and not lead to making needed improvements in 
processes that would be identified by the audits.
With truthfulness as the foundation for the audit, the auditee 
respondent should only answer the questions that are asked. Providing 
details outside of the request not only wastes the auditors time with 
fluff that may be irrelevant to the testing the auditor is performing, 
but it may also expose other areas of vulnerability that are beyond 
the scope of the audit. Some auditors are known for going on fishing 
expeditions, whereby they may ask, “I have just one more question,” 
a line made famous by the TV show Columbo, which originally aired 
in the 1970s. This line of questioning is primarily intended to reveal 
a flaw within the system by poking around. So why would we not 
want to know all the areas where we have issues? The answer is not so 
much that we do not want to know, but rather we want to be on a fair 
playing field with our competitors. Say, for example, that our firm 
is being audited for Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
(PCIDSS) compliance by a qualified auditor or our contractual 
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requirements mandates that a Statement on Auditing Standards, 
No. 70 (SAS 70, PCAOB, n.d.) be performed to get the business, we 
would want to be evaluated based upon an audit program that our 
competitors are being evaluated against. Therefore, it is important 
that individuals that are selected for interview are able to answer 
the questions posed by the auditors, but not so verbose that they 
start talking about unrelated items or bring up other vulnerabilities 
outside of the scope of the audit. Most people are proud of their 
work and want to talk about it with whoever will listen. An audit 
interview, outside of the interview sections where overviews of the 
processes are provided, is not the time to explain all the details of a 
process unless requested by the auditor.
Mock interview sessions are advantageous for those individuals 
that have not been involved in an audit before, as well as a refresher 
for those who engaged in them infrequently. In a mock interview, 
an individual can portray the auditor, asking a series of questions 
requesting evidence that a control activity was performed. This can 
help put the interviewee more at ease during the audit. The mock 
interview may also trigger additional information request ideas that 
were previously missed to support the organization’s control position.
Entrance, Exit, and Status Conferences
The entrance, exit, and status conferences are scheduled throughout 
the audit and provide the essential information to the various stake-
holders to keep the audit on track. The worst-case scenario is to get to 
the end of an audit and have a list of findings that were not previously 
discussed. At this point the opportunity is lost to provide more infor-
mation that may have cleared the issue, leading the more expensive 
process to tracking the issue, reporting evidence demonstrating that 
the proper controls were in place, and subsequently obtaining agree-
ment on closure of the issue.
Entrance Meeting
The audit entrance meeting provides the opportunity to ensure that 
the organization knows the audit scope, expectations, and key dates. 
The entrance meeting is often scheduled late Monday morning 
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to early afternoon to allow for traveling. Auditors generally travel 
Sunday night to Thursday evening or Monday morning to Friday eve-
ning to provide for some balance since on-site auditors for Big Four 
accounting firms are traveling 80% to 100% of the time depending 
upon the contracts. Hopefully the audit coordinator has communi-
cated as much as possible to the organization prior to the arrival of 
the entrance meeting, because the preparation activities as previously 
mentioned needed to ensure that the documentation would be avail-
able for the entrance meeting. Some auditors will request that the 
documentation request list be provided as soon as possible, sometimes 
ahead of the entrance meeting, however, as is more often the case, the 
auditors tend to start looking at the materials after the entrance meet-
ing has begun. Why? Because their time is usually fully committed to 
a prior client the weeks preceding this engagement. As a result, there 
is limited time to look at the files that are provided to them, and most 
auditors will agree that receiving the files the day they are on site will 
give them plenty to keep busy. In addition, this also provides more 
time to ensure that the document request list has been adequately 
prepared, reviewed, and QAed prior to providing to the auditors. The 
exception to this may be when scripts are requested to be run against 
infrastructure devices, such as Unix/Windows servers, firewalls, rout-
ers, and the output is needed for them to begin their analysis.
Senior management should be invited to the entrance meeting so 
that they are aware of the scope and timeline of the audit. All man-
agers who have a role in providing information, attending inter-
views, or providing staff should also be included. Depending upon 
the organization, it generally does not hurt to encourage everyone 
that has a key role in providing information to the auditors to attend 
as well. The entrance call is scheduled for 30 minutes to 1 hour, 
however, in practice the call is normally 10 to 15 minutes as there is 
not much to discuss at this point. The scope has been agreed to per 
prior audit engagement contracts or conversations and should not 
be a surprise at this juncture. The meeting is more of a formality 
to kickoff the audit project and answer any questions that need to 
be clarified.
From an organization’s point of view, the audit entrance meeting 
should not be considered complete if there are still lingering questions 
regarding (1) audit scope, (2) timing of fieldwork, (3) delivery dates of 
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the draft and final reports (may be approximate), (4) documentation 
requested, (5) samples that will be requested, and (6) departments 
that must be involved. Failure to have an understanding of any of 
these items by this point can lead to unnecessary confusion.
Exit Meeting
An audit may have multiple exit meetings depending upon the 
duration of the audit. If the audit involves on-site fieldwork of sev-
eral weeks, but the audit itself takes several months to complete, the 
auditors may hold a site exit meeting to reaffirm the results of their 
fieldwork, while scheduling a formal exit conference at the end of 
their analysis and prior to issuance of the audit report. The purpose of 
the exit meeting is to signal either the end of the audit activities and 
ensure that both the auditor and auditee come away with the same 
understanding. These are usually scheduled in late morning or mid-
day on the final day of the audit, again permitting auditor cleanup and 
travel time in the afternoon.
Status Meetings
Status meetings provide a more frequent opportunity for the auditor and 
the auditee to ensure that there are no surprises or misunderstandings 
at the exit conference. Knowing what issues the auditors are facing early 
in the process provides an opportunity to provide other documentation 
that may better answer the auditors’ request or permit further dialogue 
to clarify the control in question. It also provides the opportunity for 
the audit coordinator to validate that the auditor has received the infor-
mation requested and the information provided was satisfactory.
Some organizations prefer a daily status meeting; however, in prac-
tice, if the audit coordinator is communicating on a frequent basis 
with the auditor, a formal meeting every other day should be suffi-
cient. These are scheduled near the end of the normal workday (4 p.m. 
or 4:30 p.m.) for 30 minutes so that other management staff can call 
in. This is true even if the auditors may be working until 6 or 7 p.m. to 
ensure the most attendance possible. The meetings should be focused 
on what observations, gaps, or findings have been noted or what docu-
mentation has been requested and is still outstanding. An agenda and 
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updated document request list should be provided by the auditor in 
advance of each status update meeting to ensure that the conversation 
is focused on the important issues.
Report Issuance and Finding Remediation Phase
All control deficiencies should be known and communicated by the 
exit conference. If for some reason testing could not be completed, 
there could be additional deficiencies noted after the auditors have 
left the site. If this is the case, for reasons mentioned in the media 
handling section, this complicates the audit and should be avoided. 
Proactive inquiry of the auditors to ensure they have all the neces-
sary information, especially by the start of the last week of the audit, 
should be done. The auditors should be focused on completing their 
work papers the last week of the audit versus performing additional 
testing. This usually occurs because of disagreement in earlier testing 
or the selection of a new sample that was deemed insufficient (e.g., 
population was assumed to be employees and contractors, but only 
employees were provided).
At the exit conference, the auditor should provide a listing of control 
deficiencies (also referred to as gaps, observations, exceptions, or find-
ings, depending upon the nomenclature used by the auditor). These 
might end up as findings on the final report. Auditors might have to 
evaluate the findings with other organizations that have been included 
in the scope of the audit. For example, for a chief financial officer’s 
audit contracted by the federal government, the audit firm may wait 
until it has been to all the sites to ensure that it has been consistent in 
its approach and fair to each contractor. Another reason for not receiv-
ing the findings at the exit conference is that further peer reviews may 
need to be performed, or the senior partners may need to review the 
work papers containing the audit testing and evidence collected.
A draft report is subsequently issued with the findings. There 
should be no surprises if the audit team and the organization have 
worked together. Usually when surprises end up on the report, it 
is the result of (1) lack of clear communicating in the beginning as 
to what conditions would create a finding, (2) a prior issue was sur-
faced but not communicated that it was a finding, (3) documentation 
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requested were not provided, (4) misunderstanding that an earlier 
agreement was or was not reached when discussing a gap, or (5) the 
auditor held the issue to the end to avoid confrontation. In my experi-
ence through many audits, number 5 does occur, but usually one of 
the other items is the primary reason for surprises. Surprises should 
be left for birthdays and holidays and not audit findings.
Once the draft report is received by the organization from the 
auditor, the auditee has 5 to 10 business days to provide a response. 
The response provides the auditee an opportunity to agree or disagree 
to the audit finding and explain why. These comments are included 
in the reissued draft report, which should be issued 5 to 10 days after 
receipt of the auditee’s comments. If the organization agrees with the 
finding, it is best to also note a corrective action plan (CAP) at this 
time. The corrective action plan explains at a high level what will be 
done to mitigate the deficiency and when this will be completed. The 
CAP will need to be submitted within 30 days after the final report is 
reissued with the auditee comments, so if there is agreement, this may 
as well be included in the draft report. This provides the reader who is 
not so familiar with the audit an early understanding as to what steps 
will be taken.
The final report issuance varies by audit firm and the contractual 
requirements. Internal review of the draft report and work papers adds 
off-site time after the fieldwork to ensure the audit report is accurate. 
Sometimes this process can take months between the issuance of the 
draft and the final report. Firms that are security conscious will not 
wait for the final report to begin action on the issues. CAPs are typi-
cally due within 30 days after final report issuance, and it is preferable 
to mitigate the vulnerability within 90 days from the cap due date. 
Obviously, long security implementations will be the exception but 
should not be the rule. Ninety days should be sufficient for mitigating 
most vulnerabilities given the appropriate priority. Each of the CAPs 
should be tracked to ensure that the person responsible is completing 
the milestones and the target date is still on track. As the CAPS are 
completed, the audit artifacts including changed processes, reports, 
project plans, and evidence of implementation should be retained to 
provide to the auditor for next year’s review. The auditor will then take 
these items and use them as partial evidence to close the finding.
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The meeting of two personalities is like the contact of two chemical 
substances: if there is any reaction, both are transformed.
Carl Gustav Jung, 1875–1961
Why a Chapter Dedicated to Security Communications?
If the phrase security communications conjures thoughts of the network, 
protocols, blocking, terminating communications, ensuring messages 
get from point A to point B intact, and must be available 24/7, you are 
correct. However, the topic is not about computer communications 
but rather human communications. Information security governance 
depends upon humans to deliver the right message to the right indi-
viduals at the right time in the right manner for the messages to be 
heard and acted upon.
Imagine for a moment that the information security department 
creates a plethora of security policies representing the equivalent of 
creating the Mona Lisa to an artist or creating a team of athletes that 
wins the Super Bowl. Imagine then that what would have happened 
if no one had ever seen the Mona Lisa that was stored in an attic or 
the team that was capable of winning the Super Bowl never showed 
up for its games? A similar fate can fall upon the information secu-
rity program if information security policies, ideas, and initiatives are 
not properly communicated. True information security governance 
may look good on paper, with policies drafted and technical solutions 
appearing to be in place, but if these are not communicated properly, 
security governance is really not occurring.
Security communication takes on many forms such as the pub-
lishing of information security policies, selling the next information 
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investment to management, explaining the current status of security 
audit issues to the board of directors, crafting security e-mail messages 
of the latest security concerns, or simply having a conversation about 
a security issue with a security colleague or business unit manager. It 
should be clear that every communication by every individual associ-
ated with the information security team has the potential to either 
(a) provide increased credibility and support to the information secu-
rity program or (b) cause the information security area to be viewed as 
a roadblock or lessen trust that the security group has the organiza-
tion’s best interests front and center.
Communication skills are constantly evaluated as we are growing 
up—from formal penmanship, written communication skills, listening 
skills, plays well with others, and speaks up when called upon as a child 
to the formal performance reviews where written and oral communica-
tion skill competencies are evaluated on an annual basis. The continuous 
evaluation of these skills indicates the importance of them. After all, 
how effective can we be in the workplace if we cannot effectively com-
municate with others? Hence, due to this importance, this chapter is 
dedicated toward how security professionals can improve their commu-
nication skills to convey the appropriate security messages throughout 
the organization. Different aspects of communication are explored and 
by understanding the different communication styles that are occur-
ring within the company, the security executive and professional can be 
more effective in constructing and delivering the appropriate message.
End User Security Awareness Training
One of the debates over the past decade has been whether informa-
tion security awareness training has been effective. Much of this con-
cern is generally started from an analysis of the number of security 
incidents in a given year and then concluding whether the end users 
were receiving the message and acting in a secure manner in their 
day-to-day jobs. The conclusion then usually suggests that technical 
controls need to be implemented to take out the risk of “human error.” 
Unfortunately, these conclusions are made without the benefit of a 
scientifically controlled experiment, whereby the “test group” of users 
of the same organization received no security awareness training were 
evaluated against a “control group” in order to determine whether 
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there would have been more or fewer incidents experienced by the 
control group. Obviously, technical controls are very important to the 
information security program, and are necessary to address the aspects 
such as antivirus, encryption, firewalls, security mechanisms, physi-
cal security, authentication, and monitoring, but given that technical 
controls cannot fully address the end-user behaviors, security aware-
ness training must be in place to reduce the risk. Information also 
comes in nontechnical forms (oral and paper documents) that cannot 
be secured by technical means or without the diligence and assistance 
of the end user. For example, a policy may state that all documents 
transported between the office and home need to be transported in 
a locked container. If the end user is not aware of the policy or does 
not understand the rationale for the policy, she might decide it is not 
necessary and not place the documents in a locked box. Alternatively, 
an individual may load boxes of documents in his car in the winter-
time, leaving the engine running to keep it warm while hr runs back 
into the house to retrieve more boxes for loading. Meanwhile, the end 
user may be taking an increased risk that the car will be stolen and the 
confidential documents exposed. Since there are no technical controls 
to prevent this (other than the end user locking the door in between 
trips), security needs to be continuously reinforced with the end user 
to reduce the risk of this type of error.
Awareness Definition
Security awareness training is different from security training. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 
800-50: Building an Information Security Technology Security 
Awareness and Training Program (NIST, 2003) provides the follow-
ing definition:
Awareness is not training. The purpose of awareness presentations is 
simply to focus attention on security. Awareness presentations are 
intended to allow individuals to recognize IT security concerns and 
respond accordingly. In awareness activities, the learner is the recipi-
ent of information, whereas the learner in a training environment has 
a more active role. Awareness relies on reaching broad audiences with 
attractive packaging techniques. Training is more formal, having a goal 
of building knowledge and skills to facilitate job performance.
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In short, the basic objective of security awareness training is to 
(1) provide enough information to the end users as to what they and 
others should and should not do and recognize what would constitute 
a security incident, and (2) know what they should do if they rec-
ognize or suspect that a security incident has occurred. If these two 
objectives have been met, then the information security awareness 
program has been successful.
Delivering the Message
Information security programs fall short of the message when the 
security message is not crafted in a manner that grabs the end users’ 
attention or fails to provide them with the necessary information. Let’s 
face it, many security people progressed to higher levels within the 
organization due to their technical abilities, not based upon their com-
munication or marketing skills. Providing information security aware-
ness is essentially marketing—inducing the recipient of the message to 
buy something (in this case buy into) what they ordinarily may not have 
thought to buy on their own. Savvy marketers craft the message not 
in pages of boring technical, jargon-filled presentations, but rather in 
short, high-impact, sound-bite type messages that grab our attention 
and are retained. Security professionals must do the same. The follow-
ing seven steps, adapted from NIST security awareness guidance, pro-
vide a process for delivering an effective information security program.
Step 1: Security Awareness Needs Assessment
Assessing security awareness is often an overlooked step when first 
implementing a security awareness program. Without knowing where 
the highest risk areas or areas that have been causing the most inci-
dents are, valuable time with the end users could be wasted. The needs 
can be determined from multiple sources, as described next.
New or Changed Policies If the organization is rolling out a new iden-
tity management system or a new incident reporting process, this may 
be a good time to explain how this will work. Or a new law or regula-
tion could mandate new reporting requirements that would need to 
be communicated.
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Past Security Incidents Past breaches can provide a wealth of informa-
tion from which to construct the security awareness program. These 
are also very useful in obtaining the end users’ attention, as it dem-
onstrates that security issues are occurring within their organization 
versus a theoretical concept that “this could happen.” It also reduces 
the likelihood that the end user will think that the security depart-
ment is sensationalizing the news. Care should be taken when pre-
senting actual incidents within the company that it is not possible 
for the end users to deduce the person or in which department that 
the individual was working. This could cause some ethical and legal 
issues in disclosing personal human resource issues. The objective is to 
explain the incident so that the same type of incident does not reoc-
cur through someone else’s behavior. Incidents of the same type that 
have a high number of occurrences would be excellent candidates for 
targeted security awareness training.
Systems Security Plans Systems security plans (SSPs) document the 
current state of an information security system and can take the form 
of a major application (MA) or general support system (GSS). Since 
these plans define the overall business objective of the system, the 
infrastructure, and the managerial, technical, and operational con-
trols required to support the system, these documents can provide 
excellent sources of the types of information that needs to be shared 
with the end users. For example, if there are many business partners 
that are part of the infrastructure, the end users may need to be made 
aware of which email communications are secure or what is permis-
sible to discuss with the business partner due to intellectual property 
rights that are defined in the systems security plan.
Audit Findings and Recommendations If there are recurring audit issues 
that have not been mitigated, these should be included in the secu-
rity awareness training. Since auditors cannot audit 100% of every-
thing, samples are taken that represent a statistical significance if an 
issue is found. The issues found may or may not have occurred across 
every department; however, that does not mean that the issue is not 
broader than the audit issue found. For example, the auditors may 
pull a sample of policies and procedures and determine that they have 
not been updated on an annual basis for a couple of departments. 
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Odds are, just as when a pest exterminator sees one mouse, there are 
likely to be many more, so is it likely that other areas have not been 
following the process of annual updates. Typically these are issues of 
security governance across the organization; the tone at the top has 
not made this a priority or there have not been the processes in place 
to monitor and ensure this is completed on an annual basis. Repeat 
audit issues should always be addressed either to a targeted group or 
broadly across the organization, depending upon the issue.
Event Analysis Similar to security incidents, event analysis of the 
monitoring logs can highlight areas of concern. These are likely to 
evolve into targeted training more than security awareness training. 
For example, logs indicating that firewall vulnerability is repeatedly 
being exploited by external hackers may indicate the need to train the 
network group on device configurations.
Industry Trends Introduction of new technology into the marketplace 
can provide a rich source for discussion. Discussing the use of social 
media in the workplace, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, or Myspace will 
provide relevant discussion of issues that most end users can relate to. 
Alternatively a discussion of the use (or nonuse) of personal e-mail and 
the acceptable use policy to govern appropriate Internet behavior will 
be of interest to the end users. The security officer has to keep abreast 
of the current industry trends to ensure that the risks are mitigated, 
as new technologies are often released first and then security controls 
are added second. The reality of this situation is that products are usu-
ally in a race to become the first to capture market share and may 
not have implemented the necessary security controls. As an example, 
consider the evolution of the Windows operating system and how it 
took almost nine releases over a period of more than two decades to 
build-in many of the security concepts that are expected today.
Management Concerns Managers should be polled to determine what 
issues they are aware of that need more focus. They may be concerned 
with documents not being properly disposed or laptops not being put 
away at the end of the day or securely transported.
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Organizational Changes After reorganizations, employees are often-
times reporting to a new manager that may operate differently. This 
is a good time to reinforce the security concepts. Locations may have 
closed during the reorganizations or whole departments eliminated, 
thus creating potential changes in the security procedures.
Step 2: Program Design
Communications can either happen through the best intentions or be 
designed. By approaching the security awareness program as some-
thing that must be designed, the chances of leaving out critical com-
ponents are lessened. A car would not be produced without a design; 
a TV show would not be delivered without a script to guide the flow 
of the contents.
Target Audience A cliché in providing presentations is to know your 
audience. The security awareness presentation delivered to a group of 
airline mechanics may be different than to a group of customer service 
representatives. The analogies or stories used in the presentation to 
connect with the audience may be different. For example, relating the 
information security concepts of physical protection to ensure that no 
unauthorized people are in the hangar that could cause loss of life by 
tampering with the airplane engine parts may be effective with the 
airline mechanics. The customer service representatives may relate to 
the importance of verifying the caller with identifying information 
so as to not release confidential information to the wrong person. 
Alternatively, talking about sending faxes to the wrong healthcare 
provider would have little relevance to the airline mechanics.
Frequency of Sessions Security awareness training should be performed 
minimally once a year and preferably during a time in the business 
cycle that will not cause an increased burden in meeting the com-
pany objectives. For example, having a training session for a group of 
accountants at fiscal yearend or right before tax season would not be 
welcomed. If face-to-face sessions are used, scheduling of the sessions 
needs to be planned so that there is ample time for individuals to plan 
the training into their schedules.
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Number of Users Face-to-face sessions work best when the number is 
kept to 30 or less. A group of this size allows for interaction and more 
exchange of information between the participants. Schedules should 
be drawn up 6 to 8 weeks in advance of the training to ensure the 
greatest attendance and to obtain the appropriate facilities.
Method of Delivery Face-to-face sessions work best, however, these are 
also time consuming, as multiple sessions are needed to cover the work-
force in groups of 25 to 30 people. The security officer and his staff have 
to dedicate significant resources to this task, especially if the associates 
are spread out across multiple locations. As a result of cost reductions, 
some security departments have gravitated to online learning manage-
ment systems to deliver PowerPoint-type contact to the end user. The 
difficulty with this approach is that users may simply click through the 
material without providing their full attention, which is much harder 
to do in an interactive security awareness session. Even though quizzes 
can be incorporated into the material to determine whether the end user 
was paying attention, it is difficult to ascertain if the end user was truly 
engaged. The more engaged the participants in the learning process, 
the greater the likelihood that the material will be retained.
Resources Required The labor, materials, locations, and budget required 
for the program need to be reviewed. At this stage the full costs may 
not be known, however, the budget parameters should be determined. 
It would not be unreasonable to spend 1% to 2% of the information 
security budget on security awareness training and a greater percent-
age on a small budget.
Step 3: Develop Scope
The security awareness program must be scoped or there is a risk 
that the message will be lost in delivering the training. Scoping uti-
lizes the needs assessment captured in step 1 and determines what 
topics are provided.
Determine Participants Needing Training Once the scope of the train-
ing has been initially defined, the population that is required to attend 
or participate in the training needs to be defined. Depending upon 
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the company desire or the law or regulation, all employees, including 
contractors requiring systems access may be subject to the training. If 
a subcontractor relationship exists with another firm that is perform-
ing work on the organization’s behalf, then it should be determined 
whether the subcontractor should provide its own security awareness 
training (as the subcontractors are employees or contracted to that 
firm) or should the company that hired the subcontractor require the 
security awareness training provided to its own employees.
New hires present a special situation that must be addressed. The 
organization may require annual refresher training for the existing 
employees and contractors, but the new hires also need the security 
awareness training from day one. New hires should not be allowed 
access to the system until they have had some form of security aware-
ness training. One technique that is very effective is to have the hiring 
manager provide security awareness training to the employee (e.g., in 
the form of a PowerPoint presentation); have the employee sign an 
attestation that they have read the security requirements, understand 
them, and will abide by them; and have the manager fax or e-mail 
the signed copy to the security administration or access management 
department or whichever department is responsible for account estab-
lishment. Once the fax or e-mail is received, then the department 
can release the login ID and password to the manager to provide to 
the employee. The employee would then log on and change the one-
time password. In this manner, the new hire has the appropriate on-
boarding security awareness training that may not line up with the 
scheduled annual awareness training, which they would take during 
the next cycle with everyone else.
Business Units Security awareness training is generally developed for the 
current cycle (i.e., annual training) and provided to everyone in the orga-
nization. However, there may be special situations where the training 
is customized to a particular department because of different concerns.
Select Theme One of the most important aspects in designing a secu-
rity awareness program is to select a theme for the training. A list 
of themes is shown in Table  12.1. This helps to focus the training 
around a subject and keeps the scope from drifting. Selecting a theme 
does not limit the creativeness of the training, but rather permits 
314  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
the designer to build the program around a common concept while 
introducing other security-related items into the program. For exam-
ple, while constructing a security awareness training program using 
the theme “Internet and E-mail Security,” the concepts of antivirus, 
confidentiality, non-sharing of passwords, encryption, phishing, and 
website malware can be introduced into the training.
The common mistake is that the fire hose method of security 
awareness education is used, and all possible aspects of security are 
communicated during a 1 to 2 hour presentation or during a webinar. 
The end users eyes glaze over and little is retained other than “be sure 
to not let someone piggyback behind you when walking in the build-
ing” or “hit CTL–ALT–DELETE and Lock when stepping away 
from the computer.” The themed approach avoids this scenario.
Step 4: Content Development
Once the theme is chosen for the security awareness training, the 
content should be developed to be as impactful as possible to achieve 
the highest retention rate after training. Face-to-face training affords 
the ability to combine video, music, props, and attendee interaction 
to create an unforgettable learning environment (versus the two- 
dimensional Internet training delivery mechanisms). Game shows, 
use of online videos, and interactive skits to grab the participants’ 







e-mail security identity theft confidentiality, 
information sensitivity
Spam
Social engineering incidents and 
incident response
Shoulder surfing Government 
regulations
wireless security tablet computing Smartphones Laptop security
copyright protections 
and licensing




e-mail etiquette clean desk policy Home network usage Protecting yourself 
and your company 
in a disaster
Handling of protected 
health information or 
credit card data
Latest information 
security events in 
the news
what is risk? obtaining access 
to information
315eFFeCtIve seCurIty CommunICAtIons
attention work very well. Once the security awareness training grabs 
attendees’ attention, it is not uncommon to see that people enjoy com-
ing to the sessions and are the first ones to sign up in subsequent years.
Security awareness should be fun! One of the first places to start to 
build the security training session is to go to the toy store and the party 
store to buy some toys. As silly as this may sound, when people walk 
into the room feeling like they are about to play a game, their mood 
changes from “Is this going to be another boring security PowerPoint 
presentation?” to one of “Hey, this looks like fun!” Their curiosity 
takes over and as a result, they are more likely to pay attention.
Security is a serious subject, but that does not mean that it has to 
be presented that way to be impactful. If the security professional is 
uncomfortable with giving presentations that appear silly or humor-
ous, then another possibility is to enlist someone from corporate com-
munications or marketing for support. Imagine being in the place of 
the end user that is required to attend mandatory awareness training. 
Programs should be constructed in such a manner that the end-user 
wants to attend the security awareness training.
Step 5: Communication and Logistics Plan
A one-page slide announcing the theme of the program should be 
developed as well as posters indicating the dates of the program. 
If multiple locations are part of the program, the poster could look 
something analogous to rock concert tour dates to generate interest.
E-mails to the end users at least 1 month prior to the awareness 
session should be mailed, along with follow-up reminders at 2- and 
1-week intervals. People are often very busy and may appreciate the 
e-mail reminders to sign up for the awareness session. Provisions 
for make-up signups should also be planned by scheduling one or 
two make-up sessions after the regular sessions have concluded. The 
e-mail reminders should stress promptness in attending the sessions.
Each location should have signup sheets for the session to ensure that 
sessions are appropriately filled and do not exceed the size of the room. 
A good rule of thumb is to only have enough signups for five less than 
the capacity of the session. For example, if the room will comfortably 
seat 30 people in the session, then permit 25 to sign up. Why? Because 
there will always be some individuals that will add their names below 
316  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
the line exceeding the capacity. This can cause problems if tables and 
exercises were set up for a group size of 25, but 30 show up. By planning 
for a maximum of 30 people, and allowing 25 to sign up with a 5-person 
contingency, there would be no problem if 30 people showed up.
Travel arrangements to the various sites are also determined in this 
step, making reservations at least 30 to 60 days in advance to reduce 
the costs of the program.
Step 6: Awareness Delivery
Details at this stage are very critical, as the security awareness session 
should be managed as a production with contingencies for items that 
may go wrong. The trainer should arrive at the room location at least 
1 hour before the start of the session so that the room can be set up 
in advance of people arriving for the first session. Items such as visual 
props, table arrangements, candy or food, evaluation sheets, and pre-
sentation copies need to be arranged around the room. The LCD pro-
jector and computer need to be tested to ensure the video, audio, and 
presentation operation are working correctly.
Sessions should be no more than 1 hour, as the attention span starts 
to fade after 45 to 60 minutes. Sessions should also be scheduled 
30 minutes apart to allow for (a) those individuals that arrive early 
to “get a good seat,” (b) those individuals that stay after the last ses-
sion to ask one-on-one questions, and (c) set up for the next session. 
The trainer should be available at the start of each session to greet 
each person as they enter the room, and if the trainer is still running 
around setting up tables, projectors, and props, he or she will not be 
available. Greeting each person helps to make the program personable 
and starts the connection process, which increases the likelihood the 
individual will pay more attention.
The delivery should be scripted, but be spontaneous at the same 
time. Each subsequent delivery can incorporate what worked and 
remove what did not work in the prior sessions.
Sessions should start 5 minutes after the posted start time of the 
session and end 5 minutes prior to the end. Starting 5 minutes into 
the session accounts for the latecomers that would miss the start of the 
session. In high school, students have 5 minutes to get to their next 
class, but once people get into the work world, they are faced with 
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back-to-back meetings with no built-in travel time. Ending 5 minutes 
early provides time for them to fill out the evaluations.
Step 7: Evaluation/Feedback Loops
Evaluations provide insight into what is and is not working with the 
security awareness program. The quality adage “If you can’t measure 
it, you can’t improve it” applies to information security as well. Did 
the end users enjoy the training? Did they learn what was expected? 
Was there anything that could have been improved (content, logistics, 
delivery, understanding, etc.)?
One method that is highly successful is to provide a trade of sorts, 
or an exchange, at the door as the attendees are leaving, exchanging 
a security trinket for an evaluation. They may place the evaluation 
facedown in the chair, but they do not receive the trinket unless they 
provide an evaluation. A small percentage will be blank; however this 
technique usually results in 95% to 100% return of the evaluations.
The evaluations can then be tracked in a database by location, and 
assessments of the training can be performed. Numerical scores are 
tabulated (e.g., 4 out of 5 on a 5-point scale) and open-ended question 
responses are recorded. Quizzes several months after the training can 
be issued to determine whether the preceding training was effective.
Security Awareness Training Does Not Have to Be Boring
By injecting some creativity into the security awareness program, the 
training can be fun for the participants and fun for the creators. As a 
side benefit, engaging security professionals where this is not their daily 
role can broaden their own interpersonal and communication skills. 
The approach demonstrated in the aforementioned seven steps aides in 
the understanding and retention of the security message, which is the 
primary goal of creating a fun security awareness program.
Targeted Security Training
Security awareness training provides the broad security training that 
is sufficient for most of the organization. However, to ensure that 
the proper skills are retained by the organization to carry out the 
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implementation of the security policies, targeted training needs to be 
developed for certain groups, primarily those individuals managing 
others and those who are directly involved in an information secu-
rity function.
Security administrators need targeted training in areas such as 
Microsoft Active Directory, Resource Access Control Facility (RACF), 
Access Control Facility (AC2), and UNIX administration to be able to 
set up and administer accounts correctly. Depending upon the level of 
the staff and the expectations, the depth of the training may vary. For 
example, the security administrator that is setting up accounts may need 
training on how to use the identity management system but not neces-
sarily the technical details of Active Directory. On the other hand, the 
security analyst who is responsible for building automated queries and 
processes may need a seminar in Active Directory. Information security 
governance cannot occur if individuals are not competent within their 
assigned jobs. This does not mean that everyone needs the 5-day class, 
where a PowerPoint or 2-hour hands-on training session may suffice.
Managers of employees and contractors typically require additional 
training, usually an hour or less PowerPoint or learning management 
system–type course to address issues such as access authorization 
using the identity management system and the handling on on-
boarding and terminations. During the on-boarding process, security 
awareness training, ensuring that background checks are completed, 
and providing the new hires initial access are subjects that may be 
covered. When the employee or contractor is terminated, the manager 
usually has some responsibility to enter information into the system 
and collect physical property such as badges, credit cards, laptops, 
and tokens. Communicating these requirements through training can 
reduce the risk that these activities are not occurring and increasing 
the exposure to the systems after the employee leaves the company.
There are also specialized types of training depending upon the 
department that may need to occur, such as training of the handling 
of a customer care application, data center operations, and emergency 
response training. Not everyone in the organization would need to 
do what is required in the event of an emergency in the data center, 
such as a fire, however, the computer operators would need to know 
what to do to protect the data center and minimize the loss as well as 
how to safely evacuate.
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Continuous Security Reminders
A daily e-mail from the help desk explaining the latest security inci-
dent would cause most users to set up an e-mail filter to move this 
type of e-mail to the delete bucket. A balance of the security message 
must be achieved whereby when the users see an information security 
message, they are likely to read it and act upon it accordingly.
E-mails of the latest incidents as applied to the organization can be 
very beneficial, especially if employees can relate to the issues in their 
own home environment. The breach involving Epsilon in 2011 where 
there was an exposure to the e-mail accounts of millions of customers 
to firms such as Chase, Citigroup, and Verizon, caused e-mail mes-
sages to be spammed and appeared to be coming from these orga-
nizations. This represented a great opportunity for organizations to 
communicate what was occurring and educate the end users about 
protecting their accounts. Since this occurred to many users as part of 
their personal computer involvement outside of work, this also has a 
side benefit of demonstrating the organization’s caring for the associ-
ate. These opportunities should be leveraged, which increase the like-
lihood of compliance to the security policies.
Utilize Multiple Security Awareness Vehicles
The potential avenues for security communication can fill a book by 
themselves. Some of the avenues for communication include
• Company newsletters
• Posters
• Learning management system online presentations
• Brown bag lunches
• Links on corporate intranet sites
• Weekly e-mails
• Logon page or scrolling marquee messages
• Hosting a “security day”
• Monthly, short three- to five-page presentations
• Online quizzes
• Online “scavenger hunts”
• Security contests
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Each of these methods should be considered as supplemental to the 
classroom-type training that is delivered face-to-face in person annu-
ally. Posters should also be used sparingly and typically in support of a 
specific security awareness campaign. Posters that utilize slogans tend 
to have limited lasting power beyond the campaign period. Posters can 
serve as a great advertisement for ongoing online training or classroom 
training, but by themselves have limited value. If posters are used, care 
should be taken to track where the posters have been displayed so that 
they can be removed in a timely manner. The messages should be impact-
ful and address different security concerns beyond the “don’t share your 
password” type of message. Relating the security message back to how 
implementing security controls serves to protect the information for the 
customers that entrust their information to us can be very impactful.
Security Officer Communication Skills
As discussed in Chapter 3 on Defining the Security Management 
Organization and also in Chapter 4 on Interacting with the C-Suite, 
the security officer must be able to interact with multiple levels of 
management. Oftentimes when employees respond to the first survey 
that an organization issues on employee satisfaction, a frequent issue 
that surfaces is lack of communication. What does this really mean? 
That the associate did not feel listened to? That their ideas were not 
acted upon? That there was not an avenue to provide input? That the 
manager or supervisor was not sharing relevant news in a timely man-
ner? It could be any one or more of those items or something else.
The security officer must be able to communicate with individuals in 
different levels of the organizational hierarchy, from the board of direc-
tors to the end users and everywhere in between. There are different 
personalities that must be communicated with, different styles of work-
ing and different ways that people deliver, receive, and process informa-
tion. The subsequent techniques can improve the ability of the security 
officer or any security professional to communicate with others.
Talking versus Listening
Many people appear to believe that they are best communicating 
when they are talking, however, when we are listening and the other 
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person feels that he or she has been heard, our ability to communi-
cate is much greater. Unfortunately, we block ourselves from effective 
listening by not paying full attention to the person speaking. Those 
who are good listeners tend to draw other people to them; people con-
fide in them and they become a trusted member of the team. By not 
listening, it sends the message that what they have to say is not very 
important. Critical information is then missed and opportunities to 
demonstrate that the person is cared about is also missed. True listen-
ing involves providing our full attention.
Roadblocks to Effective Listening
There are 12 roadblocks that get in our way of effective listening, that 
make it hard for us to truly listen to what the other person is saying 
(McKay, 1995). Because listening is so crucial in communications, we 
should continuously be aware of our behavior when another person 
is speaking.
 1. Comparing—While the other person is talking, you are trying 
to determine if you have had that situation before, and was it 
worse or not. They may be talking about an issue that you have 
had before, and the thought is running though your mind, “Hey, 
it isn’t that tough to complete that, why are they having a prob-
lem.” By comparing, it is difficult to listen to what their problem 
is, as the mind is busy analyzing our own past experiences.
 2. Mind reading—Instead of focusing on what the person is say-
ing, the listener is focused on trying to understand the mean-
ing behind what they are saying and interpret what different 
situation is driving the comments. For example, they may be 
saying “I have worked long hours to review these security vio-
lation reports, and I am tired of reworking them,” while the 
listener is thinking, “Oh, they just had a long day because they 
are going to school in the evenings and are probably just tired.” 
This may not be the case at all, and in fact the real issue is that 
the rework is preventing other work from being performed.
 3. Rehearsing—The mind is too busy thinking of what the lis-
tener will say next, that they are not focusing on the message 
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that is being delivered. In this case, the listener “appears” to 
be interested in what is being said.
 4. Filtering—The listener listens just long enough to hear 
whether the person is angry, unhappy, or in danger. Once the 
emotion is determined, then the listening stops and focuses 
on other activities or plans that the person is thinking about. 
The listener only hears half of what is being said.
 5. Judging—Judging occurs when someone is prejudged before 
they even start talking. A negative label is placed on the per-
son who devalues what they may have to say. If the person is 
seen as unqualified, incompetent, or lacking necessary skills 
by the listener, they may discount what they have to say. 
This causes insights to be missed that could provide valuable 
insight to the solution.
 6. Dreaming—When the talker mentions a thought that causes 
you to think of something in your own life that is unrelated to 
what they are saying, this is dreaming. They may be talking 
about what happens if the contract that the company is bid-
ding on is not won, what will happen to the security staffing 
levels, but before they get to ask the questions, your mind has 
drifted off to the last company that you worked for that lost a 
huge contract and how you hated going through the reduction 
in force motions with your staff.
 7. Identifying—Similar to dreaming, in this case every thing the 
person is telling gets related back by the listener to an experi-
ence in their own life. This is commonly shown when people 
are talking about a situation and then a similar situation is 
parroted back from the listener’s life.
 8. Advising—In this scenario, the listener is too busy thinking of 
the solution to the problem from the first few sound bites that 
they miss important information or fail to pickup on how the 
listener is feeling.
 9. Sparring—Quickly disagreeing by the listener causes the lis-
tener to search for items to disagree with. This can take the 
form of a put-down where the talker does not feel listened to 
and possibly humiliated.
 10. Being right—This person will go to great lengths to dem-
onstrate that they are right, including standing by their 
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convictions, not listening to criticism, making excuses, shout-
ing, and twisting the facts.
 11. Derailing—The conversation is ended by changing the subject 
and avoiding the conflict. This is sometimes done by joking to 
avoid the discomfort of having to discuss the subject.
 12. Placating—The listener is very agreeable, as you want people 
to like you, see you as nice, pleasant, and supportive. Listening 
may be at the level just enough to get the idea of what is being 
said, however, you are not fully engaged.
By being conscious of these blocks, they can be avoided to become 
a better listener. There are also four steps to becoming a better listener, 
as discussed in the next few sections.
Generating a Clear Message
Effective oral communication depends upon generating a series of 
clear, straightforward messages that expresses the thoughts, feel-
ings, and observations that need to be conveyed. Since over 90% of 
what we “hear” is not from the words, but from the volume, pitch, 
and rhythm of the message and the body movements, including 
facial expression, it is important that our messages are congruent. 
We cannot be verbalizing the need for a new, exciting security ini-
tiative with our posture slouched in the chair and expect the recipi-
ent of the message to be as excited as we are (or potentially not). 
Double messages should be avoided without hidden agendas. Over 
the long-term, hidden agendas serve to undermine the security 
department’s credibility.
Influencing and Negotiating Skills
Not everyone is going to automatically sign up for the information 
security initiatives, especially if this means spending money that 
could be allocated to other programs, involves an increase in the num-
ber of rules or adds perceived overhead to their business operations. 
To successfully negotiate when discussing a position, the security offi-
cer must be able to separate the problem from the individual. Direct 
attacks based upon prior experience with a particular department will 
324  InFormAtIon seCurIty governAnCe sImplIFIed
not help gain its support. The key is to look at the security initiative 
that is being proposed from the perspective of the person that you 
are trying to influence. It is also dangerous to try to read the other 
person’s mind as noted in the previous section and come to prejudged 
conclusions of their support or nonsupport of the project. It is OK to 
postulate in advance what the stakeholders may think about the situa-
tion to assist with the preparations; however, it is not prudent to come 
to foregone conclusions about their reaction.
Consider various options to implementing a strategy that may 
be pliable to the stakeholder. There is always more than one way to 
perform something. A request by a business manager may be met 
with resistance by the security officer. However, by brainstorming 
various options, one of these solutions may be palatable, with some 
investigation, for both the business manager and the security officer. 
Once options are determined, these can be generated into require-
ments that are not demands but rather where the solution is mutu-
ally agreeable.
Written Communication Skills
Written communication takes on several forms in today’s word 
from e-mail, texting, twittering, social media (Facebook, Myspace, 
LinkedIn) posting, report writing, policy/procedure writing, and 
memo writing. E-mail is the predominant written form of communi-
cation and is much different than writing a memo or a policy and pro-
cedure. Care must be taken to know the audience and the purpose of 
the written communication. Although e-mail is a very quick method 
to communicate across the organization, it is amazing how many 
e-mails people send that have incorrect grammar, misspelled words, 
or use negative language. Since there is no tone button on the e-mail 
that is sent, words must be chosen carefully so as to not alienate the 
recipient. A simple request may turn into hurt feelings if not writ-
ten in a clear, nonconfrontational manner. E-mails are also received 
almost as quickly as the send button is pressed, so extra care needs to 
be made taken constructing the message. Although it may be easy to 
become emotional over an issue, these are best handled by picking up 




Presentations come with the territory and security officers will find 
themselves in the position of having to deliver a presentation to senior 
management. Since management has limited time, presentations need 
to be focused with, “What do I hope to obtain or convey with this pre-
sentation?” Sometimes presentations will be an impromptu-type, such 
as the 30-second elevator speech, or it may be at the other extreme in 
the form of a memorized speech. Most presentations are combination of 
the two, whereby the presentation slides serve to guide the presentation, 
with much of the material being an impromptu delivery (albeit prepared) 
by the presenter. Presentation dos and don’ts are shown in Table 12.2.
Table 12.2 Presentation dos and don’ts
do tHiS don’t do tHiS
Know the audience: General end users? 
technically oriented users? Management? 
assume that the audience has the same level 
of understanding.
engage the audience by asking questions. Speak nonstop for 45 minutes or more (beyond the 
normal attention span).
use a mixture of audio, video, and visual 
artifacts to make a point.
exclusively using PowerPoint.
translate the technical issues by using 
analogies, stories, and relating to common 
everyday language.
use technical security jargon when unnecessary.
Make eye contact and use a friendly 
demeanor.
read the presentation slide by slide or from 
note cards.
answer their questions using the no-dumb-
question rule. 
act superior to the questioner by failing to recognize 
their comments as valid, albeit they may be 
coming from a different perspective or disagree.
ask questions early to get the audience 
engaged.
completely, but briefly, answer their questions.
if unsure of an answer, open the question up 
to the group.
Lose credibility by talking about subjects that you 
have little experience with.
Leave time for questions and end the 
presentation 5 minutes early to permit time 
for attendees to make their next meeting.
Speak right up until the end of the hour and not get 
the conclusion or discussion of options completed.
Focus on a few main objectives for the 
presentation.
Provide histories (organization, computing) that are 
not related to the current discussion.
Keep the type text at least 24 font point. use graphics that are hard to see or are distracting 
(e.g., excessive use of animation).
Speak with a microphone in larger rooms so 
the audience in the back of the room can 
hear.
assume that your voice is loud enough; some 
individuals may not be able to pick up the 
modulation properly.
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Applying Personality Type to Security Communications
Ideas emanating from the early work of Carl Jung, a Swiss psycholo-
gist, were extended through the development of an instrument to 
indicate personality type differences by Isabel Myers and her mother 
Katharine Cook Briggs in 1943 (Myers, 1995). This later became 
known as the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator, or MBTI, which has 
been taken by millions of people. The MBTI is a very powerful tool, 
which at its simplest form breaks down all of the personalities into 
16 types. Understanding each of these 16 types can help the security 
organization communicate more effectively with different individu-
als based upon their type. In other words, it helps to know how they 
may be wired to understand how they take in information, make 
decisions, where they get their energy from, and how they organize 
their lives.
The Four Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) Preference Scales
The complete psychology explanation of the 16 types is well beyond 
the scope of this book, but there are many useful books written on the 
MBTI type noted at the end of this chapter. However it is useful to 
provide a brief primer on the 16 types and, more important, what the 
implications are for the information security department. There are 
four scales, with each person having a natural preference for one of 
the two opposites on each scale. While we all use each of the oppo-
sites at different times, one scale feels more natural to us most of the 
time. This natural tendency becomes our preference or the place where 
we are the most comfortable. The combination of the four scales, with 
two opposite values, yields 16 combinations of letters. Each set of 
letters yields a describable personality, not in a stereotypical manner, 
but rather a mechanism to explain the personality and what may be 
expected behavior, career interests, reactions to certain events, and so 
forth from that personality type. It is important to note that no “pref-
erence” is better than another, it is just different. Each of us uses all of 
the dimensions of preference at some point, and we flex our behaviors 
depending upon the situation. For example, an introverted parent may 
flex their extraversion when providing discipline to a child.
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Extraversion versus Introversion Scale The first preference is about where 
you prefer to get your energy: the external world (extraversion, E) or 
from the inside world (introversion, I). Extraverts tend to get energy 
from the people, interactions, and events, whereas introverts tend to 
derive their energy from their internal thought, feelings, and reflec-
tions. It is sometimes said that extraverts are processing information 
as they are talking, while introverts tend to crystallize the idea inter-
nally first before speaking. Introverts draw their energy from being 
alone, while the extravert may feel drained by spending long periods 
without interaction. Table 12.3 shows some of the characteristics of 
extraverts and introverts (Kroger and Thuesen, 1992).
Sensing versus Intuition Scale This preference indicates how informa-
tion is gathered. Sensing (S) individuals prefer to take in information 
through their senses, such as seeing, hearing, smelling, and so forth, 
to see what is actually happening. They are observant of what is going 
on around them and very good at determining the practicality of the 
situation. Information presented is preferred to be delivered in a very 
specific manner. Sensors tend to prefer to be presented with the facts 
and details of what they are reviewing. About 70% of the world pre-
fers to gather information this way.
Individuals that prefer to see the big picture to take in information 
most likely prefer intuition (N) to gather information. They focus on 
Table 12.3 where do i Prefer to Focus My energy (inner or outer world)?
eXtraverSion (e)—tuned into outer 
worLd oF PeoPLe and eventS
introverSion (i)—drawn to inner 
worLd oF ideaS and eXPerienceS
Seek interaction Like to be alone
enjoy groups enjoy one-on-one conversation
act or speak first, then think think first, then speak or act
Sociable and expressive think to themselves
expend energy conserve energy
Focus outwardly Focus inwardly
take initiative in work and relationships quiet, reserved
Like variety and action Like to focus on one thing at a time
outgoing enjoy reflecting
Breath of information depth of information
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the relationship between various facts, facts that may not appear to 
have any relationship to the sensor. They are good at seeing new pos-
sibilities and new ways of doing things. Table 12.4 shows some of the 
characteristics of sensing and intuition preferences.
Thinking versus Feeling Scale How decisions are made is attributed 
to the decision-making preference, which has two ends of the scale, 
thinking (T) and feeling (F). Thinkers tend to look at the logical ram-
ifications of a course of action. The goal of the thinker is to make a 
decision from an objective viewpoint and tend not to get personally 
involved in the decision. They are often called firm minded and seek 
clarity in the decision. They are good at figuring out what is wrong 
with something so that problem-solving abilities can then be applied.
The feelers tend to approach decision making based upon what 
is important to them and to the other people. While the decision 
making of the thinker may gravitate toward what is right, lawful, or 
concludes with justice, the feeler may base the decision on person-
centered values to achieve harmony and recognition of other individu-
als through understanding, appreciating, and supporting others. In 
short, feelers tend to prefer empathy over intellect. Table 12.5 shows 
some of the characteristics of thinkers and feelers.
Judging versus Perceiving Scale The last preference indicates the prefer-
ence as to how you orient your world. Judgers (J) want to regulate and 
control life by living in a scheduled, organized, and structured way. 
They do not like things unsettled and want order in their lives. They 
enjoy their ability to stick to a schedule and get things done. For the 
judgers there is usually a right way and a wrong way to do things.
Table 12.4 what Kind of information do i normally Pay attention to?
SenSinG (S)—FocuS on concrete, 
reaL, actuaL
intuition (n)—FocuS on aBStract, 
reLationSHiPS, PatternS
Prefer facts, concrete data Prefer insights
value practical applications value imaginative insight
Present oriented Future oriented
Focus on reality, details, specifics Focus on the big picture, possibilities
Like step-by-step instructions Like to jump around, move in anywhere
Pragmatic Speculative
value common sense value innovation
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Perceivers (P) prefer to be flexible and adaptable in different situ-
ations. They want to be able to be spontaneous and flexible to rise to 
the opportunity as it presents itself. They are called perceivers due 
to their ability to keep collecting new information, rather than draw 
premature conclusions on a subject. In other words, they prefer the 
open-endedness and ability to change their decision based upon new 
information. Table 12.6 shows some of the characteristics of judgers 
and perceivers.
Determining Individual MBTI Personality
Using the aforementioned descriptions and characteristics, by now it 
should be possible to determine your approximate MBTI or set of four 
letters describing your personality. This can be used as a guide for the 
next section in determining the individual temperament. The actual 
determination of the letters is more accurately determined by tak-
ing an assessment of the MBTI® by Consulting Psychologists Press, 
Table 12.6 How do i organize My world?




Seek closure, things settled Seek openness
value structure, goals Like flexibility, tentative
Scheduled, methodical Spontaneous, flexible
Systematic casual
Like closure and have things decided Like to have their options open, able to change
avoid last-minute stresses energized by last-minute pressures
enjoy completing projects enjoy starting projects
Table 12.5 How do i Make decisions?
tHinKinG (t)—anaLyticaL, LoGicaL 
conSequenceS, PrinciPLed
FeeLinG (F)—conSider iMPortance 
to tHeM, otHer PeoPLe and vaLueS
Firm minded Gentle hearted
objective, convinced by logic Subjective, convinced by values
Laws, justice, policy Humane, social values
reasonable compassionate
Logical problem solvers assess impact on people
don’t take things personally Likely to take things personally
Good at critiquing Good at appreciating
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containing more than 200 preference questions and determining the 
letters with more accuracy (CPP, 1993). In real life, we have to learn to 
approximate the Myers–Briggs of our peers, unless we ask them if they 
know what theirs are, as they are not going to take a 200-plus question 
assessment for us! Over time, speed reading the types for individuals 
become easier and a very valuable tool for interacting with others.
The Four Temperaments In an effort to distill the 16 types into 
commonalities for ease of discussion, David Keirsey portioned the 
16 types into four temperaments by grouping the Sensing-Perceiving 
(SPs), Sensing-Judging (SJs), Intuition-Thinking (NTs), and Intuition-
Feeling (NFs) (Keirsey, 1998). Although there are individual differ-
ences due to the other two letters that make up each set of 4 letters (for 
an individual’s personality), there was a strong commonality within 
these groups, which simplifies the discussion of their temperament.
Following is a brief description of some of the characteristics of 
personality types that fall into each of the four temperaments, along 
with the implications as to how security should be communicated 
with each temperament. For example, the SJ temperament consists 
of those individuals who have the ESTJ, ISTJ, ESFJ, or ISFJ per-
sonality preferences. For example, the ESTJ natural preferences are 
to obtain their energy from extraversion, gather information through 
sensing (concrete, detail-oriented), make decisions based upon think-
ing (logical, analytical values), and orient their world through Judging 
(schedule oriented, organized). The ESTJs share some common char-
acteristics with the other SJs (ISTJ, ESFJ, ISFJ), even though they 
may vary on one of the other dimensions.
SJ “Guardian” Temperament Those personality preferences shar-
ing the SJ temperament (ESTJ, Supervisor; ISTJ, Inspector; ESFJ, 
Provider; ISFJ, Protector) share characteristics of being reliable, orga-
nized, task focused, and hard working at their best. At their worst, 
they may be perceived as being judgmental, controlling, inflexible, or 
close minded. They typically respect the laws and traditions of soci-
ety, like to be in charge, have a standard way of doing things, expect 
others to be realistic, strive to belong and to contribute, have high 
expectations of themselves and others, are critical of mistakes and 
may fail to reward expected duties, have difficulty refusing to take on 
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other assignments, and do not like surprises. They are also good at 
anticipating problems.
While people of any temperament can be successful at any job, there 
are some careers that attract this temperament more than others. The 
SJ temperament may choose careers as a project manager, regulatory 
compliance officer, budget analyst, chief information officer, bank 
manager/loan officer, government employee, administrative assistant, 
nurse, auditor, pharmacist, engineer, or an accountant. These are jobs 
typically involving adhering to a set of rules and standards without a 
large amount of ambiguity, which is attractive to the SJ temperament. 
SJs are also attracted toward positions that can create financial security.
When communicating information security issues with the SJ 
temperament, it is important that if something was done wrong, that 
regret is expressed and a simple I’m sorry is used. This can set things 
straight and allow the SJ to move forward. SJs should be appreciated 
for their responsibility and willingness to handle the details of the 
situation in the form of compliments. For example, individuals in 
the security group managing the very detailed logging and monitor-
ing may be of the SJ temperament as evidenced by their willingness 
to handle and organize the vast amount of detail.
Commitments must be kept with SJs to win their trust. If the CEO 
is an SJ and there were promises made to implement a security initia-
tive by the end of March so that a new product could be launched in 
May, the CEO who shares this personality type preference will most 
likely be less forgiving than the SP type, for example, when the dead-
line is not met.
Communications with SJs should be specific and practical, as 
Dragnet ’s Joe Friday would iterate, “Just the facts ma’am. Just the 
facts.” SJs are also resistant to change and need to be brought into 
change more slowly with logical reasons for the change. However, 
once the change has been embraced, they can be one of the strongest 
supporters of the change.
SP “Artisan” Temperament The SP temperament (ESTP, Promoter; 
ISTP, Crafter; ESFP, Performer; ISFP, Composer) personality types 
may be viewed as the action seekers. They may be viewed as opti-
mistic, generous, fun loving, adventurous, realistic, and adaptable at 
their best, or hyperactive, impatient, impulsive, and scattered at their 
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worst. They enjoy life in the here and now, highly value freedom and 
action, like risk and challenge, are spontaneous, may be perceived 
as indecisive, are observant, ask the right questions to get what they 
need, respond well to crisis, like short-term projects, and dislike laws 
and standard ways of doing things. This is sharp contrast to the SJ 
temperament previously discussed, which thrives on standards and 
ensuring that the rules are being followed.
For career selections, the SPs tend to gravitate toward careers that 
permit them to experience life versus a means toward an end. Potential 
career choices for the SJ may include emergency room nurse, medical 
assistant, photographer, police officer, public relations specialist, fire/
insurance fraud investigator, news anchor, airline mechanic, marine 
biologist, or paramedic/firefighter. In the security field, individuals 
wanting the excitement of responding to a disaster recovery situation 
or an intrusion may gravitate toward this area.
When communicating with the SP temperament, appreciation 
should be shown for their enthusiasm, common sense, and ability to 
deal with crisis. Joining in some of their activities may be appropriate, 
such as an invitation to meet them and a group of security vendors 
after work. Business executives of this type may be part of the golf 
club or bowling league, and this would be a good opportunity to net-
work with these individuals and build rapport to create a nonadver-
sarial environment. Given choices and alternatives, those sharing the 
SP temperament will want to do things their own way in their own 
timeframe. Issues should be pinpointed and overwhelming them with 
information avoided. They also do not like being told how to change 
or what to do.
NF “Idealist” Temperament Those sharing the NF temperament 
(ENFJ, Teacher; INFJ, Counselor; ENFP, Champion; INFP, Healer), 
known as the ideal seekers, share the characteristics of being compas-
sionate, loyal helpful, genuine, warmhearted, and nurturing at their 
best, or may be perceived as moody, depressed, or oversensitive at 
their worst. They are stimulated by new ideas, take an antiauthoritar-
ian attitude, often side with the underdog, see possibilities in institu-
tions and people, search for meaning and authenticity, self-actualize, 
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maintain close contact with others, give freely and need positive 
appreciation, and are good listeners.
NF temperaments may gravitate toward jobs such as psychologist, 
sociologist, facilitator, career counselor, travel agent, human resources 
recruiter, teacher (health, art, drama, foreign language), social worker, 
or hotel and restaurant manager.
When communicating with the NF temperament, cards, gifts, 
compliments and adoration go a long way. They are sensitive to criti-
cism, so extra tact is necessary. Patience is needed to understanding 
of their need to express their feelings. Their support can be gained by 
appealing to their creativity and vision of their ideals.
NT “Rational” Temperament Individuals sharing the NT tempera-
ment group (ENTJ, Field Marshal; INTJ, Mastermind; ENTP, 
Inventor; INTP, Architect), known as the knowledge seekers, have 
strengths of being innovative, inquisitive, analytical, bright, indepen-
dent, witty and competent at their best, or they may be perceived 
as arrogant, cynical, critical, distant, or self-righteous at their worst. 
They work well with ideas and concepts, value knowledge and com-
petency, understand and synthesize complex information, anticipate 
future trends, focus on long-term goals, like to start projects (although 
not as good on follow-through), not always aware of other’s feelings, 
aim for mastery, and deal with the day-to-day details but have little 
interest in them.
Knowledge seekers may be found as an executive, senior man-
ager, personnel manager, sales/marketing manager, technical trainer, 
network integration specialist, technical writer, investment banker, 
attorney, psychiatrist, database administrator, credit analyst, technical 
project manager, architect, or Web developer/computer programmer.
When communicating a security concern or initiative with the NT 
temperament, the security professional should attempt to appreci-
ate their objectivity, quick minds, and knowledge. Since they value 
mastery in what they do, conversations that are intellectually stimu-
lating should be pursued, feelings should be avoided in conversation, 
and debate with them, letting them know frequently you value their 
insights. Many of the technical staff involved in connecting patterns 
together, such as the network engineers or database administrators, 
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can become supportive of the security program by simply asking them 
for their input and genuinely incorporating their insights into the 
security strategy and subsequent implementations.
Summing Up the MBTI for Security
Communication is so important and goes well beyond providing a 
written report or an oral presentation; it is how we interact with oth-
ers on a daily basis. As the security program must remain credible to 
be effective, we must ensure that we are communicating the security 
messages clearly, and in a manner in which they will be heard. We 
tend to communicate by default by the manner that we are comfort-
able receiving. Unfortunately, and fortunately, we are not all the same, 
and we take in and process information differently. To be success-
ful within the organization, the security officer and his or her team 
need to be able to communicate at an appropriate level with others 
within the organization. Understanding the differences in personali-
ties will increase the effectiveness of the security message that needs 
to be delivered.
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the law anD 
information Security
If you give to a thief he cannot steal from you, and he is then no longer 
a thief.
William Saroyan, 1908–1981
Over the past several decades, and particularly in the last decade, 
there has been an increased focus on information security in concert 
with the fear that individual privacy could be compromised. As infor-
mation has become more electronic and networks such as the Internet 
provide access points to personal computers and company computer 
networks, the attention of lawmakers has been raised. The fear is that 
this massive aggregation and interconnection of information will lead 
to exposures of sensitive information.
Numerous laws have been put in place. In some cases, these laws 
overlap, adding to the complexity for the security officer attempting 
to build a one-size-fits-all information security program. The gover-
nance strategy must ensure the compliance with existing laws, as well 
as remain abreast of the emerging laws and regulations that are on 
the horizon. When the regulations are published, they come with a 
mandated compliance date and depending upon the size of the orga-
nization and the scope of the mandate, can be very time consuming 
to complete between the period of final law issuance and the required 
implementation. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the security offi-
cer to review draft regulations and proactively anticipate what types 
of requirements have a good chance of remaining in the final ver-
sion of the law to provide more time to implement the new require-
ments. An added benefit of this approach is that by being well versed 
in the upcoming provisions, the security officer has the opportunity 
to provide input by way of comments to the proposal, usually within 
a 60-day period for federal regulations, to help shape the legislation. 
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For example, thousands of comments were received shortly after 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Security Rule was published in 2003, which changed the format and 
contents of the Final Security Rule. This also provides the opportu-
nity for the security officer to assist his or her business partners to 
comply with the regulation, having gained experience with the details 
of the regulation.
Some regulations that must be complied with are not laws per se, 
but are regulations formulated by an industry body. The Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is good example 
of this, whereby the standard was formed by the major credit card 
issuers to ensure security between the merchants and card proces-
sors. Even though the standard is not a law, it is a requirement estab-
lished by the issuers that must be complied with to participate within 
the industry.
The subsequent sections present a brief synopsis of some of the key 
laws that have driven information security in recent years, as well 
as some of the high-level controls that are required. These sections 
should be regarded as an executive guide to the information security 
laws impacting information security decisions. Many times individu-
als are working within their own vertical industry and are unaware 
of the laws, regulations, control frameworks, and standards that are 
being discussed in other industries. Each of the laws has a specific 
purpose, genealogy, and differences with the other standards, but 
after working with these different laws, it is also clear that by fol-
lowing a consistent framework, whether it be COBIT (ITGI, n.d.), 
NIST 800-53 (NIST, 2009), ISO 27000/27001 (ISO, 2005), PCI, 
Information Security Forum (ISF) Good Security Practice (ISF, 
2007), or some other framework, there are requirements in these 
frameworks that if followed, would more than likely to satisfy the 
law or regulation in most cases. This is due to the fact that many 
of these laws and regulations are grounded in security principles to 
begin with and it should be no surprise that these requirements are 
presented within the regulation. The difference will typically be that 
the control framework will be more prescriptive and granular than the 
higher-level law. This is necessary, otherwise technology advances and 
innovation would be impeded by having the law state requirements in 
terms of today’s technology. The law or regulation would also not be 
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very flexible. These are the strengths of keeping the laws written at a 
more generic level, however, this is also criticized as a weakness since 
the law does not describe specifically what to do.
The security officer and the security department are often in a 
position where they are interpreting the law’s requirements for senior 
management. The legal staff will know the ins and outs of the legal 
system, which can be very helpful, particularly with their under-
standing of contract laws. Customers entrust their data to a business 
with the expectation that the information is adequately protected and 
used for business purposes. This expectation does not change even if 
the business decides to subcontract and share the information with 
another entity. From the perspective of the consumer, they still have 
that expectation and do not care who is at fault if there is an incident. 
The legal staff must be involved in contracts of services or products of 
other organizations to ensure that the appropriate information secu-
rity language is included. The language includes clauses that require 
the subcontractor to protect the confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability of the information, ensure there is the right to audit the con-
trols of the subentity, and establish communication protocols and 
expectations between the subcontractor and the contracting business 
in the event there is a breach. The security department can provide the 
technical expertise to the legal department or the assurance as to how 
the laws or regulations are being met.
Since it is difficult to have real privacy of information without secu-
rity, the security officer needs to keep abreast of the privacy laws as 
well. HIPAA is a prime example whereby the security regulations 
followed the privacy regulations, as it was viewed as important to pro-
tect the security of the information to achieve privacy. The fear by 
Congress was that the aggregation and moving the transactions to 
an electronic format would create privacy concerns if the security was 
not addressed.
Civil Law versus Criminal Law
Criminal laws exist for the purpose of punishing the perpetrator of 
the crime, hoping to also serve as a deterrent to others considering 
committing the same crime. Since computer crime prosecution is not 
very prevalent and very few criminals go to jail, some of the criminal 
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penalties associated with the various laws do not seem to serve as a 
large deterrent. As more criminals are prosecuted and sent to jail, 
maybe the criminal penalties will provide the deterrent that the law 
prescribes. It seems that the conduct would need to be egregious and 
willful to move to a standard of criminal prosecution. In large cases, 
such as the Heartland Payment Systems fraud where Albert Gonzalez 
received 20 years, it is obvious that an example was made of the fraud 
to deter others from engaging in similar activity (Mosaritolo, 2010).
Another reason for the lack of criminal prosecution may be that 
for criminal law the plaintiff must demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt to a jury of their peers that an offense occurred, which given 
the complexities of hacking, this may be difficult to explain in under-
standable terms to the jury. Prosecutors have to weigh the odds of a 
successful outcome before investing valuable time and resources into 
the case.
The more likely scenario is the leveling of civil monetary damages 
in the form of statutory damages that may be assessed as a matter 
of law. If the law has been violated, then there is entitlement to the 
award. This may also present itself by way of fines, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission’s assessment of $15 million in fines for Eli Lilly’s 
accidental e-mail/website disclosure of customers who were using an 
antidepressant drug (FTC, 2002).
Civil cases are must more likely to be pursued to make the victim 
whole, as the standard of proof is much different. Whereas crimi-
nal cases must determine beyond a reasonable doubt, civil cases only 
require that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to find the 
person guilty of the infraction.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA; Public 
Law 99-508), also known as the Wiretap Act, was passed by Congress 
to extend the protections of the wiretap law to electronic commu-
nication forms, such as e-mail, text, video, audio, and data. Under 
the law, messages may not be intercepted in transmission or in stored 
form while in transit. Law enforcement would need to obtain a court 
order to obtain information such as account activity logs showing 
the IP addresses that were visited by a subscriber of Internet services 
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or the e-mail addresses from who the subscriber exchanged emails. 
Law enforcement can also obtain a court order to compel cellular 
phone companies to provide records showing the cell phone location 
information for calls made from a person’s cell phone. In an effort to 
increase the foreign intelligence gathering activities after the events of 
9/11, the U.S. Patriot Act was made law by President George W. Bush 
on October 26, 2001. The U.S. Patriot Act weakened the restrictions 
and increased law enforcement’s ability to obtain telephone, e-mail 
communications, and records such as medical and financial. For 
example, a search warrant could be issued for voicemail communica-
tions, bypassing the more stringent Wiretap Act.
The Computer Security Act of 1987
Congress enacted a law that reaffirmed the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) as being responsible for the pro-
tection of unclassified, nonmilitary government systems and informa-
tion. The National Security Agency (NSA), which provided for the 
protection of classified information for the military, provided techni-
cal assistance to the nonmilitary parts of government, as Congress 
decided that is it was more appropriate to have a nonmilitary agency 
responsible for the creation of guidance for protecting civilian infor-
mation. The Computer Security Act of 1987 became Public Law 
100-235 (NIST, 1987). The key implications of the act was that it 
required that minimum acceptable security practices would be estab-
lished for federal computer systems, systems security plans would be 
constructed for the these systems defining the security controls in use, 
and that appropriate training would be provided. Computer systems 
were defined to include the computers, ancillary equipment, software, 
firmware, services, and included the computer systems operated by 
any federal agency or a contractor of a federal agency that processes 
information on behalf of the federal government.
Several attempts have been made to amend the Computer Security 
Act (1997, 1999, and 2001) to address technical changes that had 
occurred since 1987 and to designate a single agency to lead the 
computer security activities. These measures passed the House of 
Representatives and made their way through the Senate subcommit-
tees, but were not presented to the Senate for a vote. No attempts have 
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been made to change the law since 2001. This may be due in part to 
having more focus on the Federal Information Security Management 
Act of 2002.
The Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 provides restrictions on the federal gov-
ernment in the collection, maintenance, and use of the information 
collected on individuals (FTC, 1974). The act provides protection 
from disclosure of information that is defined within a “record set.” 
Information cannot be released unless it was specifically requested by 
a court and with an individual’s express consent. Whereas the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
provided protections for the release of health care information, the 
release of information contained within government systems such as 
Medicare and Medicaid was already protected by the Privacy Act of 
1974. The attempts to provide a balance between the federal govern-
ment’s need to collect information but at the same time not collect too 
much information or release information that constitutes an invasion 
of privacy. From a historical perspective, the act was born during the 
aftermath of Watergate, where information was collected on individ-
uals related to the Watergate scandal. Also, with the interconnectiv-
ity between systems and networks in the 1970s and the subsequent 
introduction of the PC that followed the act in the early ’80s, there 
was concern over the potential aggregation of information by the use 
of a single identifier, such as the social security number. The act estab-
lished fair information practices by placing some structure on how 
agencies managed their records, provided individuals with increased 
access to the records held by federal agencies; provided the means to 
amend records that were not accurate, relevant, timely, or complete; 
and restricted their disclosure to appropriate individuals.
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
Public law 107-204 was enacted on July 30, 2002, and is referred to 
as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act by the Senate, and the Corporate Auditing Accountability and 
Responsibility Act in the House of Representatives, but is most 
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widely known as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), (SEC, 2002). 
The bill came about as there were a number of accounting scandals 
that cost investors and employees of companies such as Enron, Tyco 
International, and WorldCom dearly. Arthur Andersen, a well known 
and respected audit firm and auditor for Enron, ceased doing busi-
ness after the Enron scandal. SOX established the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to provide independent over-
sight of public accounting firms providing auditing services. The act 
also established standards to ensure auditor independence and avoid 
conflicts of interest, with a key provision restricting companies that 
provide consulting from providing audit services. Executives were 
also required to take individual responsibility for the accuracy and 
completeness of the financial reports, which was represented by their 
signing off and attesting to the documents. Within organizations, this 
resulted in a series of management signoffs to ensure that appropri-
ate governance was achieved. For the chief financial officer and chief 
executive officer to sign-off on the documents, it was not unusual for 
them to also require attestations of the management staff as well.
The most significant section of the law is section 404, which 
requires an assessment of the internal controls. This part of the law 
has received criticism in recent years for the costs associated with 
compliance. Initially, many auditing firms took a very conservative 
view of what was required to be in compliance, resulting in some cases 
extensive auditing, documentation, and testing of the automated con-
trols. However, the increased attention to the internal controls has 
had a positive effect on the controls that in the past were overridden 
by management. The laws did represent more risk to the audit firms, 
as more work needed to be done to ensure that there was no unde-
tected fraud being committed.
The PCAOB approved auditing standard No. 5 on July 25, 2007, 
replacing the guidance provided in standard No. 2 issued in 2004. 
The guidance refers to the report of the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (also known as the 
COSO report) as a framework for demonstrating the internal controls.
The European Union has passed a law named Directive 84/253/
EEC, also called the 8th Company Law Directive. This is some-
times referred to as EuroSOX, however, this name is somewhat of 
a misnomer when compared to the United States version of SOX. 
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The difference is that the legislative process takes time and must be 
addressed by each country. Whereas the U.S. version was a single law 
that was mandated at once, the European directive is met by various 
laws within each country. The adoption of the directive has been var-
ied and not had the same focus or effect as SOX in the United States. 
The international standards such as ISO 27001/27002, COBIT, and 
COSO appear to be the predominant standards used to demonstrate 
adequate internal controls.
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA)
The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA; Public Law 106-1020), also 
known as the Financial Services Act, was enacted on November 12, 
1999, which repealed part of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933, which 
provided the ability for banks to function as an investment bank, 
commercial bank, and insurance company. The act also provided the 
Financial Privacy Rule, which permitted individuals to opt out of 
having their information shared with unaffiliated parties. Individuals 
need to be notified each time the privacy policy is changed and must 
be given the opportunity to opt out. As such, the Financial Privacy 
Rule established a privacy policy between the individual and the 
company. Section 501(b) of the GLBA required the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (FRB), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to develop standards 
for the examination to ensure that adequate safeguards are being 
implemented. The examination procedures were developed to deter-
mine the involvement of the board of directors, evaluate the risk man-
agement process, evaluate the adequacy of the program to manage 
and control risk, assess measures taken to oversee service providers, 
and determine where an effective process exists to adjust the program.
The Safeguards Rule of the GLBA requires the development of a 
written information security plan and must protect the current and 
past client’s financial information. Title 15, chapter 94, subchapter I, 
section 6801(b) requires that the financial institution “establish appro-
priate standards for the financial institutions subject to their juris-
diction relating to administrative, technical and physical safeguards 
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and 
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information; (2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards 
to the security or integrity of such records; and (3) to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which 
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.” 
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) IT 
Examination Handbook discussed in Chapter 7 can be used as a basis 
to meet the GLBA requirements.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) was enacted by Congress (Public Law 104-191) with two 
purposes in mind: (1) to reform health insurance to protect insurance 
coverage for workers and families when they change or lose their jobs, 
and (2) to simplify the administrative processes by adopting stan-
dards to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation’s health 
care system. Title I of HIPAA contains provisions to address health 
insurance reform, whereas Title II addresses national standards 
for electronic transactions, unique health identifiers, privacy, and 
security. Title II is known as Administrative Simplification and is 
intended to reduce the costs of health care through the widespread 
use of electronic data interchange. Administrative simplification was 
added to the Title XI of the Social Security Act through Subtitle F of 
Title II of the enacted HIPAA law.
Although the initial intent of the Administrative Simplification 
was to reduce the administrative costs associated with processing 
health care transactions, Congress recognized that standardizing and 
electronically aggregating health care information would increase the 
risk of disclosure of confidential information, and the patient’s privacy 
rights needed to be protected. Security provisions were needed not 
only to protect the confidentiality of information but also to ensure 
that information retained the appropriate integrity. Consider the situ-
ation where the diagnosis or vital sign information is changed on a 
medical record, and subsequent treatment decisions are based upon 
this information. The impact of not being able to rely on the informa-
tion stored within the health care environment could have life-threat-
ening consequences. Thus, privacy issues are primarily centered on 
the confidentiality of information to ensure that only the appropriate 
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individuals have access to the information, whereas the security stan-
dards take on a larger scope to also address issues of integrity and 
availability of information.
The proposed security and electronic signature standards were 
originally published in the Federal Register on August 12, 1998. The 
security rule was delayed on several occasions, as resources were com-
mitted to and focused on the proposed transaction and code set and 
privacy rules, both of which generated a large number of public com-
ments. These public comments must be reviewed, and the numbers 
can be large. Several thousand comments were received on the privacy 
rule and on the proposed security rule. The security rule was initiated 
during the Clinton administration and was carried over into the Bush 
administration, which created political challenges for expedient pas-
sage of the rule. As a result, the language was rewritten during 2002 to 
coincide with the privacy rule (issued on December 28, 2000, and was 
subsequently modified on August 14, 2002, with a compliance date for 
most covered entities of April 14, 2003), which needed to go through 
the Health ad Human Services clearance process prior to final rule 
publication. The Final Security Rule was submitted by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services to the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) in early 2003 and was published in the Federal 
Register as 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, and 164 on February 20, 2003. 
The regulations became effective on April 21, 2003, and covered enti-
ties were required to comply with the requirements by April 21, 2005, 
and small health plans had until April 21, 2006.
The Administrative Simplification (Part C of Title XI of the Social 
Security Act) provisions state that covered entities that maintain or 
transmit health information are required to “maintain reasonable 
and appropriate administrative, physical and technical safeguards to 
ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information and to pro-
tect against any reasonable anticipated threats or hazards to the secu-
rity or integrity of the information and unauthorized use or disclosure 
of the information.” The administrative, technical, and physical safe-
guards were divided into addressable and required implementation 
specifications. The addressable standards were more flexible; how-
ever, the required safeguards had to be implemented according to the 
rule. The contractors supporting Medicare claims processing (fiscal 
intermediaries and carriers now known as Medicare administrative 
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contractors) were given the directive that all of the required and 
addressable security controls were to be regarded as required, setting 
a higher, and more stringent standard for the protection of Medicare 
information maintained by the contractors.
Since the Final Security Rule was written to be consistent with the 
Privacy Rule, the focus of security standards applied to health infor-
mation in support of the Administrative Simplification requirements 
were shifted to protected health information (PHI) and specifically to 
electronic PHI. The applicability statement of the Final Security Rule 
states: “A covered entity must comply with the applicable standards, 
implementation specifications, and requirements of this subpart with 
respect to electronic protected health information.” Covered entities 
are defined as (1) a health plan, (2) a health care clearinghouse, and 
(3) a health care provider who transmits any health information in 
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by part 162 
of title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
The security rule was meant to be scalable such that small provid-
ers would not be burdened with excessive costs of implementation, 
and the large providers, health plans, and clearinghouses could take 
steps appropriate to their business environments. For example, a small 
office may be able to control access and enforce segregation of duties 
between the staff with a manually documented process with super-
visory review, whereas a larger organization would most likely need 
automated support through an identity management system, manage-
ment approval processes, and automated reporting tools to achieve 
the same level of assurance. Decisions have to be made to reasonably 
protect the information and document how the decisions were deter-
mined. Although it was earlier recognized that security is always a 
risk-based decision, it is sometimes difficult to determine what will be 
“reasonable” under the circumstances.
One of the criticisms of the HIPAA Final Security Rule since its 
mandated implementation has been the lack of enforcement. When 
the HIPAA law was first issued, many organizations were very focused 
on achieving HIPAA compliance and formed steering committees, 
hired consultants and tracked compliance. Investigations were han-
dled on a complaint-basis only, which resulted in a small number of 
complaints given the number of health care providers. In February 
2006, HHS issued the Final Rule for HIPAA enforcement, setting 
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the civil monetary penalties and procedures for investigations. Since 
the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), which is in charge of the enforce-
ment, has tried to work out arrangements between the offender and 
the victim versus pursue prosecution, there have been few prosecu-
tions under the law. In 2007, Piedmont Hospital in Atlanta was the 
first to undergo a HIPAA-type audit, which caused concern across 
health care as to whether the government would be actively audit-
ing health care organizations. To date, this fear has not materialized.
Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act
As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
Subtitle D of the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act extended the HIPAA security and 
privacy rules to the business associates of the covered entities. Breach 
notification requirements were also added to the HITECH Act, 
requiring the Federal Trade Commission and HHS to issue guidance 
on the breach notification requirements. Additionally, the organization 
must account for disclosures when using an electronic health record 
(EHR). The HITECH Act strengthened the civil monetary penalties 
by raising the maximum fine from $25,000 under HIPAA to $1.5 mil-
lion under HITECH. The first civil monetary penalty (CMP) of this 
magnitude was issued by the HHS Office for Civil Rights to Cignet 
Health (Cignet) for violating the HIPAA privacy rule in the amount 
of $4.3 million. OCR issued a notice of proposed determination on 
October 20, 2010, finding that Cignet violated 41 patients’ rights 
by denying them access to their medical records that were requested 
between September 2008 and October 2009. These violations resulted 
in $1.3 million in fines, and Cignet’s failure to fully cooperate in the 
investigation netted it an additional $3 million in fines (Vijayan, 2011).
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)
The primary purpose of the Federal Information Security Management 
Act of 2002 (FISMA), enacted as Title III of the E-Government Act 
of 2002, is to provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the 
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effectiveness of security controls over information resources that sup-
port federal operations and assets (NIST, 2002). The law also pro-
vided funding for NIST to develop the minimum necessary controls 
required to provide adequate security. The government publishes an 
annual report card based upon its assessment of compliance with the 
framework. Multiple bills have been introduced into Congress in 
recent years to change FISMA from what is perceived to be largely 
a paper-based compliance reporting mechanism to one that is more 
reflective of the risks and incorporates the concept of continuous 
monitoring and standardized methods to measure the security of the 
systems. FISMA applies not only to the federal government but also 
to those contracted to perform actions on behalf of the government. 
































Figure 13.1 Federal information Security Management System (FiSMa) control areas.
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Summary
Although the preceding discussion of some of the information secu-
rity laws is not a comprehensive list, the laws represented provide the 
majority of the driving legislation in force today, and should give 
the perception that information security is being addressed by laws 
and regulations in multiple industries and governments. Different 
laws permit different causes of action for enforcement of the secu-
rity rules. For example, until recently with the introduction of the 
HITECH Act, a HIPAA violation could not be used to sue for a 
private cause of action. Now state attorney generals have the author-
ity to sue using the HIPAA law as the basis. In January 2010, the 
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal sued Health Net 
of Connecticut alleging it failed to secure patient information when 
it lost a hard drive containing personal information on 1.5 million 
patients and waited 6 months to inform the consumers of the breach.
The laws have come about in large part because information secu-
rity is not something that businesses will normally invest in just 
because ‘it is the right thing to do.’ Without this legislation, it is likely 
that the security posture of the impacted industries would not be 
where they are today, albeit there is much work that needs to be done. 
Smaller organizations often find it difficult to obtain the appropri-
ate resources to comply with the regulations, and larger organizations 
may become complacent after the initial implementation following a 
new law’s introduction if the appropriate security oversight and gov-
ernance mechanisms noted in the other chapters are not put in place.
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learninG from information 
Security inciDentS
The public seldom forgive twice.
Johann Kaspar Lavater, 1741–1801
The common method of building an information security program 
is to (1) review the laws and regulations that apply to the particular 
organization and determine which ones are pertinent, (2) develop a 
gap analysis or assessment to determine which controls are missing, 
(3) create an information security policy representing the required 
laws and regulations, and (4) developing and implementing controls 
to satisfy the policy that has been developed.
This process may appear somewhat simplified and make it sound as 
if it is a simple, quick exercise, when in fact this process can occur itera-
tively over several years to move an organization to a place where it feels 
comfortable with the security controls. And just as the organization is 
beginning to feel comfortable, new technologies are introduced, mergers 
and acquisitions take place, and new breaches are reported in the news.
This chapter focuses on security incidents that have occurred over 
the past several years. Why are these important? After all, these are 
other companies’ incidents occurring on different infrastructures with 
different applications and “our security is so much tighter … espe-
cially than our competition’s!” Reality is, we can learn so much from 
what other people have experienced without having to experience it 
for ourselves. We do not have to drink alcohol to excess, smoke, or 
use illegal drugs to know that these can be harmful to us. We do not 
have to run a red light to know that it could be fatal. As children, we 
are taught not to “ jump in a river because someone else told us to.” 
We are human beings with the ability to assimilate information and 
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learn from the mistakes of others. The daily newspaper provides an 
excellent vehicle to learn from others’ mistakes.
While it is useful to read as many technical magazines and books 
on information security as possible, one does not need to go further 
than reading USA Today to get a very good idea of the security issues 
that are occurring. There is rarely a single day that goes by that there 
is not a USA Today article that is highlighting an information security 
concern. Organizations obviously do not want to be the ones that 
are associated with the security issues; however, organizations should 
view these newspapers and magazines as opportunities to learn what 
issues are of interest to the general public to avoid them ever occur-
ring in the first place. Daily scanning of the newspaper for incidents 
provides a very proactive way to develop the appropriate controls to 
minimize the occurrence of the events within the organization and 
keep out of the newspapers.
Verizon also provides an annual report on data breaches that is very 
interesting and provides much intelligence as to where the breaches 
appear to be coming from and the types of exploits that are occurring. 
Since it started in 2004, Verizon has analyzed over 1700 breaches and 
over 900 million compromised records. According to its latest report, 
92% of the breaches were external, 50% utilized some form of hack-
ing, 49% used malware, and 83% of the victims were targets of oppor-
tunity (Verizon Business, 2011). It is fascinating to note that 92% of 
the attacks were not highly difficult, 86% were not even discovered by 
the organizations themselves but rather by third parties, and 96% of 
the breaches were avoidable by simple or intermediate controls. This 
data suggests that organizations that can understand what incidents 
are occurring and have the appropriate information security gover-
nance structures in place to implement and monitor the appropriate 
controls have the ability to significantly reduce the likelihood these 
incidents will occur. Implementation of security controls does not nec-
essarily involve large expenditures for technical solutions, but rather 
the understanding of the controls necessary and ensuring their consis-
tent application. Examining the incidents of other companies can pro-
vide insight as to where the people, process, or technology breakdowns 
may be occurring within the organization. Just because an incident is 
not yet known does not mean that it has not yet occurred, citing that 
in 86% of the cases they were discovered by third parties. For the small 
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organization that does not have the scale of business connections a 
large organization may have, it may have data being stolen without its 
knowledge and without knowledge that it was the target until some-
one else in a business relationship reports an issue.
Information security governance depends upon effectively communi-
cating the policies, procedures, and controls throughout the company and 
ensuring that they are being followed. One method of gaining the atten-
tion of others needed to support the policies is to provide them with an 
understanding that the threats are not theoretical, but rather are real and 
occur more than they may be aware. Security governance failures at other 
organizations, as represented by their security incidents, and especially 
those that share the same vertical industry, size, revenue, and geographic 
characteristics can provide the incentive necessary to examine how the 
organization is ensuring that that same situation will not occur there.
Recent Security Incidents
The security incidents that follow can be used as examples within the 
organization to explain the need for different security controls. These 
incidents are only a handful of the incidents that are reported each 
year, each chosen due either by their widespread coverage of the issue 
or to provide a good cross-section of security issues as a reference.
Texas State Comptroller
Issue: Texas State Comptroller’s Office exposes 3.5 million per-
sonal records
Company: State of Texas
Date: January 2010; discovered March 31, 2011
Impact: $1.8 million
Lessons learned: The comptroller’s office left information including 
Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, birth dates, and 
mailing addresses on their servers unprotected for over a year before it 
was noticed. Information that was transferred from three other state 
agencies was stored on the computers unencrypted, which was in vio-
lation of the procedures. The comptroller’s office subsequently hired 
consulting firms ($290,000), established a call center for inquiries 
($393,000), and spent $1.2 million to notify those whose information 
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had been exposed (Rashid, 2011). As expected, the security officer 
and security staff were terminated following the incident.
This was clearly a case where the organization knew the proper 
actions, however, due to a lack of following the prescribed proce-
dures, the organization was placed at risk. Based upon the fact that 
the exposure was not discovered until a year later also suggests that 
there was a lack of ongoing internal review of the security procedures 
and subsequent security testing that the procedures were being fol-
lowed. Several years earlier, a Texas attorney general sent a memo 
to ensure that sensitive databases were protected in reaction to other 
breaches that were occurring. This illustrates that the reaction to a 
security incident by issuing a memo may provide the appearance 
that action is being taken and may satisfy management that they 
are performing due diligence in being aware of potential threats, 
but without adequate implementation of information security gov-
ernance in the form of policies, procedures, and internal review 
processes, the issuance of a memo by itself is not very effective. The 
support is admirable and may even be politically motivated versus 
amounting to increased protection of the organization’s resources.
Sony PlayStation Network
Issue: Sony PlayStation Network and Qriocity servers breached
Company: Sony
Date: April 17–19, 2011
Impact: E-mail addresses, birth dates, login, and password details revealed
Lessons learned: Hackers were able to gain access to a Sony server 
exposing the names, email addresses, birth dates, login/password 
information, and credit card information for Sony’s online gamers. 
Since information was retrieved about the gamers and their purchas-
ing histories, this opened the possibility of targeted phishing attacks 
based upon their prior purchasing histories and tastes in music and 
online video games. Subsequent spear phishing attacks could cause 
some gamers to give up bank account and Social Security information 
in the future. Many websites use the e-mail address as the identifier 
to log into their websites, and end users may use the same password 
to authenticate for simplicity across these sites, exposure of the e-mail 
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address information and login information can provide the hackers 
with the means to access other accounts for fraudulent purposes.
Sony has had to provide several public apologies since taking the 
site offline. The real damage to the company is the failure of trust in 
the network as well as the time it takes to investigate the breach while 
the network is offline. Even though the credit card information may 
be encrypted as Sony indicated, the cost of lawsuits and public rela-
tions most certainly will have long-term effects. One question that 
should be answered is why did Sony store the credit card information, 
even encrypted, in the first place. Since other processing companies 
typically handled processing, there really was no need to store this 
information. Also, was this the result of a targeted phishing attack 
against someone with administrative access to the information? If so, 
what extra controls were in place, in terms of policies, training, sepa-
ration of IDs, frequency of administrative password changes, logging 
and monitoring detection, and so forth to mitigate the risk of a tar-
geted attack?
Although the long-term financial impact of the breach is unclear, 
what is not unclear is that in the minds of 77 million members of the 
Sony PlayStation Network, Sony failed to protect their information. 
As Sony offered free credit protection as well as reimbursement of up 
to $1 million per person for identity restoration costs, legal fees, and 
lost wages within 12 months of the incident, the final costs of the 
breach could be substantial (Kitten, 2011).
One could make the assumption that Sony was lax in its applica-
tion of appropriate security controls. However, it would be difficult to 
assume that an organization the size of Sony did not allocate extensive 
resources toward protecting the network. The incident should demon-
strate how fragile our networks are. The security staff may close the 
doors 99.9% of the time, but the one time that someone lets down 
their guard, that door becomes opened and a public relations night-
mare ensues. This incident also suggests that multiple doors need to be 
in place, whereby there is a system of checks and balances, and road-
blocks that make it difficult to penetrate the system undetected. Sony 
attempted to bring up the system initially in early May 2011, how-
ever it was unable to because the hackers had penetrated the systems 
deeper than Sony originally thought. Clearly, 100% of the end users 
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will not perform what is asked for in the policies 100% of the time, so 
there must be other controls within the environment such as antivi-
rus filtering, spyware detection, vulnerability scanning, logging and 
monitoring, baseline configurations, administrative access controls, 
data classification, restricted file access, help desk procedures, and so 
forth to mitigate the risk of an elevation of privileges when they are 
targeted and give up their keys. For example, the end user’s car keys 
may open the car door, but the steering wheel manual locking device 
prevents the car from going further. The cliché “defense in depth” is 
very real and security departments need to review multiple strategies 
to answer, “What if they were able to get through this door, then what?”
Student Loan Social Security Numbers Stolen
Issue: 3.3 million Social Security numbers stolen from student 
loan program
Company: Education Credit Management
Date: March 2010
Impact: Social Security numbers revealed
Lessons learned: The information was not stolen from external Internet 
access but rather from information residing on a thumb drive. The 
company has not revealed whether the information was encrypted, 
but one can make some assumptions here that the information was 
not encrypted since the federal loan guarantor is offering 12 months 
of credit protection to the 3.3 million individuals, representing 5% of 
the federal student loans (Fox News, 2010). Organizations would not 
incur that expense if there was no real security breach. As noted in 
the previous chapter, similar breaches of a portable device occurred 
in November 2010 when Health Net, Inc., lost an unencrypted hard 
drive containing Social Security numbers and bank account numbers 
on 1.5 million people.
The first step in protecting portable media is to ensure that poli-
cies are in place as to what can and cannot be copied to flash drives, 
USB thumb drives, CDs, DVDs, and by whom. Policies in them-
selves may provide the protections once detected, however, without 
adequate technical controls, enforcement of the policies may be very 
difficult at best. Care also must be taken to ensure that information is 
appropriately classified and segregated for access control to reduce the 
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likelihood that the wrong individuals will have access to the infor-
mation. Monitoring also needs to be in place to see what informa-
tion is being copied. When people inside the organization know that 
monitoring activities are taking place, this can serve as a strong deter-
rent toward copying information to external media. The copying may 
not even be malicious, but may increase the risk that the information 
would be exposed through accidental loss of the drive.
Social Security Numbers Printed on Outside of Envelopes
Issue: Social Security numbers printed on outside of envelopes
Company: CitiGroup
Date: January 2010
Impact: 600,000 CitiGroup customers
Lessons learned: The annual tax documents that were mailed con-
tained the Social Security number on the outside envelope. CitiGroup’s 
communications indicated, “The digits were not identified as a Social 
Security number, and they were printed at the lower edge of the mail-
ing envelope with other numbers and letters that together resembled a 
mail routing number.” It also stated, “We believe there is little or no risk 
to our customers. The error has been corrected for all future mailings.”
These communications sound almost like a denial that there was a 
real issue in the public relations announcements, attempting to down-
play the fact that Social Security numbers were printed on the enve-
lopes. Was this the result of a genuine mistake? Did CitiGroup use 
the social security number as part of a series of numbers to control the 
printing reconciliation process? Was this the idea of one program-
mer? (Fox Business, 2010) Did this error slip though the peer reviews, 
and was the design implementation reviewed by information security 
before rolling this out the door? Or was this result of a quick, subcon-
tract relationship by a small external vendor that was unaware of the 
security implications? Or was it the result of all of the above?
Printing of Social Security numbers on envelopes is not a new phe-
nomenon. Several state agencies have been guilty of doing the same 
and in some cases multiple times. For example, the State of Wisconsin 
repeated the mistake three times in one year, once blaming an exter-
nal contractor and another time blaming the error on a malfunction 
of the folding machines permitting the Social Security number to be 
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shown in the envelope window. Obviously a procedure change did not 
occur by the external contractor to prevent the issue from happening a 
second time by the same contractor.
People make mistakes and that is a given. However, care must be 
taken when it comes to critical information, such as identifiers like 
Social Security numbers, credit card information, driver’s license num-
bers, birth dates, maiden names, and security codes. Most organiza-
tions do not have a good handle on where this information resides 
and where it flows. Security dollars need to be allocated to the highest 
risk assets to be effective, so why not target these high-value informa-
tion assets when constructing the security program. In this case, the 
printing of the Social Security numbers should be traced from the 
birth (receipt) of the Social Security number, life (storage, printing), 
to death (no longer needed), and incorporate the appropriate protec-
tion and quality assurance strategies to ensure that the information is 
protected throughout the life cycle.
Valid E-Mail Addresses Exposed
Issue: Issuer of 40 billion e-mails per year is breached
Company: Epsilon
Date: March 2011
Impact: Active e-mail accounts of users of at least 50 major compa-
nies disclosed
Lessons learned: Most people have never heard of the company named 
Epsilon and have not had a prior relationship with them—until this 
breach was revealed. Epsilon provides e-mail services for many major 
brands, including Brookstone, Best Buy, Chase, Citi, Capital One, 
Walgreens, Marriott, and Kroger. Epsilon sends approximately 
40 billion e-mails per year for over 2500 clients. The breach at Epsilon 
provided the active e-mail accounts of customers of these firms, which 
could be used in future phishing attacks. Not only do the hackers have 
the valid e-mail account addresses, but now they also have the names 
of companies where individuals shop, which can lead to clever phish-
ing attacks (Schwartz, 2011).
The companies issued e-mails offering apologies, while also 
emphatically stating in bold print, “but did not include any customer 
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account or financial information.” They also issued further reminders 
about not revealing personal information in e-mail requests. As in the 
case of the Sony PlayStation, this breach represents a public relations 
issue. However, in the Epsilon case the organizations involved simply 
passed the blame for the breach by stating “we have been informed by 
Epsilon, a vendor we use to send e-mails …” Fortunately, there was 
enough foresight to not share customer account and financial infor-
mation with the e-mail service provider to limit the risk. There is still 
the risk when engaging a subcontractor that their actions will cause 
issues for the business. While the full extent of the damage of this 
may never be known, as it is not clear who accessed the information 
and what motives they had (was it the work of script kiddies or moti-
vated hackers for subsequent financial gain), these situations illustrate 
the care that must be taken when subcontracting work to another 
company. Are they being audited frequently? Are these audits rigor-
ous? What is their process when a security incident occurs? What 
is the liability of the contracted firm versus the liability of the one 
contracting? Who determines if credit monitoring must be offered in 
case of a breach and who pays for it? These items should be discussed 
and clearly documented well in advance of the breach.
E-mail addresses when compared to transaction-type information, 
such as credit card information, Social Security numbers, or a health 
care subscriber ID may be considered to be less of a risk to the orga-
nization if disclosed. This breach illustrates that this thinking may 
be in error, as the knowledge of the e-mail address, combined with 
the company name, provides the opportunity for hackers to exploit 
existing account holders through phishing attacks or provide targeted 
marketing (i.e., phony ads requesting personal account information 
entry) to obtain account information.
This breach could eclipse the largest breach, which occurred at 
Heartland Payment Systems where 130 million credit and debit card 
accounts were impacted, causing Heartland to examine stronger 
security controls, such as end-to-end encryption, tokenization, and 
chip technology. Albert Gonzalez was convicted for the Heartland 
break-in and earned the harshest sentence given to date for this type 
of crime, 20 years, which resulted in losses exceeding $200 million 
according to federal prosecutors.
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Office Copier Hard Disk Contained Confidential Information
Issue: 409,000 records breached after being left on office copier
Company: Affinity Health Plan
Date: March 2010
Impact: Medical information, Social Security numbers, date of 
birth released
Lessons learned: Information was left on a company copier that was 
returned to the leasing company (Rey, 2010). Who knew the copier 
had a hard drive? Many of the copiers today have the capability to 
scan and e-mail information, and may have remnants left on the 
copier. Who has access to this information? How was it configured? 
Can information from the copier be sent to people outside of the orga-
nization, unencrypted? What processes are in place for media saniti-
zation and disposal? What are the procedures to prevent access of the 
information by the firm servicing the equipment?
The incident illustrates that when new technology is introduced to 
an organization, the policies need to ensure that information security 
is involved. This situation could have been avoided if some simple 
questions about storage and encryption were answered with respect 
to the copiers. The incident also highlights that information security 
governance must take a holistic approach to information security and 
consider information in all forms—written, oral, and electronic—
when considering the security controls that may be required.
Advanced Persistent Threat Targets Security Token




Impact: Uneasiness of RSA token security
Lessons learned: Advanced persistent threats (APTs) whereby targets 
are chosen and a series of ongoing attacks against a specific, targeted 
organization to achieve a particular objective are on the increase. As 
opposed to the typical phishing attack whereby millions of potential 
targets are presented with a phishing e-mail and the hope is that a 
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small percentage will bite, the advanced persistent attacks attempt 
to penetrate a particular target over a period of time to gain access 
to valuable information. In this case, RSA Security’s security token 
was the target. The token generates a random number every 30 to 
60 seconds based upon the token ID, time, and a seed value. The 
algorithm was reverse engineered about 10 years ago, so with the 
token ID or the seed value, it would be possible to generate the pass 
code. A pin number also has to be supplied by the end user and the 
login ID would need to be known, each of which could be obtained 
through social engineering, thus reducing the strength of this method 
of authentication. RSA had not yet disclosed what information was 
accessed through the APT (Kirk, 2011).
Eventually, hackers working to defeat a security control, given 
enough time and resources, may defeat the control. While it is still 
unknown as to the impact of the RSA Security breach, it may require 
that millions of tokens be invalidated and reissued if this is the case. 
The lesson here is not so much about the viability of the RSA prod-
uct, but rather that an organization needs to fully understand what 
software, hardware, and security controls are in place to protect the 
organization and if there are issues with any of those products. This is 
not to suggest that an organization discontinues the use of an industry 
product upon the initial news, especially if there is not a better alter-
native. However, when these events do occur, it demonstrates that 
products that were once secure may require some additional controls 
or require an upgrade or replacement as a result of a breach. This is 
part of the cost of doing business.
The organization needs to be aware of technology changes and 
when they become insufficient to protect the information assets. 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was a standard approved in 1999 
to protect wireless networks. However, the standard was replaced 
by the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) standard and WPA2 stan-
dards in 2003 and 2004, respectively, after it was determined that 
the WEP standard was too easily broken into and was no longer suf-
ficient. WEP was one of the vulnerabilities that caused the T.J. Maxx 
company to be breached. The Payment Card Industry’s Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS) subsequently required all companies handling 
credit card data after June 2010 to implement WPA security or better.
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Who Will Be Next?
Financial services firms have long understood the need for informa-
tion security to protect the financial information and provide contin-
gencies for the losses by replacing the funds in the customer accounts 
and making them whole again. This becomes more difficult in the 
case of medical information. Once the disclosure has happened and 
the individual’s personal information is disclosed, it is impossible to 
“put the information back in the bottle.” The damage is already done 
after the disclosure and it is then up to civil penalties to make it right. 
However, unlike the banking scenario, the confidentiality breach 
cannot be undone and appear as if it never happened to the consumer.
The disclosures in the preceding examples may or may not result in 
actual financial damages to the consumer or the company, depending 
upon to whom the information was provided. In the copier example, 
the company was able to retrieve some of the hard drives from the 
leasing company. Had anyone seen the data at the leasing company? 
If they had, were they the type of individual that would have acted or 
sold the information? If the disclosure was accidental, odds are that 
the information would not have fallen into malicious hands unless the 
attack was initiated in that manner. An organization may misplace a 
tape, CD, DVD, or USB drive, but unless the whereabouts are clearly 
known, there is the possibility that it was accidentally discarded in a 
place that no one would have accessed it (e.g., shredded, thrown out 
in the garbage). This does not suggest that the follow-on precautions 
do not need to be observed in investigating the incident, reviewing 
policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of the event happen-
ing again in the future, and increasing the security controls, but rather 
that it is possible that no one was harmed by the incident. In today’s 
world where we fear having our identities stolen, organizations need 
to be on the conservative side of providing the proper assurance after 
a breach, or the company risks losing the customer base. On the other 
hand, when an organization thinks that the compromise is the result 
of a targeted attack (versus an accidental mishandling of informa-
tion), since the attack is the result of malicious intent, the organiza-
tion needs to assume that any information disclosed will be used in 
subsequent activities by the hacker for financial gain.
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Unfortunately individuals who have been victims of identity theft 
may need to spend years to undo the damage done to their credit 
histories and encounter problems in purchasing new houses, cars, or 
even applying for credit at the local big-box store. Assuming that each 
of the individuals affected will tell at least 10 of their friends of the 
breach, if they know the source of the breach, such as identity theft 
occurring shortly after the Heartland Payment Systems breach or the 
Epsilon breach, they may create a loss in revenue for the organizations 
issuing their credit cards even though they did not directly cause the 
breach. As noted earlier, the work of the subcontractors is often attrib-
uted to the company that hired them. It is doubtful that few people 
could name the subcontractors that printed viewable social security 
numbers in the State of Wisconsin example, but surely the State of 
Wisconsin was viewed as not appropriately managing the process.
So, what organization will be next? Hopefully, lessons can be 
learned without having to experience them firsthand. It becomes very 
costly once a breach occurs, not only for the cost of the actual breach 
in terms of breach notification, credit monitoring, public relations, 
restoring the infrastructure, and upgrading security controls, but also 
in legal fees to fend off lawsuits, fines, and increased use of external 
audits, vulnerability assessments, and penetration testing. After an 
incident these services are also usually needed very rapidly, and as 
a result, the costs for the services may be much higher than if the 
processes were built into and prices negotiated as part of an ongoing 
information security program.
Every Control Could Result in an Incident
One way to view security controls is, “What could happen if we didn’t 
implement the control?” The answer to this question can be answered 
by scanning the USA Today articles referred to at the beginning of 
this chapter. A useful exercise would be to construct what the head-
line would be: “UPSTARTXYZ Company Fails to Protect Millions,” 
“ABCHealth Reveals 500,000 AIDS Patients,” or “Local Newspaper 
buys 123Company Intellectual Property Hard Drive on e-Bay.” The 
information security governance program must focus on the risk 
of the assets and ensure that the appropriate controls are in place. 
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Examining the lessons learned on a periodic basis from other com-
panies and subsequently testing the information security policies, 
results in asking the right questions to examine where there may be 
new vulnerabilities.
From a cost perspective, reviewing the incidents of other companies 
is a very cost-effective way to enhance the security governance. What 
is learned is not only what the incident was, but the press releases 
also typically indicate what actions the company is planning to pro-
vide comfort to the public that the company can again be entrusted 
with its customers’ sensitive information. Information gleaned from 
these incidents should be regarded as “free research.” Someone else 
has already done their homework after the incident to reduce the risk 
of the occurrence happening again, and much can be learned from the 
incident and subsequent resolution.
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17 wayS to DiSmantle 
information Security 
Governance effortS
Now, what I want is Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. 
Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out every-
thing else.
Charles Dickens, 1812–1870
“17 Ways to Dismantle Information Security Governance Efforts.” 
Now that is an odd title for the last chapter in a book that was written 
to provide insights on ways to successfully provide the proper informa-
tion security governance for the organization. Why would we want to 
know how to dismantle information security governance? Why would 
we want to know how to effectively sink an information security pro-
gram? After all, when we set out to achieve something, the objective 
should be to do our best and succeed, right? The answer is simple. 
Although implementing the guidance provided in the rest of this book 
will go a long way toward increasing the chances of success, this book 
cannot possibly cover all the gotchas that will occur during the life 
cycle of building and maintaining an effective security program.
This chapter provides insights into a few of these gotchas to watch 
out for, as any one of them has the capability to put the security officer 
and his or her department in a position where they could lose credibil-
ity with their peers and make implementation of the security program 
difficult at best. Some of these items are covered in more detail in the 
other chapters, however, it is useful to have a quick list of items to be 
aware of. This list could be reviewed on a weekly basis, as a checklist 
or as a quick assessment of activities that need to be performed that 
may be beyond the daily job of responding to issues, implementing 
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new controls, and managing the information security program. Just as 
it is prudent to be prepared for incidents that may occur, management 
should also be prepared for these security management incidents and 
have a response plan to deal with these situations.
1. Out of Sight, Out of Mind (Lack of Management Visibility)
The security department may address all the information security 
areas but may lack in having the appropriate management visibility. 
This could be due to not being high enough in the organizational 
structure, reporting to an area that does not have much organizational 
clout, or not taking the right steps to be engaged with the rest of the 
management team. More often than not, if the security function is 
not reporting high enough in the management chain, it is usually bur-
ied within the information technology (IT) organization. In recent 
years, the security function has gained visibility due to the plethora of 
compliance laws and regulations and the instant notoriety of breaches 
that has gained the attention of many boards of directors.
2. I Can Do It All by Myself
The technical and analytical competence and desire may exist within 
the information security department, however, there will always be 
new technologies and new ways of solving problems to consider. It 
is unrealistic to believe that a company’s information security staff 
can be proficient in all technologies in all platforms. Typically when 
a new product is introduced, say a vulnerability scanning tool or data 
loss prevention (DLP) tool, there will need to be external expertise to 
install, configure, tune, set up the reporting, and provide assistance 
to interpret the information delivered by the tool. The company’s 
information security department brings its knowledge of the com-
pany environment, infrastructure, and requirements to the table. The 
external vendors can provide knowledge transfer of the product since 
they are installing and working with the product on a daily basis. 
Departments purchasing products without purchasing professional 
installation assistance or subsequent training for their staff are missing 
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an opportunity to enhance the usage of the product and accelerate 
development of the product’s features to meet the business needs.
3. He That Knows Nothing, Doubts Nothing
The security organization should embrace the lifelong learning con-
cept to its fullest by encouraging certifications of the security staff, 
online webinars, conferences, subscribing to security publications, 
and purchasing security books in areas they would like to focus on in 
greater depth. Without this institutional knowledge, it is very easy to 
accept whatever explanations are provided for not doing something 
or assuming that the information assets are adequately protected, 
when they are not. Without the proper knowledge through individual 
learning the organization may be accepting risks than they should.
4. Honesty Is the Best Policy
Access is compromised and incidents occur even when the best efforts 
have been applied to managing the security controls. Sometimes there 
may be gaps in a process due to other higher priority projects, and a 
termination fails to be processed on time, a system failure renders 
the security event information management products temporarily 
unusable, or the network engineer accidently opens a mail relay on a 
server while applying maintenance. The security department needs to 
be honest and deal with the issue that has been created to maintain 
credibility. The organization needs to have multiple defense-in-depth 
quality assurance and testing processes to be able to detect when criti-
cal security processes temporarily fail.
5. Ignorance of the Law Excuses No Man
The organization not only desires that compliance is achieved, but it 
expects that the security department is recommending controls that 
satisfy the laws and regulations within the vertical industry in which 
it operates. The security department should keep abreast of the perti-
nent current laws and regulations as well as maintain an understand-
ing of what changes to the laws are emerging.
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6. Lightning Never Strikes Twice in the Same Place
Lightning never strikes twice in the same place. But, it strikes twice in 
the same area! In other words, fixing an item on one server in response 
to a specific audit issue and considering the issue closed is a recipe for 
disaster. The question should always be asked, “Have I addressed this 
particular vulnerability wherever the vulnerability may exist?” This 
includes identifying the current devices that could also have the same 
vulnerability, ensuring that the vulnerability is not reintroduced (e.g., 
reinstalling the vulnerability on a desktop/laptop initial image disk 
because the initial image disk was not upgraded), and providing for 
future testing of the vulnerability. Lightning will strike, just on a dif-
ferent device if we do not address the vulnerability for all devices. 
Likewise, if it is noticed that individuals are inadvertently responding 
to phishing e-mails, odds are that providing training solely to that set 
of users will not solve the problem for the organization.
7. Live and Learn
Learn from the security mistakes of other companies. Several of these 
incidents and the types of learning that may be achieved are high-
lighted in the chapter on security incidents. Failure to learn means 
that these will become repeatable. Repeating the mistakes takes valu-
able time away from other resources that could be used to automate 
more processes and reduce costs. Rather than waiting to experience 
the same issues that other companies have experienced the hard way, 
proactively being aware of current news events can cause the organi-
zation to implement controls to avoid the same issue at much less cost.
8. Look after Number 1
Each security organization should invest a fair amount of time in 
determining which information is the most important to project, or 
the number 1. No organization has unlimited resources and data clas-
sification can serve to identify the information that is important to 
the business, identify the location, and identify the correct ownership. 
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When determining the risk assessment, the value of the information 
to the enterprise should be considered.
9. Look before You Leap
Security technology needs to be evaluated for where it fits into the 
security architecture and the problem that it will solve. Researching 
external market intelligence companies, such as Gartner, Forrester, 
and Burton Group, can provide insights as to where these products are 
positioned and where they stand in relation to other similar products. 
The long-term costs need to be evaluated. For example, an identity 
management system may cost 60% of a competing product, however, 
it may require extensive customization to provide automation of the 
provisioning process, driving the subsequent cost to two to three times 
that of a competing product. This can cause the loss of credibility with 
management, as the project must be extended for multiple phases due 
to unforeseen customization.
10. Many Hands Make Light Work
The security department is a small but critical piece toward imple-
menting an effective security program. It is important to identify 
which skills are contained within information security and which 
skills are resident outside the department. For example, the corpo-
rate communications or marketing departments may have individu-
als who are skilled in putting together online training. This can ease 
the burden of the security department, as they can deliver the con-
tent desired and have the corporate communications department put 
together the packaging and tracking mechanisms to complete the 
training. Similarly, the internal audit department can provide exper-
tise and potentially staff to assist with the external audits. The help 
desk staff could be trained to reset passwords after lockout, or provide 
first-level security support. Individual security representatives could 
be established in each department to coordinate access requests or 
deliver answers to security questions that the team may have. Business 
managers could be selected as champions for the security efforts in the 
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different offices. In short, the security department can be much more 
effective by leveraging the capabilities and personnel within the rest 
of the organization.
11. Practice What You Preach
It is probably obvious that security departments are not above the law 
in the execution of daily tasks. However, what if the intentions are 
good but the results end up representing a violation of policy? For 
example, disabling or bypassing some of the security features to per-
form an internal penetration test or vulnerability assessment might 
produce the unintended consequences of opening the environment 
to viruses or internal and external exploits. Or, suppose an effort to 
review the strength of passwords across the organization involved the 
use of a password-cracking tool, revealing the actual passwords to 
login accounts? In this case, a control that was not to be shared and 
was to be kept secret by the company users was now revealed to the 
security team. Suppose those secrets revealed the passwords of execu-
tives and they were concerned that the security team or other infor-
mation technology individuals now had access to their personal data, 
such as salary information in the human resources system, or their 
e-mail messages. This could be very detrimental to the security leader’s 
job situation. The password vulnerability scan may also reveal that the 
executive had not lived up to his or her vocal support of the security 
program, and had not followed the rules by making an easy to guess 
password, such as password, spouses name, or favorite sports team.
To avoid this situation from happening, the security leader could 
discuss the proposed test in advance with the appropriate and respon-
sible executives and obtain their approval before proceeding. This pro-
tects the security leader by having obtained the support up front and 
would avoid embarrassment. It could be argued that the executives are 
also responsible for complying with the rules, just like everyone else. 
Although this is true, this is the where judgment must be exercised by 
asking the question, “What do I expect to gain out of this approach?” 
If the objective is to embarrass some key executives who are necessary 
to support the security program, then do not pursue approval from a 
higher executive first and also proceed while simultaneously preparing 
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the resume. If on the other hand, the objective is to strengthen the 
password controls within the entire organization, then soliciting 
the permission up front is a wiser move. Subsequent individual dis-
cussions with the executives failing to comply with the rule can then 
be held after a senior executive has authorized the testing.
12. Prevention Is Better Than Cure
When choosing between preventive, detective, or corrective controls, 
preventive controls intuitively win out. This is very logical; however, 
many organizations will spend enormous resources on detection tools 
or spend much time responding to audit findings with corrective 
action plans, and less on people, processes, or technology to stop the 
problem in the first place. For example, policies and training can 
be put in place to inform end users that they are not to access personal 
e-mail from work, as this may increase the potential for malware to 
enter the organization. Monitoring tools for website access can be 
monitored and reporting of violations can occur as a detective control 
and subsequently corrective procedure. Viewing this same issue from 
a preventive viewpoint, the e-mail site could simply be blocked for all 
company users, with the restriction lifted for those showing justifica-
tion for the need for using the site.
13. There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Cat
Not performing security according to best practices? Blasphemy! Lower 
the standards? Ridiculous! Well, not really. Many times there is a ten-
dency of security professionals, most of whom are very detail oriented, 
to want to dot every i and cross every t on every security control. After 
all, who doesn’t want to implement a best practice in their profession? 
The reality is that security controls need to incorporate the concept of 
risk, just as the business makes decisions about new product launches, 
services to be provided, and markets to go into based upon business 
risk. There are typically more potential business opportunities than a 
business can be engaged in at one time without losing focus and spread-
ing itself too thin. The same is true with security initiatives; these must 
be prioritized to support the business priorities versus being prioritized 
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to meet the implementation of a best practices model, assuming one 
did exist. Understanding the business context of the security control is 
essential to being able to appropriately prioritize the initiative.
One could proceed down the ISO 27001 path, the COBIT path, 
or any other framework, but at some point, if these initiatives did not 
involve the business areas in their development, this most likely will 
be met with resistance. This is especially true if the organization is 
not required to meet the regulation (i.e., as part of an International 
Organization for Standardization [ISO] certification).
The security department needs to be flexible and work within the 
confines of the business while providing the appropriate level of infor-
mation asset protection.
14. When In Rome, Do as the Romans Do
At the end of the day, the business executives own the decision as to 
how much risk should be accepted by the organization. The security 
leader has a responsibility to educate the senior executive on what 
“accepting the risk” means. This requires the security leader to trans-
late the risk into nontechnical, business terms, which communicate 
that the security area is not acting as a department with the paranoid 
switch being in the always-on position, but truly understands what 
the impact and probability of the threat will mean to the business.
If also the security leader has taken the time to explain the risk, and 
the business executive is willing to accept it, it may still be beneficial 
to reach this consensus across the business leaders. For example, the 
human resources business owner of an employee benefits application 
may be willing to accept the risk of lower authentication standards, 
but the chief financial officer (CFO) may have a different viewpoint 
of the exposure. However the risks are articulated, the security leader 
should have the business leader sign off on the results of the risk 
assessment related to the situation and formally provide the business 
justification and authorization to accept the risk. Amazingly, this pro-
cess tends to make individuals more accountable and less willing to 
accept the risk. Typically, the only risks that end up being accepted 
are those risks that would cause major business disruptions or would 
be too costly to mitigate.
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Security leader should not view this scenario as the ability to abdi-
cate the decision to the business leaders. The reality is that security 
leaders must act as if they own the decision and therefore would per-
form their due diligence to ensure that the decision has considered all 
the relevant variables to making the best decision. In the end, secu-
rity officers must then own the decision as well, and as new informa-
tion changes the risk profile of the decision, be diligent in ensuring 
that executives are informed to make a possible change in direction. 
Taking this approach promotes a business partnership between secu-
rity officers and executives and has the impact that the next time there 
is a significant issue, security officers are more likely to be seen as 
credible in communicating the risks and discerning which ones are 
more critical.
15. When the Cat’s Away, the Mice Will Play
Integrity is doing the right thing when no one is watching. Most indi-
viduals inside an organization will strive to do the right thing; others 
will do the right thing as long as someone’s back is not turned. This is 
why monitoring becomes important and reporting on accountability. 
If end users are habitually appearing on information security viola-
tion reports, then these need to be reported to management for train-
ing and corrective action. The individual managers need to be made 
accountable for their staff and have vested ownership in their success. 
For example, periodic recertification of the end users access engages 
managers to ensure that they know what information their staff needs. 
The managers provide the re-review of the access and attestation that 
the end users need the access. The managers need to be held respon-
sible for ensuring that their staffs are operating in a secure manner. 
Most end users are not malicious, but they may try to circumvent 
security controls when met with pressing deadlines or if they are in 
disagreement with the security procedures.
16. You Win Some, You Lose Some
Security controls establish barriers to entry and reduce the risk 
of loss due to disclosure, destruction or loss of information, or the 
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unavailability of information. By implementing the appropriate secu-
rity policies and procedures, and managing the governance of these 
implementations, the risk of loss should be minimal. However, the 
organization must be prepared to handle the losses that do occur, so 
that the subsequent financial impact is minimal. This requires appro-
priate logging and monitoring, establishment of computer incident 
response teams (CIRTs), redundant failover servers if high availabil-
ity is needed, backup and recovery capabilities (business continuity 
and disaster recovery planning), off-site processing, and so forth. In 
other words, effective security governance can greatly reduce the risk, 
but it cannot eliminate it. This message should also be communicated 
well before an incident occurs, so that the expectation is not that all 
of the security investments will completely eliminate the risk, no 
matter how effective the control may be. DNA testing, for example, 
is 99.99% accurate; however this assumes that the correct evidence 
chain of custody was managed throughout the process and documen-
tation was correct.
17. Bad News Travels Fast
When there is a security breach, the incident must be responded 
to very quickly. This sounds like saying “What goes up must come 
down.” The reality is that in many organizations, the security incident 
response procedures are outdated, individuals have changed positions, 
the reporting requirements are unknown, incidents are not clearly 
defined, or there has not been a major incident in a while, which 
ensures that the process is being followed and improved on a regular 
basis. Therefore, sometimes the security leader may be out of the loop 
in responding to the incident, as the technical staff handles it.
With the lack of documentation and training for incident response, 
it may be unclear who is actually in charge and responsible for ensur-
ing that the incident is followed up on appropriately. It is important 
the security leader and his department be viewed as being front and 
center with respect to the security issue. Sometimes the scope or the 
potential damage possible by an incident is not immediately known. 
For example, the loss of a hard drive, memory stick, or a laptop may 
be inconsequential to an organization if it does not contain financial 
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or protected health information (PHI). However, it may contain these 
items or the Social Security numbers useful to identity thieves or a 
business strategy that would be useful to a competitor. The security 
leader needs to be able to exercise good judgment early in the process 
to ascertain the potential impact to the business. There will be many 
times when the security leader will have to rely on the facts provided 
by the information technology staff, the security department, and the 
business users to determine the actions required.
The security leader needs to have excellent facilitation, oral com-
munication, and active listening skills to work through a security 
issue. The ability to remain calm, permit the technical analysis to 
occur without requesting updates so frequent that the technical staff 
cannot do the investigation, and the ability to know who within the 
organization is needed to resolve the problem are key determinants of 
how quickly and accurately the problem will be resolved.
The corporate communications department should have preestab-
lished procedures for interacting with the media after an incident. 
Individuals within the company should also be instructed o never talk 
with the media, as they could provide misleading information that is 
taken out of context. Consider the 2010 multiple recalls by Toyota to 
fix a problem with unintended acceleration of the vehicles. Toyota was 
not only criticized for withholding the initial knowledge that there 
was a problem, but also had to issue multiple recalls and issued pre-
mature statements that the problem was fixed. Security incidents need 
to be reported soon after the facts confirm that there is a suspected 
problem, followed by comments to the effect that the company takes 
the issue very seriously and is working to resolve the problem.
Final Thoughts
As we are in the final chapter of this book, it is only appropriate to 
repeat the definition of information security governance stated in the 
first chapter:
Information Security Governance is a subset of enterprise governance 
that provides strategic direction, ensures objectives are achieved, man-
ages risk appropriately, uses organizational resources responsibly, and 
monitors the success or failure of the information security programme.
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As we went through this journey together, building rock after rock, 
we explored what was required to build the information security strat-
egy, gain the support of the executives, understand the risks facing the 
organization, implement policies to govern the management inten-
tions, utilize control frameworks and standards to provide structure 
and a roadmap; implement controls to comply with laws and regula-
tions; audit the controls to ensure their constant effectiveness and suf-
ficiency; communicate with all levels of the organization to reinforce 
the security message; monitor the incidents of others to avoid making 
the same mistakes; and monitor the effectiveness through tracking, 
remediation, and reporting mechanisms. Each of the rocks that were 
added one by one in building the foundation for information security 
governance were built with a centrally managed information security 
management structure and supporting information security council 
with defined visions, missions, goals, and responsibilities.
Information security as a profession offers an ever-changing envi-
ronment, with new threats, technological advances, and consumers 
and business process owners demanding more access to information 
in more places. The governance concepts presented in this book will 
still be relevant for years to come, even though the specific technol-
ogy may change. Information security leadership, by management 
and technical security professionals, is necessary to stay current with 
the emerging business drivers. Technology is always changing and 
fades from our memory, such as removing perforated leader strips 
from  continuous-feed paper printouts, calculator watches, using a 
public phone booth, looking up numbers in a telephone book, watch-
ing VCRs or laser discs, using carbon copy paper, or going to an 
arcade to play video games (Raphael, 2009). While the technology 
may change, the functionality offered by the previous technology does 
not go away. We still watch movies, albeit via DVDs; we look up 
phone numbers on an online search engine or mobile phone applica-
tion; we still view documents in printed form, produced by higher 
speed laser or inkjet single-sheet feed printers or scanners. And with 
worldwide mobile users increasing from 500 mobile subscriptions to 
over 5 billion from the year 2000 to 2011, and Internet users increas-
ing sevenfold from 250 million to over 2 billion in the same time 
period (MercoPress, 2011), it is easy to see where the applications and 
need to have information at our fingertips are headed. Public phone 
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booths, busy signals, and long-distance charges for the most part are 
a thing of the past with a cell phone and Internet data plan in every 
pocket. We still communicate—enhanced by video webcams, phone 
cameras, texting, and voice-to-text conversions. As security profes-
sionals, we need to be able to secure the platforms, the communica-
tions between them, and protect the data at rest and in transit across 
whatever mechanism may be storing the information. As we venture 
into virtualization, cloud computing, smartphones, tablet computing, 
Web 2.0, continuous security monitoring, tackling advanced persis-
tent threats, or whatever the next security focus is for our organiza-
tion, the foundation that was built in the preceding chapters will be 
able to be leveraged to guide the appropriate solution, without having 
to radically change the underlying governance foundation. This is the 
true essence of building information security governance to meet the 
objectives of the organization.
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